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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VASUBANDHU

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF VASUBANDHU

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Wisconsin in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

BY

Le Manh That

Degree to be awarded: January 19_____ May 1974 August 19_____

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Major Professor

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Dean, Graduate School

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VASUBANDHU

BY

LE MANH THAT

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Buddhist Studies)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1974

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF

VASUBANDHU

Dedicated to the memory of the late

PROFESSOR RICHARD H. R O B I N S O N

苟來生之匪亡
捲生年以增惻

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PREFACE

The pages that follow will be dealing with Vasubandhu and his philosophy, a subject which is so laden with so much controversy and unsettling questions that even the identity of Vasubandhu himself is subject to doubt. Scholars generally agree, however, to consider him to be an idealistic philosopher and his philosophy an idealistic philosophy, according to which "consciousness is the sole reality outside which nothing exists". In fact, if we were to open any book on the subject of the history of Indian philosophy, we could readily find that Vasubandhu is indeed so characterized, mostly under the heading of Yagàcàra idealism. Our own research about him and his philosophy indicates the contrary, nonetheless. Not only is he not considering consciousness as the sole reality outside which nothing exists, but further he even denies the existence of the consciousness itself. Starting with his initial question as to whether the object of consciousness is indeed nothing but name, he reaches his final conclusion that consciousness is nothing but a mechanism by which informations are processed. Thus, as he himself says it, "consciousness absolutely does not exist in the way in which it verbally constructs itself and in the way in which it verbally constructs the object". In other words, consciousness absolutely does not exist in the way in which it processes the informations from itself and in the way in which it processes the informations from the objective world. Why? Because it is but an information-processing mechanism, no more no less. It follows then that in so describing, one can hardly consider Vasubandhu to be an idealist philosopher and his philosophy an idealistic philosophy.

Of course, it does not matter much whether Vasubandhu is an idealist philosopher and his philosophy an idealistic philosophy or not. What matters is the fact that when such view is held, his philosophy is not properly described and thus is not properly evaluated, especially when it is generally agreed that it plays a pivotal and decisive role in the history of Indian philosophy itself.

The present thesis represents, therefore, an attempt at describing his philosophy as we see it. We will not try to repeat here the sterile game of labelling it with some specific philosophical brandname. Instead, we will try to describe it as best as we can, as it appears to us. But how can we determine that we will describe it without any pre-conceived idea? When I first set out to write the present thesis several years ago, in the first draft of my introduction to it I listed the four following propositions as what I at that time called "the premises of Vasubandhu's system":

1. The concept of an object does not necessarily refer to the existence and the reality of that object. It may be a mere Russellian description.

2. The validity of any concept therefore consists of its "inseparable implication" (avinàbhàva), that is to say, the truth or falsity of any concept depends not upon its adequacy to the object, but on its consistency with other concepts. Otherwise stated, the ideality of a concept guarantees its formal validity.

3. To know is to conceptualize, hence knowledge does not necessarily

posit the existence or the non-existence of an object.

4. The conceptualization occurs in a process beginning with "the unconscious possession of body and situation" and terminating with the conceptual construction.

These four propositions are now proved, in our opinion, to be generally true, but nor totally satisfactory. For instance, although in the present study the theory of descriptions is still held to be one of the cornerstone of Vasubandhu's philosophy, nowhere is it described in relation to, or in terms of, "the concept of an object". Similarly, the term "conceptualization" is completely absent in the following pages. Despite these unsatisfactory descriptions, In think that they are still generally valid to some extent in giving us some idea as to what Vasubandhu's philosophy is. But what is particularly special about them is that after reading those four propositions my then academic adviser, the late Professor Richard H. Robinson, noted down a query on their margin, asking whether they are "yours views or V's", meaning whether they are my views or Vasubandhu's own views.

That query of his caused me to think and rethink a great deal about what I then thought and wrote about Vasubandhu. I questioned not only whether I have attributed my views to him, but further whether in presenting him I have tried to cloth him with modern terms and ideas. These concerns and questions of mine, which, as can be seen, stem directly from the above query by Professor Robinson, determine not a little the results that I now present in this dissertation. I presently believe that they can be readily resolved

if any statement of mine about him is documented with his words expressed in his own writings. Thus, we answer at the same time the question raised previously as to how one knows that one describes his philosophy without any preconceived idea.

Such a resolution, though generally reasonable if not outright simple, has its own limit, however, in that it prevents us from fully discussing the implications that Vasubandhu's various theories and notions have, as we formulate them. For instance, in Chapter One we formulate his notion of the absolute in a language very close to that which Beth uses to formulate Aristotles' principle of the absolute. Yet, we desist from talking about Vasubandhu's theory of science and of mathematics. Similarly, although we observe in Chapter Eight that there is a close causal relationship betwen his definition of consciousness as a verbal construction and the idea of freedom, we do not explicitly draw from it any ethical implication, despite that it is quite apparent upon reflection.

In dealing with a subject like Vasubandhu about whom so much has been written, it is just simply fair to point out at this outset that we owe a great deal to agreat many scholars, even to those whose opinions we strongly disagree with and severely criticize. For it is thanks to their painstaking labor in the thankless task of editing and elucidating what is still extant and reconstructing what is lost among his writings that makes it possible for a study such as ours to be composed. So to them all we express our warm thanks and deep appreciation. However, there are two scholars to whom it is our pleasant task to express our deep gratitude individually, because they

play such a central role in the present study that it can be said, were it not for them, this study could not have done. First, I wish to express my deep gratitude to Professor Miller who not only accepted me as one of his students, but further helped me in many ways which makes it possible for this thesis to be presented. And secondly, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the late Professor Robinson who guidance and help determine not a little the form that the present dissertation takes. But it is my misfortune that he did not live long enough to see it through. So, I respectfully dedicate it as a small tribute to his memory. Among my friends and acquantainces, I wish to express a special thanks and appreciation to Dr Stephan Anacker. Lastly, it is customary to say that if there is any error in this study, it is my own and I am fully responsible for it.

C H A P T E R O N E

P R O B L E M S O F V A S U B A N D H U'S P H I L O S O P H Y

To write about a philosophy is to ask questions about the problems it proposes to deal with. In the present case, we attempt a critical study of Vasubandhu's philosophy. It is quite natural, then, to ask: what are the problems that Vasubandhu occupies himself with in his philosophical writings? Answering this question will not only help orientating ourselves in the search for understanding of his thought, but also help us recognizing what his contributions might be to the history of world philosophy and what their implications are for us today.

To answer a question implies and presupposes, however, a certain way of answering it and as such, requires that the question must be answered in a certain way. To answer the question of what the problems of Vasubandhu's philosophy are, therefore implies and presupposes a certain way of answering it such that it may lead us towards a proper understanding and evaluation of his thought. But to say that we answer something in a certain way is also saying at the same time that we must limit ourselves in a certain way and look at it from a certain standpoint. Once such a situation has occurred, it is obvious that no matter how hard we might try to remove it, a limitation has already imposed itself upon us in regards to the possible range of our perception of the thing in question. For being in a certain way and looking at it from a certain standpoint, we not only determine our position, but further we accept that position as a sole means, at the time at least, to see how it could be properly perceived. In so doing, we might, of course, run the risk of suffering all the disadvantages that such an approach usually carries with it, due to its limitation of our view of the thing in

question. However, it might just as well, thanks to such a limitation, bring us at the same time closer to the thing itself and thus, allow us seeing precisely what constitutes the latter with the possible result that we will know it and understand it better.

This rather general statement is made here concerning our approach to the study of Vasubandhu's philosophy so as to differentiate the present study from the works that hitherto have been done on him. These works can be said to have followed a time-honored approach, according to which Vasubandhu is viewed as component of a system of thought and treated as such. Surely, such an approach is not without its merit. Its history can be traced far back at least to the time of Vasubandhu himself, when Sanghabhadra examines and criticizes point by point his first major writing, the Abhidharmakośa.[1] To Sanghabhadra, Vasubandhu must be judged not on the merit of his thought, but on the merit of his thought in the context of certain system which, in the case of the Abhidharmakośa, is the Vaibhāsika. This way of viewing him can, to some extent, be very helpful in that it contrasts his own contributions against the system as a whole, of which he is purported to be a part, and thereby clarifies the creative aspects of his thought. Indeed, by reading the criticisms made in the Nyāyānusāra by Sanghabhadra,[1] we may learn as much as half of all what is expressed in the Abhidharmakośa itself that is peculiar to Vasubandhu and his own.

But the danger of such an approach lies in the fact that it requires Vasubandhu to speak as a spokeman of a system and thus, leads to a situation where the system completely overwhelms him and immerses him entirely. We now know nothing about Vasubandhu anymore. What we know is the system as he

represents it. And it is here that lies the dangerous and damaging effect of the time-honored approach mentioned above. The thinker and his creative contributions are sacrificed for the sake of understanding the system which he is said to represent. We do not know why he chooses a certain problem and treats it the way he does. All is explained in terms of the requirements of the system. So, the individual need of each thinker is ignored. If Vasubandhu writes the Abhidharmakośa, the question is not what leads him to write it and why, but whether or not he is correct in presenting the system which he is said to present. Failing to ask the questions of the former sort and amphasizing the importance of those of the latter sort, the works that hitherto have been written on Vasubandhu can be said to be devoid of much of their value. In fact, it is possible to say today that almost no intelligible account of his philosophy has ever been attempted, although a large number of materials on him and about him have been accumulated by a good many scholars throughout the years. Here and there, one finds some fragmentary studies on one or a series of two or three of his works together, designated as Vasubandhu's philosophy and the like without any substance. And this situation occurs, not because he fails to attract and hold the attention of his fellow philosophers and researchers; on the contrary, it is the reverse.

Ever since Sanghabhadra opened his frontal attack upon the Abhidharmakośa, Vasubandhu's other works have undergone similar critical treatments. We have, for example, Dignāga's and Uddyotakara's examinations of his logical theories and formulations.[2] Then, we encounter Bhāvaviveka's criticisms against his

so-called theory of "three natures".[3] Further still, we witness the dispute betwen Dharmapàla and Sthiramati over his notion of self-knowledge.[4] And this is not to mention numerous commentaries, big and small, written on his equally numerous works, by his followers. Yet, despite these various critical studies, the result is rather disheartening. They end up in setting a line of inquiry according to which Vasubandhu's philosophy is presented either based exclusively upon the Abhidharmakośa or exclusively upon his other writings such as the Vimśatikà and the Trimśikà. As this line of inquiry is the result of many laboring generations of scholars, it bears down upon history rather heavily. In fact, it still serves almost universally as the main approach to Vasubandhu's thought. A cursory look through the list of books on him by modern researchers will be sufficient to convince anyone still in doubt of the truth of that statement.[5] Thus, it is no wonder that on the one hand we are told by some that he is the founder of the Kośa school of thought,[6] and on the other it is said that he is the "perfector" of the Vijñaptimàtratà system,[7] without ever knowing why he is so described differently. Worse still, the books written after the above-mentioned line of inquiry, although designating themselves as studies on Vasubandhu's thought, fail even to let us see what constitutes his ultimate philosophical concern. All we read is related to Vasubandhu a systematizer[8] or Vasubandhu "a perfector", and never Vasubandhu a man who has some wonders about the world and about himself and wishes to make some inquiries into them on his own. It is the Vasubandhu of the latter sort who will be able to present us

with some of his unsolved problems and therefore appeal to our sense of excitement which certainly would lead us towards more investigations of his philosophy and thus more understanding thereof as a result. In light of this observation, it can be said that the failure of the above time-honored approach is indeed complete and miserable.

It is due to the failure of that time-honored approach that we made the above general statment concerning our own approach to Vasubandhu's philosophy. Our approach is a genetic approach, which views his philosophical system as a development out of an initial philosophical concern. The aim of this thesis is to find out what that initial philosophical concern is and how it directs the development of Vasubandhu's philosophical system.

It has been said that "Vasubandhu lived too much, thought too much and wrote too much".[9] So, it is not an easy matter to state flatly at the beginning what his initial philosophical concern is. However, if one is familiar enough with his writings, one would not fail to be impressed by the constant recurrence of certain themes which arecharacteristically his. It is among these themes that his initial philosophical concern must be found if it can be found at all. The most prominent of these themes is the question of what the object of a consciousness is. This is the question that Vasubandhu poses in the Abhidharmakośa after a long discussion as to what precisely such terms as "past","future" etc.[10] are referring to. The Vaibhāsika thinks that there exist indeed such entities as past and future, for, they argue, if they

do not exist, then how can they be known at all? One cannot know something which is nothing, since the knowledge of nothing is equivalent to non-knowledge. This reasoning of the Vaibhàsika is, of course, not without its merit. It reminds us of a similar argument by Parmenides according to which "not from non-Being shall I allow you to say or think, for it is not possible to say or to think that which is not".[11] In fact, it is by relying upon that kind of reasoning that the Vaibhàsika assert the existence of such entities as past, future,[12] birth[13], etc...

To Vasubandhu, such an assertion seems almost bordering upon absurdity. Take, for instance, the notion 'thirteenth sense-field', which, the Vaibhàsika admit, absolutely does not exist. It, however, can be knowed and expressed, that is, it can be object of a consciousness. "Then, what is the object of consciousness corresponding to the notion 'thirteenth sense-field'? Is it nothing but a name? In that case, an object of consciousness can be nothing but a name, and the object which it refers to needs not exist".[14] Clearly, if something which is known to be absolutely non-existing is known as in the case of the notion of thirteenth sense-field just quoted, then there must exist some mechanism by which such non-existing object of consciousness can be known. One cannot simply deny that it cannot be known because it absolutely does not exist. For it is a fact that it is known and expressible. So, what is the mechanism by which that which absolutely does not exist is known? Vasubandhu's answer, as has been seen, is that it is known, because it is but a name, and the object it refers to needs not exist. As a result, the object of consciousness can be nothing but a name. But, how can one prove it to be so?

Take, for example, the notion 'birth'. The Vaibhàsika argue that the word 'birth' must stand for some object called 'birth'. Otherwise, it is impossible to explain such statements as "I know the birth of things". To know the birth of things is just like to see a daisy one happens to notice in a bush on the way home. The daisy is there, facing and beaming its information to him. Similarly, the birth must be out there, facing those who try to know it and giving them enough necessary informations so that their knowledge of it is possible. In short, to the Vaibhàsika the object of consciousness is on the same plane and plays the same role as the object of, say, visual perception. It is due to this theory of object of theirs that the above reasoning is advanced. For how can any one know something which absolutely does not exist? It is just as one attempts something which is not there to be seen. How can anyone see something which is not there to be seen, to begin with? We will see how Vasubandhu responds to these questions with his own theory of self-knowledge. Presently, we observe that he answers them with a counter-question of his own. He points out, for instance, that everybody knowswhat a thirteenth sense-field is. Yet, such a sense-field absolutely does not exist, as the Vaibhàsika themselves admit. It follows that that which absolutely does not exist can still be an object of consciousness. The object of consciousness in this case is hence nothing but a name. When it is so, then why must the object of consciousness be like that of the visual perception? There is no necessity to so assume. Thus, one can know the birth of things, without any need to assume that an object called birth must exist.

Further, Vasubandhu points out that in the statement "I know the birth of things", the word 'birth' itself can be removed and substituted for by some other words without having the statement distorted or destroyed. Thus one can say "I know things being born", where evidently the word 'birth' does not occur and is not required. Or better still, one can express "I know things existing which have not existed previously", in which even the last vestige of that word , i.e. the expression 'being born', is totally removed and fully substituted for.[15] Clearly then, by basing oneself upon the word 'birth' to postulate the existence of an entity called birth, one not only exposes oneself to such counter-questions as that advanced previously concerning the existence of the thirteenth sense-field, but further commits oneself to a shaky notion of name. We have seen that just by a stroke of the pen, Vasubandhu can easily remove the word 'birth' and replace it by some other of its equivalents without having the statement semantically altered. It follows that that word does not necessarily stand for any object, because it can be replaced by some of its equivalents, which cannot be taken in any way to be standing for an object at all. In short, such terms as birth etc... are nothing but incomplete symbols having the form "the so-and-so", because they can be removed and substituted for by some of their equivalent. In other words, for any constant term or proper name n, there is always a predicate N such that (ix)N(x), where the symbol (i...) indicates that the term in question is an incomplete symbol. Thus, every term is but a description.

$$n \cong (ix)N(x)$$

So, if the Vaibhāsika holds that any grammatically correct denoting phrase must stand for some object,[16] then Vasubandhu would respond that it needs not be so. For, for any singular constant term or proper name n, it is always possible to replace it by a predicate N which is true only of the object with which n is concerned and in which n does not occur nor is required, such that (ix)N(x). With this response, Vasubandhu now is able to show that the object of consciousness is indeed nothing but name. It is indeed nothing but name. For if it is otherwise, how can the the substitution for n be effectuated, as it is actually done? If the term 'birth' were to stand for an object called birth, then how can it be substituted and understood at the same time, as it actually occurs? Thus, by discovering that a term can be substituted for without losing what it is intended to say, Vasubandhu proves beyond any doubt that the object of consciousness is indeed nothing but name, and explains at the same time why an object can be talked about without ever knowing whether it exists or not. The theory of descriptions is hence formulated. It asserts that for any n there is always an eliminatable description N such that (ix)N(x). In other words, I can say, "I know the birth of something". But I can just as well say, "I know something being born". However, in so doing, I assume that the term 'birth' can be substituted for by the its equivalent expression 'being born'. The notion of equivalence is therefore playing a very important role in the theory of descriptions just formulated, because without it, it is impossible to know how the substitution can be done and is done correctly. We can say that it is one of the main postulates of Vasubandhu's philosophical

system from which many other results were to be derived.

One of these results is his theory of deductive logic. Nowadays, an inference in Indian logic is usually written in the form[17]

(2) $$(\forall x)(A(h,x) \rightarrow A(s,x)$$

where $A(y,x)$ indicates the relation of pervasion of the term y in x, h the property known (hetu), and s the property to be proved (sàdhya). But such a form can be written if and only if the relation of pervasion is assumed. This relation is never recognized before Vasubandhu advances his theory of the triple characteristic of h. So, Indian logic before his time is but a logic by analogy, that is, a logic in which the validity of a particular argument is judged by analogy by another particular known argument and thus is not subject to any general criterium of truth at all. However, when Vasubandhu writes his Tarkaśàstra, which might be composed during his student's days, he points out that for any inference to be valid, it must satisfy three following conditions:[18] (1) occurrence of h in the inferred only, (2) occurrence of h in similar instances only, and (3) non-occurrence in dissimilar instances of h only, which can be formulated as follows:

(3) $$(\forall x)(h(x) \rightarrow A(x,p))$$

(4) $$(\forall x)(h(x) \rightarrow (si(x,p) \vee s(x)))$$

(5) $$(\forall x)-(h(x) \rightarrow -s(x))$$

Now, it has been proved that these three conditions do yield (2)[19]. Hence, for the first time Indian logic is based upon a deductive theory, that is, a theory which will tells us why a certain argument is formulated the way it does and how it can be judged. It is due to this theory that the cumber-

some five-membered schemata set up and defended by the Naiyāyika is reduced not only to a three-membered one, but further even to a two-membered.

But if the deductive property of (2) is recognized through the triple characteristics of h, this does not mean that it is recognized accidentally. In fact, it is the reverse. We have seen that in attempting to disprove the notion that such terms as birth stand for some object, Vasubandhu has recourse to the theory of descriptions, saying that those terms can be substituted for by their equivalents. Thus, for any n it is always possible to replace it with an eliminatable predicate N such that (ix)N(x).

$$n \cong (ix)N(x)$$

However, in so formulating it, one must accept not only the notion of equivalence but also the notion of pervasion. That is to say, if we assert that the word 'birth' is equivalent to the expression 'something is existing which has not existed previously', then we must assert at the same time that birth implies something existing which has not existed previously. For if there is no such implication, the equivalence cannot be recognized. Thus, the expression $n \cong (ix)N(x)$ always implies that

(6) $$(\forall x)(\exists y)(f(x) \ \& \ (\forall x)(\forall y)(x = y)) \rightarrow g(y)))$$

And from (6), one can deduce easily (3), (4) and (5). As a result, we may say that Vasubandhu's theory of the triple characteristics of h is a consequence of his theory of descriptions, and his notion of pervasion which is so essential to the development of Indian logic into a deductive science is a direct descendent of his notion of equivalence.

Once the validity of an argument is formally judged upon its deductive pro-

perty, then where is the place of perception? This question is raised not only in response to the objections of those who are accustomed to the logic by analogy, which requires that what is unseen must be judged by what is already seen, but also in response to Vasubandhu' conception of the object of consciousness. We have seen that to him the object of consciousness is nothing but name. Now, if it is so, then where is the place of the object of perception? Obviously, it cannot be a name. To answer that question, Vasubandhu devotes an entire work of his to its examination. In the Abhidharmakośa, although some difficulties of the atomic theory of the object of perception are referred to[20], he is generally satisfied with the assertion that "perception is the best evidence".[21] However, when we begin reading the Viṃśatikā, an entirely new perspective is open. No more is perception accepted at its face-value. Even the criteria which usually characterize it are put into doubt. For instance, if we see something, we must see it at certain time in certain place, which other people may see and which is capable of producing some effect. Thus, if I see a daisy, I must see it this noon in my garden where my friends also see it, and if I touch it, I certainly will feel some sensation. In short, perception is an activity which occurs in space and time with some degree of universality and efficacy. Given these four criteria, which people used to determine a perception, Vasubandhu points out that all these four can be easily satisfied by a perception which occurs in a dream and which is therefore not a perception at all. In a dream we might see ourselves playing, for example, with a girl at certain time in certain place, which may lead finally to our noctural pollution.[22] Not only are these criteria proven to be insufficient, if not outright false, but further even

the object of perception cannot be defined. Everybody knows that things one sees are consisted of atoms and molucules. But atoms are imperceptible and have no part. So, one is left with the task of constructing a theory as to how things are seen the way they are, which up to Vasubandhu's time at least, is not at all satisfactory, as he repeatedly indicates in the Viṃśatikā.[23] It is due to his assail upon various theories of perception in this work that he is wrongly considered to be an idealist by many.[24] Such a conclusion is wrong, because what he does there is merely to prepare the way for his new definition of what perception is.

His new definition consists of rejecting the usual notion that perception must be defined in terms of its object. Rather, according to him it must be defined in terms of the language in which it is expressed, because "perception is a cognition arising just from the object by which it is designated". Thus, we can see that this new definition of perception is a result of the above assertion of his that "the object of cconsciousness is nothing but name". Although, it has been subject to severe criticisms by Dignāga to such a point that the latter even dares say that it is not of Vasubandhu himself.[25] In fact, such a view of perception is unique in the history of Indian, if not world, philosophy. For beside him, most agree that perception is inexpressible; it is an intimate experience free of verbal construction.[26] But if perception is defined in terms of the language in which it is expressed, that is, defined in terms of the informations which the object may disclose to a perceiver, then on the part of that perceiver a mechanism must be

assumed which is capble of processing it. This mechanism is described by Vasubandhu as follows: "the seed of its own from which what causes one to know arises as a self-knowledge of a thing when it arrives at the decisive point of its transformation, that seed on the one side, and the seed which arises as a self-knowledge of itself on the other, these are the two that the Blessed One called the eye-field and the thing-field, respectively".[27] In other words, when an object is perceived, it is its informations, its seeds, which cause one to know, and not the object itself. And the process of causing one to know operates as follows. First, the information is given through various means of sensory transmission, along which it is partly processed. When it reaches its final point of the processing, it appears as a knowledge concerning with the object in question. But while this processing is going on, it does so only with the accompanying presence of self-knowledge. What this means is that when an impression is thrown into our consciousness, not only are we aware of the said impression, but also we know that we aware of it. Otherwise stated, the processing consciousness is consisted of two operating mechanisms; one is intended for the processing of whatever information which it may lay its hands upon, and the other is for overseeing that whole processing operation. So, one cannot activate one mechanism without activating the other, and vice versa. They follow each other like a shadow.

This view of the mechanism of knowledge is interesting in many respects, but we will not presently detail all of them out here. Instead, we will

attempt to find out whether there is any connection betwen this view and Vasubandhu's theory of descriptions. Suppose that we have a statement of the sort "there are only two blue daisies", which can be written in the form

(7) $(\exists x)(\exists y)(f(x) \,\&\, h(x) \,\&\, f(y) \,\&\, h(y) \,\&\, x = y \,\&\, (\forall s)(f(s) \,\&\, h(s)) \rightarrow (s = x \vee s = y))$

where f stands for 'blue', h for 'daisy' and s for its 'seed'. Now, the statement as it is expressed in (7) can be understood in two different ways. One can understand it to mean that there is only one cognition of two distinct objects, that is, that there is only one cognition of two distinct daisies. If so, expressions of (7) can be cancelled to become

(8) $(\exists x)(\exists y)(\forall s)(x = y) \,\&\, (s = x \vee s = y)$

On the other hand, one can take it to mean that there is a cognition of some daisies, which happen to be consisted of only two units, then (7) can be rewritten into

(9) $(\exists x)(\exists y)(h(x) \;\&\; (\forall x)(\,y)(x = y) \rightarrow h(y))$

Now, comparing (9) with (6) above, one can easily see that (9) is nothing but another form of (6). Of course, formulas (8) and (9) carry with them two distinct concepts of number. But this needs not concern us here, although it might be quite instructive, if discussed, as to what precisely Vasubandhu's conception of number is. Suffice it to say that to him, number is also a sort of descriptions among others.[28]

When formula (9) is another form of (6), it is obvious that Vasubandhu attempts to relate his theory of the mechanism of knowledge with that of descriptions through means of the notion of "seed". The reason for this

attempt lies perhaps in his wondering about the multitude of descriptions and the uniqueness of cognition. In the above example, we have two distinct daisies. The informations which they beam to us must therefore be coming from both of them. What, then, allows us to have only one cognition of two daisies, and not two distinct cognitions of them? This question can be answered by pointing out that although the informations are coming from two distinct sources and thus allow us to be aware of them, they activate only one mechanism and thus give rise to only one cognition. The implication of this response is quite interesting, when we apply it to the problem of what kind of relationship exists betwen the perceiver and the object.

As has been seen, the perceiver is considered by Vasubandhu to be a processing mechanism of the informations which may reach him from his surroundings. The transformation of his consciousness is nothing but a verbal construction. So, the relation he has with his sources of informations is neither symmetrical, nor transitive, nor reflexive. It seems as if there is no relation at all in so far as it is of the kind just mentioned. Of course, he must have some relation so as to be able to function even as a mechanism. Yet, to the extent that he is aware of himself and the world, none of the kinds of relation listed above can be applied to him. His cognition of a certain object certainly does not have a symmetrical relation with that object. For how can such a cognition be compared with the object to begin with? And this is not to mention of their different sizes, shapes, if not substances and the like. Nor can it have a transitive one. This is

too obvious to require any explanation. Nor can it have a reflexive one. For it cannot be identical with the object which gives rise to it. One recalls here the humorous discussion of how Caitra possesses memory in order to find memory in the Abhidharmakośa.[29] Thus, without having any specific relation, cognition and hence consciousness do not exist in the way that things are supposed to exist, that is, to exist in dependence.[30] In fact, Vasubandhu once says, "the consciousness does not exist absolutely in the way in which it verbally constructs itself and in the way in which it verbally constructs the object".[31] To those who have the habit of viewing Vasubandhu as an idealist, they should recite the just-quoted statement of his three times before starting talking about him and his philosophy. What are the reasons, then, that cognition has no relation and that consciousness may not exist?

To answer that question, Vasubandhu advances his theory of triple natures. According to this theory, everything has a triple nature, i.e. it can be verbally constructed, it can be verbally constructed within certain conditions, and it is what it is. These three natures do not differ from each other, however. They "should be characterized as non-dual and imperceptible, because the first does not exist, the second does not exist in the way it does, and the third has as its own-nature the non-existence of the first".[32] And they are called the constructed nature, the relational nature and the absolute nature, respectively. For example, when I see a daisy, the daisy itself is the absolute nature, because it is what it is. It is capable at the same time, however, of supplying its own informations to me under a variety of conditions. This

is its relational nature. Besides, it is also capable of being verbally constructed by me to be whatever I want and wish; and this is its constructed nature. These three natures of my daisy, as Vasubandhu says, are, of course, non-dual and imperceptible, because there is just simply a daisy there, nothing more and nothing less. Everything is thus an absolute in the sense that it is what it is. It is due to this property of things that "the consciousness absolutely does not exist in the way in which it verbally constructs itself and in the way in which it verbally constructs the object". And that is also the reaon why no specific relation can be assigned to our cognition of things. In fact, we can show why when such a concept of absolute is advanced, no relation can be introduced.

Suppose there are entities x and y and let x have to y the relation R, then there is an entity r such that if for any entity a, a is distinct from r, then r has to a the relation R, but not the reverse.

(10) $(\exists x)(\exists y)R(x,y) \qquad (\exists r)(\forall a)(a \neq r \longrightarrow (R(r,a) \ \& \ -R(a,r)))$

By looking at (10) one can easily see that the relation expressed therein is obviously non-symmetrical and non-transitive. It is not reflexive, either, although it is a little bit harder to see. Thus, relation may be conceived without assigning to it any specific property at all. We have seen that both our knowledge and the object have certain relation to each other. Yet such a relation needs not be of any specific type. Perhaps, it may be called the absolute relation.

Thus, from what has been said, one can easily recognize that Vasubandhu's

philosophy does develop out of an initial philosophical concern, which centers around the question of what the object of consciousness is. It is owing to that concern that he proposes his theory of descriptions so as to be able to show that the object of consciousness is indeed nothing but name. Once, the answer to his philosophical concern is so formulated, the rest of his philosophy follows as a consequence. Thus, if the object of consciousness is nothing but name, then every action of it must be defined in terms of language. We have seen how he defines perception and determines the working mechanism of the consciousness itself. We have seen also how his theory of descriptions conditions the development of his logic. and how his logical theories, in turn, reinforces his definition of perception, which leads finally to his view of consciousness as nothing but a verbal processing mechanism.

In so describing Vasubandhu's philosophy, we are not, of course, unaware of various difficulties that he presents to the students of his thought. Even his identity is subject to doubt, leading eventually to numerous theories and suggestions concerning who he was and when he lived.[33] Furthermore, some of his works, particularly those belonging to the field of logic, are now lost or extant only in a few fragments. Besides, what is left of his writings now amounts to a great sum without any definite order with respect to their chronology. This last problem poses a rather serious threat to the approach we use here, because being genetic, it must be capable of determining not only the logical development of his system, but also its chronological order as well.

Taken all those problems together, the plan of the present study is as follows. In Chapter Two we will examine the problem of Vasubandhu's life and his works in an attempt to determine his date and to give a comprehensive list of all the writings, lost or still extant, known to be authored by him, which up to now has not been done. In Chapter Three we will discuss his theory of descriptions. Chapter Four will deal with various logical results that his theory of descriptions brings about. Chapters Five and Six study his new definition of perception and its consequences. Chapter Seven describes his view of what consciousness is. The final chapter contains some of our own observations about his philosophy and its general implications.

N O T E S

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8. Frauwallner, Vasubandhu's Vàdavidhih, WZKSOA I (1957) 133; Cf. Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956, p 365.

9. Lamotte, Introduction au Karmasiddhiprakarana, MCB IV (1935/1936) 178.

10. Abhidharmakośa V ad 27a-b: kim kàtritrasyàpy anyad asti kàritram/ atha tan naivàtìtam nàpy anàgatam na pratyutpannam asti ca/ tenàsamskrtatvàn nityam atìti/ àto na vaktavyam yadà k(à)ritram na karoti dharmas tadà'nàgata iti/ syàd esa dosa yadi dharmàt kàritram anyat syàt/ tat tu khalu

nànyat

ato na bhavaty esa dosah/ evam tarhi sa eva

adhvàyogah

yadi dharma eva kàritram kasmàt sa eva dharmas tenaivàtmanà vidyamànah kadàcid atìta ity ucyate kadàcid anàgata ity adhvanàm vyavasthà na siddhyati/ kim atra na sidhyati/ yo hy ajàto dharmah so'nàgatah/ yo jàto bhavati na ca vinastah sa varttamànam dravyato'sti tathà'tìtam anàgatam càsti/

11. Parmenides, ed. Tarán, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, fragment 8: οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν: οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. Cf. fragment 2: ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, Πειθοῦς ἐστὶ κέλευθος. (Ἀληθείῃ γὰρ ἕπηται), ἡ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεὼν ἐστὶ μὴ εἶναι, τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐὸν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν) οὔτε φράσαις.

12. Abhidharmakośa, V ad 27c: athàlambanamàtram dharmà bhavanti/ atìtànàgatam apy àlambanam bhavatìti brùmah/ yadi nàsti katham àlambanam/ atredànìm brùmah/ yadà tadàlambanam tathàsti tadàlambanam abhùt bhavisyati ceti/ na hi kaścid

atìtam rùpam vedanàm và smarann..astìti paśyati/ kim tarhi/ abhùd iti/ yathà khalv api varttamànam rùpam anubhùtam tathà tad atìtam smaryate/ yathà cànàgatam vartamànam bhavisyati tathà buddhyà grhyate/ yadi ca tat tathaivàsti vartamànam pràpnoti/ atha nàsti/ asad apy alambanam bhavatìti siddham/

13. Abhidharmakośa II ad 46b: yat tarhi sùtra uktam samskrtasyotpàdo'pi prajñàyate vyayo'pi sthityanyathàtvam apìti/ granthajño devànàm priyo na tv arthajñah/ arthaś ca pratiśaranam uktam bhagavatà/ kah punar asyàrthah/ avidyàndhà hi bàlàh samskàrapravàham àtmat àtmìyataś càdhimuktà abhisvajante/ tasya mithyàdhimoksasya vyàvarttanàrtham bhagavàms tasya samskàrapravàhasya samskrtatvam pratìtyasamutpannatàm dyotayitukàm idam àha trìnìmàni samskrtasya samskrtalaksanàni/ na tu laksanasya/ na hi laksanasyotpàdàdayah prajñàyante/ na càprajñàyamànà ete laksanam bhavitum arhanti/ ata evàtra sùtre samskrtasyotpàdo'pi prajñàyata ity uktam/ punah samskrtagrahanam samskrtatve laksanànìti yathà vijñàyeta/ maivam vijñàyi samskrtasya vastuno'stitve laksanàni jalavalàkavat sàdhvasàdhutve và kanyàlaksanavad iti/

14. Abhidharmakośa II ad 27c: yady asad apy àlambanam syàt trayodaśam apy àyatanam syàt/ atha trayodaśam àyatanam nàstìty asya vijñànasya kim àlambanam/ etad eva nàmàlambanam/ evam tarhi nàma eva nàstìti pratìyeta/

15. Abhidharmakośa II ad 46c-d: tasmàt prajñaptimàtram evaitad abhùtvà bhàvajñàpanàrtham kriyate jàtam iti/ sa càbhùtvà bhàvalaksana utpàdo bahuvikalpah/ tasya viśesàrtham rùpasyotpàda iti sasthìm kurvanti yathà rùpasamjñaka evotpàdah pratìyeta mà'nyah pratyàyìti/ tadyathà candanasya gandhàdayah śilàputrakasya śarìram iti/ evam sthityàdayo'pi yathàyogam veditavyàh/

16. The expression "any grammatically correct denoting phrase" is borrowed from Russell, On denoting, Mind XIV (1905) 479-493 so as to convey correctly the Vaibhàsika view of what a word is. Cf. Abhidharmakośa II ad 47a-b: tatra samjñàkaranam nàma/ tadyathà rùpam śabda ity evam àdih/. Also Abhidharmadìpa kàrikà 144: svarùpam vedayamś cchabdo vyañjanàdìni ca dhruvam/ arthapratyàyakah pràjñair bhaktikalpanayocyate//.

17. Staal, Contraposition in Indian logic, Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, ed. E. Nagel et al, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, p 634.

18. Tarkaśàstra, Taishô 1633 p 30c20-21: 我立因三種相、是根本法、同類所攝、異類相離 . Cf. Tucci, Pre-Dinnàga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese sources, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929, p 13: asmàbhis trilaksano hetuh sthàpitah/ tadyathà paksadharmah sapaksasattvam vipaksavyàvrttiś ca/; Ui, Der Ursprung der Trairùpyalinga Theorie in der indischen Logik, Commemoration Volume of The 25th Anniversary of the foundation of the Professorship of Science of Religion in Tôkyô Imperial University, Tokyo, 1934, pp 343-345; Ui, Bukkyô ronrigaku, Tokyo: Tatô shuppan, 1933, pp 235-250.

19. Staal, Contraposition in Indian logic, pp 634-638; Berg, The Journal of Symbolic Logic XXXV (1970) 573-574.

20. Abhidharmakośa I ad 20a-b: tasmàd ràśivad eva skandhàh prajñaptisantah/ rùpìny api tarhy àyatanàni prajñaptisanti pràpnuvanti/ bahùnàm caksuràdiparamànùnàm àyadvàrabhàvàt/ na/ ekaśah samagrànàm kàranabhàvàt visayasahakàritratvàd và nendriyam prthag àyatanam syàt/. Cf. Abhidharmakośa I ad 44a-b: kim punar ebhiś caksuràdibhir àtmaparimànatulyasyàrthasya grahanam bhavaty àśuvrttyà ca parvatàdìnàm alàtacakràdivad àhosvit tulyàtulyasya/ yàni tàvad etàni pràptavisayàny uktàny ebhih tribhir ghrànàdibhis tulyavisayagrahanam matam/ yàvanto hìndriyaparamànavas tàvanto hi visayaparamànavah samety vijñànam janayanti/ caksuhśrotràbhyàm tv aniyamah/ kadàcid alpìyàmso yadà vàlàgram paśyati/ kadàcit samà yadà dràksàphalam paśyati/ kadàcit bhùyàmso yadà mahàntam parvatam paśyaty unmisitamàtrena/ evam śrotrena maśakameghàdiśabdaśravane ghosam/ manas tv amùrttivad eveti nàsya parimànaparicchedah sampradhàryate/ katham punar esàm caksuràdìndriyaparamànùnàm samniveśah/ caksurindriyaparamànavas tàvad aksitàrakàyàm ajàjìpuspavad avasthitàh/ acchacarmàvacchàditàs tu na vikìryante/ adharauttaryena pindavad avasthità ity apare/ na cànyonyam àvrnvanti sphatikavad acchatvàt/ śrotrendriyaparamànavo bhùrjàbhyantaràvasthitàh/ ghrànendriyaparamànavo ghatàbhyantarena śalàkàvat/ àdyàni trìnìndriyàni màlàvad avasthitàni/....

21. Abhidharmakośa IV ad 2d: na ca drstàd garistham pramànam astìti/. Cf. Vimśatikà ad 16a: sarvesàm ca pramànànàm pratyaksam pramànam garistham ity....

22. Vimśatikà ad 3a-4a: deśàdi niyamah siddhah svapnavat svapna iva svapnavat/ katham tàvat/ svapne vinàpy arthena kvacid eva deśe kimcid

bhramarārāmastrīpurusādikan drśyate na sarvatra/ tatreva ca deśe kadācid drśyate na sarvakālam iti siddho vināpy arthena deśakālaniyamah/

pretavat punah/

santānaniyamah

siddha iti vartate pretānām iva pretavat katham siddhah samam/

sarvaih pūyanadyādidarśane//

pūyapūrnānadī pūyanadī ghrtaghatavat/ tulyakarmavipākāvasthā hi pretāh sarve'pi pūyapūrno nadīm paśyanti naika eva/ yathā pūyapūrnā mevam mūtrapurīsādi pūrnā dandāsidharaiś ca purusair adhisthitām ity-ādi grahanena/ evam samtānāniyamo vijñaptīnām asaty apy arthe siddhah/

svapnopaghātavat krtyakriyā

siddheti veditavyam/ yathā svapne dvayasamāpattim antarena śukravisargalaksanah svapnopaghātah/ evam tāvad anyānyair drstāntair deśakālaniyamādicatustayam siddham/

23. Vimśatikā ad 11-15:

na tad ekam na cānekam visayah paramānuśah/
na ca te samhatā yasmāt paramānur na sidhyati//
sadkena yugapad yogāt paramānoh sadamśatā/
sannām samāna deśatvāt pindah syād anumātrakah//
paramānor asamyoge tatsamghāte'sti kasya sah/
na cānavayavatvena tatsamyogo na sidhyati//
digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvam na yujyate/
chāyāvrtī katham vānyo na pindaś cen na tasya te//
ekatve na kramenetir yugapan na grahāgrahau/
vicchinnāneka vrttiś ca sūksānīksā ca no bhavet//

Cf. Abhidharmakośa I ad 43d: ghrānam katham prāptavisayam/ nirucchvāsasya gandhāgrahanāt/ keyam prāptir nāma/ nirantarotpattih/ kim punah paramānavah sprśanty anyonyam āhosvin na/ na sprśantīti kāśmīrakah/ kim kāranam/ yadi tāvat sarvātmanā sprśeyur miśrībhaveyur dravyāni/ athaikadeśena sāvayavāh prasajyeran/ niravayavāś ca paramānavah/ katham tarhi śabdābhinispattir bhavati/ ata eva yadi hi sprśeyur hasto hasto'bhyāhatah sajyetopalaś copale/ katham citam pratyāhatam na viśīryate/ vāyudhātusamdhāritatvāt/...../ na sprśanti nirantare tu sprstasamjñeti bhadantah/ bhadantamatam caistavyam/ anyathā hi sāntarānam paramānūnām śūnyesv antaresu gathakena pratibādhyeta/

yatah sapratidhPa isyante/ na ca paramànubhyo'nye samghàtà iti/ ta eva te samghàtah sprśyante yathà rùpyante/ yadi ca digbhàgabhedah kalpyate sprstasyàsprstasya và sàvayavatvaprasangah/ nocet sprstasyàpi aprasangah//.

24. Lévi, Matériaux pour l'étude du système vijñaptimàtra, Paris: H. Champion, 1932, pp 7-14; Das Gupta, Philosophy of Vasubandhu in Vimśatikà and Trimśikà, IHQ IV (1928) 36-43; Stcherbatsky, Die drei Richtungen in der Philosophie des Buddhismus, Rocznik Orjentalistyczny X (1929) 1-37; Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956, pp 350-365; Hacker, Vivarta, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur im Mainz: Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 1953; p 219; Ruegg, Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne, Paris: E. de Boccard, 1959; pp 83-93; Chatterjee, The Yogàcàra Idealism, Varanasi: Banares Hindu University, 1962.

25. Vàdavidhi, Fragment 9: don de las rnam par śes pa mṅon sum źes pa/ yul gaṅ gis rnam par śes pa tha sñad bya ba de kho na las gal te de de skye źiṅ gźan las ma yin la/ de las gźan las kyaṅ ma yin pahi śes pa de mṅon sum ste/ dper na gzugs la sogs pahi śes pa daṅ bde ba la sogs pahi śes pa bźin źes paho// hdis ni hkhrul pahi śes pa bsal te/ dper na ña phyis la rdul gyi śes pa lta buho// de ni dṅul gyis dṅul gyi śes paho źes tha sñad byed la de dṅul las skye ba yaṅ (ma) yin gyi/ ña phyis kho nas de bskyed par bya baho// kun rdzob pahi śes pa yaṅ hdis gsal te/ de ltar ni bum pahi śes pa (bum pahi śes pa) źes pa hdi ltar de bum pa la sogs pa rnams kyis tha sñad bya źiṅ/ de de rnams las hbyuṅ ba ni ma yin te/ de rnams ni kun rdzob tu yod pa ñid kyis rgyu ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir ro// gzugs la sogs pa de ltar yaṅ dag par źen pa rnams kho na las de hbyuṅ ṅo// rjes su dpag pahi śes pa yaṅ hdi kho nas bsal te/ du bahi śes pa daṅ hbrel pa dran pa dag las kyaṅ de byuṅ gi me kho na las ma yin pas so// de las hbyuṅ ba kho na ste/ mi hbyuṅ ba ni ma yin no źes pa hdi yaṅ hdir don du mṅon par hdod do//. Cf. Dignàga, Pràmànasamuccaya I p 16a5-6, ed. Hattori, Dignàga, On Perception, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp 186-187: dehi rjes la gźan gyis byas pahi mṅon sum brtag par bya ste/

rtsod sgrub slob dpon gyi ma yin/ ṅes par sñin po med par dgons/
gźan du cha śas su gsuṅ hgyur/ des na kho bos brtag par byaho//

rtsod pa sgrub pa ni slob dpon dbyig gñen gyi ma yin no/ gaṅ gi phyir rtsod pa sgrub pa de la ni slob dpon gyis sñin po med par dgons pa ste/ de lta ma yin

na cha śas can du mdsad par hgyur ro/ de na kho bos kyaṅ tshad ma la sogs pa cun zad cig brtag par byaho//

26. Abhidharmavijñānakāyapādaśāstra, Taishō 1539 p 559b27-c28: 有六識身。謂眼識乃至意識。眼識但了別青色不能了別此是青色。是青識。能了別青色。乃至意識了別其名。不能了別此是青色。若能了別其名。爾時不能了別青色。亦能了別此是青色。如青色。黃赤白等色亦爾...

Cf. Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya I p 14b 2-4: chos mṅon pa las kyaṅ/ mig gi rnam par śes pa daṅ ldan pa sṅon po śes kyi sṅon poho sñam du ni ma yin no/ don la don du hdu śes kyi don la chos su hdu śes pa ni ma yin no źes gsuṅs so// gal te de gcig tu mi rtog na rnam par śes pa lṅa po de hdus pa la dmigs pa ji ltar yin/ gaṅ yaṅ skye mched kyi raṅ gi mtshan ñid la so so raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can yin gyi/ rdsas kyi ran gi mtshan ñid la ni ma yin no źes kyaṅ ji ltar gsuṅs śe na/

der don du mas bskyed paḥi phyir/ raṅ don spyi yo spyod yul can//

de rdsas du mas bskyed par bya baḥi phyir na raṅ gi skye mched la spyiḥi spyod yul can źes brjod kyi/ tha dad pa la tha mi dad par rtogs pa las ni ma yin no//

27. Viṃśatikā ad 9: yatah svabījād vijñaptir yadābhāsā pravartate/
dvividhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravīt//

kim uktam bhavati/ rūpapratibhāsā vijñaptir yatah svabījāt parināmaviśesaprāptād utpadyate tac ca bījam yatpratibhāsā ca sā te tasyā vijñapteś caksūrūpāyatanatvena yathākramam bhagavān abravīt/ evam yāvat sprstavyapratibhāsā vijñaptir yatah svabījāt parināmaviśesaprāptād utpadyate/ tac ca bījam yatpratibhāsā ca sā te tasyā kāyasprastavyāyatanatvena yathākramam bhagavān abravīd ity ayam abhiprāyah//

28. Abhidharmakośa II ad 46d: tena tarhy anātmatvam apy estavyam anātmabuddhisiddhyartham/ samkhyāparimānaprthaktvasamyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasattādayo'pi tīrthakāraparikalpitā abhyupagantavyā ekadvimahādanuprthaksamyuktaviyuktaparāparasadādibuddhisiddhyartham/

29. Abhidharmakośa IX, ed. Pradhan, Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967, p 472-473: asaty ātmani ka eva smarati/ smaratīti ko'rthah/ smrtyā visayam grhnāti/ kim tadgrahanam anyat smaranāt/ smrtim tarhi kah karoti/ uktah sa yas tām karoti smrtihetucittaviśesah/ yat tarhi caitrah smaratīty ucyate/ tato hi caitrākhyāt samtānāt tām bhavantām drstvocyate caitrah smaratīti/ asaty ātmani

kasyeyam smrtih/ kim arthaisà sasthì/ svàmyarthà/ yathà kasya kah svàmì/ yathà goś caitrah/ katham asau tasyàh svàmì/ tadadhìno hi tasyà vàhadohàdisu viniyogah kva ca punah smrtir viniyoktavyà ya evam tasyàh svàmì mrgyate/ smartavye'rthe/ kim artham viniyoktavyà/ smaranàrtham/ aho sùktàni sukhaidhitànàm/ saiva hi nàma tad artham viniyoktavyeti/ katham ca viniyoktavyà/ utpàdanata àhosvit sampreśanatah/ smrtigatyayogàd utpàdanatah/ hetur va tarhi svàmì pràpnoti phalam eva ca svam/ yasmàd dhetor adhipatyam phale phalena ca tadvàn hetur iti/ yo hy eva hetuh smrtes tasyaivàsau/ yaś'càpi sa caitràbhidhànah samskàrasamùhasantàna ekato grhìtvà gàvàkhyasvàmìty ucyate sa càpi tasya deśàntaravikàrotpattau kàranabhàram cetasi krtvà na tu khalu kaścid ekaś caitro nàmàsti na càpi gauh/ tasmàt tatràpi na hetubhàvam vyatìty asti svàmibhàvah/ evam ko vijànatìti kasya vijñànam ity evam àdisu vaktavyesu/ tasya hetur indriyàrtham anaskàrà yathàyogam ity esa viśesah//.

30. Pratìtyasamutpàdavyàkhyà TT 5496. Cf. Tucci, A fragment from the Pratìtyasamutpàda of Vasubandhu, JRAS (1930) 611-623.

31. Trisvabhàvanirdeśa ad 5, ed. de la Vallée Poussin, MCB II (1933) 154-157:

asatkalpo'tra kaś cittam yatas tat kalpyate yathà/
yathà ca kalpayaty artham tathàtyantam na vidyate//

32. Trisvabhàvanirdeśa ad 18-30:

asaddvayasvabhàvatvàt tadabhàvasvabhàvatah/
svabhàvàt kalpitàj jñeyo nispanno'bhinnalaksanah//
advayatvasvabhàvatvàd dvayàbhàvasvabhàvatah/
nispannàt kalpitaś caiva vijñeyo'bhinnalaksanah//
yathàkhyànam asadbhàvàt tathàsattvasvabhàvatah/
svabhàvàt paratantràkhyàn nispanno'bhinnalaksanah//
asaddvayasvabhàvatvàd yathàkhyànàsvabhàvatah/
nispannàt paratantro'pi vijñeyo'bhinnalaksanah//....
trayo'py ète svabhàvà hi advayàlabhyalaksanàh/
abhàvàd atathàbhàvàt tadabhàvasvabhàvatah//....

33. Frauwallner, On the date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu, Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1951; Wayman, Analysis of the Śravakabhùmi manuscript, Berkeley: The University of California, 1961.

C H A P T E R T W O

V A S U B A N D H U A N D H I S W O R K S

Ever since Wassiliew tried to determine his date more than a century ago,[1] the problem of when Vasubandhu lived never ceased to be controversial, and numerous attempts have been made subsequently to settle it without any definite result. By the time Péri undertook his major study to find for it a solution with his thourough investigation of the data available at his time,[2] it seems for a while as if he was able to resolve it to everybody's satisfaction. But to the sorrow of the students of Vasubandhu's thought, Péri's solution was not as completely satisfactory as it was originally believed. In fact, it was so unsatisfactory to such a point that it called for a radical resolution in the form of two-Vasubandhus hypothesis advanced by Frauwallner.[3] Thus, we now face with not only the question of when Vasubandhu lived, but also with the problem of how many Vasubandhus there were in the history of Indian philosophy.

The cause of this perplex situation is not hard to find. Already Péri has recognized that according to Chinese historical data there are at least three different dates in which Vasubandhu might have been born: he might have been born at 900 years after the Buddha's Nirvàna, or at 1000 A.N. or at 1100 A. N. Péri further observed that these dates were subject to intensive investigation by various disciples of Hsüan Tsang without any settling result. He, in turn, attempted to resolve them with his theory, though not successfully. But the greatest of all his failures lies, however,

in his assumption that the dates 900 A. N. and 1100 A. N. were given to the same man by the same informant. So, now not only do we have to explain why there are two dates for the same man, but also why they are given by the same informant. Truly, misfortune never occurs alone. The just-mentioned assumption by Péri is his greatest failure of all, because it lays the foundation on which all other subsequent mistakes were to arise, leading finally to the two-Vasubandhus hypothesis proposed by Frauwallner.

It can be said that Frauwallner's whole hypothesis rests squarely upon the assumption that Paramàrtha did give two different dates to the man or men bearing the name Vasubandhu. One quick examination of all the translations and all the works still extant under Paramàrtha's name does not yield, however, any information which allows us to say or assume that he gave two different dates to Vasubandhu. On the contrary, all we learn is that according to him Vasubandhu was born 900 years after the Buddha's Nirvàna, that is, he gave one specific date to Vasubandhu, and not two. If so, then where did the assumption that Paramàrtha gave two different dates to Vasubandhu originate? The answer to this question is now quite apparent. It originated with Péri. It was Péri who, for the first time, pointed out a passage in Hui Chao's Ch'êng wei shih lun liao i têng 慧昭成唯識論了燈義 which reads as follows:

> 淮天親菩薩傳說云佛滅度一千一百年有外道頻闍訶婆娑頻闍訶是山名婆娑是住以此外道住此山中因即號名。
>
> "According to T'ien ts'in p'u tsa chüan, it is related that one thousand and one hundred years more after the Buddha's Nirvàna there was a heretic named Vindhyavàsin. Vindhya is the name of a mountain; vàsin means staying. Because that heretic was staying in that mountain, he was, thus, so named".[4]

and concluded that "À la date près, c'est presque littéralement le texte de Paramàrtha, que nous connaissons".[5] Thus, according to Péri, Hui Chao has copied his above passage out from the biography of Vasubandhu written or translated by Paramàrtha. Unfortunately however, this conclusion of his seems to be premature, because (1) informations concerning dates and chronology cited in Hui Chao's writings are mostly rather unreliable, (2) the title of the biography cited by Hui Chao is not the same with that written or translated by Paramàrtha, and (3) at Hui Chao's time it is known that there were at least more than one biography of Vasubandhu which were in circulation. On account of the important role played by Péri's assumption that Pàramàrtha did give two different dates to Vasubandhu, in subsequent writings of others, particularly that of Frauwallner, those three reasons just listed must be examined closely.

About the first reason that the dates and chronology given by Hui Chao's writings are mostly not reliable, it can be easily substantiated by pointing out, for example, his statement that "Nàgàrjuna was born 200 years after the Buddha's Nirvàna",[6] which, by any standard and interpretation, is totally unacceptable. So, whenever Chao gives us any date, we must take it with a grain of salt, if not with outright suspicion. The same goes for the case we are concerned with here. Chao says, "according to <u>T'ien ts'in p'u tsa</u> chüan it is related that one thousand and one hundred years more after the Buddha's Nirvàna, there was a heretic named Vindhyavàsin...". Now, the date given here to Vindhyavàsin might have been quoted directly by Chao from the <u>Tien ts'in p'u tsa chüan</u>. Or it might just as well, have been quoted from hearsays or from some manuscript emended and/or corrected by some previous

hands. Assuming for a moment that the first alternative is true, it still does not allow Péri to conclude that the just mentioned passage is "almost literally Paramàrtha's text that we now know", because the title of the document cited by Chao is not the same as that which is written or translated by Paramàrtha.

As has been seen, the title quoted by Chao is T'ien ts'in p'u tsa chüan, while the biography of Vasubandhu written or translated by Paramàrtha is called P'o su p'an tu fa shih chüan 婆藪盤豆法師傳.[8] It is quite clear then that they are not identical in any way, form or shape. Péri claimed that the quotation from T'ien ts'in p'u tsa chüan by Hui Chao is "almost literally Paramàrtha's text that we now know". He did so, apparently with a further reason that the language of the two texts is quite similar. But again, the similarity of language in different works by different authors on the same subject such as history or biography is not unknown in Chinese writings, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Examples for the first kind can be easily found in the comparison of the extant portion of Pao Ch'ang's Lives of Famous Monks with its corresponding part of Hui Chiao's Lives of Emminent Monks.[8] As for the examples for the second kind, all one needs is to read the various standard History of the Late Han Dynasty, i.e. the T'ung k'uan Han Chi 東觀漢記, the Hsü Han Chi 後漢記 and the Hsü Han Shu 後漢書. Thus, the similarity in language betwen two works cannot be used at all as a criterium for identifying them as having been authored by the same man, especially when they have different titles as in the case we are facing presently.

Furthermore, subsequent to the passage quoted above, after saying that the heretic Vindhyavàsin lived 1100 A.N. and wrote his Ch'in chi che lun 塵七十論

which led Vasubandhu into composing his own Ch'in chi che lun 金七十論 as a rebuttal, Hui Chao added the following:

> "But Chüan said that one thousand and one hundred years after the Buddha's Nirvàna, the heretic was born and wrote Chi che lun, and that when Vasubandhu was born, the heretic was already died. Thus, it follows that Vasubandhu was also born one thousand and one hundred years more after the Buddha's Nirvàna. But this seems to be wrong. Why? Because the Tripitakàcàrya Paramàrtha in his Commentary Upon The Madhyàntavibhàga said that Vasubandhu was born nine hundred years after the Buddha's Nirvàna. The heretic, therefore, must also have been born before nine hundred years after the Buddha's Nirvàna".

Clearly, Chao not only did not say that Paramàrtha gives the date 1100 A.N. to Vasubandhu, but further cited him as an authority to refute that date as wrong. So, in so far as Paramàrtha is explicitly quoted, there is no question as to what date he explicitly gives to Vasubandhu. The crux of the whole problem of whether he did give two dates to Vasubandhu, lies therefore in the question of whether the title "T'ien ts'in p'u tsa chüan" quoted by Chao can be identified with the P'o su p'an tu fa shih chüan written or translated by Paramàrtha. We have seen that Péri considered them to be identical. However, such an identification is not possible, not only because the similarity in language would not and could not warrant, as has been said, but also because there were more than one biography of Vasubandhu in circulation at Chao's time. Suppose that there was only one biography of Vasubandhu in circulation at his time, then if there were two different titles cited by two different authors, one could reasonably assume that they were one and the same. But in the present case, we know for certain that there were more than one biography of Vasubandhu in circ-

in circulation at Chao's time

ulation at Chao's time; so it is quite imprudent to assume flatly that what Chao quoted under the title T'ien ts'in p'u tsa chüan does automatically come from the P'o su p'an tu fa shih chüan by Paramàrtha, because he might as well quote it from some other sources. The similarity in language has been shown previously to be not even a proof, let alone a decisive proof at that. What is the situation, then, of writings concerning Vasubandhu's life at Chao's time?

Already when Paramàrtha was still alive and working at Canton, one of his main collaborators, Hui K'ai, mentioned the existence of a biography of Vasubandhu which is known as Pie chüan.[9] One hundred years thereafter, Fa Tsang (640-710) confirmed the presence of this so-called Pie chüan and added that there was another biography which is named Pen chüan.[10] Besides, in his Ku ch'in i ching tu chi written in the year 664 A. D., Ts'ing Mai listed still another biography of Vasubandhu entitled P'o su p'an tu chüan and said that it was translated by Kumarajìva.[11] Taken all these informations together, plus those reported by Paramàrtha and Hui Chao, we then definitely know that by the end of seventh century there were at least five following biographies of Vasubandhu which were known to the writers of that century. They are:

1. P'o su p'an tu chüan, translated by Kumarajìva.
2. P'o su p'an tu fa shih chüan, translated by Paramàrtha.
3. Pie chüan, mentioned by Hui K'ai in his Preface,
4. Pen chüan, cited by Fa Tsang.
5. T'ien ts'in p'u tsa chüan, cited by Hui Chao.

All these biographies, except Number 2, are now lost. The question of whether any of these five can be identified to exist only in name and therefore can be

considered to be identical with one of the other four or not, is not easy to answer. Péri addressed himself to this question and hesitatingly proposed that the Biographies Number 1 and 4 are the same, while those of Numbers 2, 3 and possibly 5 must certainly be identical. The criterium for carrying this identification is again consisted of the similarity in language among them. As a result, it bases itself upon a rather shaky ground, because we have pointed out that in matters concerning Chinese historical works, including those supposedly translated versions, their similarity in language does not play a decisive role in deciding which one is the same work and which is not. In the present case, quotations from Pen Chüan by Fa Tsang does indeed have the flavor of those biographies attributed to Kumarajîva in the sense that they are usually full of marvellous events. But such dsecriptions of marvellous events have nothing to do with the possibility that Pen chüan must be identical with P'O su p'an tu chüan supposedly translated by Kumarajîva, because they might draw their informations from the same source, which in this case is usually Indian. And Indian biography is always full of marvellous events, anyway. In fact, Péri has taken note of the fact that Hui Tsiang has several times spoken in his Fa hua ching chüan chi of the statement by Paramàrtha about the existence of a certain Si yü chüan chi. Consequently, the mere fact that similarity in language exists in more than one account, is no proof that they are the same and written or translated by the same person. The same can be said for the rest of other identifications by Péri.

In any case, with the above analysis it becomes plainly clear that Péri's above assumption is not justified. Even if justitified, it is still an assum-

ption and not a fact. The fact is that in all the translations as well as in all the writings still extant or quoted of Paramàrtha nowhere did he give the date 1100 A. N. to Vasubandhu, and that in all the quotations by numerous writers subsequently to Paramàrtha nowhere was Paramàrtha credited explicitly or implicitly with the opinion that Vasubandhu was born 1100 A. N. On the contrary, he was usually cited as an authority to refute that said date, as has been seen. So, in this much we can be completely and confidently certain that Paramàrtha didnot give two different dates to Vasubandhu and that according to him Vasubandhu was born 900 A.N. All the assertions that "the date 1100 A.N. was originally given by Paramàrtha in the Life of Vasubandhu", that "Paramàrtha knew two different dates for Vasubandhu and considered them worth transmitting to his posterity" etc..., which are loudly claimed by such scholars as Frauwallner, are nothing but these scholars' own fictions.

Even more striking is the situation where those who oppose Frauwallner's two-Vasubandhus hypothesis seem to acknowledge tacitly the correctness of both Péri's assumption and Frauwallner's assertion that Paramàrtha did give two dates to Vasubandhu. Thus, in his rather lengthy review of Frauwallner's On the date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu, Sakurabe did not raise a single word against those said assumptions and assertions by Péri and Frauwallner.[13] Jaini was even more matter-of-fact in his vacuous affirmation that "Paramàrtha gives two dates for Vasubandhu" without bothering to check whether it is true or not.[14] Wayman, although rejecting the two Vasubandhus conjured up by Frauwallner, was completely silent on the premise upon which the two-Vasubandhus hypothesis was based.[15] This is not to mention the fact that

he burdens himself with his own theory of two Vasubandhus, which does not certainly fare any better than Frauwallner's, if not worse, due to his basing himself upon the rather flimsy evidence of Tibetan historians of later time. Not untill Lê Manh Thát pointed it out in his Dua vào viêc nghiên cứu triêt hoc Vasubandhu is the assertion that "Paramàrtha gives two dates for Vasubandhu" uncovered to be nothing but a fraudulent assertion without substance.[16] In retrospect, the above assumption by Péri is his greatest of all the failures, which have occurred in his undertaking of solving the problem of Vasubandhu's date. It is the greatest, because it bears down hard upon subsequent generations which mostly did not have the same competence and the same breadth of knowledge in the field of Chinese studies as he did and therefore were readily willing to submit easily to his suggestion, even when such suggestion showed itself to be blatantly unjustified as in the case we had above.

Now, if Péri's assumption has been proved to be wrong, we have to assign all the three dates previously mentioned to who-ever first explicitly recorded them, without attempting to rely upon any assumption at all. We know now that

1. Paramàrtha gives the date 900 A. N. for Vasubandhu,
2. Hsüan Tsang gives the date 1000 A. N. for him, and
3. Hui K'ai gives the date 1100 A. N.

These are the three dates and their earliest reporters, and one can recognize for oneself that there exists a great discrepancy of time betwen them. In order to resolve it, we propose to deal with the first two dates first here, since it is rather easy to reconcile those given by Paramàrtha and Hsüan Tsang than

that given by Hui K'ai.

According to Paramàrtha, Vasubandhu was born 900 years after the Buddha's Nirvàna. P'u Kuang in his Chu chŏ lun chí informed us that Paramàrtha says,[17] "One thousand two hundred sixty-five years have past since the time the Buddha passed away untill now". Now, we know precisely when Paramàrtha and P'u Kuang lived. So, in order to know what exactly the date 900 A. N. for Vasubandhu is referring to, we must know when the Buddha passed away; and in order to know when he passed away, we must determine what exactly the expression "untill now" in the just quoted statement by P'u Kuang means. Frauwallner interpreted it to mean "up to the time of Paramàrtha", that is, up to about the year 564 A.D. when Paramàrtha began translating the Abhidharmakośa in Canton. And because of this, Sakurabe rightly pointed out that in that case the so-called Vasubandhu the Elder would have been born in the third century A.D. rather than in the year 320 A.D. as it was proposed by Frauwallner. Frauwallner's interpretation is wrong, however, not on that account, although such a wrong calculation is indeed deplorable. It is wrong, because it is based apparently upon a poor knowledge of the Chinese language on the part of the interpreter.

The expression "untill now" 至今 , when used by any author, even in the case where that author has taken his information from another author, is always indicating the now of the said author, and not otherwise. For example, when Tao An wrote in his Er kiao lun that

> "According to Dharmàcàrya Kumarajìva's Chronology and the Che Chu Ming, in accordance with the Ch'uan ch'iu, the Tathàgata was born in the fifth year of King Huan of Chou, cycle yi ch'u,...., and He entered the Nirvàna in the fifteenth year of King Siang, cycle kia chen. Thus, one thousand two hundred and five years have past since then till now".[18]

Now, we know that Tao An wrote his Er kiao lun 二教論 in the year 568 A.D. and that the 15th year of King Siang of Chou is corresponding with the year 687 B.C. A quick count from the year 687 B.C. down to 568 A.D. does give us the number 1205 years. So, there is no doubt whatever as to which year the expression "till now" 至今 in the above passage would refer to. It refers to the year 568 A.D. of Tao An, and not to that of Kumarajìva, from whom Tao An borrowed his information. As a result, although P'u Kuang said that "Paramàrtha says, one thousand two hundred and sixty-five years have past since the time the Buddha passed away till now", we must understand that the expression "till now" therein is referring to the now of P'u Kuang, and not that of Paramàrtha, as Frauwallner has wrongly interpreted it to be.

Now, if "one thousand two hundred and sixty-five years have past since the time the Buddha passed away" untill P'u Kuang's time, then when did Kuang live? We know that Kuang was one of Hsüan Tsang's disciples and close associates. We do not know, however, when he wrote the Chu chŏ lun chi where the just-quoted statement was made. Fortunately, we are aware that Hsüan Tsang translated the Abhidharmakośa during the period betwen the years 651-654.[19] It follows naturally, then, that Kuang should have written his work after the year 654 A.D., when the task of translating and explaining the Abhidharmakośa for his associates was finished by Tsang himself. In all probability, the Chu chŏ lun chi might have been written during the years 654-666, when Tsang died and Kuang was released of his duty in helping Tsang in the task of translating and had some time of his own. Whatever the case may be, we can be certain that the above statement by Kuang must have been made after the year 654 A.D., when Tsang officially fi-

nished his task of translating and explaining the Abhidharmakośa and started working on other projects. Thus, if we take the year 664 A.D. as the latest time limit when Kuang finished composing his Chu chŏ lun chi, we can see that that year is indeed what is expressed by Kuang with the phrase "till now". In other words, up to the year 664 A.D., one thousand two hundred and sixty-five years have past since the time the Buddha past away. So, we can say that the year 664 A.D. is corresponding with the year 1265 A.N. Once it is so, the task of finding when Vasubandhu was born becomes rather quite easy.

Paramàrtha says that Vasubandhu was born 900 A.N. What he means by this is that Vasubandhu was born during the fourth century A.D. For if the year 664 A.D. is the year 1265 A.N. and if we start counting up, we would have the year 900 A.N. falling exactly on the year 300 A.D.

Year A. D.	664	600	500	400	300
Year A. N.	1265	1200	1100	1000	900

Table 1

Vasubandhu was thus born during the fourth century A.D. From this conclusion, it is quite clear that we are free from all the pitfalls that Frauwallner and others have fallen into, which Sakurabe has pointed out and which we have previously referred to. Further, it must be added that the Chinese language is not at all as ambiguous as one would like to think, when properly interpreted.

Now, if the date 900 A.N. given by Paramàrtha is corresponding to the fourth century A.D., what century is the date 1000 A.N. by Hsüan Tsang referring to? To answer this question, we must take note of the fact that the expression "the date 1000 A.N." which we used here, is used rather loosely and therefore may be

quite misleading. What Hsüan Tsang actually says is that Asanga was born "within 1000 years after the Buddha's Nirvàna".[20] But since Tsang specifically says also that Vasubandhu was a brother of Asanga, we can safely assume that Vasubandhu must have been born "within 1000 years A.N." or not long thereafter so as to be able to visit Asanga when the latter was in his deathbed. In any case, being brothers from the same mother, if Asanga was born "within 1000 years A.N.", then Vasubandhu must have similarly been so. Now, the expression "within 1000 years A.N." has posed some problem in the way of interpreting it. Some understand it as referring to the quantity of years betwen the years1000 and 1100. That is at least the way that Takakusu and Frauwallner interpret it. Such a way seems to us, however, to be faulty, if not outright wrong. Already long before Frauwallner published his study, Péri noticed that although the expression "within 1000 years" might be susceptible to two totally different interpretations, that is, that it may be interpreted as referring to either the quantity of years betwen the years 1000 and 1100 or the quantity of years betwen the years 900 and 1000, he preferred the interpretation that it refers to the quantity of years betwen the years 900 and 1000. For otherwise, one would be left without any expression for the period betwen the year 1 and the year 100. This reason given by Péri shows how perceptive he was to the use of Chinese language. In fact, we are now forced to understand the expression "within 1000 years" as indeed referring to the quantity of years betwen the years 900 and 1000, regardless of whether we prefer it or not. Why? Exactly because of the same reason as Péri just stated. In truth, when a Chinese says "within one hundred years of a man's life", what he means is of course not the period after the year 100,

but the period before and ended with that year. So, one cannot interpret the expression "within 1000 years" to mean the quantity of years betwen the year 1000 and the year 1100, as Takakusu and Frauwallner have done. On the contrary, it must be understood to be referring to the period betwen the years 900 and 1000.

When it is so understood, what would follow, then? Clearly, if the expression "within 1000 years" is understood to mean the period betwen the years 900 and 1000, then it is an equivalent of the expression "after 900 years". In effect, when Hsüan Tsang says, Vasubandhu was born within 1000 years A.N., he actually means that Vasubandhu was born after 900 years A.N. Once it is so concluded, one can, by looking at Table 1 above, recognize that Hsüan Tsang does give the same date for Vasubandhu as Paramàrtha did. However, since Table 1 is set up, based upon the data given by Paramàrtha, it may be questioned as to whether it can be used to determine the date given by Hsüan Tsang. Fortunately, we need not answer that question, because the conclusion just arrived at can be independently substantiated by materials provided by Hsüan Tsang alone, and they are none other than the materials Tsang wrote about Dharmapàla. In his Ta T'ang si yu chi Tsang gave us rather detailed informations concerning the latter, and thanks to them a reasonable date for Dharmapàla has been reached, which is generally being accepted and which puts his life-time betwen the years 531-560.[22] Now, according to Tsang, Dharmapàla was said to live "after 1100 years after the Buddha's Nirvàna". It follows that the period betwen the years 1100 and 1200 is corresponding to the sixth century A.D. From that conclusion, it is quite easy to see that the date 1000 A.N. given by Hsüan Tsang for Vasubandhu is referring to the fourth century A.D. and is thus equivalent to the date 900 A.N. given by Paramàrtha.[23]

So, the dates given by Paramàrtha and Hsüan Tsang for Vasubandhu are referring to the same fourth century A.D. We are now left with the date 1100 A.N. reported by Hui K'ai. This is a rather peculiar problem that K'ai presented to us. First, although at least four writings of his[24] survived the time to be transmitted down to us, practically nothing precise is known of his life and work during the period before he met Paramàrtha in 562 A.D., and that period was rather long, because he died six years later in 568, even before Paramàrtha himself passed away in the following year at the age of 71.[25] Secondly, we know nothing of the possible knowledge that K'ai might have of other sources of materials which he might have used to write about Vasubandhu. Due to this lack of knowledge, some scholars such as Frauwallner have utilized his relationship with Paramàrtha to bolster their argument that Paramàrtha did give the date 1100 A.N. for Vasubandhu. In fact, Frauwallner went so far as to assert that K'ai was "an intimate disciple" of Paramàrtha, and hence whatever K'ai wrote about Vasubandhu must have come from none other than Paramàrtha himself. Thus, if K'ai said that Vasubandhu was born 1100 A.N., then that date must have been the date given by Paramàrtha somewhere in his writings. Owing to this rather strange reasoning, we propose hereby to inquire into the question of whether K'ai was indeed "an intimate disciple and a close collaborator" of Paramàrtha, before explaining and determing what century the date 1100 A.N. is referring to.

We have said that today we know almost nothing precise about K'ai's life before the year 562 A.D. Tao Hsüan (593-667) did not seem to consider K'ai highly to include him in his famous <u>Siu kao seng chüan</u> with an independent

biography although he did know K'ai's name and mentioned it in the biography written for Paramàrtha.[27] What we know about K'ai are therefore wholly derived from his own writings. We have said that four of his writings are still extant of which the two Prefaces he wrote for the translations of Mahàyànasamgraha and of Abhidharmakośa are the most important and the most informative. In the Preface for the Mahàyànasamgraha, K'ai said:

> "I, Hui K'ai, my mind was ashamed of me being a 'bag-carrier', assiduously and humbly gathered all the fire-flies to erringly follow the students' path and receive the teaching and its meaning. I travelled to and stayed at the lecturing shops in many years and at many places. Famous teachers and excellent friends I had enough opportunities to inquire about their advices and instructions. Yet, in general, my understanding is superficial and shallow. If I went deeper into any subject, I had no means to do it. And in searching beyond the waves to find their source, I realized that there were many things that I have not understood yet. This was because my thinking was stopped at words and my deliberation was confused about the great Teaching. The more I was aware of that, the sadder I became. And this burdened my heart but not once. Sometimes, I wished to follow the wind to go to inquire about the Teaching. But while I was still not knowing yet the best way to realize it, I met the Tripitakàcàrya... named Kulanàtha".[29]

And some lines later on, K'ai described how Paramàrtha treated him as follows:

> "I, K'ai, formerly used to study under him [Paramàrtha] and was awashed a little bit of the dullness of my mind. But having not studied long enough yet, I had to leave. Now, I have the honor of meeting him again, I am all the more happy and again wish to immerse myself in his penetration and to receive the share of his virtue. I wish to inquire about the Teaching from and to expose my doubts to, him. Although I request him fervently three times, I am still not receiving his agreement.

> I become irresolute and lose my intention. My mind and my heart have nothing to rely upon".[30]

Reading those passages just quoted, it becomes apparent that Paramàrtha did not treat K'ai well, let alone of his letting the latter become his "intimate disciple and close collaborator". In fact, only after Ou Yang Shun formally requested Paramàrtha to translate the Mahàyànasamgraha did K'ai become the latter's "pen-receptionist", as K'ai himself informed us.[31] The same is repeated in his Preface to the translation of Abhidharmakośa. So, to say as Frauwallner did that K'ai was an intimate disciple and a close collaborator of Paramàrtha is to say against K'ai's own words and thus constitutes a false allegation concerning their relationship. It is true that K'ai acknowledged of his being very faithfull to the utmost in writing down what Paramàrtha said, as he himself asserted several times. But if he so did, it is because he was afraid that "if one word is changed, the meaning becomes completely different". Whatever question K'ai wished to ask Paramàrtha and whatever doubt he wished to expose to the latter, he never had a chance, simply because the latter himself refused. Consequently, although K'ai might have worked with the latter with all his earnest, the latter seemed to be never in close association with him. So, we can say that Paramàrtha had very little influence, if any at all, upon K'ai in their short association. The assertion that whatever K'ai wrote on his own must have come from Paramàrtha, therefore can be disposed of easily and permanently. What he wrote was his own, drawn from his own learning and thinking. It follows that the date 1100 A.N. given by him for Vasubandhu does not necessarily or even accidently derive from Paramàrtha's knowledge or writings, since we know for certain at least from the latter's writings that

he never gi

he never gave that date to Vasubandhu. But if the date 1100 A.N. did not come from Paramàrtha, then where did K'ai get it?

To answer this question without knowing K'ai's life in detail is not an easy matter. We know that K'ai passed away in the year 568 A.D. In his note on K'ai's life, Yen K'o-chün (1762-1843) said that K'ai was already "famous during the Liang period".[33] The Liang dynasty reigned from the year 502 A.D. to 557. So, if K'ai was already famous under the Liang and died in the year 568, then we can safely assume that he must have been born around the years 501-510 A.D. From the year 500 A.D. down to the time when K'ai died, Buddhism in Southern China possesses two prominent features. First, intensive studies[34] of the Prajñàpàramita literature and of the Madhyamika treatises are carried with such men as Liang Wu-ti and others, among whom we would expect the presence of K'ai himself, because K'ai confesses that "he has travelled to and stayed at the lecturing shops in many years and at many places". Once having studied those treatises and literatures, K'ai surely would not fail to recognize that all the great Madhyamika authorities in China up to his time agree that Nàgàrjunà was born nine centuries after the Buddha's Nirvàna.[35] So, if Nàgàrjuna was born at that date, K'ai, of course, would not assign that same date to Vasubandhu, even when it is said by Paramàrtha himself. Secondly, numerous attempts are made to reconstruct the lineage of Buddhism patterned after Chinese genealogy,[36] leading to the widespread appearances of numerous chronological systems of Indian patriarchs, of which the most popular is that of Fu fa tsang yin yüan chüan.[37,38] It is not our task here to examine whether Fu fa tsang yin yüan chüan is a true translation or not, although as Maspéro has showed, it might be a forgery "composed in China towards the middle or the end of the sixth century, by compiling

fragments of previous works" and its "list of the twenty-four patriarchs is the work of the same forger".[39] It is just sufficient for our purpose here that whether forged or not, Fu fa tsang yin yüan chüan was already in circulation towards "the middle or the end of the sixth century" and that its list of patriarchs is just "one of the numerous chronological systems of the Buddhist doctors which were widespread in China at this epoch". In other words, even when we reject the traditional assertion that the Fu fa tsang yin yüan chüan was translated by Kikeya in the year 472 A.D. and agree with Maspéro that it is a forgery, we still have to admit that the list of twenty-four or twenty-three patriarchs was already in circulation at Hui K'ai's time in one form or another. Now, the Fu fa tsang yin yüan chüan mentions among its list of patriarchs the names of Nàgàrjuna and Vasubandhu without stating specifically their dates. However, it lets us know that six other patriarchs, i.e. Kanadeva, Rahùlatà, Sanghanandi, Gayasata, Kumàràta and Jayata, have succeeded each other after Nàgàrjuna passed away and before Vasubandhu became a patriarch. In short, according to it, from Nàgàrjuna down to Vasubandhu there are eight patriarchs in toto. And given the time distance betwen each of them an average of twenty-five years, we can see that these eight patriarchs cover a period of 200 years. Thus, taken this fact together with the above fact about Nàgàrjuna's date, one can immediately recognize why in K'ai's opinion "Vasubandhu was born one thousand and one hundred years more after the Buddha's Nirvàna".

But does K'ai really derive his date for Vasubandhu from his knowledge of Nàgàrjuna's date and of the former's chronological position in relation to the latter in the list of patriarchs? We cannot answer this question

as fully and as precisely as we wish. K'ai merely says that he derives it from a certain Pie chüan. What is this Pie chüan, then? Péri again assumes it to be indicating none other than the P'o su p'an tu fa shih chüan written or translated by Paramàrtha, because of the following reasons. First, Pie chüan, as its title implies, is usually referring to those biographies written subsequently to an already existing standard biography, which is called Pen chüan. Fa Tsang in fact does mention the existence of a Pen chüan in his Hua yen ching chüan chi. Therefore, the Pie chüan that K'ai refers to must be written after the Pen chüan. Secondly, the Pen chüan seems to be full of marvellous stories, because the sample quotations by Fa Tsang from it so indicate. This relation of marvellous stories is also a characteristic trait of all the other biographies attributed to Kumarajìva, i.e. the biographies of Nàgàrjuna, Aśvaghosa and Àryadeva. So, the Pen chüan must have been written by Kumarajìva's hands, and thereby can be identified with the P'o su p'an tu chüan which Ts'ing Mai reported to be a biography of Vasubandhu translated by Kumàrajìva himself. Now, Péri concludes that if the Pie chüan must be written after the Pen chüan and if the Pen chüan is known to be attributed to Kumaràjìva, then it follows that the Pie chüan must be the P'o su p'an tu fa shih chüan written or translated by Paramàrtha.

Obviously, one can see that the reasons advanced by Péri do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the Pie chüan referred to by Hui K'ai is that of Paramàrtha. However, since those reasons are already given, let us examine briefly whether they have any validity at all. First, concerning the priority of the Pen chüan versus the Pie chüan, nowhere in Chinese materials can we find a bit of evidence to support it. In fact, Chinese historians never made

use of the word "Pen chüan" and among various classifications of the chüan style not one has ever mentioned the term "Pen chüan".[40] So, it is quite presumptuous to assert that the Pen chüan is indicating the so-and-so. On the other hand, the word Pie chüan is widely known and widely used. It is used to designate usually a collection of marvellous stories concerning a person and therefore is usually considered to be synonymous with chüan chi shao shuo, "marvellous story" 傳奇小說[41]. Consequently, to say that the Pie chüan must be written after the Pen chüan is almost tantamount to saying non-sense. As for the second reason that since the Pen chüan quoted by Fa Tsang is full of marvellous stories, it therefore must be attributed to Kumarajîva, while the Pie chüan, due to its lack of such stories, can be reasonably assigned to Paramârtha, one is again struck by the incoherence of Péri's argument. To begin with, we know for certain that the term Pie chüan was first used by the Chinese Hui K'ai. So, we must take it to mean exactly what the Chinese has thought it to be, which, in this case, is none other than meaning "marvellous story", a short form of chüan chi shao shuo. Then, the Pen chüan quoted by Fa Tsang might be full of marvellous stories; but it does not follow that the original Pen chüan must be necessarily so. In fact, it is the reverse. The best examples of this kind are perhaps the following case of the biographies of two Vietnamese monks.

The first monk was named Đàm Hoàng, who went to Vietnam at about the year 425 A.D. to practice the reciting of the Buddha's name. Some twenty years later when a great debate about the reasons why one cannot see the Buddha occurred with such protagonists as Huê Lâm, Dao Cao, Pháp Minh and Lý Miễu, which seemed to reach its acute point, Hoàng burnt himself to death. "Then,

monks and laymen realized the marvellous efficacy of Hôang's practice" because after the self-immolation they "all saw Hôang, of golden body, riding a yellow deer running ver fast towards the West".[42] That is how Hôang's life is described in Hui Chiao's Kao seng chüan. However, when it is rewritten by Kai Chü in his Ts'ing tu wang sheng chüan, many more marvellous stories are introduced.[43] For example, Hui Chiao talks of "people collecting Hôang's remains to place it in the stûpa for worshipping", while Chü, not content with the plain talk of "Hôang's remains", adds that "people collect Hôang's śarîra", a detail as incredible as the whole story itself.

The second monk was named Khuy Sung, who went pilgrims in India at about the year 680 A.D. and met I Ts'ing there. The record of his life is found in Ts'ing's Ta T'ang si yu chu fa kao seng chüan. Now, if we compare what is told by Ts'ing about him with what is written five hundred years later by Fei Chö in the famous San p'ao kan yin yu lü lu,[44] the same situation occurs, but to a greater extent. For instance, almost an entirely new episode is introduced by Chö concerning the relationship that the deeply pietist Khuy Sung has with his patron saint Samantabhadra. And curiously enough, Chö lets his reader know that he draws his information from I Ts'ing's Ta T'ang si yu chu fa kao seng chüan where no such episode is implied.

So, through examples of this kind which show that marvellous stories appearing in various biographies are wholly due to the addition made by later hands, we can see that the appearance of marvellous stories in Fa Tsang's quotations from the Pen chüan is not a guarantee at all that those marvellous stories would also occur in the Pen chüan itself. In truth, from our experience we tend to think that Fa Tsang might have fabricate those

stories himself, while basing himself upon the general sketch of Vasubandhu's life drawn by the Pen chüan. In any case, we see no possible relationship betwen the Pen chüan and the Pie chüan as well as betwen them and Kumàrajìva's P'o su p'an tu chüan and Paramàrtha's P'o su P'an tu fa shi chüan, especially when standing upon the ground advanced by Péri. All we can say is that the Pie chüan must appear before Hui Kâi's time so that it can be used as one of his sources. In this connection, we are inclined to be opinion that the Pie chüan might be none other than the biography of Vasubandhu in the Fu fa tsang yin yüan chüan itself, although if it is so, we cannot explain why in the present edition of the latter nowhere is the date for Vasubandhu to be found. Of course, it can be argued that K'ai needs not use the Fu fa tsang yin yüan chüan itself as it appears in the present edition, but rather one of its variants which are known to be in circulation at his time and which might have the date that he employs in his Preface to the translation of the Abhidharmakośa. But in so doing, one may reach the limit of credibility and may go into the universe of fictions. Nevertheless, regardless of whatever the identity of the Pie chüan may be, we can be sure that it is from it that the date 1100 A.N. for Vasubandhu originates. We also suggested that in all probability that date has originated in conjunction with the date 900 A.N. for Nàgàrjuna, because that seems to us be the only plausible suggestion at present time. So, in order to have any idea as to what century A.D. the date 1100 A.N. is referring to, we obviously must know what century the date 900A.N for Nàgàrjuna is corresponding to.

Unfortunately, the question of Nàgàrjuna's date is no less perplex and

complex than even that of Vasubandhu. And again, it is not our task here to carry out a full-scale and exhaustive treatement of it so as to determine what precisely can we say about. Rather, we will concentrate our effort upon those reports which are made before Hui K'ai's time and have some bearing upon him, which is to mean that we must eliminate all the informations appearing later than the year 568 A.D. and focus attention, instead, upon those given by Kumàrajìva and his associates.

Although Kumarajìva himself does not give any specific date for Nàgàrjuna, what is written by his associates provides us with a rather clear idea as to when Nàgàrjuna was born. In his Preface to the Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise, Hui Yüan says:

> "There was a Mahàyàna bodhisattva named Nàgàrjuna who was born in India and came from the Brahman caste; having accumulated virtue in bygone ages, his mind fitted existence in this world, and he appeared during the ninth century A.N. at the moment when the Dharma was decadent and weak".[45]

Seng Chao shares a similar opinion, when he writes of Àryadeva as follows:[46] "Eight hundred years and more after the Buddha's Nirvàna there was a boddhisattva monk named Deva". Seng Jui (352-436) also expresses the same idea in his Preface to the Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise with the statement that "Therefore Aśvaghosa arose in the remnant of the True Dharma, and Nàgàrjuna was born at the end of the Counterfeit Dharma".[47] So, in their own words, all Kumarajìva's associates agree that Nàgàrjuna was born either "during the ninth century A, N." or "at the end of the Counterfeit Dharma". And all of them lived and worked long before Hui K'ai was born.

However, some twenty years after K'ai's death, Chi Tsang (549-622) wrote

his Po lun tsu chu 百論序疏, in which he made the following statement:

> "Master Seng Jui's Preface to the Satyasiddhi, written after Kumarajîva departed from the world, quotes Master Kumarajîva's words, saying that three hundred and fifty years after the Buddha's decease Aśvaghasa came into the world; at five hundred and thirty years Nàgàrjuna came into the world; Aśvaghosa flourished at the end of the True Dharma and Nàgàrjuna arose at the beginning of the Counterfeit Dharma".[48]

In his Chung kuan lun chu 中觀論疏, Tsang again repeated the same thing with slightly different wording: "Master Jui in his Preface to the Satyasiddhi quoted Master Kumarajîva's words, saying that Aśvaghosa was born in the year 350, and Nàgàrjuna in the year 530 A.N.".[49] Thus, according to these statements of Chi Tsang, Seng Jui and Kumarajîva are said to think that Nàgàrjuna "arose at the beginning of the Counterfeit Dharma" or "was born in the year 530 A.N.", which is diametrically opposed to the above assertion by Seng Jui himself that "Nàgàrjuna was born at the end of the Counterfeit Dharma". Clearly, something is wrong here. The easiest way to resolve the just mentioned contradiction would be to disregard Chi Tsang's statements, since his materials are of later origins. However, because they have been used recently to determine Nàgàrjuna's date, even to the point of ignoring Seng Jui's own words, by Lamotte[50], it is instructive to discuss briefly here how successfull such a making use of dubious materials has been.

Lamotte claims that Chi Tsang's statement that "Three hundred and fifty years after the Buddha's decease Aśvaghosa came into the world, at five hundred and thirty years Nàgàrjuna came into the world" can be interpreted in two different ways. I.e. one might understand it to mean that Aśvaghosa was born 350 years

after the Buddha's

after the Buddha's Nirvàna and Nàgàrjuna was born 530 years after the Buddha's Nirvàna; or one might have it to mean that Aśvaghosa was born 350 years after the Buddha's Nirvàna, and Nàgàrjuna was born 530 years after Aśvaghosa. If the first interpretation is accepted, then using Kumarajìva's date for the Buddha's Nirvàna which is falling on the year 637 B.C., we would have Nàgàrjuna being born about the year 107 B.C. If the second interpretation is used, his birth-year would be 243 A.D. Lamotte then concludes: "Evidently, it is the last date which was adopted by Kumarajìva, his disciples Seng Chao and Seng Jui and his contemporary Hui Yüan".[51]

But curiously enough, Lamotte never questions the validity of such an interpretation and goes on to induce other evidence to support it. Indeed, if he accepts the first part of what is purported to be the statement by Kumarajìva quoted in Seng Jui's Preface to the Satyasiddhi, then he must accept also the second part of that same statement, which says that "Aśvaghosa flourished at the end of the True Dharma and Nàgàrjuna arose at the beginning of the Counterfeit Dharma". In other words, regardless of whatever one might say about the duration of the True and the Counterfeit Dharmas, it is self-evident that Aśvaghosa and Nàgàrjuna followed each other successively to appear in the world, and were not separated from each other to the extent of 530 years, as Lamotte's conclusion assumes. Consequently, when the above statement says that "at five hundred and thirty years Nàgàrjuna came into the world", we must understand it to mean that it is five hundred and thirty years after the Buddha's Nirvàna, and not after Aśvaghosa, that Nàgàrjuna was born. Thus, it is quite surprising to find a scholar of Lamotte's stature of being so frivolous in accepting so easily such a faulty interpretation. Perhaps he was so impressed with other evidence that he forgot to remind

himself of being more carefull in selecting data, especially those which seem to be so precise as in the case of the date 243 A.D. which he arrived at above. So, in front of Chi Tsang's report which he says is a quotation from Seng Jui's Preface to the Satyasiddhi, we must accept or reject it in toto, that is, we must accept or reject its statement that Aśvaghosa was born 350 years A.N. and Nàgàrjuna 530 A.N.; but we cannot accept or reject it in piecemeal in that we, for example, accept 530 years to mean the years after Aśvaghosa for Nàgàrjuna and then ignore the subsequent assertion that "Nàgàrjuna flourished at the beginning of the Counterfeit Dharma". Otherwise stated, either we accept Nàgàrjuna to be born in the year 107 B.C. or we must reject it completely as not valid, and there is no more second interpretation like that supposed by Lamotte. And this is not to say of the incredible ancientry of Aśvaghosa, which Lamotte himself has pointed out, if Aśvaghosa was born indeed in the year 350 A.N., as the so-called Preface to the Satyasiddhi said, and of all the possible difficulties it entails, which Robinson[52] has cryptically referred to. What is then our position in relation to this problem?

Although Robinson has called Lamotte's above-quoted conclusion to be a "very plausible suggestion that the figure 530 means 530 years after Aśvaghosa rather than after the Nirvàna", we have shown that no such interpretation could be made in terms of Chi Tsang's report as a whole. Now, since the date for Aśvaghosa and that for Nàgàrjuna both seem to be of such an incredible ancientry, i.e., Aśvaghosa was born in the year 287 B.C. and Nàgàrjuna in 107 B.C., we think that they must be rejected. In other words, we must reject Chi Tsang's report with whatever it may entail, including the so-called Preface to the Satyasiddhi by Seng Jui together with Kumàrajìva's statement therein. In fact, Robinson already indicated the possibly

spurious character of Seng Jui's Preface to the Satyasiddhi. This is because the transmission of the Satyasiddhi itself has raised a number of problems of considerable difficulties[53]. Furthermore, in his Chu wei mo kie king[54], Seng Chao quoted Kumàrajìva as saying that Pàrśva, Aśvaghosa's teacher, lived 600 A.N., which, if one accept the above date 637 B.C. for the Buddha's Nirvàna, would have him born around the year 37 B.C. And thus, Aśvaghosa must be born no earlier than that year, and certainly not at the year 287 B.C., which the so-called Seng Jui's Preface to the Satyasiddhi alleged it to be. Besides, in his still extant Preface to the Great Perfection Wisdom, Jui specifically stated that "Aśvaghosa arose after the True Dharma and Nàgàrjuna was born at the end of the Counterfeit Dharma"[55], which entirely contradicts the quotation attributed to him and to Kumàrajìva where it is said that "Aśvaghosa flourished at the end of the True Dharma and Nàgàrjuna arose at the beginning of the Counterfeit Dharma", by Chi Tsang. On account of these reasons, we think that not only the proposed chronology based upon Chi Tsang's report by Lamotte must be rejected, but also the whole report by Chi Tsang himself.

Having rejected Chi Tsang's report and Lamotte's chronology, we are thus left with the informations actually coming from Hui Yüan, Sang Chao and Seng Jui themselves. Yüan says, Nàgàrjuna "received the destination of nine hundred" 接九百之運 years after the Buddha's Nirvàna. Jui, as has been seen, states that "Nàgàrjuna was born at the end of the Counterfeit Dharma". Chao reported that "eight hundred years and more after the Buddha's Nirvàna there was a bodhisattva monk named Deva". In his biography, which is supposed to be translated by Kumàrajìva, Deva is said to be Nàgàrjuna's disciple.[56] Thus, it is quite difficult to say which century A.N. the expression "the end of the

Counterfeit Dharma" means. However, if Deva is Nàgàrjuna's disciple and he lives eight hundred years and more after the Buddha's Nirvàna, it is not hard at all to assert, as Hui Yüan did, that Nàgàrjuna "received the destination of nine hundred", that is, that his life would span over a period which will end at the year 900 A.N. In other words, Nàgàrjuna must live about 750-850 A.N., as Ui has supposed[57]. So, if we accept Kumàrajìva's dating of the Buddha's Nirvàna in the year 637 B.C. and the Tibetan tradition, according to which Nàgàrjuna is supposed to die at 60 years of age, his date of "ninth century" A.N. is corresponding quite nicely to the period of about 113-173 A.D. And his reception of "the destination of nine hundred" means that he would live to the year 173 A.D. Hence, Nàgàrjuna lived and died during the second century A.D., and the date 900 A.N. of his indicates nothing but that century.

Now, if the date 900 A.N. is corresponding with the second century A.D., it follows naturally that the date 1100 A.N. for Vasubandhu must tally with nothing but the fourth century A.D. Consequently, even this date 1100 A.N. given by Hui K'ai for Vasubandhu still is in almost perfect accordance with the dates given by Paramàrtha and Hiuan Tsang. Therefore, although all of them report different dates for Vasubandhu, which would make the latter's life span seemingly over a period of more than three hundred years, in actuality they all agree that Vasubandhu lived during the fourth century A.D., when all the facts have been brought to light and seperated from unwarranted assumption and supposition. With this conclusion, it is quite clear that Paramàrtha did not give two dates to Vasubandhu, that his date and Hui K'ai's date are the same century, and that Hiuan Tsang's date did not correspond with the fifth century, as Frauwallner wrongly identified[58], but with the fourth century, which both Paramàrtha and Hui K'ai agreed. Thus, there is no difficulty whatsoever in solving the existence of different dates for Vasubandhu in Chinese traditions, when

judicious and competent investigation is carried out and unfounded and frivolous assumption discarded. The theory of two Vasubandhus expounded by Frauwallner is henceforth nothing more than his own imagination. There is no fact that Paramàrtha gives two dates to Vasubandhu, just as there are not two Vasubandhus in the Life of Vasubandhu.

Once the entanglement concerning Vasubandhu's dates on the Chinese side is cleared, there is almost no necessary nor sufficient reasons to suppose any further the existence of more than one Vasubandhu. But ten years after the publication of On the date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu, Frauwallner seemed to shift his position and placed more emphasis on the evidence given by the Indian side, particularly that offered by Yaśomitra, in order to support his hypothesis of two Vasubandhus in his Landmarks in Indian Logic[59]. As consequence, some discussion is needed as to the facts concerning Vasubandhu occurring in Sanskrit literature, although they do not have the full importance that the Chinese data possess. Two most noted of these facts are those related to Yaśomitra's reference to a certain Vrddhàcàrya Vasubandhu and to the Gupta kings whom Vasubandhu was reported by Paramàrtha to be associated with. They have been thouroughly investigated and resolved by Lê Manh Thát[60] and subsequently by Anacker[61]. So, what follows will mostly be the summary of their results and conclusions with little modification.

First, the name Vrddhàcàryavasubandhu or Sthaviravasubandhu is mentionned only three times in Yaśomitra, at Vyàkhyà ad I 13-14c; ad III 27; and ad IV 2b-3b.[62]

1/ Vyàkhyà ad I 13-14c, p 40: aśrayabhutarupanàd ity apara iti vrddhàcàryavasubandhuh/ bhutagrahanam aśrayabhutapradarśanàrtham/ atas cetarah prasanjayati/ evam tarhi caksurvijñànàdinàm apìti vistarah/ caksuradyaśrayarùpanàt tadvijñànanàm api rùpatvaprasangah/ visamo'yam upanyasa iti/ vrddhàcàryavasubandhudesiyah kascit pariharati/ avijñaptir hìti vistarah/ chàya vrksam upaslasthàśritya vartate/ prabhàpi manim tathaiva/

utpattinimittamatram tani tesam iti nopaslastaniti bhavah/ tam itarah pratyaha/ idam tavad avaibhasikiyam iti vistarah/ naitad vaibhàsikamatam/ vaibhàsikamatam tu chàyavarnaparamanuh svabhutacatuskam aśritya vartate/...

2/ Vyàkhyà ad III 27, p 43: ayonisomanaskarahetuka'vidyokta sùtràntara iti/ (...)/ avidyàhetukaś càyonisomanaskara iti/ (....)/ sa cehàpy upadanàntarbhutatvad ukto bhavatìti/(...)/ apara iti/sthavira-vasubandhor acàryo manoràthopadhyàya evam àha/ acàrya àha/ katham iti vistarah/ katham ayonisomanaskarasyopadane'ntarhavah/...

3/ Vyàkhyà ad IV 2b-3b: avasthanahetvabhavàt (...)/ sthaviravasubandhu-prabhrtibhir ayam hetur uktah/...

Those are the three passages from the Vyàkhyà where Yaśomitra refers to Vrddhàcàrya or Sthavira Vasubandhu. The first of these clearly states that it is the Vrddhàcàrya Vasubandhu's opinion that unmanifest action is physical because it depends on the material element of the body. This opinion is already expressed in the Mahàvibhàsa[63] and, as a matter of fact, is adopted by the Abhidharmakośa[64]. The second passage has been misunderstood by de La Vallée Poussin[65] who has it saying that Sthavira Vasubandhu upheld the theory that nescience comes from improper mental attention and that he was the master of Manoràtha. Actually, it is the reverse in that it is Manoràtha who upheld that theory and was Sthavira Vasubandhu's master. This explicitly rules out the possibility that there was a Vrddhàcàrya Vasubandhu who was Manoràtha's teacher, and thus the possibility that there were two Vasubandhus, one the master and the other the pupil of Manoràtha, as de La Vallée Poussin and later, with some modifications, Wayman[66] suggested. de La Vallée Poussin's misunderstanding probably came from the manuscript itself, where it is read "sthaviro vasubandhur acàryo manoràthopàdhyàya evam àha", which Law correctly emended to be what has been quoted above. One might raise objections to this emendation by pointing out that P'u Kuang[67], commenting on the same passage, reported that the above-mentionned theory is that of

a certain "Vasubandhu the Elder" 古世親. This, however, poses no problem on account that although the Abhidharmakośa is rather not very clear as to the solution for the question of whether nescience arises from improper mental attention, it says nothing which can be taken to be contradicting the theory held by Manoràtha. Thus, it may even be taken to be Vasubandhu's theory itself. "The Elder Vasubandhu" spoken of by Kuang is therefore no one else but Vasubandhu of Abhidharmakośa. The last passage states that the Sthavira Vasubandhu and others says that a flame is destroyed by an absence of a cause of stability. This is again Vasubandhu's position, and the objection that "an absence cannot be a cause" belongs to the Vaibhàsika[68].

In each of these cases, it is quite plainly clear that the theory attributed to Vrddhàcàrya Vasubandhu or Sthavira Vasubandhu is in fact the one adopted by Vasubandhu of the Abhidharmakośa himself. But why did Yaśómitra choose to invoke Vasubandhu's name in these cases and not in all throughout his work? And why did he confer upon the latter the dubious qualifier "Vrddhàcàrya" ? Indeed, it seems rather odd that Vasubandhu's name was invoked only three times in that long Vyàkhyà, which, except that three times, always addressed him as "the Master" and nothing else. This oddity will vanish easily, however, if we are to remenber that those three passages contain in each of them several other opinions, which would lead to ambiguity, if the usual title "The Master" is used. As for the dubious qualifier "Vrddhàcàrya", the word "vrddha" in that compound does not necessarily mean "old", as we ordinarily take it to be and go on to interpret that compound to indicate a certain master of the old times, as Frauwallner and Wayman have done. This is because it also means "eminent", in which case vrddhàcàrya is nothing more than a synonym of sthavira "the Venerable

Elder". So, there is nothing surprising and dubious at all in those titles, especially when they are conferred upon Vasubandhu's real name. In this connection it must be pointed out that once Vasubandhu has been addressed as vrddhàcàrya, it is not strange that Asanga should be called "pùrvàcàrya" by Yaśomitra, regardless of whether one takes it to mean "ancient master" or "previous master" nor not. Asanga was quite a "ancient master" to Yaśomitra and certainly a "previous master" to him and to Vasubandhu, the latter of whom was in any case one of his followers.

Yaśomitra's reference to Vrddhàcàrya Vasubandhu thus presents no trace of evidence for supporting the hypothesis of two Vasubandhus, as Frauwallner interpreted it to be. We now come to the second set of facts. Paramàrtha[69] reports to us that Vasubandhu lived under the reign of a king named Vikramàditya and did the tutoring work to the latter's son untill this imperial prince ascended the throne and was known under the title Bàlàditya. In other words, Vasubandhu was the subject of these two kings. We know that the names Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya are borne by several kings of the Gupta dynasty. Candragupta, for example, is called Candragupta Vikramàditya, just as Skandhagupta is called Skandhagupta Vikramàditya. Similarly, Govindagupta and Narasimhagupta both have the title Bàlàditya added to their name. Furthermore, in commenting on the verse "soyam samprati Candraguptanayaś candraprakàśo yuvà/ jàto bhùpatir àśrayah krta-dhiyàm distyà krtàrthaśramah// (This very son of Candragupta, young, shining like a moon, patron of eminent men of letters, has now become lord deserving congratulations on the success of his efforts), Vàmana wrote in his Kàvyàlankàrasùtravrtti that in that verse "the words 'patron of eminent men of letters' contain an allusion to the tutorship of Vasubandhu"[70] (Àśrayah krta-dhiyàm ity asya Vasubandhu-sàcivyopaksepa-paratvàt sàbhipràyatvam).

Thus, if the bit of information reported by Vàmana is credible, Vasubandhu must be the subject of Candragupta Vikramàditya and not Skandhagupta Vikramàditya. But, Candragupta is supposed to reign from about the year 375 to 415 A.D. Therefore, if Vasubandhu lived in fact during the fourth century, as we have upheld above, he could not be the subject of the king Bàlàditya, as Paramàrtha said, even when we do acknowledge there was a king succeeding Candragupta and bearing the title Bàlàditya, because he could not live beyond the year 415 of the king Candragupta. Consequently, if no solution is found for this problem, we are forced either to return to the hypothesis of two Vasubandhus or to re-examine the dating of the Gupta kings.

As a matter of fact, Frauwallner did rely on this discrepancy to persuade others of the correctness of his hypothesis. He argued that in all the Gupta kings who borne the titles Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya, only two are known to be succeeding each other uninterrupted, and they are Skandhagupta Vikramàditya (455-467) and Narasimhagupta Bàlàditya (467-473). Hence, they must be the sovereigns under whom Vasubandhu lived, as Paramàrtha reported. The biography translated by Paramàrtha for Vasubandhu, for that reason, must be a composite of two different lives of two different Vasubandhus, one living in the fourth century and the other in the fifth. In anticipating the objections which may be raised concerning the above assertion that only Skandhagupta and Narasimhagupta succeeded each other and borne the titles Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya, Frauwallner acknowledges that one may suppose Govindagupta succeeding Candragupta and having the title Bàlàditya, but emphasizes that this is still a supposition and not a fact, which the case of Skandhagupta and Narasimhagupta is. Again, as with the assertion about the Chinese traditions discussed above, this

emphasis on the fact of his raises serious doubts in our mind. And they are not at all without foundation. First, Narasimhagupta did not succeed Skandhagupta uninterrupted, because, as Frauwallner himself was well aware, there was another king who reigned a short period betwen Skandhagupta and Narasimhagupta and who had the name Prakaragupta but not the title Bàlàditya. So, for whatever reasons Frauwallner called upon to support his hypothesis, it is still not a fact that Skandhagupta and Narasimhagupta succeeded each other uninterrupted, as he has claimed. Secondly, since Paramàrtha reported that the relationship betwen Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya is that of father and son, and since Narasimhagupta is not the son of Skandhagupta, it follows then that, regardless of whatever one might say about Paramàrtha's memory, we are bound to accept or to reject in toto his information, which clearly contradicts Frauwallner's identification of Narasimhagupta and Skandhagupta with Bàlàditya and Vikramàditya. Thus, the so-called fact that Skandhagupta and Narasimha succeeded each other uninterrupted and borne the titles Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya is no more fact than is his assertion concerning the dates given by Paramàrtha and Hui K'ai above. So, we have no need either to assume the presence of two Vasubandhus or to worry about the date arrived at previously for Vasubandhu, in terms of what was induced by Frauwallner to support his hypothesis. What then is the solution to the problem raised above?

If Skandhagupta and Narasimhagupta could not be identified with Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya, let us return to the first bearer of the title Vikramàditya, who is certainly none other than Candragupta the Second, to see whether there is anybody who succeeds him and bears the title Bàlàditya or not. Thanks to the discovery of a series of inscriptions, we now know that after Candragupta Vikramàditya there was

a Young King named Govindagupta and borne the title Bàlàditya. These inscriptions are issued either jointly with his mother or with the ministers under his charge at Vaiśàlì, the place where they are found today, and all have the texts of the following forms: "Mahàràjàdhiràja-Śrìcandraguptapatnì mahàràja-Śrìgovindaguptamàtà mahàdevì Śrìdhruvasvaminì śrìyuvaràjabhattàrakapadìyakumàràmàtyàdhikàranasya", "Mahàràja-Govindagupta-Bàlàdityo yuvaràjabhattàrakapadìyablàdhikàranasya", etc...[71] The first form clearly states what relationship Govindagupta had with Candragupta. It reads: "The wife of Śrì Candragupta, Emperor, Great King of Kings, mother of the Great King Govindagupta, Mahàdevì Śrì Dhruvasvaminì (issues this) from the office of the prince-minister to his Highness, the Young King". So, Candragupta Vikramàditya was Govindagupta's father and Dhruvadevì his mother and the queen. The second form informs of what title this Young King and Great King Govindagupta has. It says: "The Great King Govindagupta Bàlàditya (issues this) from the Military Office of his Highness, the Young King". Govindagupta, the son of Candragupta Vikramàditya, did have the title Bàlàditya. Thus, we do have a pair of kings of the Gupta period who have the father-and-son relationship and who bear the titles Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya, respectively, which Paramàrtha referred to. Are they then the Vikramàditya and the Bàlàditya whom the latter speaks of?

Answering this question, we face immediately two difficulties. First, Candragupta Vikramàditya is supposed to reign betwen the years 375-415 A.D. and therefore precludes any possibility of Vasubandhu being able to live under his successor having the title Bàlàditya, as Paramàrtha reported, if the date which we have arrived at for Vasubandhu previously is accepted. Secondly, it is not attested that Govindagupta in fact succeeded Candragupta. In front of these two difficulties, Lê Manh Thát[72] has proposed a re-dating

of the Gupta kings, assuming them to have reigned twenty or so years previously to their traditionally assigned dates. This course of solution is by no means impossible, in spite of its radical character which would be resulted into the entire re-dating of Indian history. However, Anacker[73] recently pointed out that the title Yuvaràjan conferred upon Govindagupta and attested in the inscriptions issued by him may be taken to indicate that Govindagupta did ascend the throne as "Young King", when Candragupta was still alive. In fact, the term yuvaràjan is usually translated as "Crown Prince", but as Anacker recognized, this translation is inadequate and does not convey its full meaning. Instead, it must be rendered as "Young King", probably as opposed to the "Old King". We know that Govindagupta was already Young King, when he issued his inscriptions found in Vaiśàlì. When did he issue them, then?

It is quite difficult to flatly answer that question, since materials concerning Govindagupta are so scarce that even his birthyear and death-year are wholly unknown to us, let alone the details relating to the issueing of his inscriptions. But because the inscriptions are found at Vaiśàlì (Besarh), it may be safely assumed that the following possibility exists. First, when Fa Hsian visited India during the years[74] 399-412 A.D., it is reported that Pàtaliputra was the capital of the Guptas. Secondly, we also know from other sources that Candragupta established for a time Ujjain as his capital during his campaign against the Western Ksàtrapas of Gujerat[75]. Thirdly, although it is not attested epigraphically, several later sources say that Dhruvadevì was originally the wife of Candragupta II's elder brother Ràmagupta, who under the threat of the Śaka gave her to the Śaka satrap. But thanks to the bravery of Candragupta II, she was won back, and shortly after Candragupta overthrew Ràmagupta, she became the former's wife out of gratitude. Now, Candragupta is assumed to ascend the throne

in the year 375. So, Dhruvadevì must become his wife no sooner than that, and Govindagupta must be born thereafter, probably in the year 376. Taking these three circumstantial evidence together, we may reach following conclusions. As to Govindagupta, he must be consacrated as "Young King" at about the year 390, since sixteen years is the usual age for a prince to acceed as Young King. This is similar to the Thái thuong hòang system created by the Trần Dynasty in Vietnamese history, where when the Imperial prince reached the age of eighteen, he usually received the throne to become Emperor and his father retired to become the Great Old Emperor, although the power remained very much in the latter's hands. At about the year 390, Candragupta launched his campaign against the Western Ksàtrapas and had for a time Ujjain as his capital. So, since Pàtaliputra is known to be the capital during the year 399-412, it follows then that Govindagupta Bàlàditya, after being consacrated as Young King, must be acting as a royal symbol during his father's absence throughout that campaign, which might last for more than two years, in that heartland of the Guptas, which is the central Gangetic valley, including among other cities Ayodhyà and Vaiśàlì. Therefore, the Vaiśàlì inscriptions issued by him must have been issued during that time, that is, during the years 390-395.

Thus, if at about the years 390-395 Govindagupta already entitled himself Bàlàditya and claimed himself "the Great King" and "the Young King", we have no need further to re-date the Gupta kings and the Indian history, because he substantiated sufficiently for us that there was a pair of kings who succeeded each other as father and son and bore the titles Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya respectively, and under whom Vasubandhu lived, as Paramàrtha reported. Consequently, despite that Candragupta reigned up to the year 415 and Govindagupta did not actually succeed him thereafter, but Kumàragupta I., instead, there is no discrepancy betwen Vasubandhu's date of fourth century

and Candragupta's long reign, because Govindagupta as the son of Candragupta has been consacrated as the Young King under the title Bàlàditya already in the year 390 or shortly thereafter, if not before that. In this framework hence, Vasubandhu was quite active during the last part of his life, which covered the period betwen the years 380-390, when he acted as a tutor to the young Govindagupta and died shortly after when Govindagupta became Bàlàditya. In any case, we know for sure that Candragupta Vikramàditya had a son by the name Govindagupta and this Govindagupta claimed himself the title Bàlàditya and called himself "Great King" in his own inscriptions. So, it is the fact that Candragupta and Govindagupta had the father-and-son relationship and bore the titles Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya, respectively and successively, and that they are the only two Guptas who have such a characteristic which none of the others, including Skandhagupta and Narasimhagupta, possess, as Frauwallner has erroneously claimed. And since Kumàragupta is the successor of Candragupta Vikramàditya and has not the title Bàlàditya, it can be safely surmised that Govindagupta claims himself the title Bàlàditya and calls himself the "Young King" and the "Great King", when his father and mother are still alive. Indeed, as has been seen, his mother already speaks of him as Young King, when she issues the inscription jointly with him. So, long before Candragupta's reign ended in the year 415, there was a Govindagupta Bàlàditya who did the governing job in Vaiśàlì and the surrounding area. Furthermore, Paramàrtha says nothing of the death of Vikramàditya; he says only that Bàlàditya ascended the throne during the life-time of Vasubandhu. Therefore, there is no need to assume unnecessarily that Vikramàditya must die before Bàlàditya assumeshis responsability as king. We have known examples in India as elsewhere, which assert unequivocally that the young king may be already in the throne when the old king is still alive and well. Besides, those above-mentionned inscriptions

state explicitly that Govindagupta already claimed himself "Great King" and "Young King" Bàlàditya, when his father and certainly his mother were still living. Thus, as far as Vasubandhu is concerned, the two diffculties referred to above pose no problem at all, since we have shown that the two kings associated with him by the names Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya in fact have lived about the year 390 A.D., if not earlier, especially for the latter of the two. From this, we could even conclude that Vasubandhu must have died during the life-time of both Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya.

Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya, whom Paramàrtha spoke of in his Life of Vasubandhu, are therefore none other than Candragupta Vikramàditya and his son Govindagupta Bàlàditya. It is true that we do not know what and where and when Govindagupta ended up to and we are certainly well aware that it is not him but Kumàragupta I., who succeeded Candragupta Vikramàditya when the latter died in the year 415. But what we know about Govindagupta Bàlàditya, as has been amply demonstrated, clearly points to the fact that he was Candragupta's son, bore the title Bàlàditya and already was consacrated as Young King and Great King. And this should be sufficient to justify Vasubandhu's association with him, as Paramàrtha reported. The only uncertain aspect of this whole picture is the time when he issued jointly with his mother or with his minister the above-quoted inscriptions. But again, we have shown that such an issueing probably occurred at about the years 390-395, when Govindagupta was old enough to be consacrated as Young and Great King. In any case, it is not a fact that Skandhagupta and Narasimhagupta are father and son and bear the titles Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya, as Frauwallner claimed; but it is an indeniable fact that Candragupta II. and Govindagupta are and do. We therefore do not see any reason to suppose in any other way that Vasubandhu did not associate

himself with the kings Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya, as Paramàrtha has reported. Thus, in all probability Vasubandhu died during the life-time of these two kings at about the year 395 A.D.

From what has been said, it is quite clear that no re-dating of the Gupta kings, and hence of the entire Indian history, is needed, in spite that such a re-dating is by no means unfounded and unnecessary. However, within the limit of our discussion here, if a less radical solution is found, no further more radical approach is required. So, if we can satisfactorily explain the association Vasubandhu had with the kings Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya within the traditional framework of the Gupta kings, where it is agreed that Candragupta Vikramàditya reigned betwen the years 375-415 A.D., no further inquiry into the radical approach of re-dating is necessary or even desirable, which would contribute almost nothing new, as far as the problems concerning Vasubandhu are concerned, and only to the prolongation of the discussion. Unwittingly and quite unexpectedly, that association can even aid us in fixing more accurately a terminus ad quo for Vasubandhu, which in this case must be none other than the year 395 A.D. and which the traditional Chinese dates failed to give, as we have seen. As consequence, the mentionning of Vikramàditya and Bàlàditya by Paramàrtha not only does not pose any serious unsolvable problems, but on the contrary, can even be quite a help, once some of the difficulties related to it are properly resolved.

Thus, if taken together as a whole, Chinese and Indian data give us a rather clear and sharp picture of Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu died around the year 395 at the age of 80. So, he was born around the year 315 A.D. at Purusapura in a brahmin family. He had an elder brother, the famous Asanga, and a younger one by the name Virificivatsa. Since Purusapura like the Kingdom of Gandhàra as a whole was still

a stronghold of Sarvàstivàda Buddhism, both Asanga and Vasubandhu entered the order of that sect. Asanga was soon dissatisfied and undertook the study of Buddhism with Maitreya with the result that numerous works were produced through their collaboration, of which the most monumental and the most celebrated is surely the Yogàcàrabhùmi. Vasubandhu too was soon to be dissatisfied with that sect. But before leaving it, he wrote the famous Abhidharmakośa as a critical study of the doctrine of that sect. There for the first time, he laid out the problems which occupied his thought effort, and destroyed once and for all all the pseudo-problems that the Sarvàstivàdin has attached to Buddhism. He was probably about thirty years old, when he finished writing that work, that is, around the year 345 A.D. From 345 A.D. to around 355 A.D., we are not very clear as to what Vasubandhu did. Perhaps, various logical works attributed to him were written during that ten years. By 355 A.D. Vasubandhu was possibly wholly dissatisfied with logic and all the problems it entails. Asanga fell ill and sent words to Vasubandhu to come to see him. During this reunion, Vasubandhu should have discussed many questions which occupied his mind with Asanga and the result is a new series of works, which later on constituted what is usually called his vijñànavàdin thought. From 355 A.D. to his death in 395 A.D., he wrote indeed many works, including the Vimśatikà, the Trimśikà, the Trisvabhàva-nirdeśa, the Karmasiddhiprakarana, the Vyàkhyàyukti etc... and numerous commentaries on various Sùtra and on the works of Maiterya and Asanga, and a few religious hymns such as Sambharaparikatha, Sìlaparikatha etc..... It was in all probability during this period that he composed the treatise called Paramàrthasaptati to refute the Samkhya Vindhyavàsa posthumously, and refused to debate with others Buddhists of his time, particularly the notorious Sanghabhadra, on account of his so-called

old age. Through his writings, he was probably very much influenced by his brother's and Maitreya's thought and personality, although not exclusively. He wrote a famous commentary on Àryadeva's Śataśàstra, about which Kumàrajìva later was reported by his disciple Seng Chao to have said that it is the only work that Kumàrajìva valued most[77]. By the year 375, Vasubandhu might be living at Ayodhyà, which is Candragupta's "capital-in-residence" for a while. And perhaps there that he was engaged by the latter to be his son's tutor. Govindagupta grew up to become Bàlàditya, and maybe because Ayodhyà and Vaiśàlì were his childhood towns, he was given the governorship of the central Gangetic valley, when Candragupta was absent during the campaign in the West. He established himself in Vaiśàlì from where to issue his inscriptions together with his mother and ministers under his charge. It was in Ayodhyà, not far from Vaiśàlì where his disciple Govindagupta Bàlàditya resided, that Vasubandhu lived his last day of his full eighth year. He died an accomplished man, both socially and personally, at the age of eighty in the year 395 A.D.

That is a sketchy account of Vasubandhu's life gathered from the informations given by Paramàrtha, Hsüan Tsang and Bu sTon . We also mentionned the names of few of his works. Lamotte has said: "Vasubandhu wrote too much". The Chinese even conferred upon him the title "the master of thousand treatises". Indeed, from what we now know, Vasubandhu is quite a prolific writer. Although both Paramàrtha and Bu sTon give us rather too general and sketchy lists of his works to be of use, we can rely upon various reports and catalogues of the Chinese and Tibetan translations to set up a definite list of his writings, lost or still extant in toto or in fragment, known to us. In the following list, no attempt will be made to discuss the authenticity of each work attributed to Vasubandhu by the author of a catalogue or a report. We will take the informations at their face value, except in the case

where such informations are known definitely to be spurious, because a discussion of that nature will take a lot of time and space, which seems to be not very appropriate in a study devoted to Vasubandhu's thought. Furthermore, the question of authenticity appears to center mostly around the works belonging to the commentary category, which, as has been said, do not have the same importance as Vasubandhu's own independent writings. So, for the sake of clarity, his works will be classified into three categories under the headings of Indenpendent Writings, Commentaries and Hymns, respectively. For each work, if its title in Sanskrit is known, it will be given as such. Otherwise, it will be given the Chinese or the Tibetan title, as the case requires. Those lost will be designated as "Lost". Those still extant in fragments will be designated "Fragment". Those still extant in original Sankrit will be designated as "Sanskrit". Those still extant in Chinese or Tibetan translations or in both will be designated as "Taishô X" or "TT X", respectively, where X stand for the number in the actual Taishô edition of the Chinese Tripitaka or in the actual Suzuki edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka.

I. Independent Writings

1. Abhidharmakośa : Sankrit; Taishô 1558, 1559 & 1560; TT 5590 & 5591.
2. Vàdavidhi: Fragment.
3. Vàdavidhàna: Fragment.
4. Vàdahrdaya: Lost
5. Vimśatikà: Sanskrit; Taishô 1588, 1589 & 1590; TT 5557 & 5558.
6. Trimśikà: Sanskrit; Taishô 1586 & 1587; TT 5556.
7. Trisvabhàva-nirdeśa: Sanskrit; TT 5559.
8. Pratìtyasamutpàdavyàkhyà: Fragment Sanskrit; TT 5496.
9. Pañcaskandha-prakarana: Taishô 1612; TT 5560.
10. 大乘百法明門論 : Taishô 1614; TT 5564.
11. Vyàkhyàyukti: TT 5562.
12. Vyàkhyàyukti-sùtra-khanda-śata: TT 5561.

13. Karmasiddhi-prakarana: Taishô 1608 & 1609; TT 5563.
14. Trinihsvabhàva-śàstra: Taishô 1617.
15. Buddhatà-śàstra: Taishô 1610.
16. Tarka-śàstra: Fragment; Taishô 1633.
17. 轉識論 : Taishô 1587.
18. 顯識論 : Taishô 1618.
19. Vivrta-gùhyàrtha-pinda-vyàkhyà: TT 5553.
20. Nirvàna-śàstra: Taishô 1527.
21. Astàdaśaśùnyatà-śàstra: Fragment Sankrit; Taishô
22. 六門教受習定論 : Taishô 1607.
23. 止觀門論頌 : Taishô 1655.
24. Vajrasuci-śàstra: Taishô 1512.
25. Pañcakamagunopalambha-nirdeśa: TT 5680

II. Commentaries

26. Viśesacintabràhmanapariprcchà-sùtra-tìkà: Taishô 1532.
27. Àryàksayamati-nirdeśa-tìkà: TT 5495.
28. Àryabhadracàryàpranidhàna-tìkà: TT 5516.
29. Áryacaturdharmaka-vyàkhyàna: TT 5490.
30. Àrya-gayàśìrsa-sùtra-tìkà: Taishô 1531; TT 5492.
31. Daśabhùmika-sùtra-śàstra: Taishô 1522; TT 5494.
32. Saddharmapundarikà-sùtropadeśa: Taishô 1519 & 1520.
33. Àryabhagavatìprajñàpàramitavajrachedikàsaptàrtha-tìkà: Taishô 1510, 1511 & 1513; TT 5216
34. Amitàyur-sùtropadeśa: Taishô 1524.
35. Dharmacakraparavrtti-sùtropadeśa: Taishô 1533.
36. Bodhicittotpàda-sùtra-śàstra: Taishô 1659.
37. Àryasammukhidhàranivyàkhyàna: Taishô 1361; TT 5489
38. Buddhànusmrti-tìkà: TT 5487.
39. Caturdharmaka-ratnosnìsa-sùtropadeśa: Taishô 1526.
40. 涅槃經本有今無偈論 : Taishô 1528.
41. 遺教經論: Taishô 1529.

42. Śata-śàstra-vrtti: Taishô 1569.

43. Àryanirdeśaprakarana: Taishô 1602.

44. Mahàyànasamgrahabhàsya: Taishô 1595, 1596 & 1597; TT 5551.

45. Mahàyànasùtràlamkara-vyàkhyàna: Sanskrit; Taishô 1604; TT 5527.

46. Madhyàntavibhàga-tìkà: Sanskrit; Taishô 1599 & 1600; TT 5528.

47. Dharmadharmatàvibhanga-vrtti: Fragment Sanskrit; TT 5529.

48. Tryupasampada-sùtropadeśa: Taishô 1534.

III. Hymns and Discussions of Hymns.

49. Triratna-stotra: TT 2057

50. Sìlaparikatha: TT 5421 & 5664

51. Sambhara-parikatha: TT 5422 & 5666

52. Saptagunaparivadanakatha: TT 5420 & 5663

53. Ekagàtha-bhàsya: TT 5488

54. Gàthàsamgrahaśàstra: TT 5603

55. Gàthàsamgraha-śàstràrtha: TT 5604.

Miscellany.

56. Paramàrtha-saptatì: Lost.

Thus, at least fifty-six writings by Vasubandhu are still known to us, which are mostly preserved in Chinese or Tibetan translations. Thanks to the painstaking labor of many scholars, particularly of Frauwallner[81], various logical works of his, of which the Vàdavidhi is of special interest, have been reconstructed. Our knowledge of Vasubandhu's discovery and achievements in the field of logic will derive mainly from these reconstructed accounts. Although the Tarka-śàstra has been doubted by Tucci[82] as to whether it is Vasubandhu's work, due to the fact that it talked about the five-menbered inference-schema and that it was cited in Dignàga's Pramànasammuccaya in plural, we now have no need to entertain such a doubt, especially after the interesting results presented by Takemura[83] in his investigating work. The Tarka-śàstra together with various reconstructed logical writings of his will, hence, be able to give us a rather clear picture of what Vasubandhu's logic is. In this connection, it must be

pointed out that possibly Vasubandhu has written two different versions of the same work having the name Tarka-śàstra. The first version, parts of which remain to be the Chinese translation known to us today, was probably composed when he was still a student as a result of his study of the Nyàya-sùtra and other texts concerning the art of debate. Indeed, the only chief difference which gives it a characteristic is the introduction of three conditions for establishing the validity of the inference of the type upheld by the Nyàyika.[84] Vasubandhu wrote it in all probability around the year 335-340, and certainly before the Abhidharmakośa. The second version is the one cited by Dignàga in his Pramànasamuccaya[85] concerning the logical theory that a logical inference needs only two menbers and not three or five, which we will see are employed by Vasubandhu himself in the exposition of his thought, e.g., the Karmasiddhiprakarana. This version is therefore a revised copy of the first and is written late in his life, perhaps about the year 370. The problem related to Vasubandhu's changing view on logic will be discussed later on. Suffice it to say right now that our inclusion of the Tarka-śàstra into his bibliography is not without reason and fact.

Also thanks to the editing work of many researchers, Sanskrit original and fragment of a number of Vasubandhu's writings have been published, particularly the Abhidharmakośa[86], the Vimśatikà and the Trimśikà[87], the Trisvabhava-nirdeśa[88], the Pratìtya-samutpàda-vyàkhyà[89], the Dharmadharmatàvibhàgavrtti[90], the Mahàyànasùtràlamkara-vyàkhyàna[91] and the Madhyàntavibhàga-bhàsya[92]. And they will be used exclusively in the following chapters in the study of his thought, in spite that their modern translations and commentaries will not be disregarded[93], specifically de La Vallée Poussin's translations of the Kośa, the Vimśatikà and the Trisvabhava-nirdeśa, Lévi's translations of the Vimśatikà and the Trimśíkà, and Ui's commentaries on the latter two.

N O T E S

1. Wassiljew, Der Buddhismus, St. Petersburg, 1860, p 235ff.

2. Péri, À propos de la date de Vasubandhu, BEFEO X (1911) 339-390.

3. Frauwallner, On the date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu, Roma, 1951.

4. Hui Chao, Ch'êng wei shih lun liao i teng, Taishô 1832, 688b3-28.

5. Péri, Op. cit., p 257.

6. Hui Chao, Op. cit., p 659c8-12; Lê Mạnh Thát, Sơ thảo lịch sử hình thành Văn hệ Bát nhã, Sài gòn, 1968, p 210.

7. P'o sou p'an tou fa shih chüan, Taishô 2049, 188a6-191a17.

8. Arthur F. Wright, Biography and Hagiography: Hui-Chiao's Lives of Eminent Monks, Silver Jubilee Volume of the Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusho, Kyoto University, Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, pp 408-412.

9. Hui K'ai, A p'i t'a mo ku chö shih lun tsu, Taishô 1559, 161a16-20:
仏滅度後千一百餘年有出家菩薩名婆藪槃豆…造大小乘論凡數十部並盛宣行、靡不宗学法師德業具如別傳

10. Fa Tsang, Hua yen ching chüan chi, Taishô 2073, 156b27-c10:
婆藪槃豆菩薩、此云天親、於山中釋十地品經本經文、依次消解菩薩初造論成感經放光明山振地動、其国主臣民俱來慶賀歎希有瑞也、廣如本傳。(…) 又別傳云天親、造花嚴經論、既未獲具本、此十地或是。

11. Ts'ing Mai, Ku chin i ching tu chi, Taishô 2151, 259b29.

12. Hui Tsiang, Fa hua ching chüan chi, Taishô 2068, 49b13, 49c29, etc...; Cf. Péri, Op. Cit, pp 351-352.

13. Sakurabe, Fu ra wa li no shi no Seshin nendai ron ni tsuite, IBK I (1952)202-208.

14. Jaini, On the theory of two Vasubandhus, BSOAS XXI (1958) 48-53

15. Wayman, Analysis of the Śravakabhùmi manuscript, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, pp 19-24.

16. Lê Manh Thát, Dựa vào việc nghiên cứu triết học Vasubandhu, Sài gòn, 1968.

17. P'u Kuang, Ku chŏ lun chi, Taishô 1821; Cf. Frauwallner, Op. cit.; Sakurabe, Op. cit., p 208;

18. Tao An, Er ch'iao lun, in Kuang hong ming chi, Taishô 2103, 142a18-20: 又依什法師年紀及百法銘、並共春秋符同、如來滅桓王五年歲次乙丑至桓王二十三年歲次癸未出家、至五十年歲在甲午成佛、襄王十五年歲在甲申滅度至今一千二百五年、

19. Thích Minh Châu, Hsuan Tsang The Pilgrim and Scholar, Sàigon: Viên Đại học Vạn Hạnh xuất băn, 1966, p 162.

20. Hsuan Tsang, Ta T'ang si yu chi, Taishô 2087, 896b27-29: 菴沒羅林西北百餘步有如來髮爪窣堵波、其側故基是世親菩薩從覩史多下見無著菩薩處、無著菩薩健馱邏國人也、仏滅去世後一千年中誕...

21. Péri, Op. cit., p 356; Frauwallner, Op. cit.; Takakusu, A study of Paramàrtha's Life of Vasubandhu and the date of Vasubandhu, JRAS (1905) 51, note 1.

22. Ui, Genjo imen no Indo sho ronshi no nendai, in Indo tetsugaku kenkyû V, Tokyo, 1929, pp 134; Kajiyama, Bhàvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapàla, WZKSOA XII-XIII (1968/1969) 193-203.

23. Lê Manh Thát, Op. cit.

24. Ui, Shintai sanzô den no kenkyû, in Indo tetsugaku kenkyû VI, p 6.

25. Ui, Op. cit., pp 122-128.

26. Frauwallner, Op. cit.; Péri, Op. cit., p 357.

27. Tao Hsuan, Siu kao seng chüan, Taishô 2060, 430a19.

28. Hui K'ai, Jie ta cheng lun shih tsu, Taishô 1595, 152c3-153b26; Ibid., A p'i ta mo ku chŏ lun tsu, Taishô 1559, 161a3-b28.

29. Hui K'ai, Jie ta cheng lun shih tsu, Taishô 1595, 152a16-21: 慧恺志慚負蒙勤惓聚螢、謬得齒迹学徒、禀承訓義、遊宦諸辯、多歷年所、各師勝友、稍得諧論、但綜涉疎淺、鑽仰無述、尋波討源、多所未悟、此蓋慮窮於文字、思迷於弘旨、明發興嗟、覃心非一、每欲順風問道、未知厥路有三藏法師.....

30. Hui K'ai, Jie ta cheng lun shih tsu, p 153a14-17:
惟昔帝受業已少淫況收、服膺未久、便解遣、今重奉值
倍懷踊舞、欲復飡和熏燎、訪道咨疑、雖懇懇三請而不
驚免、悅然失圖、心魂靡託、

31. Hui K'ai, Jie ta cheng lun shih tsu, p 153a18-b4:
儀州刺史陽山公世子敦陽絕、風、業、峻整、武威負技、
該閱文史、深造治要、崇潮內湛、潘輝外溢、銳賢味道
篤信愛奇、將為請主、薦中礼事、法師乃欣然受請、許焉翻譯、

32. Hui K'ai, A p'i ta mo ku chŏ lun tsu, Taishō 1559, 161b8-16.

33. Yen k'o Chün, Ch'üan shang ku san tai Ch'in Han San kuo lo ch'ao wen, IV, Peking: Chung hua shu ku, 1958, p 3501; Ch'uan Ch'en wen, ch. 18 fol. 2b3.

34. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1967, p 165.

35. Hui K'ai, Jie ta cheng lun shih tsu, Taishō 1595, 153b22:

36. Ch'en, Buddhism in China, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, p 450; Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, Louvain, 1958, pp 210-222.

37. Robinson, Op. cit., pp 21-25.

38. Fu fa tsang yin yuan chüan, Taishō 2058, 321b22-29.

39. Maspéro, Sur la date et l'authenticité du Fou fa tsang yin yuan tchouan, Mélanges Sylvain Lévi, Paris, 1911, pp 129-149. This is not to mention the fact that although the year 472 A.D. of its translation by Kikeya might be in doubt, the Fu fa tsang yin yuan chüan in some form must have been existed before the year 518 A.D., because it was already known to Seng Yu who died in 519 A.D. For further informations, see Lê Mạnh Thát, Nghiên cứu về Phú pháp tạng nhân duyên truyện, Typescript 1967, Sàigòn.

40. Tetsuji Morohashi, Dai Kan Wa jiten I, pp 881c-882b.

41. Tetsuji Morohashi, Op. cit., II, pp 239c-240b: 別傳 = 傳奇小說.

42. Hui Hao, Kao seng chüan, Taishô 2059, p 405c19-28; cf. Lê Mạnh Thát, Góp vào việc nghiên cứu lịch sử Phật giáo Việt nam thế kỷ thứ năm, Tư Tưởng 1 (1972) 69-88 & 2(1972) 55-80.

43. K'ai Chu, Ts'ing tu wang sheng chüan, Taishô 2071, 112a22-b7; Lê Mạnh Thát, Nghiên cứu về Đàm Hoằng, Sài gòn, 1973.

44. I Ts'ing, Ta T'ang Si yu ku fa kao seng chüan, Taishô 2066, 4b1-6; Fei Chü, San p'ao kan yin yu liao lu, Taishô 2084, 850a11-24; Lê Mạnh Thát, Về pháp sư Khuy Sung, (to appear).

45. Hui Yüan, Ta chi lun shao tsu, in Ch'u san tsang chi chi, Taishô 2145, 75b27-29: 有大乘高士厥号龍樹生于天竺 出自梵種、積誠曩代、契心在茲、接九百之運、撫顏溝之會、

46. Seng Chao, Po lun tsu, Taishô 1569, 167c13-14:
仏泥曰後八百餘年有出家大士厥號提婆

47. Seng Jui, Mo ho p'an ya po lo mi ching shih lun tsu, Taishô 1509, 57a12-13 & 57b13-14: 是以馬鳴起於正法之餘、龍樹生於像法之末、…
故天竺傳云、像正之末、馬鳴龍樹道学之門、共沛晉湖喪矣

48. Chi Tsang, Po lun tsu chu, Taishô 1827, 233a8-11:
嘗師城實論序是什師去世後作之、述什師語云、仏滅後三百五十年馬鳴出世、五百三十年龍樹出世、(……)又云馬鳴興正法之末龍樹起於像法之初…

49. Chi Tsang, Chung kuan lun chu, Taishô 1824, 18b23-25: 問龍樹於像法中何時出耶、答、嘗師城實論序述羅什語云、馬鳴是三百五十年出龍樹是五百三十年出、…

50. Lamotte, L'Enseignement de Vimalakìrti, Louvain, 1962, pp 70-77; Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, III, Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1970, pp 51-55.

51. Lamotte, L'Enseignement de Vimalakìrti, pp 75-76: "C'est évidemment cette dernière date qui fut adoptée par Kumàrajìva, ses disciples Seng-tchao et Seng-jouei et son contemporain Houei-yuan.(...) Deux indices, relevés par M.R.Hikata, permettent

de contrôler l'exactitude de la date 243 p. C. proposée pour la naissance de Nàgàrjuna".

52. Robinson, Op. cit., p 26.

53. Lê Manh Thát, Sơ thão lich sử hình thành vắn hệ bát nhã, pp 220-225.

54. Seng Chao, Chu wei mo kie ching, Taishô 1775, 399b5-27.

55. Seng Jui, Op. cit.; Chi Tsang, Op. cit.

56. T'i p'o p'u tsa chüan, Taishô 2048, 186c8 & 187a18; cf. Lamotte, L'Enseignement de Vimalakìrti, p 75; Chi Tsang, Po lun tsu chu, Taishô 1827, 233a7-b1.

57. Ui, The Vaiśesika philosophy, London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1917, pp 42-43; Lê Manh Thát, Sơ thão lich sử hình thành vắn hệ bát nhã, pp 220-221.

58. Frauwallner, Op. cit.

59. Frauwallner, Landmarks in the history of Indian logic, WZKSOA V (1961) 125-148; Die Weltliteratur, 3. Band, Wien, 1954, p 1849; Die Philosophie der Buddhismus, p 531.

60. Lê Manh Thát, Dựa vào việc nghiên cứu triết hoc Vasubandhu, pp 30-36.

61. Anacker, Vasubandhu: Three Aspects; a Study of a Buddhist philosopher, Doctoral Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin, 1970, pp 8-26.

62. Yaśomitra, The Abhidharmakośavyàkhyà of Yaśomitra, ed. N.N. Law, London, 1949.

63. Kokuyaku Issaikyô, Abidatsuma bu 25, p 25, note 155.

64. Abhidharmakośa, I, 13-14c, LVP pp 23-27.

65. Abhidharmakośa, III, 27, LVP p 70.

66. de La Vallée Poussin, Notes bouddhiques, Bulletins de l'Académie royale de Belgique, XVI (1930) 15-19; L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, Introduction, pp xxvii-xxviii ; Wayman, Op. cit.

67. de La Vallée Poussin, Op. cit.

68. Lê Manh Thát, Dựa vào việc nghiên cứu triết hoc Vasubandhu, pp 34-35.

69. P'o sou p'an tou fa shih chüan, Taishô 2049, 190b.

70. Vamàna, Kàvyàlamkàrasùtravrtti, Vanavilasam Press ed., p 86.

71. Besarh seals of Govindagupta, IA(1923) 12.

72. Lê Manht Thát, Dua vào viêc nghiên cúu triêt hoc Vasubandhu, p 35.

73. Anacker, Op. cit., pp 9-10.

74. Fa Hsian, Fo kuo chi, Taishô 2085, 859b.

75. Saletore, Life in the Gupta age, p 84.

76. Saletore, Op. cit. 16-18.

77. Robinson, Op. cit., pp 33 & 248; cf. Péri, Op. cit., 375-376.

78. Paramàrtha, P'o sou p'an tou fa shih chüan, Taishô 2049, 191a; Hsüan Tsang, Ta T'ang si yu chi, Taishô 2087, 896b27-29; Bu sTOn, History of Buddhism, Obermiller transl., Heidelberg, 1932, pp 136-147.

79. Lamotte, Intro duction au Karmasiddhiprakarana, MCB IV (1935/1936) 178-179.

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CHAPTER THREE

ON WHAT THERE IS

We have said that it is no easy matter to determine which one is the earliest among numerous works written or known to be written by Vasubandhu. Despite that, it is a general consensus that the Abhidharmakośa was his first writing which arose a considerable interest from his contemporaries and subsequent generations, leading finally to the establishment of a school of thought called the Kośa school. Indeed, we have indicated that the first version of the Tarka-śàstra was probably composed in Vasubandhu's student days, when he was taught of the Nyàya logic and still young. But, if we compare the main tenors of these two works, a common feature immediately appears, which is that they both deals with two philosophical systèms about which Vasubandhu attempted some criticisms of his own. Unfortunately, the Tarka-śàstra is not wholly preserved; and there is still some doubt as to its authenticity. So, we are better start with the Abhidharmakośa, and see what we can find therein which lays the foundation for Vasubandhu's later thinking effort.

The Abhidharmakośa is truely Vasubandhu's longest work and the most extensive exposition of his knowledge of any kind. Yet, it is surprisingly pointed out by many scholars repeatedly that contrary to his later works, the Abhidharmakośa is in fact not a very mature writing in that it is full of hesitancies in argument, vagueness in position and verbosity in language[1]. These weaknesses, however, refer to us something rather very interesting about Vasubandhu himself and his thought. They denote a certain wonder and amazement on his part about what he knew and learned. And this is in effect the base on which Vasubandhu set up his thought structure, and from which we must start, if we are to understand anything about him. But, if the Abhidharmakośa is full of hesitancies, vagueness and verbosity, what then can we expect from such a work? Surprisingly, we can expect a great deal.

The truthfullness of such an answer is quite easy to show, because if the Abhidharnakośa expresses Vasubandhu's sense of wonder and excitement about the world, we can expect to find that sense in every line of its pages. It therefore can be considered to be an embodiment of what his view is about the world around him and beyond him, which is about what there is. What is there, then?

By the time Vasubandhu was born in the year 315 A.D., many attempts have been made to answer that question, such as those by the Vaiśesika and the Samkhya, for instance, whose responses were considered expressly to be infantile by him later on in the Abhidharmakośa[2]. When he wrote that work, it seems, as we read it, that he was not sure of what there is, but certain that various theories concerning it are mostly either wrong or found to contain inconsistancies, especially that of the Vaibhàsika. In fact, the Abhidharmakośa is a critical study of the Vaibhàsika system. The Vaibhàsika view of the problem of what there is, is rather sensible and quite sophisticated at the same time. It holds that all the physical world can be broken down to the atoms, which constitute its ultimate elements and which exist momentarily for ever the eternal space; all the mental and psychological world to the consciousness and its derivatives; and the rest to the category which belongs neither to the physical nor to the mental world. The Vaibhàsika then set up a list of what they consider to be there, which consists of a total of 75 types of entities. It can be written as follows, when compared with the lists of similar nature from Vasubandhu himself and the Pàli Abhidharma literature[3]:

Category	Vaibhàsika	Vasubandhu	Pàli
Physical world	11	11	28
Consciousness	1	8	89
Derivatives	46	51	52
Unassociated	14	24	-
The Uncomposed	3	6	1

The answer to the question of what there is by the Vaibhàsika is thus unequivocally clear. What there is, is reduced and can be reduced to those 75 basic entities, which they called "dravya", that is, these 75 entities are really existing by their own right and nature. The rest of the world therefore exists only in dependence upon them and hence is not existing really (paramàrthasat) but descriptively (prajñaptisat), that is, it exists as we describe it in our own terms. For example, what is designated by the word "tree" exists only descriptively, but not really, because the designatum can be broken to its constituent elements, which, in this case, are atoms. The "atoms-tree" exists really, but the tree as such exists only descriptively. What there is for the Vaibhàsika is thus expressly identified and synonymous with what is real. To be for them is and must be to be real. Because of this identification, they are bound to find a solution for the empirical existence of things we perceive. And this, as we just saw, is none other the supposition that there are two levels of truth, i.e., the absolute truth and the descriptive truth. Seventy-five entities mentionned above belongs to the first level; the rest to the second one. But what are the criteria which allow them to reduce things into 75 entities and assign them to the level of the absolute truth?

The response by the Vaibhàsika is rather revealing. First, they maintain that whatever is real must possess a faculty of producing a cognition special to its own[4]. And secondly, they maintain that in order to be able to produce a cognition special to its own, it must not, naturally, be susceptible to further division and analysis.[5] Thus, the tree is not real entity according to the Vaibhàsika, because it can be subject to further analysis, in spite of the fact that it can produce some sort of cognition of its own. What is real for them can therefore be stated as folows. Whatever thing that one can think of and without which it is impossible to think, that thing must be real of necessity. In other words, everything has its

ultimate limit beyond which it is impossible to think of its existence. Or to use the Vaibhàsika's own words, "atom is the limit of the physical world, just as syllable is the limit of the nouns and moment the limit of the time"[6]. What is real then is something which is the limit of all what there is and constitutes at the same time the limit beyond which the thinking of what there is is impossible.

Having defined what is real, the Vaibhàsika begun giving us a list of what they considered to be real in their view, which, as has been seen, consisted of 75 entities. Now, Vasubandhu goes through the list. At this stage, the most striking feature springing up from it is the fact that some of the unassociated category are considered by the Vaibhàsika to be real entities. For instance, they posited that there must exist really something which is called by such names as "birth", "endurance", "aging" and "decay". Vasubandhu starts questioning the validity of these positings. Because of the interesting character of the discussion in itself as well as in our further understanding of it, the passage concerning the inquiry into the question as to whether there is really something which is called by such names as "birth" etc....or not, is worth translating here in full:

"The characters of what there is are again birth, aging, endurance and impermanence. These are the four characters of the composed. Wherever they exist, the dharma is characterized as composed; otherwise, uncomposed. Birth is that which causes that dharma to be born. Endurance is that which causes it endure. Ageing is that which causes it to age. And impermanence is that which causes it to be destroyed. Now, the Sùtra only spoke of three characters of the composed, whereas it should speak of four. Why did it not speak of four characters?

"They said, because endurance is that which has 'the staying-otherwise-ness', which is synonymous with aging, just as birth is synonymous with arising, impermanence with destruction; and because the dharma operate for moving their forces through the time; that is why the Sùtra spoke only of the three characters so as to arouse a distaste for them. Indeed, birth is that which moves its forces from the future

to the present time, while aging and impermanence move them from the present to the past, because they stopped them after having debilitated them. Just as, one might say, three ennemies is of a person wandering in a forest: one of them tries to attract that person out of the forest, the second one enfeebles him, and the third kills him.

"Furthermore, it is admitted that endurance is that which causes the forces to endure after making them appear. Thus, it is that character of the composed which is not changed. And this is also the special character of the uncomposed, because the being of the uncomposed is the endurance.

"Again, others may think that the Sùtra spoke only of one character, which is the endurance-aging, but implies two, which are endurance and otherwiseness. What advantage is there? This is for the sake of arousing the distaste for the attachment to the endurance, as when the prosperity is spoken of, it implies Black Ear.

"So, there are indeed four characters. They in turn are to appear due to other births etc..., because of their composedness. Thus, we have the birth of the birth etc...of them. They constitute four secondary characters, which is birth of the birth, endurance of the endurance, aging of the aging and impermanence of the impermanence. Now, these four characters characterize each other. So there is no fault because of their being progressus ad infinitum. Also, there is no infinite regression of a birth requiring another birth etc... Consequently, they act only on one dharma, while those other four act on eight dharma.

"Those acting on eight dharma are the birth etc... Acting here is understood to mean 'causing activity', 'causing operating". Those acting only on one dharma are birth of the birth etc... Why does a ninth dharma not arise, after having made itself, with the eight characters and secondary characters? Because the birth, for instance, causes other eight dharma to be born, after having eliminated itself. Just as, one might say, a certain hen lays a certain number of eggs, which in turn hatch each one chick. So is the endurance which, after rejecting itself, causes other eight dharma to endure, while the endurance of the endurance only causes itself and the endurance only to endure. Similarly, so are the aging and the impermanence. Therefore, there is no infinite regression.

"The Sàutràntika said, all such talks are analyzing the space. There are no

such dharma as birth of the birth etc... to be real entities, just as they cannot be distinguished by any means. Why? Because there is no means of knowing them. There is no knowledge whatsoever as to their existence as being real entities either by means of direct perception, or by reasonning, or by documentary evidence, just as in case concerning such dharma as physical world etc...

"But the Sùtra spoke that one should know the arising of the umcomposed, their destruction and their 'staying-otherwise-ness'?

"O! Beloved of the gods! one knows the words, but not their meaning. The World-honored One has said: meaning is the only refuge. What is then the meaning of the just quoted Sùtra? Blind by ignorance, the fools think the stream of forces to be I and mine, and attaches deeply themselves to them. For the sake of liberating them from that wrong thinking, the World-honnred One points out the composedness of the stream of forces which is dependently co-arisen, and so he speak of the three composed characters of the composed and not that one should know the arising of these characters or the arising of the characters of these characters etc... Nor is it possible for them to exist, even if they are known. This is what the Sùtra said when it spoke of the fact that one should know the arising of the composed.

"Similarly, one should be aware that the characters is for the understanding of the composed in terms of its being composed. Thus, the characters should not be perceived as things (vastu) of the composed in terms of their being actually existing. They are like the heron [indicating] the water nearby or the character of a young girl indicating her being good or not so good.

"As for the stream of forces, its arising is the beginning, its destruction the end, and when the stream is continuously operating, it is its endurance, the difference of the previous and the subsequent moments of which is its 'staying-otherwise-ness'. So, it is said of the son of the good family Nanda that he should know the sensations arising, enduring, disappearing and destroyed. On this point, they said further:

Birth is the beginning of the stream,
destruction its end, and endurance is itself,/
the staying-otherwise-ness is the difference of its previous and subsequent moments//
Birth is the existence of what is not existing previously,
endurance is its continuity, destruction is the disruption of that /
and the staying-otherwise-ness is admittedly the difference of the previous and subsequent moments of that continuity//
because without the endurance of the momentary dharma there is only destruction/

and without the endurance it does not destroy [anything],
so it is in vain to think of the destruction//

Therefore, endurance is the stream itself. Thus, the teaching of the Abhidharma is proved. It said: 'What is endurance? The non-destruction of the forces just arising'. It might be alleged that there is indeed no non-destruction of a moment just arising. But what the Jñànaprasthàna talked about is concerning with one [moment of] consciousness: 'what is arising? Birth; what is destruction? Death; what is staying-otherwise-ness? Aging'. And here it is concerned with the consciousness of one homogenous existence.

"So, without thinking them as real entities, it might be concluded that each moment has those four characters of the composed. How? Each moment exists after having not existed, that is its arising. Once having existed, there is no more existence, that is its destruction. The series of suceessive moments is its endurance. The difference of each moment of this series is its staying-otherwise-ness.

"But so long as the similar moments arise, they are not different. Then, how could that difference be known? Because it is just like the difference in falling time, which might be fast or slow, of a vajra, which might be projected or not projected, and if projected, it might be projected with force or without. So, the difference in the transformation of the great elements is proved. Furthermore, there are not many great differences in the broken forces. Henee, although there is the staying-otherwise-ness, they can be considered to be similar.

"But it might be argued that because there is no successive moment at the last moment of a sound or a flame or at the time of the complete extinction of the six domains, it follows that there is no staying-otherwise-ness. So the definition concerning the characters above is not sufficient. No, we do not maitain that there is endurance for every composed, but that there is a character which is "staying-otherwise-ness". So there is no fault in our definition of the character which says that for whatever there is endurance, then there is certainly the staying-otherwise-ness for it.

"In short, what is taught by the Worl-honoured One in the Sùtra, when he said 'this is the character of the composed', is this that the composed is that which exists after having not existed and again does not exist after having existed, and its series is that which is designated as endurance, which is continuously changed otherwise.

"Now, what is the problem with the birth etc... as real entities? For any dharma, if it is characterized by them, it is called character. So, the characters of a great man is not different from that great man. The characters of a cow such as dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horn etc.... is not different from the cow. The characters of the earth

dhàtu etc... such as solidity etc.... are not different from these earth dhàtu etc... It is just like the ascent of the smoke looking from afar which is characterized by its being smoke and hence is not different from it at all. There should be a clear explanation here. As long as one grasps the own-being of the physical object etc... of the composed without knowing the prior existence of that object nor its subsequent one nor the difference of its stream of forces, then the composedness does not characterize it. Thus, it is not characterized by the composedness. So, there are no birth etc... as real entities for them.

"Let assume that birth etc... are real entities. What is wrong with it? Then, one would have to assume that one dharma is born, endures, ages and is destroyed at the same time because of the state of their togetherness. If not, one would have to suppose the temporal difference of their activity, saying that birth exercises its activity while still in the future, and once having been born, it does not give birth anymore, but when the dharma is born, endurance, destruction et... exercise their activity, thus when a dharma is not born, then it endures or ages or is being destroyed. But this point here must be examined. First, does the future exist as real entities or not after giving birth? Or no knowledge concerning it is proved. Suppose it exists and birth exercises its activity, how then is the future be proved? The character of the future must be defined. If its activity, once disappeared, appears again, how then is the endurance proved? The character of the endurance must be defined. If the endurance etc... exercise their activity at the same time, then it follows that within one moment the state of being endured, aged and destroyed all occur.If on the other hand one should maintain that the endurance etc... exercise their activity successively in that at any moment of time there is something enduring, something aging or something being destroyed, then one must repudiate the theory that the dharma is momentary. If it should be maintained that 'for us, moment is that during which everything achieves its operation, then it must be explained why being arisen at the same together, the endurance causes things to endure while aging causes them to age and destruction destroys them? If it is because the endurance is being stronger, then it is stronger against what? As long as it is with the dharma, the impermanence will kill it off. If it is maintained that the endurance, once having its task done, it is not capable of doing it again, as in the case of birth. The example

does not fit. Because the operation of the birth is to cause what should be born to be born, and once it is born, it is not capable of causing it to be born again, whereas the capability of the endurance is to cause what should be enduring to endure. So, the example is not fit. What are then the obstacles which makes the endurance incapable of enduring? If they are the aging and the impermanence, then they should be stronger and should exercise their activity first. Further, if their activity is to destroy the endurance, and without the endurance the dharma does not endure, then where can they exercise their activity? And again, how should it be done? Indeed, it is because of the maintainance of the endurance that a dharma just arisen does not perish; otherwise, once neglected by it, the dharma surely does not endure, and it is its destruction. Thus, the characteristics of a dharma just arisen is its endurance, its destruction and its impermanence. But the aging is not absolutely in the way, because of its difference of the previous states which is being dissimilarly transformed. So, it is different in its otherwiseness, because it is said:

If it is as before, aging is not proved,
If it is different from what was before, it is another/
Therefore within one dharma, it is not possible to establish its aging//

The Nikàyàntarìya maintained that the impermanence destroys a certain dharma after recoursing to some other external cause of destruction. But this is like a sick man praying to Deity for the efficacy of the medicine after having taken it. So is the destruction of things due to external causes. However, the destruction of the consciousness and its derivatives are thought to be due to the occurrence of the state of momentariness in virtue of its impermanence without relying whatsoever upon the external causes of destruction. But then the endurance and the impermanence exercise their activity at the same time. And it is not admitted that the state of being endured and destroyed occurs at the same time at the same place.

"Consequently, it is in relation to the stream of forces that those characters of the composed is announced. That is how the Sùtra indicates its meaning.

"But if the future birth is the birth-giver of what should be born, then why are all the future objects not born at the same time? This is because

Birth is the birth-giver of what should be born, but not without
the cause and condition//

Indeed, without the concurrence of the cause and condition the birth is not the birth-giver. But we then see that it is the force of the cause and condition which, once occurring concurrently, give birth to the existent or not to give birth to it, and not the birth itself. Only is the cause and condition the birth-givers.

"Oh! Are you, Sirs, thinking knowing everything? The nature of the dharma is rather subtle. Further, if there is no birth, there should be no idea of what is born. And if there is no birth, there should be no genetif of the type "the arising of the physical object", because in that case it would become "the physical object of the physical object'. The case of the impermanence can be stated in the same way.

"But it then would follow that there should be a 'non-I-ness' to justify the idea of the 'non-I'. And one should come up, as imagined by the heretics, such things as number, length, individuality, association, disjunction, this-ness, that-ness, reality etc... to justify the ideas one, two, big, small, individual, associate, disassociate, this, that, real etc... As for the question of the genetif, it is for indicating what is belonging to the physical object. Otherwise, how can you say 'the own-being of the physical object' [given the fact that you do not admit the difference of the own-being of the physical object from the physical object itself]

"Therefore, all those terms are merely descriptions. For the sake of making known something existing which has not existed previously, one says, something is born. And because there are many birth which have the character of something existing which has not existed previously, so for the sake of differentiation, one employs the genetif that it is the birth of the physical object so as to indicate that it is the physical object which is being born and not something else, just as one says the odor etc... of the sandal-wood or the bust of a statue. So is the way to understand such terms as endurance etc...

"But if something is born without the birth, why are the uncomposed such as space etc... not being born? Because to say that something is born is saying that it has not existed previously. And the uncomposed are always existing, so they are not born. As all the birth is not shown according to the nature of the dharma, therefore it must be admitted that all is not born. Moreover, as other conditions, all in having equal power of giving birth, are not capable of giving birth, hence, to any other, therefore they all are incapable of giving birth to the uncomposed.

"The Vaibhàsika said, however, that birth etc... are already proved to exist as real entities, that one should not give up the documentary evidence when objections

are raised, just as one should not give up one's crop because of the presence of some dears or give up one's eating of the candies on account of some flies staying around. Consequently, objections must be refuted, and the doctrine must be upheld.

"That is the discussion concerning the characters"[7]

We give here the full and rather lengthy translation of Vasubandhu's discussion of the problem of whether such characters of things as its birth, destruction etc... can be considered to be referring to something really existing in its own right. This is because that discussion is a typical one among many which one can easily find throughout the Abhidharmakośa. For instance, the discussion on the reality of time[8], on the ātman[9] etc... It must therefore be viewed as representing Vasubandhu's thought and philosophical concern at the time of its being written, which, as has been said, should have been occurring quite early in his life. Reading that discussion, the impression one acquires is quite clear. Vasubandhu wishes to show how and why he considers such terms as birth, arising etc...are nothing but description. Indeed, for the Vaibhāsika, just as for most of other Indian philosophers of his time, if something is to be known, it must exist really as, say, a tree is for a perception of that tree. This is the first menber of the famous axiom astitvam jñeyatvam abhidheyatvam, "to be is to be knowable and nameable" and vice versa[10]. So, if we know the birth of something, or its destruction, for that matter, then there must exist somewhere something called birth or destruction. Thus, there is a whole range of terms in human language, which, if the first member of that said axiom is to be maintained, would require correspondingly a whole domain of entities to exist to be justified and understood. Vasubandhu himself names some of them such as number, extension and the like in the above passage.

In fact, it has been argued that there must exist something to justify our understanding and knowledge of such statements as "there is no unicorn"[11]. And

true to their preaching, the Naiyàyika acknowledge that the non-existence (abhàva) indeed does exist![11] As Meinong, they point out that it is quite impossible to justify the presence of the negative statements without positing the existence of the negative object, that is, the non-existence as something capable of being perceived or understood in a certain way. If indeed there is no unicorn, how can such a statement be made in the first place? The same thing can be said for other similar instances like "the son of a barren woman" or "sky-flower" etc... And if we generalize the case, it follows that every term in the universe of any language must denote something really existing externally for it to be understood. Consequently, when Sàkyamuni told Nanda that he should know the birth of his sensation, the Vaibhàsika argued that there is indeed something called birth. Otherwise, it is quite silly to tell someone to know something which does not exist at all. Furthermore, it is plainly self-evident to everyone that things do be born, age and perish. Nobody denies such a truth. It is actually an universal truth which applies to all what there is in this world. So, if we know the birth of something, that birth must of necessity refer to an object called "birth". Thus, the universe of the Vaibhàsika is full of real entities; it is even more crowded than Plato's realm of Idea, in spite of the fact that they consciously did take some measure of population control such as classification of all of their entities into 75 basic types, which we have seen previously.

But to say that there is an object called birth or an entity called 'non-existence' is tantamount to saying a lie, because people have seen human being being born, animal being born etc... and they understood what such statements as "there is no unicorn" meant, but never, as far as human historical records are concerned, did anyone have claimed seeing an object called 'birth' or an entity named 'non-existence'.

Besides, if it is argued that the objects of that type exist in some abstract world, which is beyond human perception but can be reached by human reasoning, then one may answer that either their posited existence is superfluous or else unnecessary. In effect, Vasubandhu points out that if birth (jàti) exists and gives birth (janaka), then it must give birth to all kinds of things at the same time. But in practice no such an event happens. It follows, as the Vaibhàsika themselves acknowledge, that birth does not occur without the concurrence of the causes and conditions. However, if causes and conditions are assumed to be responsible to the birth of an object, why should one posit the existence of an object called 'birth' and the like? Thus, for such an object and the like, "there is no knowledge whatsoever as to their existence as being real entities either by means of direct perception or by reasoning or by documentary evidence".

Even if birth and the like are not proved to be indicating any object whatever, the language still has nevertheless such words as birth etc... and such statements as "there is no unicorn". What is the justification for their meaningfulness, for their understandability, in short, for their knowability? Vasubandhu's answer is rather simple and precise. "For the sake of making known something existing which has not existed previously, we say, something is born. And because there are many births which have the character of something existing which has not existed previously, so for the sake of differentiation, we employ the genetif "the birth of a physical object" so as to indicate that it is the physical object which is being born and not something else, just as we say the odor etc... of the sandal-wood or the body of a statue". So, birth for Vasubandhu does not indicate any object nor does it need any referrant, because within any context of speech it can be replaced by a number of other appropriate phrases. Thus, instead of saying "there is the

birth of something", one may say "something is born" as a substitute. One can even go further in Vasubandhu's view to say "Something is now existing which has not existed before" as its equivalent. The theory held by the Vaibhàsika that any grammatically correct denoting phrase[12] stands for an object is therefore both superfluous and unnecessary. It is superfluous because the phrase 'a birth' can be substituted and reduced to a number of any other equivalent phrase where it does not occur and in which it is not required. 'A birth' does not denote an object any more than do the phrase 'something is born' or 'something is now existing which has not existed before'. It is unnecessary because it entails further difficulties which are both illogical and undesirable. First, if any phrase must denote an object, then, as Vasubandhu points out, one is supposed to assume the existence of an object called 'non-I' so as to be able to assert that there is not an I. But this would lead to the violation of the law of contradition in that one say the I exists and also does not exist at the same time. Indeed, Meinong and Russell both have recognized the dilemma. However, just as in the case of 'birth', if the phrase 'non-I' and the like are reduced to a number of any other phrases where they do not occur as constituents and in which they are not required, we are not only free from all the difficulties which the Vaibhàsika theory regarding them as standing for objects might entail, but also from the bothersome task of explaining how, if 'birth' denote an object, that object could be located in an object which is described by the statement 'something is born' or some other of similar nature in which the phrase 'birth' does not occur and is not required. Secondly, if any phrase must denote an object, where can that object be found? Suppose there is a statement in which the phrase 'non-I' (anàtman) occurs. Now, if any phrase must denote an object, where can the Vaibhàsika turn to to show that there is an object called 'non-I' so as the

phrase 'non-I' can be justified. In effect, as we have said, the universe of the Vaibhàsika is full of entities and even more crowded than is that of Plato. Thus, by Vasubandhu's ingenious device of reducing any phrase to a number of any other phrases of its equivalent, we can dispose quite handily all the difficulties as well as all the undesirabilities of the Vaibhàsika theory of the real entities.

It further throws an unexpected light upon the Vaibhàsika theory of language itself. Vasubandhu reported to us that for the Vaibhàsika the composed are among other things the "foundation of the speech"[13]. He further explained what is meant by the term "speech", which is considered to be synonymous with the term "discourse" (vàkya), by saying that "it is composed of things and words". Now, under the light of Vasubandhu's criticism, which we have just seen, it becomes plainly clear that what the Vaibhàsika means when they say "the composed are the foundation of the speech" is not that which we would expect, that is, that every thing existing are capable of being expressed in a certain in the universe of language, but that which is the least apparent to a reader, that is, that every word must denote a certain object, which serves as its "foundation". In fact, although such an understanding is rather not very self-evident to us, it is explicitly confirmed by the unknown author of the Abhidharmadìpa, when the latter expressedly states that "words are for standing for the object"[14]. And this author, thanks to the discovery of the manuscript of his work, was clearly an no less virulent opponent of Vasubandhu than the well-known Sanghabhadra. So, we are that far off the track in saying that the Vaibhàsika did hold the theory that any grammatically correct denoting phrase must stand for an object so as to be understood. This theory, as has been said, led to a number of difficulties and undesirable conclusions, among which the most striking is the following. It is the most striking not so much in

what it poses as a problem but in what the Vaibhàsika proposed as a solution for it.

We have said that for the Vaibhàsika any grammatically correct denoting phrase must denote. The question then arises as to how one can explain the presence of an object called 'birth' when someone utters a statement, say, "that is the birth of my son". We also have said that to carry out such an explanation is indeed a rather bothersome task. And truly it is not easy at all for the Vaibhàsika. They proposed that the word is born with the object (sahaja), which, if we accept Buddhaghosa's clarification, can be understood as follows. Buddhaghosa divided words for the objects, that is, their names, into four classes: That given on a special occasion, that given in virtue of a personal quality, that given by parents, and that which has spontaneously arisen. The last class is maintained, because, as he himself pointed out, without it it is not possible to account for, for instance, why people call 'moon' an object which is continuously changing itself and reveals fully itself only at certain night of the month. The word 'moon' is therefore "spontaneously arising" (opapàtika) with the object which is later known as moon.[15] In the Vaibhàsika's own terms, the word 'moon' is born with the object to be called 'moon'. So, when someone utters "that is the birth of my son", the word 'birth' is standing for the object 'birth' and is born with that object. That object in its turn is born with the object to be called 'son', and so on untill every word is accounted for. This is indeed quite strange a theory as it is quite absurd a conclusion. But it seems as if the temptation for the Vaibhàsika is so irresistible under the force of their argument that such a theory of language has been proposed.

Now through the ingenious device introduced by Vasubandhu, not only are such terms as birth etc... proved to be nothing but grammatically correct denoting phrases, which they are, but also all the terms of similar nature in any given language should be

conferred the same treatment. For him, they are none other than mere descriptions (prajñaptimàtra) and need not stand for any object at all. Thus, by reducing a grammatically correct denoting phrase to any other phrases of its equivalent, Vasubandhu frees himself from the bothersome and unrewarding task of looking for such objects and entities as "son of a barren woman" or "flower of the sky" etc,.., which are in fact very hard, if not impossible, to find. Hence, any phrase is taken to be not standing for any object whatever, but for a variable, which can be reduced or substituted. Instead of supposing a constant term or a proper name, say 'n', we can always employ a predicate "N' which is true only of the object with which 'n' is concerned and take 'n' as an abbreviation for the eliminable dsecription '(ix)N(x)'. So, 'n' can never be taken to stand for the object, nor can it assert the necessary existence of that object, with which it is concerned. The shadow of all sorts of undesirable fictitious and abstract objects is thus vanished once and for all without leaving a trace. There is no need any more to assume the existence of such objects as number, non-I, or extension etc... to account for the words one, two, <u>anàtman</u>, big, small etc... The universe of language is sufficient to express itself and to guarantee its meaningfulness. And this is because every term of it is capable of being reduced to a description of its equivalent where it does not occur and in which it is not required. In effect, by that conclusion, Vasubandhu also frees the Vaibhàsika from their predicament in that they readily agree with him that there is no eternal soul (àtman). Now, if the Vaibhàsika regard any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for some object, then they are bound to contradict themselves if they make such a denial, for if there were such such an object called "soul", it would exist, and we cannot first assume that there is a certain object and then proceed to deny that there is such an object. 'Soul' and all the terms of similar nature are

therefore nothing but descriptions.

This logical device of language analysis is certainly not wholly unknown to those living before Vasubandhu, Even the term "description" itself has become current prominently since the time of the Buddha. In fact, the Photthapàda-sutta credited the Buddha with a discussion on the various speculations about the nature of the eternal soul, saying that according to him such terms as atta-patilàbha, milk, curds, butter, ghee, past, present, future etc...are merely "names, expressions, designations, descriptions in common use in the world".[16] The Mahànidàna-suttanta is even more explicit. It reported the Buddha to have said to Ananda among other things the following: "Description of name-and-form is by means of the aspects, features , signs and indications. If, with respect to the aspects, features, signs and indications, these were absent, would there be any description of a corresponding verbal impression in the form"[17]. Clearly, what this statement intended to say is that the name "form-and-name" and for that matter, names of similar nature, all can be replaced by any other phrases of their equivalents. Indeed, for the Buddha, as is described by the Suttas of the type just quoted, in order for him to be able to refute those concepts prevalent at his time which he regarded to be false or uncorrect, such as the soul etc..., he had to find a device which would allow him to dispense them all together without being committing the contradiction which has been pointed earlier, that is, we cannot first assume something to exist and then proceed to deny that no such a thing ever existed or is existing. Thus, if a statement of the sort "this is a man" is made to him, he might answer with "this is something which is composed of physical and mental components such as four great elements, the sensations, the conceptualizations, the volitions and the perceptions". The term 'man' thus disappears in his answer. From that, he might proceed to deny and criticize whatever theories his opponents were capable of advancing, which he considered to be false or wrong. Thus, he denied

that there is no soul, because any statement made about it can be substituted by some other where it does not occur and in which it is not required.

But the clearest example as to how the term "description" was used before the time of Vasubandhu is none other than the discussion about what the term "chariot" means in the Milindapañha, the famous Milinda's Questions[18]. The Milindapañha in its Sanskrit original must have been known to Vasubandhu, because he quoted explicitly a passage from it in his criticism of the Vàtsìputrìya in Chapter Nine of the Abhidharmakośa[19]. After answering the King Milinda's question about his name Nàgasena as but "a denotation, a name, a description, an expression, for Nàgasena is only a name since no person is got at here", Nàgasena was accused of "speaking an untruth, a lying word".

> "Then the Venerable Nàgasena spoke thus to King Milinda: "You, sire, are a noble delicately nurtured, exceedingly delicately nurtured. If you, sire, go on foot at noon-time on the scorching ground and hot sand, trampling on sharp grit and pebbles and sand, your feet hurt you, your body wearies, your thought is impaired, and tactile consciousness arises accompanied by anguish. Now, did you come on foot or in a conveyance?"
>
> "I, revered sir, did not come on foot, I came in a chariot."
>
> "If you, sire, came by chariot, show me the chariot. Is the pole the chariot?"
>
> "O no, revered sir."
>
> "Is the axle the chariot?"
>
> "O no, revered sir."
>
> "Are the wheels the chariot?"
>
> "O no, revered sir."
>
> "Is the body of the chariot the chariot... is the flag-staff of the chariot the chariot... is the yoke the chariot... are the reins the chariot... is the goad the chariot?"
>
> "O no, revered sir."
>
> "But then, sire, is the chariot the pole, the axle, the wheels, the body of the chariot, the flag-staff of the chariot, the yoke, the reins, the goad?"

"O no, revered sir".

"But then, sire, is there a chariot apart from the pole, the axle, the wheels, the body of the chariot, the flag-staff of the chariot, the yoke, the reins, the goad?"

"O no, revered sir."

"Though I, sire, am asking you repeatedly, I do not see the chariot. Chariot is only a sound, sire. For what here is the chariot? You, sire, are speaking an untruth, a lying word. There is no chariot. You, sire, are the chief ràjah in the whole India. Of whom are you afraid that you speak a lie? Let the five hundred worthy Bactrian Greeks and the eighty thousand monks listen to me: This King Milinda speaks thus: 'I have come by chariot.' But on being told: 'If you, sire, have come by chariot, show me the chariot', he does not produce the chariot. Is it suitable to approve of that?"

When this had been said, the five hundred Bactrian Greeks, applauding the venerable Nàgasena, spoke thus to King Milinda: "Now do you, sire, speak if you can". Then King Milinda spoke thus to the venerable Nàgasena:

"I, revered Nàgasena, am not telling a lie, for it is because of the pole , because of the axle, the wheels, the body of the chariot, the flag-staff of a chariot, the yoke, the reins, and because of the goad that 'chariot' exists as a denotation, appellation, description, as an expression, as a name".

"It is well; you, sire, understand a chariot. Even so is it for me, ssire, because of the hair of the head and because of the hair of the body.... and because of the brain in the head and because of material shape and feeling and perception and the habitual tendencies and consciousness that 'Nàgasena' exists as a denotation, appellation, as a description, as an expression, merely as a name. But according to the highest meaning the person is not got at here. This, sire, was spoken by the nun Vajirà face to face with the Lord:

Just as when the parts are rightly set
The word 'chariot' is spoken,
So when there are the khandhà
It is the convention to say 'being'".[20]

Thus, it is quite explicitly evident that the author of the Milindapañha knows at least that there is some way to dispose of the notion that words must stand for entities, and that they are nothing but a denotation, an appellation, a description, an expression, a name (sankhà samaññà paññatti vohàro nàmam pavattati). Even more remarkable is the verse uttered by the nun Vajirà which says expressedly that when we say "something exists", it does not necessarily follow that that term designates the existence of some object in its own right. It is just as the term 'chariot' does not necessarily stand for the object called chariot. Surely, both Nàgasena and Milinda know what the word 'chariot' means. But what Nàgasena wishes to show to Milinda is the fact that if a word is meaningful, it does not imply that that word must stand for some object eternally externally out there somewhere. This is because it can be substituted by some other phrase of its equivalent. In the example discussed by Nàgasena, the term 'chariot' does not designate any part of the chariot, nor can it designate anything without and apart those parts. So, instead of using the term 'chariot', which might lend itself to the positing a certain entities called chariot, we may as well say "something is a combination of a number of structures which are constructed in such and such ways that one may use to transport oneself". In short, such terms as chariot and the like all can be swept away without fear of losing any of the entities which they are supposed to stand for in any universe of discourse. The same is for proper names such as Nàgasena: "'Nàgasena' exists as a denotation, an appellation, a description, as an expression, merely as a name". Thus, for any constant term or proper name n, it is always possible to replace it by a predicate N which is true only of the object with which n is concerned and in which n does not occur nor is it required. Predicate N is then said to be description.

$$n = (ix)N(x)$$

The result just arrived is essentially correct, for it disposes for us of all

the pseudo-problems arising out of the misconception about words and their meaning. Once and for all, we are free of all the idle talk about being and nonbeing based upon some compounded and erronneous notions about such statements as "there is no son of a barren woman". But it must be admitted that although the Milindapañha sees that words are nothing but "denotations, appellations, descriptions, expressions and names", as they certainly are, its device for proving that proposition is still rather crude, if not outright cumbersome. It is true that the term 'chariot' does not apply where there are not sufficient structures to justify it. It cannot either identify with any term of the parts which constitute the structures, nor can it be apart from them all. However, to say that the chariot is not the flag-staff of a chariot, as Nàgasena's questions imply, is implicitly asserting that the word 'chariot' does indeed stand for something. For in order to be able to establish a relationship betwen a chariot and its flag-staff so as to deny that the chariot is not the flag-staff of chariot, one already knew what the term 'chariot' as well as 'flag-staff' mean. That is, that one already knew that the chariot is not the flag-staff of the chariot. Consequently, it is fine to say that the chariot is not the flag-staff of the chariot and so forth. Nevertheless, such statements are possible only, if and only if one knows what the chariot as well as the flag-staff of a chariot are. So, though the term 'chariot' can be done away with in any context in which it occurs with any other phrases of its equivalent, the question still remains as to how the knowledge of the chariot can arise, if not from the term 'chariot' itself. The procedure proposed by Nàgasena for doing away with the theory that words must stand for objects is therefore rather crude and unpolished. It could lend itself to such questions as that which we have just raised.

In fact, the same procedure has been employed by Nàgàrjuna, which troubled him no

less, in spite of the fact that he has handled it with considerable dextrexity and success. In the Madhyamika-kàrikà, Nàgàrjuna goes at great length to show that whatever terms there are about the world of objects, they are nothing but descriptions. Thus, they are empty and devoid of any reference, that is, they are "devoid of own-being", to use his own term.[21] It is in this line of thought that he announced his famous thesis in the Kàrikà xxiv.18, which reads as follows:

> yah pratìtya-samutpàdah śùnyatàm tàm pracaksmahe
> sà prajñaptir upàdàya pratipat saiva madhyamà//

"That which is dependent co-arising, we call emptiness;
Relying upon it, it is the description; it is identical with the Middle Path"

Clearly, just as Nàgasena has shown Milinda that the term 'chariot' in the king's statement that "I cam in a chariot" is nothing but an empty term by dissecting the chariot into many of its parts upon which it is dependent for co-arising, so is what is done by Nàgàrjuna in his Madhyamika-kàrikà, except with more serious tone and heavier arguments. For him, whatever is dependent co-arising, like the chariot, it must be empty, for like the chariot, it is "only a sound" and "there is no chariot", after analysing it into whatever causes and conditions upon which it depends to arise. Because it is empty, it is nothing but a description. It is obvious then that the positions of both Nàgasena and Nàgàrjuna are identical. The chariot of Nàgasea is to Nàgàrjuna "that which is dependent co-arising". Because of "being dependent co-arising", the chariot was analysed by Nàgasena to become but "only a sound"; thus it must be a empty term to Nàgarjuna. And finally, both of them concluded that the term 'chariot' and the like are nothing but descriptions (prajñapti).

But if Nàgàrjuna employed the same procedure and arrived at the same conclusion as Nàgasena did, he was bound to face the same difficulties which we have pointed out previously for the latter. The difference betwen them, however, lies in the

fact that Nàgàrjuna recognized such difficulties and attempted a resolution of them, which, unfortunately, seems to be not very convincing or creative. In the Vigraha-vyàvartanì, Nàgàrjuna imagined himself as a critic of his own theory, which says that whatever is dependent co-arising is termed empty, it is but a description, devoid of its own-being. Now, the critic in the Vigraha-vyàvartanì readily points out for him that if that is the case, then his theory about being devoid of its own-being falls directly into a rather serious dilemma. That is, that if his theory about being devoid of its own-being is itself also devoid of its own-being, it follows that whatever that theory says about being devoid of its own-being has nothing to do with the being itself, because it is devoid of its own-being itself. On the other hand, if his theory about being devoid of its own-being is itself having its own-being, then it is either false or there is an exception to it.[22] By stating this dilemma, Nàgàrjuna saw clearly what has been constituted as a major difficulty since the days of the Buddha in the analysis of the type carried out by Nagasena and himself. It is true, they admitted it willingly, that when a chariot is analysed into many of its component, the word 'chariot' does not stand for any thing at all; "it is but a sound", it is a description. One can conclude hence that 'chariot' is but a description. The word 'description' here is therefore referring to the word 'chariot'. Now, if we proceed to analyse the word 'description' into its parts, which, say, is consisting of eleven letters of the Roman alphabet, then these eleven letters 'd, e, s, c, r, i, p, t, i, o, and n' are surely not the word 'description', let alone of their being referring to the word 'chariot'. Thus, if the word 'chariot' does not refer to the chariot, as Nàgasena has convincingly proved and Nàgàrjuna has concurred, then the word 'description' itself does not refer to anything. The statement that "the word 'chariot' is but a description" must therefore be false, if not unutterable. If the word 'description' does refer to something, then by the same token, words

such as chariot and the like must also refer to a certain thing.

The recognition of the dilemma by Nàgàrjuna which his theory of language, as presented in the Madhyamika-kàrikà, has created, must be reckoned as an indication of his philosophical excellence. And the Vigraha-vyàvartanì must be thouroughly studied and closedly examined, a task which has been hitherto neglected, if we are to understand the main tenets of the Madhyamika-kàrikà. Having pinpointed the core difficulty of his theory, Nàgàrjuna, it must be said, failed however to provide with a resolution. He knew that his opponents regard any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for some object and that such a phrase for him is nothing more than a description. But in proving why it is a description by pointing out that it is concerned with something which "is dependent co-arising", like the chariot of Nàgasena, he as well as Nàgasena committed themselves to a rather fundamental error, which is that they employed the term 'chariot' in two radically different senses.

When Nàgasena asked Milinda "is the chariot the axle?", Milinda naturally had to answer: "it is not". But in so replying, he understood that the word 'chariot' which is used by Nàgasena does stand for something, which is made up of other structures besides the axle. Thus, the statement that the chariot is not the axle is possible only, if one knows what the chariot is as well as what the axle is. This, however, presupposes that the words 'chariot' and the like do stand for certain thing. Otherwise, if they stand for nothing "but merely sounds", it is quite difficult to imagine what prevents one from making a statement of the sort "the chariot is the axle", because the words 'chariot' and 'axle' in this case are both nothing but mere names which are capable of being applied to whatever things one sees fit or conventional language allows. In other words, they are variables capable of being substituted for when called upon. Nàgasena and Nàgàrjuna both recognized hence the

fact that words are indeed variables capable of being substituted and that they are therefore incomplete symbols, if we may borrow Russell's terminology[23]. But the procedure which leads them to that recognition, implicitly requires that they must know what words stand for before they can assert that they are variables and descriptions. So, Nàgasena can arrive at the conclusion that "'chariot' exists as a denotation, appellation, description, as an expression, as a name", and get Milinda agree to it, only after he and Milinda both employ 'chariot' as indicating something, and not merely as a term. In fact, it is rather odd if what Nàgasena means when he asks: "is the chariot the axle", is the term 'chariot' and not something called chariot. The same thing must be said about the thesis of Nàgàrjuna, which says "that which is dependent co-arising, we call emptiness; relying upon that emptiness, it is a description". Here, the chariot is "that which is dependent co-arising", so it is emptiness, which is what Nàgasena would call "merely a sound" or "there is no chariot". Consequently, "that which is dependent co-arising" must be "a description", just as the chariot is "a denotation, an appellation, a description, an expression, a name". But in order to make the statement that "that which is dependent co-arising is a description", it is necessary that one knows beforehand what "that which is dependent co-arising" is, so as to be able to proceed to analyse it into what which it depends upon to co-arise and thus to prove that it is indeed a description. In short, one can assert that a term is a description, only after regarding it as standing for something. Otherwise, one cannot analyse the term 'chariot' into its axle, its pole , its flag-staff etc...

However, if that is the case, the term 'chariot' is used in two radically different senses, i.e., it is used to indicate something existing out there and at the same time to indicate that it is merely a term. We cannot say outright that Nàgasena and Nàgàrjuna confuse these two senses of the term, which are evidently apparent to

everyone. What we can say is that they operate under a tricky cloud of confusion so as to be able to produce their rather interesting and exceedingly helpful theory of description, saying that words are but descriptions. And that tricky cloud constitutes their fundamental error in the attempt of resolving all the difficulties which the confusion betwen naming and meaning entertained by their contemporaries, leading the latter to regard any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for some object,[24] has given rise to. In effect, the confusion betwen naming and meaning is quite prevalent not only among the philosophers of today and of recent and modern times, but also among the thinkers and grammarians of olden-age India. In his famous Tattvasamgraha-pañjikà, Kamalaśìla reported that at least three theories are known to maintain that words stand for either an universal, or a particular, or for both[25], which open the ways for various views in the later time, which Nàgasena and Nàgàrjuna, as has been seen, are combatting against with their theory of description. For them, any constant term or proper name n, one can always substitute it by a predicate N, which would give a description (ix)N(x).

But the device they use to arrive at the theory leads them to a fundamental error, which is consisted of confusing the two different senses of the term employed. This fundamental error still survived up Vasubandhu's time with the Vaibhàsika. In the Abhidharmakośa , Vasubandhu told us that for the Vaibhàsika "for whatever thing of which there is no more notion, after it is being crushed such as the jar, or after it is being analysed by the mind such as the water, that thing is true only of convention. Otherwise, it is true in its highest meaning"[26]. And he further explained what the just quoted thesis of the Vaibhàsika means as follows:

"For whatever thing the idea of which is no more when it is being

crushed into pieces, that thing is true [existing] only of convention. For instance, the jar. Here, the idea 'jar' is no more, when it is broken into pieces. In other cases, where for whatever thing the idea of which is no more when it is analysed into other dharma by the mind, that thing should also be known to be true only of convention. For instance, the water. Here, the idea 'water' is no more, when it is analysed by the mind into such dharma as physicality etc... However, in termsof the conventional knowledge of these object, people say, according to convention, that there is the jar or there is water; they are telling the truth and not a lie. That is the conventional truth.

Other than that is the absolute truth. Here, for whatever thing, the idea of which is always there, even after it is being crushed to pieces or being analysed by the mind into other dharma. It is true in its highest meaning [absolutely]. For instance, the matter. Here, after crushing it into particles and analysing it by the mind into other dharma such as essence etc..., the idea of the own-being of the matter is still there. Sensation etc... should also be looked in the same way. It is called the absolute truth because of its absolute existence. Also is the absolute truth that which is grasped by the supra-mundane knowledge or the mundane knowledge acquired immediately after it. The ancient masters said: "that which is grasped by any other means, is all the conventional truth". That is the discussion of the truths".[27]

The Vaibhàsika maintain still, hence, the theory of description as it is understood by Nàgasena and Nàgàrjuna, according to which words do not stand for anything but a description, because the things they describe can be analysed further into other things. Interestingly enough, although the present version of the Abhidharmakośa in its Sanskrit original, which we just translated, does not explicitly employ the term 'description', but employs instead the phrase "the idea X is no more" for its equivalent, for indicating the words concerned with the objects which can be either crushed into pieces or analysed by the mind into other things, the version translated into Chinese by Paramàrtha does have that term, when it says 'jar' or

'water' exist only as a description of certain form[28].

Most interesting of all, however, is the reference made to the term "apoha". It is the most interesting, because Vasubandhu is further credited with another discovery of major consequence in the field of logic and general philosophy, which, as will be seen, becomes a major subject of inquiry by all Indian schools of thought. Since the days of Stcherbatsky and Frauwallner[29], it is generally assumed that "the first exposition of apoha occurs in Dignàga's Pramànasamuccaya" and Dignàga is credited with, as in other cases, the distinguished title "the founder-father of the theory". [30] But now, as Lê Manh Thát has rightly pointed out[31], such an assumption, based upon what we know about Vasubandhu and other philosophers before, shows itself to be completely unfounded and outright erroneous. Both the term "apoha" and its compound "anyàpoha" are already employed and discussed, as has been seen above, by Vasubandhu. What Dignàga does in Chapter Five of his famous Pramànasamuccaya is nothing more than a generalization of the Vaibhàsika theory of apoha as presented by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakośa. Thus, thanks to Vasubandhu, that we now know why and how the concept of apoha originates and when it officially appears in the history of Buddhist thinking. Clearly, apoha is a derivative of the theory of description. It stands as a response to the task of showing that such objects as water etc..., which is evidently very difficult to take apart, as Nàgasena has done with the chariot of Milinda, can indeed be taken apart, though less easier and not physically at all, by the analysis of the mind. Apoha at this stage is therefore still a naive concept of analyticity, which says that whatever thing which can be analysed into other things, it is only conventionally true or existing. Yet, undoubtedly because of the connection betwen the term concerning things and the things themselves, which that concept represents, that Dignàga and the multitude of thinkers and logicians after him could derive their various theories of apoha.

Thus, the introduction by Vasubandhu of the term apoha and his discussion of its concept must be reckoned as one among others of his major contributions to the history of philosophy. Curiously enough, most researchers of the present century, with the exception of probably Stcherbatsky, all have had access to de La Vallée Poussin's edition and translation of the Abhidharmakośa both in its Sanskrit fragments and in its complete Chinese and Tibetan versions; yet, none pointed out the above fact when writing about the theory of apoha.

Apoha, as it is defined by Dignàga, is the repudiation or the differentiation of the thing from the other things.[32] Thus, what the word 'cow' refers to is that which is not the non-cow. Or what the word 'chariot' refers to is that which repudiates what is not the chariot. Obviously, in so defining, Dignàga intends to give a solution to the problem, that both Nàgasena and Nàgàrjuna left without any clear-cut answer, which is that if the word 'chariot' is merely "a denotation, an appellation, a description, an expression, a name", then how can one say, for instance, that the chariot is not the axle. Surely, the word 'chariot' must mean something, even when it does not stand for any object at all. So, with Vasubandhu's introduction of the term apoha and its concept within the framework of the Vaibhàsika theory of description, Dignàga seizes upon it and recognizes both its deficiency and its remedy at the same time. The deficiency lies in the problem, which we just mentionned, i.e., the word 'chariot', for instance, must mean something, even though it may not stand for any object at all. And the remedy is the solution that in spite of the fact that the thing designated by the word 'chariot' is broken up and analysed into many of its parts, which are not naturally designated by the same word, that word 'chariot' does have some meaning of its own by repudiating what is not being chariot. 'Chariot' is the not-not-chariot. The phrase 'not-not-chariot' can obviously be explained and

understood in many different ways. In his Apohasiddhi, Ratnakìrti points out at least three ways in which it can be explained. First, it can mean: the chariot is excluded from what is not being chariot, and vice versa. Second, it can mean: the chariot is differentiated out in the midst of what is not being chariot. Third, it can mean: the not-not-chariot is a mere repudiation of what is not being chariot[33]. And Ratnakìrti hastens to add that these three ways of explaining the phrase are unsatisfactory if not dangerously incorrect, because they affirm either that there is indeed a real thing out there called chariot, or that 'chariot' is a mere denial of what is not being chariot. So, according to him, when we talk about apoha, it is not intended at asserting either the existence or the non-existence of things, but at asserting "an affirmative statement whose truth is ascertained by the exclusion of its contradictory"[34].

By that assertion, Ratnakìrti clearly understands that apoha is in fact a derivative of the theory of description. It aims at destroying the conception that words must stand for objects. But the means the apohists use to achieve that end is rather cumbersome, if not more so than are those employed by Nàgasena and Nàgàrjuna. With the introduction of the double negation, Dignàga and his followers, Ratnakìrti included, are constantly facing with the problem of justifying the use of negation and of negative statements. Thus, although the concept of apoha is itself quite interesting, in view of the end it is intended at, it must be said that it is not an elegant concept to start with. Secondly, it poses more problems than it solves. For example, if the chariot is the not-not-chariot, then the term 'chariot' in that assertion is still used in a double sense, which we have pointed out is a fundamental error in theory of description of Nàgasena and Nàgarjuna. Consequently, despite its attractive character, the apoha concept does not act very well as a

remedy to the deficiency which Nàgasena and Nàgarjuna left open in their theory of description and which the Vaibhàsika attempted to rectify but failed due to their attachment to the analytical device provided by those two men. So, in so far as the theory of description is concerned, it must be acknowledged that the fundamental error committed by Nàgasena and Nàgarjuna still remains unresolved. A solution to it, it seems, demands that a change in method or device is required. And this is exactly what Vasubandhu proposes to do in his theory of description.

The device Vasubandhu presents is both simple and elegant. It is consisted of the statement that "for the sake of making known something existing which has not existed previously, one says, something is born; and because there are many births which have the character of something existing which has not existed previously, so for the sake of differentiation, one employs the genetif that it is the birth of a physical object so as to indicate that it is the physical object which is being born, and not something else", the statement made when Vasubandhu attempts to show to the Vaibhàsika that the word 'birth' does not stand for any object at all. Clearly, without trying to dissect the birth into many of its parts, as Nàgasena has done with King Milinda's chariot, a task, which, Vasubandhu must have recognized, even attempted, is very difficult to achieve, and if achieved, very difficult to present to his opponents as a convincing evidence that birth is "a mere sound", that it is "a denotation, an appellation, a description, an expression, a name", Vasubandhu simply says that if the word 'birth' does not stand for any object, this is because it can be substituted by a number of any other phrases of its equivalent within the context in which it occurs. Thus, if someone says, this is the birth of something, Vasubandhu would respond matter-of-factly that this is something is being born, or still further, something is existing which has not existed previously.

His response then is quite explicitly relied upon a rather simple and formal concept of substitutivity of words, according to which any grammatically correct denoting phrase does not stand for any object at all if it is capable of being substituted. Hence, Vasubandhu could dispense himself with not only the curious analytical device proposed by Nàgasena and Nàgàrjuna, which has led them to their fundamental error, but also with the remedy which the Vaibhàsika hesitatingly advanced with their naive concept of anyàpoha. In fact, that Vasubandhu gives only a passing remark to such a powerful concept, in spite that it is he who first introduces and discusses it, as we have pointed out, indicates clearly that it is not because he does not see the pregnant implication of that concept, but rather because he probably deems it unneccessary to be employed, especially when another alternative is still available and proves to be more simple and elegant. Indeed, if the word 'chariot' can be substituted for by another phrase of the form 'the so-and-so', then why should one bother with such cumbersome as Nàgasena's dissecting analysis or the Vaibhàsika's mental analysis or Dignàga's the not-not-chariot. By relying upon the formal character of a language and its substitutivity, any constant term or proper name all can be reduced to one of a number of any other phrases of its equivalent. They therefore can be said to have the form 'the so-and-so', that is, $(ix)N(x)$. Birth is no more an object than is the non-existence; nor is it more an object than is the chariot of King Milinda. Any statement in which the word 'birth' occurs and is required, all can be replaced with any of its equivalents in which that word is not required and where it does not occur. For instance, if one were to say "this is the birth of a son of a barren woman" and to suppose that every constant term of that statement stands some object, one is indeed in deep trouble in looking for an object called birth,

let alone the task of finding the son of a barren woman. On the other hand, if one were to apply the concept of substitutivity to such a statement, it becomes quite apparent that no time is to waste on the work of looking for objects or of explaining how the object called birth can co-exist with the object called son etc... What the statement of that type intends to say is the following: something is being born, which is begotten by a woman who is barren, which clearly does not contain the term 'birth' nor the term 'son'. Henceforth, no discussion is needed either as to the existence of the son of a barren woman, or as to the existence of such elusive entities as birth and the like. Even the term 'woman' can be substituted for by the phrase "something is human which is female". Thus, the whole statement "this is the birth of a son of a barren woman" can be said in another way as "something is being born, which is begotten by something which is human and female which is barren", in which statement none of the constant terms occurs nor are they required. So, an entire so-called series of objects having such names as birth, son and woman are completely wiped out not by the wind of Nàgasena's analysis, nor by the force of Dignàga's apoha, both of which, as we have seen, presuppose that they exist somehow, of necessity; but by a substituting device readily available in any language.

For Vasubandhu, then, when something is said to exist, it is always something described. When one says "there is the birth of something", he is saying "something is born". The view on what there is, as is entertained by Vasubandhu, is therefore quite clear: whatever there is, is whatever is described. There is no need to imagine or to invent entities being beyond what ever is described. By one stroke of the pen, Vasubandhu thus succeeds in wiping out a whole universe of entities which the pseudo-theories of language, including that of the Vaibhàsika, have carefully nurtured and elaborately set up. The quarrel about the universal and the particular is thereby dissolved. In Vasubandhu's language, all is needed

is a few variables such as "something" etc... The significance of the just named variable will be discussed later. All we now know is that in his universe of language all constant terms or proper names have the form 'the so-and-so', which is a description (ix)N(x), in which x is a term such that N(x). So, when someone asserts "there exists no son of a barren woman", there is no need to posit an entity called non-existence, as the Naiyàyika, both old and new, willingly do[35], so as to be able to understand the non-existence of the son of a barren woman. Thus, we may say, for Vasubandhu, to borrow what Russell has said on the subject of description, "When, in ordinary language or in philosophy, something is said to "exist", it is always something described, i.e. it is not something immediately presented, like a taste or a patch of color, but something like 'matter" or "mind" or "Homer" (meaning "the author of the Homeric poems"), which is known by description as "the so-and-so", and is thus of the form (ix)(ϕx)"[36].

Vasubandhu's theory of description is therefore not only a major contribution to the philosophical thought in general, which has merit of its own, but also, we can say, the driving force behind all the developments subsequent to the Abhidharma kośa. We will see how from this theory Vasubandhu creates for India a logic from a mass of empirical and particular inferences, which preceedes his time, and lays foundation for all subsequent achievements. Curiously enough, with such a pregnant and powerfull theory, no further exposition of it is known after his death, in spite that such concepts as apoha, perception etc... and such schemas of inference as the three-menbered and the two-menbered receive their full hearing and discussion. Such a situation occurs, probably due to the failure of his successors to grasp the significance of the theory itself. In fact, that Dignàga attempts to develop the concept of apoha into a full-pledged theory in an effort to give a coherent theory

of language to the problem, which Nàgasena, Nàgàrjuna and the Vaibhàsika failed to resolve satisfactorily and completely, is a clear indication that even he himself does not recognize the significance.

In all fairness, it must be said, however, that the theory of description is not Vasubandhu's own discovery, as our above discussion has amply shown. The term 'description' itself appears quite prominently in all the discourses related to the problem of the relationship betwen language and things since the days of the Buddha, if the reports by the Nikàya are to be believed. In any case, Nàgasena and Nàgàrjuna both are Vasubandhu's predecessors, and they are quite occupied with the question as to what the chariot or the dependent co-arising are, which, they both correctly concluded, are nothing but descriptions. Further, although it is generally held that Vasubandhu of the Abhidharmakośa, if not of the Vimśatikà and the Trimśikà[37], relies upon the thesis of the Sàutràntika to criticize the Vaibhàsika, the facts available to us do not tend to support such an opinion. In fact, de La Vallée Poussin, while translating the discussion on four characters, which we translated anew above, did identify the theory of description exposed therein as of the Sàutràntika.[38] But when listing the theses belonging to them he somehow failed to put it in[39]. This is of course not very surprising, simply because the Sautràntika do not hold explicitly such a position. According to Bareau, they only maintain that "the configuration (samsthàna) is not a real thing in itself (anyad dravyam), but merely a description"[40]. On the other hand, also according to Bareau, it is the Prajñaptivàdin who uphold the view that "the composed (samskrta) which are dependent co-arising and are thus descriptions, are suffering (duhkha)".[41] This view is obviously in agreement with the position held by Nàgasena and Nàgarjuna. It is therefore consistent to a large extent with

the theory of description as we understood it of Vasubandhu. In view of this fact, it is quite uncorrect to present the Abhidharmakośa as nothing more than a quarrelling ground for the Vaibhàsika and the Sautràntika and to regard Vasubandhu a merely an objective reporter of the scene. On the contrary, with the increasing accumulation of our knowledge concerning various sects and schools after the Buddha's Nirvàna, it is blantly clear that we must discard quite a few simple notions of ours in relation to what is said in the Abhidharmakośa.

We maintain, as our methodological discussion in Chapter One has made it clear, that in studying Vasubandhu, we must always look upon him as an individual thinker who has some wonders of his own and tries to resolve them upon his own learning and ability. In case of the theory of description, which we are concerned with here, we are of the opinion that the reckless identification made by de La Vallée Poussin, in fact a greater part of the translated version of the Abhidharmakośa itself, especially when the its original Sanskrit manuscript was discovered and published, must be used with all care and reservation, if not outright repudiated. Therefore, we will not be concerned with the problem of whether Vasubandhu's theory of description is his own or someone else's creation. This is further reinforced by the fact that if his theory of description is used and considered as a cornerstone of his system, almost all subsequent developments of his can be easily explained, as will be seen. Our view on that historical question is thus very explicit. We strongly disagree with the often-repeated notion that "It is appropriately customary to speak of a 'system' rather than an individual philosopher for in Indian scene individuals appear to be advancing doctrine of their respective school and less apt to assert individual thesis"[42]. This erroneous notion belies itself, when careful studies are carried out on the works of each individual thinker, as is the case of the theory of

description, which we have discussed.

Thus, although the term 'description' and the theory of description itself are not new, at the hand of Vasubandhu it receives an entirely new formulation, which helps not only in freeing it from all sorts of difficulties which it was hitherto abound, but also in giving it a formal concept which it does not have before, i.e., for any constant term or proper name n there is always a predicate N such that (ix)N(x). In view of this fact, we are not surprised to find that nowhere in the Abhidharmakośa is a definition of the term 'description' readily available. In fact, Vasubandhu never explicitly defines it as well as a number of other terms which play an important role in his thought structure, which will be seen soon. This is probably due to the wide-spread use his contemporaries and predecessors made of them to the point where their technical meaning is widely acknowledged and accepted without any further definition required. Indeed, nowhere is a discussion on the term 'description' in all its details to be found in any of the major writings of such prominent figures as Nàgasena or Nàgàrjuna or even Asanga, as we have said. Yet, interestingly enough, the Pàli Abhidhamma, including those of Vasubandhu's famous contemporary Buddhaghosa, have devoted a considerable space of their writings to the explanation and catalogueing of various meanings that the term 'description' may entail.

So, in the first book of the Abhidhamma pitaka, the Dhammasanganì, among the pairs (duka) of the Suttanta-màtikà is the term 'description' (paññatti), which it defines as follows: "that which is a denotation, that which is an appellation, a description, an expression, a name, a denomination, the assigning of a name, an interpretation, a distinctive mark, a phrasing on this or that dharma is a dharma called paññatti. All dharma are capable of

being described"[43]. By this definition it becomes obvious that the series of terms listed by the Milindapañha, which we have seen, is nothing but standing for the term paññatti. In fact, the Dhammasanganì gives the same definition to the terms adhivacana and nirutti[44]. This shows clearly the central position of paññatti concept in the Pàli abhidharma and confirms our view that the theory of description has a long history and plays a major role in the history of thought of India before Vasubandhu's time. It also indicates why that concept becomes predominant, while all similar terms of similar import are being discarded and forgotten. When the Dhammasanganì says among other thing "the assigning of a name, an interpretation, a distinctive mark, a phrasing on this or that dharma is a dharma called paññatti", it is evident that 'description' as a formal concept has been formulated precisely in the same way as does Vasubandhu. Yet, strangely it does not fully develop into a major theory of significant proportion, as it does with Nàgàrjuna and Vasubandhu, to mention only two foremost representatives. The Abhidhammattha-sangaha, for example. After specifying that the term 'description' may be understood either as that which describes (paññàpetì), or as that which is described (paññàpiyati), it begins listing various categories of descriptions which are known to its author[45] without discussion as to what the significance of such a view is. Buddhaghosa with his numerous commentaries follows the same footsteps. Thanks to the listing of the Abhidhammattha-sangaha, which includes such categories as nàma-paññatti, nàmakamma-paññatti, nàmadheyya-p[46] etc..., Buddhaghosa introduces them into his explaining of the Dhammasanganì, which is quite apparent in the Atthasàlinì. There, after explaining to us that the nàma-paññatti has four kinds, of which the spontaneous one has already been referred to previously, he asserts that the scope of that description covers all dharma, because there is no being, nor thing

that may not be called a name[47]. So, it seems as though the Pàli abhidhamma fails to appreciate fully the significance of the concept of description, in spite that it shows itself to be quite occupied with it.

This failure is of course not a surprise at all to us. Even Vasubandhu in a writing which must be written prior to the Abhidharmakośa still heavily depends upon his predecessors for his ideas about description and thus together with them submits himself to same fundamental error, that we have pointed out previously. The said writing is none other than the Chapter Nine of the present-day Abhidharma kośa. At the end of its Chapter Eight, we are told that "The Abhidharma established along the lines of the Kaśmirian Vaibhàsika is explained by me in its totality. Whatever is wrongly interpreted, that is my fault. For only the Muni are authorities in the exposition of the Wonderful Dharma"[48]. Obviously, that is a closing verse for the whole book, indicating his exposition of the Vaibhàsika doctrine at its end. But then we still have Chapter Nine attached to it. This Chapter Nine therefore can be taken in two ways. Either we consider it written after Vasubandhu finishes the Abhidharmakośa proper. Or he composes it seperately and before the writing of the latter. Betwen those two alternatives, it is rather difficult to definitely decide which one is the most likely, since the chronological order of Vasubandhu's works is not clearly established, as we have referred to. However, we think that the second alternative seems to offer the best choice available, due to following reasons. Firstly, in Chapter Nine Vasubandhu takes the trouble of discussing the position of the Vaiśesika, which he dismisses summarily in the Abhidharmakośa proper as "infantile"[49]. Secondly, at the end of that Chapter, Vasubandhu still talks only of the doctrine of non-I, which thus excludes the possibility of its being written after the period of, say, the Vimśatikà or the Karmasiddhiprakarana[50], which specifically have as their aim the demonstration of not only the doctrine

of non-I, but also the doctrine of non-dharma. Thirdly, its scope is a miniature of some sort of the Abhidharmakośa proper, in that it is intended as a complete exposition of the doctrine of the Vàtsìputra with his criticism, just as he does later on with the Vaibhàsika. For these reasons, we opine that Chapter Nine is an independent treatise written prior to the time of the Abhidharmakośa entitled "Exposition of the refutation of the doctrine of the Pudgala", as the Tibetan version has given[51], and attached to the latter when it was finished.

Now, in that Chapter, which, as has been said, is primarily an exposition of the Vàtsìputra doctrine of the pudgala with Vasubandhu's criticisms, we still find him using the theory of description as it is understood Nàgasena and Nàgarjuna. In fact, the language he employs in that Chapter will clarify for us a great deal the cryptic phrase that Nàgàrjuna used in the verse 18 of Chapter XXIV of the Madhyamika-kàrikà, which we quoted before: sà prajñaptir upàdàya. First, Vasubandhu asked the Vàtsìputra whether the pudgala exists as an object or as a description. Then, for fear that his opponent does not understand, he added further that if the pudgala exists as an object, it is like the atoms, which is indivisible and without which it is impossible to think. If it exists as a description, however, it is like a collection or a complex such as milk. Milk exists as a description, because it can be analysed into other elements, upon which it depends for its existence. But his opponent seemed not to have understood, for he claimed that his pudgala does not exist as an object, nor does it as a description; but "thanks to its internal elements which are gathered and working, the pudgala is described" — àdhyàtmikànupàttàn varttamànàn skandhàn upàdàya pudgalah prajñapyate. Now, in that claim, the Vàtsìputra explicitly connects the term upàdàya with prajñapti, which is exactly what Nàgàrjuna has done the verse just referred to, though less clearly so. So, Vasubandhu has to proceed to inquire him what he means by the

expression skandhàn upàdàya, "thanks to the elements". He points out that skandhàn upàdàya either means skandhàn àlambya, that is, taking the elements as objects, or skandhàn pratìtya, that is, thanks to the elements. In either case, pudgala is nothing but a description, just as milk is a description of its constituents or chariot is a description of its parts etc...[52]

By analysing the term 'pudgala' along that line, Vasubandhu clearly follows the procedure practiced by Nàgasena and Nàgàrjuna. This conclusion is further reinforced by the similarity of language, which we have notified, in the fact that the connection betwen the term upàdàya and prajñapti occurs in the writings of both Nàgàrjuna and Vasubandhu. Then, if Nàgasena used the word 'chariot' in a double sensse, it follows naturally that Vasubandhu must employ the word 'milk' in the same way, that is, the word 'milk' is understood to mean both the thing called milk and the term called milk. This error, as has been seen, could be remedied by the simple and elegant device which Vasubandhu later develops in the Abhidharmakośa proper. In this regard, it must be noted that that procedure never appears once in any of the discussions concerning such questions as to whether the term 'future' is a description or standing for an object etc..., which the Abhidharmakośa proper entails. We recognize therefore that the Abhidharmakośa does contain two theories of description, one in the Abhidharmakośa proper and the other in its Chapter Nine. The latter is an old procedure which is marred by its ambiguous use of double sense and its lack of elegance. The former is a new invention of Vasubandhu's own ability, which is not only simple and elegant, but also free of all the defects and difficulties which that old procedure implies. This distinction of two different theories of description in the Abhidharmakośa can obviously further serve as an evidence for the priority in existence of Chapter Nine.

At this point, it becomes increasingly clear that for Vasubandhu when "something is said to "exist", it is always something described". What there is for him is henceforth that which is being described. Thus, for any constant term or proper name or for any statement of the sort "there is..." or "there exists..." etc..., it is always possible to analyse them into a predicate and an argument of which it is true. So, if someone were to say "there is a birth", we have no need to suppose the existence of an object called birth, as the Vaibhàsika and a host of others do, in order to justify the knowledge of the fact that there is a birth. All we have to do, in Vasubandhu's view, is to reduce that statement into a predicate "is born" and an argument "something", which asserts that something is born. Similarly, if one were to say "the daisy is blue", the same operation applies and we would have a predicate "is blue" and "is a daisy" and a argument "something". Every singular term and proper name is thus absorbed into the variable 'something' with its proper predicate. The concept of existence can therefore be said as a function of the second order, which first order already belongs to the predicate. For any singular term n and for any statement s, there is always a function f such that f(x). In other words, if we have a statement "there is a birth", we always have its equivalent "something is born", in which 'something' is the argument x and 'is born' is the predicate or function f.

Thus, by criticizing the Vaibhàsika concept of what there is, Vasubandhu discovers a rather startling new theory of existence, in which every singular term and every statement are assigned a certain function f such that f(x). They are hence absorbed in the universe of variable, which by definition can even be empty. The statement "the daisy is blue" is of that form f(x), so x in this case is a determinate individual a, which is the daisy. Otherwise

stated, the exact form of the statement "the daisy is blue" is f(a). The argument a in that form is clearly replaceable by another determinate individual b such as the sky, which satifies the function f, that is, that we may say truly that the sky is blue. Therefore, the individual a can be left out of the form f(a) so that it barely becomes f( ), where the empty space betwen the parentheses indicates that the functin f can take on any argument of which it may be true or false. That empty space reminds us very well the emptiness which Nàgàrjuna identified with the description, as we have seen. Consequentially, if it is filled with an x, which is what Vasubandhu called "something" in his various paraphrasings, that does not indicate anything, except the possibility that for all individual there is always one of which the form f(x) may be true or false.

Clearly, that concept of existence is surely a logical one. We will see subsequently as to whether there is any other way in which the concept of existence can be defined differently. At present, it is quite evident that equipped with such a powerful concept, Vasubandhu is ready to derive from it many important and interesting results, which will be the subject of our two next chapters.

N O T E S

1. Lamotte, Introduction au Karmasiddhiprakarana, MCB IV (1935/1936) 180; Lê Manh Thát, Dua vào viêc nghiên cúu triêt hoc Vasubandhu, Sàigon, 1968, p 90; Anacker, Vasubandhu: Three Aspects, Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1970, p 17-22.

2. Abhidharmakośa III ad 100a-b, LVP pp 210-214: atra tu kecit tìrthakarà icchanti/ paramànavo nityàste tadànìm śisyanta iti/ kasmàt ta evam icchanti/ mà bhùd abìjakah sthùlànàm pràdurbhàva iti/ nanu ca sattvànàm karmajah prabhàvaviśisto vàyur bìjam uktam/ samvartanìśìrsavayur và tasya nimittam bhavisyati/ vàyunà lokàntarebhyo bìjànyàhriyanta iti mahìśàsakàh sùtre pathanti/.... ko và bàlapralàpesv àdarah iti tisthatu tàvad evàpratisedhah//.

3. For a complete listing of the entities and an introductory discussion of the differences betwen those authorities regarding them, see McGovern, A Manual of Buddhist philosophy, London: Kegan Paul & Co., 1923, pp 215ff. It must be added that the list headed by Vasubandhu is in the Mahàyànaśatadharmaprakarana, Taishō 1614 & TT 5564. It has been altered considerably by him particularly with respect to its original design, which to the Vaibhàsika aims at complete listing of all that there is, while to Vasubandhu it serves no such purpose, as is evidenced in his other works such as the Vimśatikà, for instance. We are therefore justified in being brief in the discussion of the content of these various lists.

4. Abhidharmakośa I ad 10d: yad etad bahuvidham rùpam uktam tatra kadàcid ekena dravyena caksurvijñànam utpadyate yadà tat aprakàravyavacchedo bhavati/ ...../ àyatanasvalaksanam pratyete svalaksanavisayà isyante na dravyasvalaksanam ity adosah/.

5. Abhidharmakośa II ad 22: yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyàpohe dhiyà ca tat/
ghatàrthavat samvrtisat paramàrthasad anyathà//

yasmin navayavàśo bhinne na tadbuddhir bhavati tat samvrtisat/ tadyathà ghatah/ tatra hi kapàlaśo bhinne ghatabuddhir na bhavati/ yatra cànyàn apohya dharmàn buddhyà tadbuddhir na bhavati tac càpi samvrtisad veditavyam / tadyathàmbu/ tatra hi buddhyà rùpàdìn dharmàn apohyàmbubuddhir na bhavati/ tesv eva tu samvrtisamjñà krteti samvrtivaśàt ghataś càmbu càstìti bruvantah satyam evàhur na

mṛsety etat samvṛtisatyam/ ato'nyathà paramàrthasatyam/ tatra bhinne'pi tadbuddhir bhavaty eva/ anyadharmàpohe'pi buddhyà tat paramàrthasat/ tadyathà rùpam/ tatra hi paramàṇuśo bhinne vastuni rasàrhàn api ca dharmàn apohya buddhyà rùpasya svabhàvabuddhir bhavaty eva/ evam vedanàdayo'pi dṛṣṭavyàh/ etat paramàrthena bhàvàt paramàrthasatyam iti/. Cf. Yaśomitra, Sphutàrthàbhidharmakośavyàkhyà, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri., Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1972, p 860: ghatàmbuvad iti/ dṛṣṭàntadvayopanyàso bhedadvayopapradarśanàrthaḥ/ upakramabhedinaś ca ghatàdayaḥ buddhibhedinaś ca jalàdaya iti/ jalàdisùpakramena rasàdyapakarṣanàn upapatteḥ/ atha và dvividhà samvṛtiḥ samvṛtyantaravyapàśrayà dravyàntaravyapàśrayà ca/ tatra yàsau samvṛtyantaravyapàśrayà tasyàm bhedo'pi sambhavati anyàpoho'pi/ yà tv asau dravyàntaravyapàśrayà tasyàm anyàpoha eva sambhavati na bhedaḥ/ na hi paramànor aṣṭadravyakasyàvayavaviślesah śakyate kartum iti/ samvṛtisad iti/ samvyavahàrena sat/ paramàrthasad iti/ paramàrthena sat/ svalaksanena sad ity arthah/.

6. Abhidharmakośa III ad 85b-c: paramànvakṣarakṣanàh/ rùpanàmàdhvaparyantàh/ rùpasyàpacìyamànasya paryantaḥ paramàṇuḥ/ kàlasya paryantah kṣano nàmah paryanto'kṣaram tadyathà gaur iti/ kṣanasya punaḥ kim pramànam/ samagreṣu pratyayesu yàvatà dharmasyàtmalàbhah gacchantà dharmo yàvatà paramànoḥ paramànvantaram gacchati/.

7. Abhidharmakośa II ad 45c-46d:

lakṣanàni punar jàtir jarà sthitir anityatà//45c-d//

etàni hi samskrtasya catvàri lakṣanàni/ yatraitàni bhavanti sa dharmaḥ samskrto lakṣyate/ viparyayàd asamskrtah/ tatra jàtis tam dharmam janayati sthitiḥ sthàpayati jarà jarayati anityatà vinàśayati/ nanu trìnìmàni samskṛtalakṣanànìti sùtra uktam/ caturtham apy atra vaktavyam syàt/ kim càtra noktam/ àha/ sthitih/ yat tarhi idam sthityanyathàtvam iti/ jaràyà esa paryàyas tadyathà jàter utpàda ity anityatà yàś ca vyaya iti/ ye hi dharmàh samskàràṇàm adhvasamcàràya pravṛttas ta eva sùtre lakṣanàny uktàny udvejanàrtham/ jàtir hi yà samskàràn anàgatàd adhvanaḥ pratyutpannam adhvànam samcàrayati/ jarà'nityate punaḥ pratyutpannàd atìtam durbalìkrtya pratighàtàt/ tadyathà kila gahanapraviṣṭasya puruṣasya trayah śatravaḥ/ tat eka evam gahanàd àkarṣet dvau punar jìvitàdvaparopayetàm tadvad iti/ sthitis tu samskàràn upaguhya tisthaty aviyogam ivecchanti/ ato'sau samskṛtalaksanam na vyavasthàpità/ asamskṛtasyàpi ca svalakṣane sthitibhàvàt/ anye punah kalpayanti sthitim jaràm

càbhisamasya sthityanyathàtvam ity ekam laksanam uktaṃ sùtre/ kim prayojanam/ eṣà hy eṣu saṇgàs padam ataḥ śriyam ivainàm kàlakarṇìsahitàm darśayàmàsa tasyàm anàsangàrtham iti/ ataś catvàry eva saṃskṛtalakṣanàni/

teṣàm api nàma jàtyàdìnàm saṃskṛtatvàd anyair jàtyàdibhir bhavitavyam/ bhavanty eva/

jàtijàtyàdayas teṣàm

teṣàm api catvàry anulakṣanàni bhavanti/ jàtijàtiḥ sthitisthitiḥ jaràjarà anityatà' nityatà iti/ nanu caikasyaikasya caturlakṣanì pràpnoti aparyavasàn adoṣaś ca/ teṣàm punar anyajàtyàdiprasaṇgàt/ na pràpnoti/ Yasmàt/

te'ṣṭadharmaikavṛttayaḥ/

tesàm jàtyàdìnàm aṣṭàsu dharmeṣu vṛttiḥ/ kim idam vṛttir iti/ kàritram purùṣàkàraḥ/ jàtijàtyàdìnàm caikatra dharme katham kṛtvà àtmanà navamo hi dharma utpadyate/ sàrdha lakṣanànulakṣanair aṣṭàbhiḥ/ tatra jàtir àtmànam virahayànyàn aṣṭai dharmàn janayati/ jàtijàtiḥ punas tam eva jàtim/ tadyathà kila kàcit kukkudì bahuny apatyàni prajàyate kàcid alpàni/ tadvat sthitir apy àtmànam varjayitvà'nyàn aṣṭau dharmàn sthàpayati sthitisthitis tu tàm eva sthitim/ evam jarà'nityate api yathàyogam yojye/ tasmàn na bhavaty anavasthàprasaṇgaḥ/

tad etad àkàśam pàṭyata iti Sautràntikàḥ/ na hy ete jàtyàdayo dharmà dravyataḥ samvidyante yathà'bhivyajyante/ kim kàranam/ pramànàbhàvàt/ na hy eṣàm dravyato'stitve kimcid api pramànam asti pratyakṣam anumànam àptàgamo và yathà rùpàdìnàm dharmànàm iti/ yat tarhi sùtra uktam saṃskṛtasyotpàdo'pi prajñàyate vyayo'pi sthityanythàtvam apìti/

granthajño devànàm priyo na tv arthajñaḥ/ arthaś ca pratiśaranam uktam Bhagavatà/ kaḥ punar asyàrthaḥ/ avidyàndhà hi bàlàḥ samskàrapravàham àtmat àtmìyataś càdhimuktà abhisvajante/ tasya mithyàdhimokṣasya vyàvarttanàrtham bhagavàṃs tasya saṃskàrapravàhasya saṃskṛtatvam pratityasamutpannatàṃ dyotayitukàm idam àha trìnìmàni saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛta-lakṣanàni/ na tu lakṣanasya/ na hi lakṣanasyotpàdàdayaḥ prajñàyante/ na càprajñàyamànà ete lakṣanaṃ bhavitum arhanti/ ata evàtra sùtre saṃskṛtasyotpàdo'pi prajñàyata ity uktam/ punaḥ saṃskṛtagrahanaṃ saṃskṛtatve lakṣanànìti yathà vijñàyata/ maivaṃ vijñàyi saṃskṛtasya vastuno'stitve lakṣanàni jalavalàkavat sàdhvasàdhutve và kanyàlakṣanavad iti/ tatra pravàhasyàdir utpàdo nivṛttir vyayaḥ/ sa eva pravàho'nuvarttamànaḥ sthitiḥ/ tasya pùrvàparaviśeṣaḥ sthityanyathàtvam/ evaṃ ca kṛtvoktaṃ vidità eva nandasya kulaputrasya vedanà utpadyante vidità avatisthante vidità astam pariksayam paryàdànam gacchantìti/ àha càtra

jàtir àdiḥ pravàhasya vyayaś chedaḥ sthitis tu saḥ/

sthityanyathàtvaṃ tasyaiva pùrvàparaviśistatà//
jàtir apùrvo bhàvaḥ sthitiḥ prabandho vyayas taducchedaḥ/
sthityanyathàtvam iṣṭaṃ prabandhapùrvàparaviśeṣa iti /
kṣanikasya hi dharmasya vinà sthityà vyayo bhavet/
na ca vyety eva tenàsya vṛthà tatparikalpanà //

tasmàt pravàha eva sthitiḥ/ evam ca kṛtvà'yam apy abhidharmanirdeśa upapanno bhavati/ sthitiḥ katamà/ utpannànaṃ saṃskàrànàm avinàśa iti/ na hi ksanasyotpannasyàvinàśo'stìti/ yad api ca Jñànaprasthàna uktam ekasmiṁś citte ka utpàdaḥ/ àha/ jàtiḥ/ ko vyayo maranam/ kiṃ sthityanyathàtvam jareti/ tatràpi nikàyasabhàgacittam yujyate/ pratikṣaṇam càpi saṃskṛtasyaitàni lakṣanàni yujyante vinà'pi dravyàntarakalpanayà/ katham iti/ pratiksanam abhùtvà bhàva utpàdaḥ/ bhùtvà'bhàvo vyayaḥ/ pùrvasya pùrvasyottaraksanànamubandhah sthitih/ tasyàvisadṛśatvaṃ sthityanyathàtvam iti/ yadà tarhi sadṛśà utpàdyante/ na te nirviśeṣà bhavanti/ katham idam jñàyate/ kṣiptàkṣiptabalidurbalakṣiptasya vajràdeś ciràśutarapàta-kàlabhedàt tan mahàbhùtànàṃ parinàmaviśeṣasiddheḥ/ nàtibahuviśeṣabhinnàs tu saṃskàràh saty apy anyathàtve sadṛśà eva dṛśyante/ antimasya tarhi śabdàrciḥksanasya parinirvàṇakàle ca ṣaḍàyatanasyottarakṣanàbhàvàt sthityanyathàtvaṃ nàstìty avyàpinì lakṣanavyavasthà pràpnoti/ na vai saṃskṛtasya sthitir evocyate/lakṣanaṃ api tu sthityanyathàtvam/ ato yasyàsti sthitir tasyàvaśyam anyathàtvaṃ bhavatìti nàsti lakṣanavyavasthàbhedaḥ/ samàsatas tv atra sùtre saṃskṛtasyedaṃ lakṣanaṃ iti dyotitaṃ bhagavatà saṃskṛtam nàma yad abhùtvà bhavati bhùtvà ca punar ma bhavati yaś càsya sthitisaṃjñakah prabandhaḥ so'nyathà cànyathà ca bhavatìti/ kim atra dravyàntarair jàtyàdibhir katham idànim sa eva dharmo lakṣyas tasyaiva lakṣanam yokṣyate/ kathaṃ tàvan mahàpurùṣalakṣanàni mahàpurùṣàn nànyàni sàsnàlàṅgùlakakudaśaphaviṣànàdìni ca gotvalakṣanàni gor nànyàni kàṭinyàdìni ca pṛthivì-dhàtvàdìnàm lakṣanàni tebhyo nànyàni/ yathà cordhvagamanena dùràd dhùmasya dhùmatvam lakṣyate na ca tat tasmàd anyat/ sa evàtra nyàyaḥ syàt/ na ca saṃskṛtànàm rùpàdìnàm tàvat saṃskṛtatvaṃ lakṣyate/ grhnatàpi svabhàvam yàvat pràg abhàvo na jñàyate paścàc ca saṃtateś ca viśeṣaḥ/ tasmàn na tenaiva tallakṣitaṃ bhavati na ca tebhyo dravyàntaràny eva jàtyàdìni vidyante/ athàpi nàma dravyàntaràny eva jàtyàdìni bhaveyuḥ/ kim ayuktam syàt/ eko dharmaḥ ekasmin neva kàle jàtaḥ sthito jìrno nastaḥ syàd esàm sahabhùtvàt/ na/ kàritrakàlabhedàt/ anàgatà hi jàtiḥ kàritram hi karoti/ yasmàn na jàtam janyate janite tu dharme varttamànàḥ kṣityàdayaḥ kàritram kurvantìti na yadà jàyate tadà tiṣṭhati jìryati viniśyati và/ idaṃ tàvad iha saṃpradhàryaṃ bhavet/ kim anàgatam dravyato'sti nàstìti paścàs janayati và na veti sidhyet/ saty api tu tasmin jàtiḥ kàritram kurvatì katham

anàgatà siddhyatìty anàgatalaksanam vaktavyam/ uparatakàritrà cotpannà katham varttamànà sidhyatìti varttamànàlaksanam vaktavyam/ sthityàdayo'pi ca yugapat kàritre varttamànà ekakṣana eva dharmasya sthitajìrnavinisṭatàm prasañjeyuḥ/ yadaiva hy enam sthitiḥ sthàpayati tadaiva jarà jarayati anityatà vinàśayatìti/ kim ayam tatra kàle tisthatv àhor vijjàryatu vinaśyatu và yo'pi hi brùyàt sthityàdìnàm api kàritram krameneti tasya kṣaṇikatvam vàdhyate/ athàpy evam brùyàt eṣa hi naḥ kṣano yàvataitat sarvam samàpyata iti/ evam api tàbhyàm sahotpannà sthitis tàvat sthàpayati na jarà jarayati anityatà và vinàśayatìti/ kuta etat/ sthiter balìyastvàt/ punaḥ kenàbalìyastvam/ yadainàm saha dharmenànityatà hanti/ kṛtakṛtyà punaḥ kartum notsahate jàtivat/ sthàtur yuktam anutsohum/ na hi śakyam jàtyàdijanyam varttamànatàm ànìtam punar ànetum/ śakyam tu khalu sthityà sthàpyamatyanta api sthàpayitum/ ato na yuktam yan notsahate/ ko và'tra pratibandhaḥ/ te eva jarà'nityat yadi hi te balìyasyau syàtàm pùrvam eva syàtàm/ nivṛttakàritràyàm khalv api sthitau te càpi na tiṣṭhataḥ sa càpi dharma iti katham kutra và kàritram karttum utsahisyete kim và punas tàbhyàm karttavyam/ sthitiparigrahàd dhi sa dharma utpannamàtro na vyanaśyat/ sa tu tayà vyupekṣayamàno niyatam na sthàsyaty ayam evàsya vinàśaḥ/ syàc ca tàvad ekasya dharmasyotpannasyàviśeṣaḥ sthitiḥ vinàśo'nityatà/ jarà tu khalu sarvathàtvena na tathà/ pùrvàparaviśesàt viparinàmàc ca/ atas tad anyathàtve' nya eva/ uktam hi

tathàtvena jarà'siddhir anyathàtve'nya eva saḥ/
tasmàn naikasya bhàvastha jarà nàmopapadyate//

yo'pi àha nikàyàntarìyo vinàśakàranam pràpyànityatà vinàśayatìti tasya harìtakìm pràpya devatà virecayatìty àpannam bhavati kim punas tàm kalpayitvà/ tat evàstu vinàśakàranàd vinàśaḥ cittacaittànàm ca kṣaṇikatvàbhyupagamàt tad anityatàyà vinàśakàraṇàn apekṣatvàt sthityanityate kàritram abhinnakàlam kuryàtàm ity ekasyaikatra kàle sthitavinaṣṭatà samprasajyeta/ tasmàt pravàham praty etàni saṃskṛtalakṣanàny uktànìty evam etat sùtram sunìtam bhavati/

api ca yady anàgatà jàtir janyasya janikà kim artham sarvam anàgatam yugapan notpadyeta yasmàt

janyasya janikà jàtir na hetupratyayair vinà //46//

na hi vinà hetupratyayasàmagryà jàtir janikà bhavati/ hetupratyayànàm eva tarhi sàmarthya paśyàmaḥ/ sati sàmagrya bhàvàd asti càbhàvàn na jàter iti hetupratyayà eva janakàh santaḥ/ kim ca bhoḥ sarvam vidyamànam upalabhyate/ sùkṣmà api dharmaprakṛtayaḥ samvidyante/ jàtam ity eva tu na syàd asatyàm jàtau ṣaṣṭhìvacanam ca rùpasyotpàdah iti yathà rùpasya rùpam iti/ evam yàvad anityatà yathàyogam vaktavyà/ tena

tarhy anàtmatvam apy eṣṭavyam anàtmabuddhisiddhyartham/ saṃkhyàparimànapṛthaktva-samyogavibhàgaparatvàparatvasattàdayo'pi tìrthakàraparikalpità abhyupagantavyà ekadvimahadanupṛthaksamyuktaviyuktaparàparasadàdibuddhisiddhyartham/ ṣaṣṭhìvidhànàrtham ca rùpasya samyoga iti/ eṣà ca ṣaṣṭhì katham kalpyate/ rùpasya svabhàva iti/ tasmàt prajñaptimàtram evaitad abhùtvà bhàvajñàpanàrthaṃ kriyate jàtam iti/ sa càbhùtvà-bhàvalakṣana utpàdo bahuvikalpaḥ/ tasya viśesàrtham rùpasyotpàda iti ṣaṣṭhìm kurvanti yathà rùpasaṃjñaka evotpàdah pratìyeta mà'nyah pratyàyìti/ tadyathà candanasya gandhàdayah śilàputrakasya śarìram iti/ evam sthityàdayo'pi yathàyogam veditavyàḥ/ yadi jàtyà vinà jàyate kasmàd asaṃskṛtam apy àkàśàdikaṃ na jàyate/ jàyata ity abhùtvà bhavati/ asaṃskṛtam ca nityam astìti na jàyate/ yathà ca dharmatayà na sarvam jàtim adiṣyate tathà na sarvam jàyata ity eṣṭavyam/yathà ca tulye jàtimattve tad anye pratyayàs tad anyasyotpàdane na samàrthà bhavanty evam evàsaṃskṛtasyotpàdane sarve'py asamarthàḥ syuḥ/ siddhà eva tu dravyabhàvena jàtyàdaya iti vaibhàṣikàḥ/ na hi dùṣakàh santìty àgamà upàsyante na hi mṛgàh santìti yavà nopayante na hi makṣikàḥ patantìti modakà na bhakṣyante/ tasmàd doṣeṣu pratividhàtavyam siddhàntaś cànuvarttitavyaḥ/ uktàni lakṣanàni//.

8. Abhidharmakośa V ad 24c-27d, LVP 50-66: sarvakàlàstità uktatvàt dvayàt sadviṣayàt phalàt/ tadastivàdàt sarvàstivàdà iṣṭàḥ caturvidhàḥ//. Already in the discussion related to the four characters, Vasubandhu questioned the reality of such entities as the future.

9. Abhidharmakośa IX, LVP 227-301: ed. Pradhan p 461: yat tarhi vàtsìputrìyàḥ pudgalaṃ santam icchanti/ vicàryam tàvad etat/ kiṃ te dravyata icchanty àhosvit prajñaptitaḥ/ kim cedaṃ dravyata iti kim và prajñaptitaḥ/ rùpàdivat bhàvàntaram cet dravyataḥ/ kṣìràdivat samudàyaś cet prajñaptitaḥ/ kim càtaḥ/ yadi tàvat dravyataḥ/ sambhinnasvabhàvatvàt skandhebhyo'nyo vaktavya itaretaraskandhavat/ kàraṇam càsya vaktavyam/ asaṃskṛto và/ atas tìthìrkadṛṣṭiprasaṇgo nisprayojanatvam ca/ atha prajñaptitaḥ/ vayam apy evam brùmaḥ/...

10. Potter, Astitva Jñeyatva Abhidheyatva, WZKSOA XII-XIII (1968/1969) 275-280; cf. Ibid., Presuppositions of India's philosophies, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963; Robinson, The classical Indian Axiomatic, Philosophy East and West XVII (1967) 145; Lê Manh Thát, Đưa vào luận lý học trung quán của Nàgàrjuna, Tư Tưởng 1 (1967) 60-80.

11. Matilal, The Navya-nyàya doctrine of negation, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 1968, pp 99-142; Nyàyasùtra II.ii.7-12 with Vàtsyàyana's commentary. It must be pointed out that the same view is held by the Vaiśesika. See Vaiśeṣika-sùtra III.i.9 with the famous remark by Praśastapàda: abhàvo'py anumànam eva yathotpannam kàryam kàraṇasadbhàve liṇgam, evam anutpannaṃ kàryam kàranàsadbhàve liṇgam. The Naiyayika and the Vaiśeṣika are thus anticipating the negativists of the modern time such as Meinong and his like, who in certain sense serve as a stimulus to such men as Frege and Russell with the result that the modern theory of description appears. See Meinong, Ueber Gegenstandstheorie, in Abhandlungen zur Erkenntnistheorie und Gegenstandstheorie, Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1971, pp 481-530, particularly pp 489-490: Wer paradoxe Ausdrucksweise liebt, könnte also ganz wohl sagen: es gibt Gegenstände, von denen gilt, dass es dergleichen Gegenstände nicht gibt...; also, Ueber Urteilsgefühle: was sie sind und was sie nicht sind, in Abhandlungen zur Psychologie, Graz: ADV, 1969, pp 577-614; Findlay, Meinong's theory of objects and values, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, pp 1-263; Frege, Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik C (1892) 25-50; Ibid., Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand, Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16 (1892) 192-205; Ibid., Die Verneinung, in Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I (1919) 143-157; Russell, On denoting, Mind XIV (1905) 479-493. Cf. Russell, Introduction to mathematical philosophy, London: Allen & Unwin, 1919.

12. That phrase, i.e. 'any grammatically correct denoting phrase', is borrowed from Russell, On denoting, so as to convey correctly the Vaibhàsika view of what words are, and also the pecularities of the Sanskrit language, in which, except the verbal roots, all words are listed in their declined form (the enclitic is naturally remained undeclined). Thus, the Abhidharmakośa II ad 47a-b gives us the following definition of what nàman is: "tatra samjñàkaranam nàma/ tadyathà rùpam śabda ity evam àdiḥ/. Cf. Abhidharmadìpa, kàrikà 142: "nàma-paryàyah samjñàkaranam yathà ghata iti". And nàman to the Vaibhàṣika is obviously the word proper. Cf. Abhidharmadìpa, kàrikà 144: svarùpam vedayamś cchabdo vyañjanàdìni ca dhruvam/ artha-pratyàyakah pràjñair bhakti-kalpanayocyate//.

13. Abhidharmakośa I ad 7c-d, LVP 12: te punaḥ saṃskṛtà dharmà rùpàdiskandhapañcakam/ ta evàdhvà kathàvastu saniḥsàràḥ savastukàḥ//. On kathàvastu, Vasubandhu comments as follows: (ed. Pradhan p 5) kathà vàkyàm/ tasyà vastu nàma/ sàrthakavastugrahanàt tu

saṃskṛtaṃ kathàvastùcyate/ anyathà hi Prakaranagraṇtho virùdhyet/ kathàvastùny aṣṭàdaśabhir dhàtubhiḥ samgrhìtàni/. Yaśomitra added further the curious statement that only the samskṛta are the foundation of language, and not the asaṃskṛta, in his explanation of the just quoted passage. Abhidharmakośa & Bhàṣya of Àchàrya (sic) Vasubandhu with Sphutàrthà Commentary of Àcàrya Yaśomitra, Part I, Varaṇasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970, ed. Shastri p 26-27: kathàvastu śabdenàpi ta eva saṃskṛtà bhagavatà deśitàḥ/ trìnìmàni bhikṣavaḥ kathàvastùny acathurthàny apañcàni yàny àśrityàryàḥ kathàḥ kathayantaḥ kathayanti/ katamàni trìni/ atìtam kathàvastu anàgataṃ kathàvastu pratyutpannaṃ kathàvastu iti/ kathà vàkyam iti/ vistaraḥ kathà vàkyam varṇàtmakaḥ śabda ity arthaḥ/ tasyà vastu nàma viṣaya ity arthaḥ/ nàmnaḥ punar artho'bhidheyaḥ/ tathà hi vakṣyati vàn nàmni pravartate nàmàrtham dyotayati iti/ yadi nàmaiva kathàvastu nàmaiva saṃskàraskandhaikadeśa eveti katham kṛtvà kathàvastu-śabdena saṃskṛtà evoktàḥ/ ity ata àha sàrthakavastugrahanàt tu saṃskṛtam kathàvas-tùcyata iti/ anyathà hìti/ vistaraḥ yadi sàrthakam vastu na gṛhyeta Prakaranagraṇtho virùdhyet kathàvastùny aṣṭàdaśabhir dhàtubhiḥ saṃgrhìtàṇìti/ kayà punar yuktayà sàrthakam vastu gṛhyate/ dvividhaḥ kathàyà viṣayaḥ sàkṣàt pàrampuryena ca/ sàkṣàd-viṣayo nàma pàrampuryenàrthaḥ/ sa hi svaviṣayabhùtasya nàmno viṣaya iti/ atas tasyàpi viṣayo vyavasthàpyate/ asaṃskṛtam kasmàn na kathàvastutvenoktam adhvapatitasya nàmno'nadhvapatitena sahàrthàyogàt/ viṣayo hetur iti và/ arthadvayavàcakavastu-śabdaparigrahàd và/ yadi kathàyà viṣayo hetuḥ pratyayaś ca bhavati tat kathàvastu/ asaṃskṛtaṃ tu na hetupratyayaḥ kathàyà iti na kathàvastu/ atha và atìtàdìnàm saṃskṛtànàm atibahurùpatvenàkhyàtakaraṇayogyatvàt evam caivam ca dìpaṃkaras tathàgato'bhùt evaṃ caivam ca maitryeyas tathàgato bhaviṣyati evaṃ caivam ca ràjà kapphinì bhavati iti/ atah saṃskṛtà eva kathàvastutvenoktàh nàsaṃskṛtàh//

14. Abhidharmadìpa, Kàrikà 142-149: "vàn nàmni pravartate nàmàrtham dyotayati", which is identical with a sentence in the just-quoted passage of Yaśomitra: "nàmnaḥ punar artho'bhidheyaḥ/ tathà hi vaksyati vàn nàmni pravartate nàmàrtham dyotayati". For further information, see Padmanabh Jaini, The Vaibhàsika theory of words and meanings, BSOAS XXII (1959) 95-107; also his introduction to Abhidharmadìpa, ed. Jaini, Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959.

15. Dìgha-nikàya I 202: imà kho citta loka-samaññà loka-niruttiyo loka-vohàrà loka-paññattiyo, yàhi tathàgato voharati aparàmasam ti.

17. Dìgha-nikàya II 62: yehi, Ànanda, àkàrehi yehi lingehi yehi nimittehi yehi

uddesehi nàmakàyassa paññatti hoti, tesu àkàresu tesu lingesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asti api nu kho rùpakàye adhivacanasamphasso paññàyathà ti.

18. The Milindapañho, ed. V. Trenckner, London: Williams and Norgate, 1880; Thích Minh Châu, Milindapañha and Nàgasenabhikshusùtra, Sài gòn: The Vietnam Buddhist Institute, 1964; Iwagami, Higashi no chie nishi no chie, Tokyo, 1966.

19. Abhidharmakośa X, LVP 263; ed. Pradhan p 469, which has a curious reference to "Kalingena ràjñopasamkramyoktah" etc... Surely, that must be a mistake.

20. The Milindapañho, pp 26-28: Atha kho àyasmà Nàgaseno Milindam ràjànam etad avoca: Tvam kho si mahàràja khattiyasukhumàlo accantasukhumàlo, tassa te mahàràja majjhantikasamayam tattàya bhùmiyà unhàya vàlikàya kharà sakkhara-kathala-vàlikà maddità pàdena gacchantassa pàdà rujanti, kàyo kilamati, cittam upahaññati, dukkhasahagatam kàyaviññànam uppajjati, kin nu tvam pàden'àgato si udàhu vàhanenàti. — Nâham bhante pàden'àgacchàmi, rathenâham àgato'smîti. -- Sace tvam mahàràja rathen'àgato si ratham me àrocehi, kin nu kho mahàràja ìsà ratho ti.-- Na hi bhante ti. -- Akkho ratho ti.--- Na hi bhante ti.--- Cakkàni ratho ti. --- Na hi bhante ti. -- Rathapañjaran ratho ti. -- Na hi bhante ti. -- Rathadandako ratho ti. -- Na hi bhante ti. -- Yugam ratho ti. --- Na hi bhante ti. --- Rasmiyo ratho ti. -- Na hi bhante ti. -- Patodalatthi ratho ti. -- Na hi Bhante ti. -- Kin nu kho mahàràja ìsà-akkha-cakka-rathapañjara-rathadanda-yaga-rasmi-patodam ratho ti. -- Na hi bhante ti. -- Kim pana mahàràja aññatra ìsà-akkha-cakka-rathapañjara-rathadanda-yuga-rasmi-patodam ratho ti. -- Na hi bhante ti. Tam aham mahàràja pucchanto pucchanto na passàmi ratham, saddo yeva nu kho mahàràja ratho, ko pan'ettha ratho, alikam tvam mahàràja bhàsasi musàvàdam, natthi ratho, tvam si mahàràja sakala-Jambudìpe aggaràjà, kassa pana tvam bhàyitvà musà bhàsasi, sunantu me bhonto pañcasatà Yonakà asìtisahassà ca bhikkhù ayam Milindo ràjà evam àha: rathenâham àgato'smîti: sace tvam mahàràja rathen'àgato si ratham me àrocehîti vutto samàno ratham na sampàdeti, kallan nu kho tad abhinanditun ti.

Evam vutte pañcasatà Yonakà àyasmato Nàgasenassa sàdhukàram datvà Milindam ràjànam etad avocum: Idàni kho tvam mahàràja sakkonto bhàsassûti. Atho kho Milindo ràjà àyasmantam Nàgasenam etad avoca: Nâham bhante Nàgasena musà bhanàmi, ìsañ ca paṭicca akkhañ ca paṭicca cakkàni ca paṭicca rathapañjarañ ca paṭicca rathadandakañ ca paṭicca ratho ti sankhà samaññà paññatti vohàro nàmam pavattatîti. --- Sàdhu kho tvam mahàràja ratham jànàsi, evam eva kho mahàràja mayham pi kese ca paṭicca lome ca paṭicca.....

matthalungañ ca paṭicca rùpañ ca paticca vedanañ ca paticca saññañ ca paṭicca sankhàre ca paṭicca viññànañ ca paṭicca Nàgaseno ti sankhà samaññà paññatti vohàro nàmamattam pavattati, paramatthato pan'ettha puggalo'ñûpalabbhati. Bhàsitam p'etam mahàràja Vajiràya Bhikkhuniyà Bhagavato sammukhà:

yathà hi angasambhàrà hoti saddo ratho iti,
evam khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammutîti.

The English version quoted is Horner's translation, Milinda's Questions I, London: Luzac & Company, LTD, 1964, pp 36-38, with only one minor modification, which is the substitution of 'description' for Horner's "designation" and 'expression' for Horner's "a current usage", so as to maintain the uniformity of our language, if not to convey the full meaning of the two terms 'paññatti' and 'vohàra'.

21. Nàgàrjuna, Mûlamadhyamakakàrikàs de Nàgàrjuna avec la Prasannapadà Commentaire de Candrakìrti, ed. de La Vallée Poussin, St. Petersberg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1913, pp 503-504. From our point of view, it is therefore not at all surprising when Candrakìrti uses the same simile of the chariot to illustrate the point Nàrgàrjuna makes in Kàrikà XXIV.18: yà ceyam svabhàvaśùnyatà sà prajñaptir ùpàdàya/ saiva śùnyatà upàdàya prajñaptir iti vyavasthàpyate/ cakràdìny upàdàya rathàngàni rathaḥ prajñapyate/ tasya yà svàngàny upàdàya prajñaptiḥ sà svabhàvenànutpattiḥ/ yà ca svabhàvenànutpattiḥ sà śùnyatà//. For further discussion, see Lê Mạnh Thát, Đưa vào luận lý học trung quán của Nàgàrjuna, Tư Tưởng 1 (1967) 53-83; also, Thử ký hiêu hóa thuyết tách nhân (apoha), Sài gòn, 1969.

22. Nàgàrjuna, The Vigrahavyàvartanì of Nàgàrjuna, MCB IX (1948/1951) 99-152. For the opponent's objections, see Kàrikà 1-20 with their commentary. We are concerned here with its first two Kàrika:

sarveṣàm bhàvànàm sarvatra na vidyate svabhàvaś cet/
tvadvacanam asvabhàvaṃ na nivartayituṃ svabhàvamalam//1
atha sa svabhàvam etad vàkyaṃ pùrvà hatà pratijñà te/
vaiṣamikatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyaḥ //2

Curiously, Kàrikà 3 raises a rather interesting paradox, which we may call Nàgàrjuna paradox or The Speaker's paradox, saying that if someone says "Do not speak", which we better convert to "I do not speak", does he speak? Kàrikà 3: mà śabdavadity etat syàtte buddhir na caitad upapannam/ śabdena hy atra satà bhaviṣyato vàranam tasya//. It reminds of the Liar paradox of Epimenides. For a critical study of Nàgàrjuna's

philosphy and logic, see Lê Manh Thát, Nghiên cứu về triết học Lòng Tho (to be published).

23. Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica I, London: Cambridge University Press, 1950 (second Edition), pp 66-71; also Russell, Introduction to mathematical philosophy, London, 1919. It must be noted that Quine in his Introduction to the reprint of the just-said passage of Principia Mathematica refers to the history of theory of description and says that "The general idea of contextual definition goes back to Jeremy Bentham (1843, vol. 8, pp 246-247), who called it paraphrasis and saw in it a method of accounting for fictions by explaining various purported terms away". See Incomplete symbols: Descriptions, in From Frege to Gödel: A source book in mathematical logic, 1879-1931, ed. Jean van Heijenoort, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, pp 216-217. Now, however, with our clarification of the idea of prajñapti = paññatti, the theory of description must be dated back at least to Nàgasena, if not the Buddha's date.

24. See for instance Vigrahavyàvartanì, Kàrikà 9:

yadi ca na bhavet svabhàvo dharmànàm niḥsvabhàva ity eva/
nàmàpi bhavenaivam nàma hi nirvastukam nàsti// 9

yadi sarvadharmànàm svabhàvo na bhavet tatràpi niḥsvabhàvo bhavet/ tatra niḥsvabhàva ity evam nàmàpi na bhavet/ kasmàt/ nàma hi nirvastukaṃ kimcid api nàsti/ tasmàn nàma sadbhàvàt svabhàvo bhàvànàm asti svabhàvasadbhàvàc càśùnyàḥ sarvabhàvàḥ/ tasmàd yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhàvàḥ sarvabhàvà niḥsvabhàvatvàc chùnyà iti tan na/. See also Jaini, The Vaibhàsika theory of words and meanings, BSOAS XXII (1959) 95-107.

25. Kamalaśìla, Tattvasamgraha of Àcàrya Shàntaraksita with the commentary 'Pañjikà' of Shri Kamalaśhìla, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi: Bauddhabharati, 1968, p 348: Kàrikà 882 of Śàntarakṣita: jàtisambandhayoḥ pùrvam vyàsataḥ pratiṣedhanàt/ nànantaràḥ prakalpyante śabdàrthàs trividhàḥ pare//. Kamalaśìla adds among other things the following: jàtiḥ padàrthaḥ iti kàtyàyanaḥ (or: vàjàtyàyanaḥ) dravyam iti vyàdhiḥ ubhayam pàṇiniḥ.

26. Abhidharmakośa VI 4, LVP 139-142: yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyàpohe dhiyà ca tat/ ghaṭàrthavat samvṛtisat paramàrthasad anyathà//. This, as always, is quoted from Pradhan's edition. In the translation, however, we follow that of Shastri, Abhidharmakośa & Bhàsya of Acharya Vasubandhu with Sphutàrthà commentary of àcàrya Yáśomitra IIII, pp 889-890, which has "ghaṭàmbuvat" instead of "ghaṭàrthavet". "Ghaṭàmbuvat" seems to us to be correct, not only because of the complete agreement with all Chinese and Tibetan

translations, but also because of Yaśomitra's Vyàkhyà, which clearly has "ghaṭàmbuvad iti/ dṛṣṭàntadvayopanyàso bhedadvayopapradarśanàrthaḥ/".

27. Abhidharmakośa VI 4: yasminn avayavaśo bhinne na tadbuddhir bhavati tat samvṛtisat/ tadyathà ghaṭaḥ/ tatra hi kapàlaśo bhinne ghaṭabuddhir na bhavati/ yatra cànyàn apohya dharmàn buddhyà tadbuddhir na bhavati tac càpi samvṛtisad veditavyam/ tadyathàmbu/ tatra hi buddhyà rùpàdìn dharmàn apohyàmbubuddhir na bhavati/ teṣv eva tu samvṛtisaṃjñà kṛteti samvṛtivaśàt ghaṭaś càmbu càstìti bruvantaḥ satyam evàhur na mṛṣety etat samvṛtisatyam/ ato'nyathà paramàrthasatyam/ tatra bhinne'pi tadbuddhir bhavati eva/ anyadharmàpohe'pi buddhyà tat paramàrthasat/ tadyathà rùpam/ tatra hi paramàṇuśo bhinne vastuni rasàrhàn api ca dharmàn apohya buddhyà rùpasya svabhàvabuddhir bhavaty eva/ evam vedanàdayo'pi dṛṣṭavyàḥ/ etat paramàrthena bhàvàt paramàrthasatyam iti/ yathà lokottarena jñànena gṛhyate tatpṛṣṭhalabdhena và laukikena tathà paramartha-satyam/ yathà'nyena tathà samvṛtisatyam iti pùrvàcàryàḥ/ uktàni satyàni//.

28. A p'i ta mo chu chŏ shih lun, Taishô 1559, p 268c9-269a3: 阿毘達磨諸有二、謂俗諦真諦、比二諦何相、偈曰、
若破彼無智、由智除餘尔、俗諦如瓶水、異此名真諦、
釋曰、若物分分被破、物智則不起、此物名俗有、譬如瓶等、比瓶等破成瓦緣、此瓦瓶智則不起、是故瓶等諸物、由形相假有、總況於此物中由智析除餘法、此物智亦不起、此物名俗有、譬如水等、此水若由智析除色大等法、水智則不起、是故水等諸物、由聚集假故有、由名句問顯果真實義、緣名句等於真義起智、若八觀時、不能緣名等、若出觀時不能緣真義、是故名等皆此智由顯示假故有、於此三法、以何法為俗、但名所作無体是俗....

29. Stcharbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Leningrad: Bibliotheca Buddhica XXVI, 1930, pp 457-482; Frauwallner, Beiträge zur Apohalehre, WZKM XXXVII(1930) 259-283; XXXVIII (1931) 230-232; XXXIX (1932) 247-258; XXXX (1933) 31-49; XXXXII (1935) 89-102; XXXXIV (1937) 233-289; Mookerje, The Buddhist philosophy of universal flux, Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1935; Vetter, Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakìrti, Sitzungsberichte der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philo-Histor. Klasse, 245. Band, 2.Abhandlung, Wien, 1964, pp 41-63; D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian realism, Delhi, 1963, pp 306-310.

30. Sharma, The differentiation theory of meaning in Indian logic, The Hague: Mouton, 1969, p29.

31. Lê Manh Thát, Thử ký hiệu hóa thuyết tách nhận (apoha), Sài gòn, 1969.

32. Stcherbatsky, Op. cit.; Frauwallner, Op. cit.; Lê Mạnh Thát; Thử ký hiệu hóa thuyết tách nhân (apoha); Sharma, Op. cit.

33. Ratnakìrti, Apohasiddhi, in Ratnakìrtinibandhàvali, ed. Anantlal Thakur, Patna: Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1957, pp 53-61:(p 53) nanu ko'yam apoho nàma? kim idam anyasmàd apohyate, asmàd và anyad apohyate; asmin vànyad apohyata iti vyutpattyà vijàtivyàvṛttam bàhyam eva vivakṣitam; buddhyàkàro và; yadi và apohanam apoha ity anya-vyàvrttimàtram iti trayaḥ pakṣàḥ.

34. Ratnakìrti, Op. cit.: atràbhidhìyate: nàsmàbhir apohaśabdena vidhir eva kevalo'bhipretaḥ, nàpy anyavyàvṛttimàtram, kim tv anyàpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdànàm arthaḥ, tataś ca praty ekapakṣopanipàtidoṣàvakàśaḥ.

35. Matilal, Op. cit.; Nyàyasùtra II.ii.7-12; cf. note 11 above.

36. Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica, pp 174-175.

37. Schmidthausen, Sautràntika-Voraussetzungen im Vimśatikà und Trimśikà, WZKSOA XI (1967) 109-138; Jaini, The Sautràntika theory of bìja, BSOAS XXII (1959) 236-249; Lamotte, Le Traité de l'acte de Vasubandhu: Karmasiddhiprakarana, MCB IV (1935/1936) 180: "Limitant nos ambitions, nous attribuerons la Karmasiddhip. à 'Vasubandhu le Sautràntika', auteur de l'Abhidharmakośa" ; Yamaguchi, Seshin no Jôgoron, Kyoto: Hôzôkan, 1952, p 26.

38. Abhidharmakośa II ad 46c-d, LVP 235-236: "Réplique du Sàutràntika". In fact, it must noted that although we constantly refer to de La Vallée Poussin's translation under the now obvious abbreviation LVP, this does not mean that his is the best translation of the Abhidharmakośa. On the contrary, in our opinion a new rendering is needed, especially in light of the recent publication of the original Sanskrit. Lê Manh Thát recently finished a translation into Vietnamese, based upon the Sanskrit version, and seemed to have intention of also making it available in English.

39. De La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, Paris, 1931, pp LII-LV.

40. Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, Sàigòn: Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient, 1955, p 158; Abhidharmakośa IV ad 3c, LVP 10-14; also Masuda, Origin and doctrines of early Indian Buddhist schools, Asia Major II (1925) 67-69.

41. Bareau, Op. cit., p 85.

42. Sharma, Op. cit., p 24, note 19. Strangely enough, statements of that type are made by those who like to claim "that India should not, indeed cannot, be left out of any general study of the history of logic and philosophy". It is strange because if an individual does not deem himself to be capable of finding ways to the truth on his own, but is content to merely a mouthpiece of a system whatever it is like an intelligent robot, then sadly indeed, most of Indian contributions to thought should now be best forgotten!

43. Abhidhammapitake Dhammasanganì, ed. J. Kashyap, Varanasi: Pàli Publication Board, 1960, p 284: màtikà 130: katame dhammà paññatti? yà tesam tesam dhammànam samkhà samaññà paññatti vohàro nàmam nàma-kammam nàmadheyyam nirutti byañjanam abhilàpo, ime dhammà paññatti/ sabbeva dhammà paññattipathà/.

44. Dhammasanganì, màtikà 128-129: katame dhammà adhivacanà? yà tesam tesam dhammànam sankhà samaññà paññatti vohàro nàmam nàmakammam nàmadheyyam nirutti byañjanam abhilàpo, ime dhammà adhivacanà/ sabbeva dhammà adhivacanapathà/. The same is for nirutti with the replacing adhivananà by it.

45. Abhidhammatthasamgaha VII 40: tato avasesà paññatti pana paññàpiyattà paññatti, paññàpanato pãññattìti ca duvidhà hoti/ 41: katham tam tam bhùtaviparinàmàkàram upàdàya tathà tathà paññatti bhùmipabbatàdikà, sambhàrasannivesàkàram upàdàya geharathasakatàdikà khandhapãñcakam upàdàya purisapuggalàdikà, càndàvadrnàdikàm upàdàya disàkàlàdikà, asamphudvàkàram upàdàya kùpaguhàdikà, tam tam bhùtanimittam bhàvanàvisesañ ca upàdàya kasinanimittàdikà coti evam àdippabhedà pana paramatthato avijjamànàpi atthacchàyàkàrena cittuppàdànamàramabhùtà tamtam upàdàya upanidhàya kàranam katvà tathà tathà parikappiyamànà samkhàyati, samaññàyati, voharìyati, paññàpìyatìti paññattìti pavuccati. Ayam paññatti paññàpiyattà paññatti nàma/ 42: pãññàpanato paññatti pana nàma-nàmakammàdinàmena paridìpità. sà vijjamàna-paññatti, avijjamàna-paññatti, vijjamànena avijjamàna-paññatti, avijjamànena vijjamànapaññatti, vijjamànena vijjamànapaññatti, avijjamànena avijjamànapaññatti coti chabbidhà hoti/ 43: tattha yadà pana paramatthato vijjamànam rupavedanàdim etàya paññàpenti, tadàyam vijjamànapaññatti. Yadà pana paramatthato avijjamànam bhùmipabbatàdim etàya paññàpenti, tadàyam avijjamànapaññattìti pavuccati. Ubhinnam pana vomissakavasena sesà yathàkkam chalabhiññò itthisaddo, cakkhuviññànam, ràjaputto ti veditabbà/....

46. Compendium of Philosophy, Shwe Zan Aung transl., London: Luzac & Co., 1956,

pp 198-200; Jaini, The Vaibhàsika theory of words and meaning, BSOAS XXII (1959) pp 100-101; see also the beginning of Puggala-paññatti-atthakathà, where Buddhaghosa explains the term 'paññatti'.

47. Buddhaghosa, Atthasàlinì V 114: eka-dhammo sabba-dhammesu nipatati, sabbe dhammà ekadhammasmin nipatanti. Katham? Ayam hi nàmapaññatti eko dhammo, so sabbesu catu-bhùmikesu dhammesu nipatati. Satto pi samkhàro pi nàmato muttako nàma natthi.

48. Abhidharmakośa VIII ad 40, LVP 222-224: yo'yam iha śàstre'bhidharma uktaḥ kim eṣa eva śàstràbhidharmo deśitaḥ:

kàśmìravaibhàṣikanìtisiddhaḥ pràyo mayà'yam kathito'bhidharmaḥ/
yad durgrhìtam tad ihàsmadàgaḥ saddharmanìtau munayaḥ pramàṇam//40

pràyena hi kàśmìravaibhàṣikànàm nìtyàdisiddha eṣa'smàbhir abhidharma àkhyàtaḥ/ yad atràsmàbhir durgṛhìtam sp'smàkam aparàdhaḥ/ saddharmanìtau tu punar buddhà eva pramànam buddhaputràś ca/. Furthermore, as de La Vallée Poussin, LVP 227, points out, the Tibetan version ended the Chapter Eight with the following: chos mṅon pahi mdzod kyi bśad pa las sñoms par hjug pa bstan pa shes bya ba mdzog kyi gnas brgyad paho / chos mṅon pai mdzod ḥdi rdzogs so, which he reconstructs as "Abhidharmakośabhàsye samàpattinirdeśo nàma astamam kośasthànam/ samàpto'yam Abhidharmakośaḥ", thus indicating clearly that the Abhidharmakośa ends with (samàpta) Chapter Eight, although the present Sanskrit edition just simply has "abhidharmakośabhàsye samàpattinirdeśo nàmàṣṭamakośa-sthànam iti". De La Vallée Poussin, Op. cit., also points out the fact that Yaśomitra considered Chapter Nine as merely an Appendix to Chapter Eight, aṣṭamakośasthànasam-baddha eva pudgalaviniścayaḥ, that is, the book is ended with the latter.

49. Abhidharmakośa III ad 100 a-b, LVP 214: ko và bàlapralàpesv àdarad iti tisthatu.

50. Abhidharmakośa IX, LVP 301: imàm hi nirvànapuraikavartinìm tathàgatàdityavacoṃ' śubhàsvatìm/ niràtmatàm àryasahasravàhitàm na mandacakṣurvivṛtàm apìkṣate// (ed. Pradhan p 478). It is quite interesting that Vasubandhu at this stage still speaks of the niràtmatà as the only road to Nirvàna city. The Vimśatikà 20, Lévi 10, refers to not only gràhaka, but also to gràhya: yathà tan nirabhilàpyenàtmanà buddhànàm gocaraḥ/ tathà tad ajñànàt tadubhayam na yathàrtham vitathapratibhàsatayà gràhyagràhakavikalpasyàprahìn-atvàt/. For the Karmasiddhiprakarana, see Lamotte, Op. cit.; Yamaguchi, Op. cit.; Anacker, Op. cit.; all agree justifiably that it must be written after the Abhidharmakośa, if not, as Anacker maintains, even after the Vimśatikà.

51. Abhidharmakośa IX, LVP 227: gan zag dgag pa bstan pa shes bya ba mdzod kyi gnas

dgu pa, which we may reconstruct as Pudgalapratiṣedha-prakarano nàma navamakośa-sthànam. Interestingly enough, Vasubandhu quotes twice a work related to the question of pudgala and àtman either under the name Pudgalavàda or Àtmavàdapratisedha in the Abhidharmakośa and twice he puts the verbs referring to them in the future tense. Abhidharmakośa IV ad 73a-b, LVP 154: kasya tajjìvitam yas tadabhàvàn mṛto bhavati/ kasyeti ṣaṣṭhìm Pudgalavàde vicàrayiṣyàmaḥ/. And Abhidharmakośa V ad 27c, LVP 63: yad apy uktam phalàd iti/ naiva hi sautràntikà atìtàt karmanaḥ phalotpattimm varnayanti/ kiṃ tarhi/ tatpùrvakàt samtàniviśesàd ity àtmavàdapratiṣedhe saṃpravedayiṣyàmaḥ/. Yaśomitra clarifies the first quotations as follows: (Abhidharmakośa & Bhàsya of Achàrya Vasubandhu with Sphutàrthà Commentary of Acàrya Yaśomitra II, ed. Shastri, Varanasi, 1971, pp 685-686) kasyeti ṣaṣṭhìm pudgalavàde pudgalapratisedha-prakarane asaty àtmani kasyeyam smṛtiḥ? kim arthaiṣà ṣaṣṭhì ity atra pradeśe cintayisyàmi/ àstàm tàvad etat sàmànyàsikam ity abhipràyaḥ/. As for the second quotation, he comments: (Abhidharmakośa & Bhàsya etc... III, ed. Shastri, Varanasi, 1972, p 817) Àtmavàdapratiṣedha iti/ śàstràvasàne Vàtsìputrìyamatapratiṣedhe/. With these comments from Yaśomitra, there is no doubt whatsoever as to what the titles Pudgalavàda/pratiṣedha-prakarna/ and Àtmavàdapratisedha/prakarana/ are referring to, when Vasubandhu quotes them. They are none other than the Pudgalapratiṣedhaprakarana of Chapter Nine. Although Vasubandhu refers to himself in those two instances in the future tense, the fact that he quotes the titles indicates explicitly that a treatise by the name Pudgalavàdapratiṣedha or Àtmavàdapratisedha has to have been existing at the time of his writing the Abhidharmakośa, in spite that at that time he seemed to be hesitant as to what is the best title he should adopt, especially when he is comtemplating its inclusion in the latter. Otherwise, it is rather unusual, in view of the style of the Abhidharmakośa, to have Vasubandhu referring to another chapter when answering the question of one chapter.

52. Abhidharmakośa IX, LVP 233-238: (ed. Pradhan pp 461-463) naiva hi dravyato'sti nàpi prajñaptitaḥ/ kiṃ tarhi/ àdhyàtmikànupàttàn varttamànàn skandhàn upàdàya pudgalaḥ prajnãpyate/ tad idam andhavacanam anunmìlitàrtham na budhyàmahe/ kim idam upàdàyeti/ yady ayam arthaḥ skandhànàm lakṣyate teṣv eva pudgalaprajñaptiḥ pràpnoti/ yathà rùpàdìnàlambya teṣv eva ksìraprajñaptiḥ/ athàyam arthaḥ skandhàn pratìyeti/ skandhànàm pudgalaprajñaptikàraṇatvàt/ sa eva doṣaḥ/ na sa evam prajñapyate/ katham tarhi/ yathendhanam upàdàyàgniḥ/ katham cendhanam upàdàyàgniḥ prajñapyate/ na hi vinendhanenàgniḥ prajñapyate

na cànya indhanàd agniḥ śakyate prajñapayitum nàpy ananyaḥ/ yadi hy anyah syàd anusnam indhanam syàt/ athànanyaḥ syàd dàhyam eva dàhakam syàt/ evam na ca vinà skandhaiḥ prajñapyate pudgalaḥ/ na cànyah skandhebhyaḥ śakyate pratijñàtum śàśvata-prasangàt/ nàpy ananya ucchedaprasangàd iti/

anga tàvad bruhi kim indhanam ko'gnir iti/ tato jñàsyàmaḥ katham indhanam upàdàyàgniḥ prajñapyata iti/ kim atra vaktavyam dàhyam indhanam dàhako'gniḥ/ etad evàtra vaktavyam kim dàhyam ko dàhaka iti/ loke hi tàvad apradìptam kàsthàdikam indhanam ucyate dàhyam ca/ pradìptam agnir dàhakaś ca/ yas ca bhàsvaram coṣṇam ca bhṛśam ca tena hi tad idhyate dahyate ca/ saṃtativikàràpàdànàt/ tac cobhayam aṣṭadravyakam tac cendhanam pratìtyàgnir utpadyate/ yathà kṣìram pratìtya dadhi madhu pratìtya śuktam/ tasmàd indhanam upàdàyety ucyate/ anyaś ca sa tasmàd bhinnakàlatvàt/ yadi caivam pudgalaḥ skandhàn pratìtyotpadyate sa tebhyo'nyaś cànityaś ca pràpnoti/ atha punas tatraiva kàsthàdau pradìpte yadauṣṇyam tad agis tatsahajàtàni trìṇi bhùtànìndhanam iṣyante/ tayor api siddham anyatvam laksanabhedàt/

upàdàyàrthas tu vaktavyaḥ/ katham tad indhanam upàdàya so'gniḥ prajñapyata iti/ na hi tat tasya kàraṇam nàpi tat prajñapteḥ/ agnir eva hi tat prajñapteḥ kàraṇam/ yady àśrayàrtha upàdàyàrthaḥ sahabhàvàrthò và/ skandhà apy evam pudgalasyàśrayasahabhùtaḥ pràpnuvantìti vispastam anyatvam pratijñàyate/ tadabhàve ca pudgalàbhàvaḥ pràpnoti/ indhanàbhàva ivàgnyabhàvaḥ/

yat tu tad uktam yadìndhanàd anyo'gniḥ syàd anusnam indhanam syàd iti/ kim idam uṣṇaṃ nàma/ yadi tàvad auṣṇyam anuṣṇam evendhanam anyabhùtasvabhàvatvàt/ atha yad auṣṇyavat/ anyad api tad uṣṇasvabhàvàd agner uṣṇaṃ sidhyaty auṣṇyayogàd iti/ nàsty anyatve doṣaḥ/ atha punaḥ sarvam eva tat pradìptam kàsthàdikam indhanaṃ càgniś ceṣyate/

tad upàdàyàrthaś ca vaktavyaḥ/ skandhà eva ca pudgalà ity ananyatvam anivàryam pràpnoti/ tasmàn na sidhyaty etat/ yathendhanam upàdàyàgniḥ prajñapyate evam skandhàn upàdàya pudgalaḥ iti/ yadi càyam anyaḥ skandhebhyo na vaktavyaḥ pañcavidhaṃ jñeyam atìtànàgataṃ pratyupannam asaṃskṛtam avaktavyam iti na vaktavyam pràpnoti/ caiva hi tad atìtàdibhyaḥ pañcamam nàpañcamam vaktavyam/ yadà ca pudgalaḥ prajñapyate kim tàvat skandhàn upàlàbhya prajñapyate àhosvit pudgalam/yadi tàvat skandhàṃs teṣv eva pudgala-prajñaptiḥ pràpnoti/ pudgalasyànupalambhàt/ atha pudgalaṃ katham asya skandhàn upàdàya prajñaptir bhavati/ pudgala eva hi tasyà upàdànam pràpnoti/ atha mataṃ satsu skandheṣu pudgala upalabhyate tataḥ skandhàn upàdàyàsya prajñaptir ucyata iti/ tad evam rùpasyàpi cakṣurmanaskàràlokeṣu satsùpalambhàt tàn upàdàya prajñaptir vaktavyà/....

For the sake of completeness, it must be added that in our presentation of Vasubandhu's theory of description in the present chapter, although we have dealt with Nàgasena, Nàgàrjuna and the Vaibhàsika at length, we are content to just make a passing remark on Asanga's notions about it without any attempt to place them within the context of Vasubandhu's own theory. This is because (1) Asanga himself seems not to be very occupied with the problem as do Nàgasena or Nàgàrjuna, and (2) Vasubandhu does not pay much attention to Asanga's ideas during the time of his writing the Abhidharmakośa. Evidence for the first reason are not hard to find. Although Asanga periodically makes statements about what 'prajñapti' is, it never captures his thought. See for instance Abhidharmasamuccaya, ed. Pralhad Pradhan, Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1950, pp 81-82: dharmesu katamàḥ paryesanàḥ sambhavanti/ catustaḥ paryeṣanàḥ sambhavanti/ nàmaparyeṣanà vastuṕaryeṣanà svabhàvaprajñaptiparyeṣanà viśeṣaprajñaptiparyeṣanà ca// nàmaparyeṣanà katamà/ dharmeṣu nàmakàyapadakàyavyañjanakàyànàm aparinispannaṃ svalaksanam iti yà santìraṇà/ vastuparyeṣanà katamà/ dharmànàṃ skandhadhàtvàyatanànàm aparinispannam svalakṣanam iti yà samtìraṇà// svabhàvaprajñaptiparyeṣanà katamà/ dharmànàm abhidhànàbhidheyasambandhe svabhàvaprajñaptimàtrasya vyavahàranimittatà santìraṇà// viśeṣaprajñaptiparyeṣanà katamà/ dharmànàm abhidhànàbhidheyasambandhe viśeṣaprajñaptimàtrasya vyavahàranimittatà santiraṇà//. Cf. Rahula, Le compendium de la Super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asanga, Paris: Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient, 1971, pp 136-137. See also Bodhisattvabhùmi, ed. Ui, Bonkan taishô Bosatsuji sakuin, Tokyo: Suzuki gakuju saipan, 1961, pp 35-49: yeyaṃ svalakṣana-prajñaptir dharmànàṃ yad uta rùpam iti và vedaneti và pùrvavad antato yàvan nirvàṇam iti và, prajñaptimàtram eva tad veditavyam, na svabhàvo nàpi ca tad-vinirmuktas tad-anyo vàg-gocaro vàg-viṣayaḥ. evam sati na svabhàvo dharmànàṃ tathà vidyate yathà 'bhilapyate, na ca punaḥ sarvena sarvaṃ na vidyate. sa punar evam avidyamàno na ca sarvena sarvam avidyamànaḥ. asadbhùta-samàropàsadgràha-vivarjito bhùtàpavàdàsadgràha-vivarjitaś ca vidyate. sacet punar yathaivàbhilàpo yeṣu dharmeṣu yasmin vastuni pravartate, tadàtmakàs te dharmàs tad vastu syàt, evam sati bahuvidhà bahavaḥ svabhàvà ekasya dharmasyaikasya vastuno bhaveyuḥ. tathà hy ekasmin dharma ekasmin vastuni bahudhà bahavo bahubhir abhilàpaiḥ prajñaptaya upacàràḥ kriyante, na ca bahuvidhànàm bahùnàm prajñaptivàdànàm niyamaḥ kaścid upalabhyate..... The connection betwen prajñapti and upacàra, which Vasubandhu might have borrowed from Asanga, will be discussed later on.

As for the second reason, both Chinese and Tibetan traditions confirm its accuracy. For colorful language, see Bu-sTon, History of Buddhism, p 143; and Tàranàtha, Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indian, transl. Schiefner, St.Petersburg, 1869, p 119.

kye ma thogs med nags su lo/
bcu gñis rab tu tiṅ ḥdzin bsgrubs/
tiṅ ḥdzin ma grub glaṅ chen gyi/
rgyab khal lons paḥi grub mthaḥ brjams/

"Alas, Asanga, residing in the forest,
Has practised meditation for 12 years.
Without having attained anything by this meditation,
He has founded a system, so difficult and burdensome
That it can be carried only by an elephant!"

That is what Bu sTon and later Tàranàtha called "In such a way he (Vasubandhu) expressed his contempt with the Mahàyànistic Doctrine and with the person who expounded it". So, we are not surprised at his not using Asanga's notion of description, which he later on makes up in the Trimśikà, where he employs the term upàcàra, which, as has been seen, must be from Asanga, instead of the usual term prajñapti. Perhaps, it is justified to assert that in later works of his life did Vasubandhu use Asanga's notion of description. This problem will be returned in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOME LOGICAL RESULTS

We have seen that for the Vaibhàsika any grammatically correct denoting phrase must stand for some object, a view which was to be criticized and replaced by Vasubandhu's theory of descriptions. This theory holds that for any singular constant term or proper name n, it is always possible to replace it by a predicate N which is true only of the object with which n is concerned, and in which n does not occur nor is it required. I. e, for any n, we have (ix)N(x), where the symbol (i...) indicates that any expression to follow of the form N(...) will constitute with it an eliminable description. And since any expression of the form N(x)can always be substituted for by known rules by a function f such that f(x), it further holds that for any singular constant term or proper name or even any statement in which they occur, there is always a function f such that f(x). Thus, if the Vaibhàsika maintain that the word 'birth' must stand for some object called 'birth' so as to justify the truth of such statements as "you should know the birth of your sensation", Vasubandhu would reply that there is no such thing as the object called birth, nor is there any need or requirement to invent one. For there is always a device which would remove easily such terms as birth and the like, and in which not one single singular constant term or proper name is to occur. So, instead of saying "you should know the birth of your sensation", we can always say "you should know something you feel is being born", for instance. Or we can further say, "you should something you feel is existing which has not existed previously", etc... In these substitutive statements, the term 'birth' is not even needed, let alone the object called 'birth'. The favorite notion of the Vaibhàsika and a host of other Indian philosophical schools such as the Mimamsà that words must stand for objects, or to use the colorful

language of the Abhidharmadīpa, that "words must manifest objects", is therefore removed at a drop of a hat. There is no more worry about the threat of such entities as 'non-existence' and its company in Vasubandhu's line of thought. This is the first major result that he draws from his theory of descriptions.

It is however a negative result, though important it is. It is important due to the fact that all singular constant terms or proper names are reduced to a certain variable x with their proper predicates. On account of this, the second major result which is, needless to say, an affirmative one, can be derived. It lies in the recognition that for any term or proper name, in order for them to be reduced and substituted, the statement always contain the expression "something is...". Now, this expression is of the form $(\exists x)(\ldots)$, saying that there is a x such that (...). Clearly, given that form, we can in accordance with Vasubandhu's method substitute for by the expression of the form $-(\forall x)-(\ldots)$, for to say that something is being born is the same as saying that not everything is being born. This interchangeability of the two expressions leads Vasubandhu to the realization that for any entity x such that any number of properties, say f, g..., are true of it, and if there is a property f such that it is true of it, then there is also a property g such that it is true of it. Put it in symbolic language, we have

(1) $$((\forall x)(f(x) \supset g(x)) \ \& \ (\exists x)f(x)) \supset (\exists x)g(x)$$

where f(x) and g(x) can stand for any properties of x of which it is true. For instance, something is being born. This implies, as has been seen in the previous chapter, that in Vasubandhu's view something is prepared to be decayed. So, if there is something being born, it follows that that something is being decayed. Thus, it is quite important to recognize that in Vasubandhu's claim, according to which "the birth of something" is identical with "something is being born", no mere quibbling is intended,

but a result of major significance has been discovered. For by reducing any singular constant term or proper name to their appropriate predicates, Vasubandhu for the first time in the history of Indian philosophy not only removes for ever the religious reverence for words which is perpetrated by such schools as the Mimamsaka[1] and its derivative consequences such as the hypostasization of words partly upheld by the Vaibhàsika or entirely maintained by other sects, but also through such a reduction recognizes the notion of pervasion (vyàpti) and its significance.

Nowadays, it is generally agreed that an inference in Indian logic can be written in the form[2]

(2) $$(\forall x)(A(h,x) \longrightarrow A(s,x))$$

where A(y,x) indicates the relation of pervasion of the term y in x, h the property known (hetu), and s the property to be proved (sàdhya). Such a form can be written, however, only if the relation of pervasion is assumed, as it is obviously self-evident. Yet, up to Vasubandhu's time that relation is never explicitly stated and studied, although, in all fairness, it must be noted that his predecessors must have had some inklings about it. For example, the Nyàya-sùtra expressed the idea that if a certain x exists, then a certain y must exist.[3] Clearly, its author evidently has some notion of the concept of pervasion. The same thing must be said of the Vaibhàsika. In his discussion about the four characters of a composed dharma, which has been translated in the third chapter of the present study, Vasubandhu refers to a definition of the Vaibhàsika, which he does not regard as "inclusive" (avyàpin)[4]. This indicates at least that the Vaibhàsika must have been aware of the notion of pervasion, though not perhaps in its technical sense. And with the use of the term "avyàpin" here by Vasubandhu, we can also summarily dismiss the erroneous assertion that "It is to be noted that the Buddhist logicians have not used the word Vyàpti for this concept. Instead they use the word "Hetusàdhyapratibandha". Literally it means tying together of Hetu and Sàdhya", which has been made by a certain author.[5]

Thus, in spite that today almost all his logical writings are lost or exist only as fragments in various translations, we can, through the discovery of the Abhidharmakośa in its Sanskrit original, be certain that as far as the materials allowed us, Vasubandhu must be credited not only with the discovery of the notion of pervasion, but also of the term "vyàpti", which conveys its meaning. The question then is as to how he finds out that notion. This problem is rather quite susceptible to resolution. For within the context of the theory of descriptions such a result is expected. We have seen that in order to combat the Vaibhàsika hypostasization of words, Vasubandhu has to invent a logical device which helps him removing every and all the terms that the Vaibhàsika could point to as standing for certain objects. That device is later incorporated into a general theory of descriptions, which we have discussed. But such a device can operate only if a certain doctrine of substitutivity is assumed, in which a substitute is considered as an equivalent of what it is to substitute for. Consequently, the removal of a term occurs only when its inherent substitutivity is supposed, that is, when its substitute is pervaded by it. Given a singular constant term n, a predicate N can be such that (ix)N(x) is true of whatever n is true of, if and only if N is pervaded by n. For instance, the term 'birth' can be substituted for by such phrases as "something is being born" or "something is existing which has not existed previously", if and only if they are all equivalent, that is to say, that if and only if those phrases are pervaded by the term 'birth' such that they would convey what that term would convey. The substitutivity of the term therefore presupposes a relation betwen it and what will be its place as substitute. The term n must have a relation R with its N such that (ix)N(x) is a valid substitute for n. And in order that (ix)N(x) is a valid substitute, that relation R must be an inherent relation, that is, a relation which allow the term n pervade its predicate N such that (ix)N(x) would convey what

n would convey itself. In other words, that relation must be a relation of pervasion, which is quite clearly evidenced in formula (1): Given any entity x such that any number of properties f, g, etc... are true of it, and if there is a property f such that f(x), then there is a property g such that g(x). The notion of the relation of pervasion is thus implicitly inherent in Vasubandhu's theory of descriptions. Indeed, such a theory is hardly upheld, if that notion is not assumed. The doctrine of substitutivity depends upon its presence to be valid.

Now, if we transfer that relation of pervasion from terms to statements, it becomes eminently clear that we have an identity relation. We have pointed out that given any expression of the form (ix)N(x), it is always possible to substitute it, by known rules, by a function F such that F(x). Thus, instead of saying that birth is that which is existing, which has not existed previously, we can always say that birth implies that something is existing which has not existed before. I.e., instead of

(3) $$n \equiv (ix)N(x)$$

we have

(4) $$(\forall x)(\exists y)(f(x):(x = y) \rightarrow g(y))$$

In other words, when we identify the term 'birth' with the phrase 'something is born', it follows that to say that "this is the birth of something" is saying, of necessity, that "something is being born" or "this is something which is being born". The relation of pervasion betwen the term 'birth' and the phrase 'something is born' allows the substitution of the latter for the fomer within any context where it is required and and when philosophical clarity is needed. Similarly, the same relation has to be present in the assertion that "this is the birth of something" implies "this is something which is born". These two kinds of relation are both termed as pervasion. In fact, pervasion is usually understood as a criterion for judging the completeness of a definition, and as such it is widely used. We already have seen Vasubandhu

employing the term "avyàpin", non-inclusive, to criticize the Vaibhàsika definition. Gangeśa and his school also developped a rather sophisticated doctrine of definition, based themselves upon the investigation of what the concept 'pervasion' entertains.[6] The relation of pervasion betwen terms therefore can be said to fall within the scope of the doctrine of definition, if we equate the theory of descriptions in its limited significance with the latter in its broadest sense. That relation, if applied to statements, however is manifestly a relation of identity. What then is pervasion?

The term "vyàpti", pervasion, is employed in its technical sense for the first time in the Vàdavidhi, where his opponent uses it to advance a wrong proof based upon the "similarity of apprehension"[7]. It is also therein that Vasubandhu defines for the first time what pervasion is. According to him, "an object which cannot occur without another object is said to be inseparably connected with that other object, as for example, smoke with fire", and "inference is the direct perception of (that) inseparably connected object be someone who is aware of that inseparable connection"[8]. So, pervasion is defined in terms of inseparable connection. And this inseparable connection is already viewed in the Vàdavidhi in two different ways. First, it is defined in terms of the non-occurrance of an object without the occurrance of another object with which it is connected in an inseparable manner. Secondly, it is defined in terms of the non-occurrance of a property, i.e., "a property which never occurs except when another property is present, is said to be connected to this other property in an inseparable manner".[9] These two views evidently reflect most explicitly Vasubandhu's own main tenet of the theory of descriptions, which asserts that a singular constant term or proper name can always be substituted for by an approriate predicate, and vice versa. Our assumption that the notion of pervasion is the underlying idea of the theory of descriptions. Vasubandhu not only

states that the occurrence of one object requires the occurrence of the other object so that the conditions of the pervasion can be satisfied, but also that the same is true for the properties of an object.

Beyond the theory of descriptions, the just mentionned definition is first and foremost a definition of pervasion as it is applied to logical inference. To say that Per(A,B), where Per means A pervading B, is to say that

(5) $(\forall x)(A(x) \longrightarrow B(x))$

That is, for each entity x, given A(x) we can always infer B(x). Or, to use Vasubandhu's terminology, given h (hetu) we can always prove s (sàdhya, the thing to be proved), under the assumption that Per(h,s), of course. Now, we have seen that pervasion is defined in terms of inseparable connection (avinàbhàva), saying that "an object which never occurs except when another object is present is designated as one which is connected with this other object in an inseparable manner, or a property which never occurs except when another property is present is said to be connected to this other property in an inseparable manner". Thus, not only is s present whenever h is present, but also that whenever s is not present, h is not, of necessity, present. That definition is therefore of the form

(6) $(\forall x)(\exists y)(-h(x) \;\&\; (\forall x)(\forall y)(x = y) \longrightarrow -(s(x)))$

which can be simplified to give formula (5). Clearly, to define pervasion in terms of inseparable connection is to define it in terms of non-deviation (avyabhicàritatva). This is in fact what Vasubandhu's successors understand it to mean. So, when Vasubandhu states that "that through which the inseparable connection is denoted, is called "the example"", the same thing is repeated by Dharmakìrti, who says that "h is therefore pervading s because of the necessary relation, and this relation is of two kinds, that of identity and that of transitivity, and it is that very

inseparable connection, which is examplified by both kinds of examples"[10], although throughout the Pramànavàrttika he continues using the term avyabhicàrita, non-deviation, instead of avinàbhàva, inseparable connection. This practice of using the term "inseparable connection" to define, or at least, to interchange with, the term "non-deviation" subsequently becomes very popular not only among Vasubandhu's followers, but also among those of other schools, of which the most prominent place must be assigned to that of the Navya-naiyayika, particularly Gangeśa and Mathurànàtha. For instance, in explaining the term avyabhicàra in the verse 21 of Section Self-inference of the Nyàyabindu of Dharmakìrti, Dharmottara unhesitatingly equates it with the term avinàbhàvà.[11] The same must be said of Mathurànàtha, if not Gangeśa.

In the part on inference of the Tattvacintàmani, Gangeśa devotes a section of it to the examination of what pervasion is, in which he discusses, besides his own, twenty-one other definitions which he regards as unsatisfactory. Of these, the nineteenth is concerned with the definition which holds that the relation of pervasion is the relation of inseparable connection.[12] This definition is of course none other than Vasubandhu's own. In commenting on what inseparable connection is, Mathurànàtha says that it is "what is different from the occurrence in a locus of absence of s"[13]. But to paraphrase the inseparable connection by that phrase, he clearly identifies that definition with the definition No 1 of what non-deviation is, because the same phrase is employed by Gangeśa to characterize what non-deviation is in the said definition No 1[14]. The definition No 1 says non-deviation can be defined as "the non-occurrence of h in the locus of absence of s" (sàdhyàbhàvavad-avrttitvam). Thus, although Gangeśa considers the definition of pervasion by its inseparable connection as an independent definition, Mathurànàtha recognizes immediately that it is but a variant of the definition of non-deviation. This obviously does not surprise us at all, since we already see such a recognition having occurred in the

works of both Dharmakìrti and Dharmottara, just to mention a few representative whose works in original Sanskrit are still preserved and widely known.

We point out these rather typical interpretations of what the term 'inseparable connection' means, not so much as of historical interest as of logical consequences. We have said that all of Vasubandhu's logical works, as far as we know at the present time, exist only in fragments mostly in Tibetan and Chinese languages. Therefore, we are not in the position to possess sufficiently materials such that a reasonable understanding of Vasubandhu's major logical theories can be arrived at without further recoursing to other possible interpretations. So, although we know the definition Vasubandhu gives to the inseparable connection and the instance in which it applies, we do not know how he arrives at it and the extent to which it is valid. The objection raised upon the validity of a converse theorem is the case in point. Here, Vasubandhu's opponent, based himself upon the argument that "the non-eternality of sound is inferred through its state of having arisen due to an effort, replies that 'this is no h for non-eternality, because in the case of lightning, etc..., non-eternality is perceived through other means of cognition such as direct perception etc...'", which clearly means that for him the state of having been arisen due to an effort is not a necessary nor sufficient reason (h) for the assertion that something is not eternal, because lightning, which is not eternal, as everybody can see for himself, is not "arisen due to an effort". Vasubandhu adds further in that fragment that "others formulate this (i.e. the objection) in another manner: 'There is no h for non-eternality here, because there is no pervasion (vyàpti), just like in the case of the thesis that conscious activity necessarily exists for trees, because of their sleeping at night, a h which occurs only for śirìsa-trees'"[15].

To the first objection, Vasubandhu indicates that "we are not claiming that everything

non-eternal has arisen due to an effort, but rather only that that which has arisen due to an effort must be eternal".[16] The answer to the second objection is now lost. However, we may surmise that a similar argument must have been advanced by him, i.e., we are not claiming that all trees have conscious activity because the śirìsa trees do due to their sleeping at night. These answers obviously presuppose that some discussions about what constitutes pervasion and hence, inseparable connection, must have been made, because to claim that certain theorem is true in its normal form, but not in its converse, is saying that pervasion and inseparable connection must have some limit, beyond which it does not apply. But such discussions, if occurred, are now lost. Dignàga complained that in his exposition of logical fallacies Vasubandhu merely gives the case and its example and does not engage in any examination at all of its theoritical aspects.[17] This complain might be justified, based upon what we now know. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that if Vasubandhu does not discuss the theoritical aspect of various logical fallacies, there may be the case that that is due to probably the existence of a thourough investigation already made when he approaches the problem of pervasion and its definition by inseparable connection. We can infer the existence of such a case, because from what is still extant, we know that Vasubandhu did show a genuine concern for an exact definition of what pervasion is. After defining it as inseparable connection, which implies that "an object which never occurs except when this other object is present is designated as one which is connected with this other object in an inseparable manner; or, to put this another way, a property which never occurs except when another property is present is said to be connected to this other property in an inseparable manner", Vasubandhu goes on to say that "for example, the sound never occur apart from non-eternality, because that which has arisen on account of an effort never occurs apart from non-eternality,

and similarly, smoke never occurs apart from fire"[18]. This additional statement, which aims at giving some examples to his definition, clearly indicates what he means by inseparable connection and its implication that "an object or a property which never occurs except when another object or another property is present is said to be connected to this other object or property in an inseparable manner", as to its limit and application. He must know for sure that the state of having arisen due to an effort can be said to "be connected in an inseparable manner to" the non-eternality of the sound, but certainly not to the non-eternality of a lightning, which he himself has pointed out. In other words, the theorem that whatever has arisen due to an effort is non-eternal is a true statement, but not its converse, which says that whatever is non-eternal is arisen due to an effort. The same can be said for the case of smoke and fire: That whenever there is smoke there is fire is a true statement, but not that whenever there is fire, there is smoke. Thus, it is quite explicit in these statements that Vasubandhu must have been aware as to how far his definition of pervasion by inseparable connection is applicable and realizable and have discussed it within the context of the investigation of that definition. Otherwise, his opponent might have point out the very defects of that definition itself, by alleging that it lacks the generality covering all the cases pertaining to it, and hence is too narrow to truly serve the purpose it envisions to serve.

Our assumption is further confirmed by the silence which Vasubandhu's successors accorded to it. They continued to employ that definition and formulate it in new terms such as avyabhicàra, non-deviation, without any manifest questioning. Dignàga was the first to introduce the term avyabhicàra as an equivalent for avinàbhàva and also employed the term nàntarìyaka as a substitute for the latter. In fact, the

Tibetan translation sometimes used the same expression to translate those latter terms, i.e., it uses med na mi hbyun ba for translating both avinàbhàva and nàntarìyaka, in spite that med na mi hbyun ba is the standard locution for the former.[19] This apparent lack of distinctive expressions here does not, of course, cause us any surprise, since Uddyotakara informed us that Dignàga defines the term nàntarìyaka as follows: yo'rtho yam artham antarena na bhavati, sa nàntarìyakah, "an object which does not occur without another object is inseparably connected".[20] In effect, what Dignàga says about nàntarìyaka applies very well to avinàbhàva, because his definition is completely identical with that of Vasubandhu concerning those two terms.[21] Thus, as Frauwallner has recognized, from what is still extant, Vasubandhu must have initiated their use and employed them interchangeably as synonymous.[22] As for the term avyabhicàra, we have said that Dignàga was the first to introduce it, although with the fragmentary knowledge we have gleaned concerning Vasubandhu's logical works it is possible that that term, too, might have used by him. In any case, as Dignàga's successors and his critics both consider it to be interchangeable with the other two, we can be sure that it does convey the same meaning and connotation. We have seen Dharmakìrti and Dharmottara employing them as synonymous. The same practice is carried out by Uddyotarakara and Vacaspatimiśra, although with more precision and considerable uniformity. They specifically and mainly use the term avinàbhàva in their description and criticism of both Vasubandhu's and Dignàga's theory of pervasion, despite occasional references to the other two terms.[23] So, we can say with certainty that all those three terms, i.e., avinàbhàva, nàntarìyaka and avyabhicàra, up to Gangeśa's time are employed interchangeably and have the same meaning. At Gangeśa's time, Gangeśa seems to separate the first and the last terms into two different categories, as we have seen, by having the five definitions of avyabhicàra belong to one group and the definition of avinàbhàva to another in his list of definitions concerning pervasion. We also have seen

that such a separation, if existed, is not slow to be corrected by Mathurànàtha, who rightly identifies it nothing more than a variant of the definition No 1 of non-deviation. Thus, ever since the days of Vasubandhu and Dignàga all those three terms are used synonymously and interchangeably.

Our purpose in reconstructing the historical use of these terms is, as has been said, aimed at deeper understanding of what Vasubandhu means when he defines pervasion by inseparable connection, because of the fragmentary existence of his logical works which prevents us from fully determining their exact meaning and connotation. Now, we know that 'inseparable connection' is synonymous with 'non-deviation'; and non-deviation according to Gangeśa's information can be defined in at least five ways, as it was understood up to his time. He said[24]:

> Now, concerning the knowledge of the pervasion, which is the cause of an inference, what is pervasion? It is not simply non-deviation <u>of h with respect to s</u>, for it is not that <u>non-deviation defined as</u> the non-occurrence <u>of h</u> in the locus of absence of s (1), nor <u>that defined as</u> the non-occurrence <u>of h</u> in the locus of absence of s which is different from the locus of s (2), nor <u>that defined as h</u> having a different locus from that of a mutual absence whose counterpositive is a locus of s (3), nor <u>that defined as h</u> being the counterpositive of an absence resident in all loci of absence of s (4), nor <u>that defined as</u> the non-occurrence <u>of h</u> in what is other than the locus of s (5), since it would then fail to apply in the case of universal-positives".

Thus, up to Gangeśa's time, non-deviation can be defined specifically at leat in five ways, which we have numbered in our translation of the above passage. These five definitions, if we are to formulate them in terms of mathematical logic, can be easily shown to be equivalent, in spite that in ordinary language they seems to be divergent from each other as far as we can imagine. A number of researchers have

attempted at formulating them, and the results unfortunately pose many problems, due to their respective use of different symbols and concepts of mathematical logic.[25] For instance, the most recent and the most satisfactory formulation at the present time is that of Berg, who has them formulated as follows:[26]

(i) $(\forall x)-(h(x) \wedge x \in \{y:-s(y)\})$

(ii) $(\forall x)-(h(x) \wedge x \in \{y:(\forall z)(s(z) \rightarrow y \neq z)\})$

(iii) $(\exists F)((\forall x)(\forall y)((h(x) \wedge -F(y)) \rightarrow x \neq y) \quad (\forall x)(F(x) \rightarrow s(x)))$

(iv) $(\exists F)((\forall x)(h(x) \rightarrow F(x)) \wedge (\forall x)(-s(x) \rightarrow -F(x)))$

(v) $(\forall x)-(h(x) \wedge -s(x))$

where F refers to the counterpositive (pratiyogika) of a mutual absence (anyonyàbhàva), -F, with respect to h; and where $\{y:s(y)\}$ reads 'the locus of s', i.e., the object y having s. This formulation by Berg, as has been said, is the most satisfactory at the present time. However, with the introduction of the symbol $\in$, it raises the question as to whether the notion of non-deviation, as it is originally conceived by Vasubandhu and Dignàga together with their successors, contains and conveys the notion of class, particularly when the symbol $\in$ itself is capable of being variously interpreted and applied. For example, we have a number of theories running parallel with each other in relation to the notion of class such as that of Russell, Zermelo, etc..., and each has its own virtue and difficulty.[27] We know for certain that Dignàga repudiates that notion, as it is held to by his contemporaries, by having it ridiculed as follows: "It [the class] does not go, it does not stay, it does not exist afterwards, it has no parts, it does not leave its former receptacle -- what a congeries of defects!"[28]. He has however his own theory concerning it, according to which class is not a realm of entities existing on its own, but a construct concept capable of being defined such that no one entity is postulated and hypostasized. Thus, if the term 'cow' is applicable to

a series of individual entities of so-and-so characteristics, there is no need to postulate the existence of an entity called 'cowness' of which those individuals called 'cows' partake. Instead, it is conceived that such a wide applicability occurs because the term 'cow' repudiates whatever is not cow[29]. This theory of class is of course having its own merits, despite of its cumbersome character which we have pointed out in the previous chapter.

As for Vasubandhu's notion of class, although we can be sure that he rejects, as Dignàga does, the idea of its existence as a Platonic entity, we are not at all certain as to what specific speculation he has in mind, especially with respect to his theory of pervasion. This notwithstanding, it must be noted that in his criticism of the Vaibhàsika theory of words, which lays the foundation for his theory of descriptions, Vasubandhu emphatically denies the need to postulate the existence of such entities as "number" or "extension" to account for the terms 'one, two' or 'long, short', because in his view those terms and the like can be substituted for by other phrases of their equivalents. So, even when the notion of class and its symbol is introduced, we can always remove it with approriate description, i.e., if there is a class $\mathscr{C}$ such that for all x, $x \in \mathscr{C}$, we always have $(i\mathscr{C})N(\mathscr{C})$. Thus, it might be argued that Berg is justified in introducing the symbol $\in$ in his formulation of the five definitions of non-deviation, if those were Vasubandhu's definitions. But in our present limited knowledge of Vasubandhu's logical works, we must concede, as has been referred to, that the notion of non-deviation is of Dignàga's terminology, and thus such an introduction is rather uncalled for, particularly when it may give rise to confusion and misunderstanding. Therefore, we propose to formulate anew those five definitions here, based exclusively upon the identity relation rather than that of class.

(7) $(\forall x)\text{-}(h(x) \ \& \ (\forall x)(\forall y)(x = y) \rightarrow ((\forall y)\text{-}s(y)))$

(8) $(\forall x)\text{-}(h(x) \ \& \ (\forall x)(\forall y)(x = y) \rightarrow ((\forall y)(\forall z)(s(z) \rightarrow y \neq z)))$

(9) $(\exists F)((\forall x)(\forall y)((h(x) \ \& \ \text{-}F(y)) \rightarrow x \neq y) \ \& \ (\forall x)(F(x) \rightarrow s(x)))$

(10) $(\exists F)((\forall x)(h(x) \rightarrow F(x)) \ \& \ (\forall x)(\text{-}s(x) \rightarrow \text{-}F(x)))$

(11) $(\forall x)\text{-}(h(x) \ \& \ (\forall x)(\forall y)(x \neq y) \rightarrow ((\forall y)s(y)))$

With this new formulation, we can easily prove that these five definitions are equivalent logically to each other and correctly convey the notion of pervasion, as it is defined by Vasubandhu within the context of the notion of inseparable connection. Such a result is surely not very surprising in view of the fact that Gangeśa already had them listed as variants of the original definition of non-deviation. Further, Mathuranàtha himself while commenting upon the passage of Gangeśa, also succeeded in identifying them as equivalent to each other through his pointing out the cases where each definition does not apply on account of its deficiency. Thus, he employed the same case of an inference that "it possesses contact with a monkey because it is this tree" where the first three above definitions do not apply and hence are not valid, if we do not count the fourth definition, which does also have that inference among others of the cases[30] of which it is not true. As for the fifth, Mathuranàtha himself already inserted it among other passages in his explanation of the first definition, an insertion which he acknowledged.[31] Besides, he pointed out that the third definition is capable of being interpreted to mean the same thing as the fifth[32], although he added that technically they may have difference.[33] And this recognition of the equivalence of these five definitions is not left without further corroboration by the present-day method. Goekoop, after formalizing them in terms of first order predicate calculus, is not content to merely state that they are equivalent logically to each other, but goes on to even assert that they are also equivalent to the definition of pervasion itself,

which is already proved to be valid. He says, "That the five definitions are logically equivalent to each other and to formula (6) of pervasion can easily be proved by the calculus in which we have formulated them"[34]. The reason why they are not only logically equivalent to each other, but also to the valid definition of pervasion, will be discussed later on. At present, let's return to Mathurànàtha's explanations for a moment to see how the cases he mentionned are related to Vasubandhu's theory of pervasion and its definition.

We have said that for Mathurànàtha the fifth definition is equivalent to the first and in certain sense, to the third definition. After explaining how to interpret the phrase "other than locus of s" of that definition, he remarks that "thus the definition is not so wide as to apply where /there is a false inference/ such as 'It possesses smoke because it possesses fire', even though there is in h a non-occurrence to a lake etc..., which is other than a locus of smoke, and even though there is in h absence of the conjunct waterness and occurrence to that which is other than locus of smoke"[35]. This remark is rather interesting in that it refers us back to a case of inference which Vasubandhu regards as false proof due to its being inverted and which we have cited above. There, his opponent, based himself upon the stock inference that 'Sound is non-eternal, because it has arisen due to an effort', shows that such an inference is faulty, because there are other things such as lightning etc..., which are non-eternal, but do not arise due to an effort. That lightning is non-eternal and does not arise due to an effort is a true fact, Vasubandhu acknowledges. However, the inference that 'sound is non-eternal because it has arisen due to an effort' is also a true inference and not a faulty one on account of that fact. On the contrary, if there is faulty inference, it is on the part of his opponent, and this is indeed true. His opponent thinks that if a statement is true, then its converse is also true. Thus, if the inference that whatever is arising due to an effort is non-eternal is a true

inference, then its converse that whatever is non-eternal is arising due to an effort is also true, which is obviously not true. The wrong application of the converse proposition such as this is therefore quite well-known to Vasubandhu and it is quite apparent in Mathuranàtha's remark in explaining the content of the fifth definition. Again, if such an intimate relationship exists betwen them, this would not be very surprising. We need to compare the formulation of the fifth with that of the first and with formula (6) to see that they are indeed equivalent if not wholly identical.

Now, given the fact that the five definitions are proved to be logically equivalent not only to each other but also to the valid definition of pervasion, we must wonder why Gangeśa claims that "they fail to apply in the case of universal-positives"? Mathuranàtha clarifies further that claim as follows:

> "Since all these definitions are too narrow to apply where s is universal-positive, our author criticizes them all with the words "since pervasion is not any of these where s is universal-positive". His meaning is this that (a) pervasion is not any of the five definitions where s is of complete occurrence and universal-positive, as in such valid inferences as 'It is nameable because it is knowable'; and that (b) pervasion is not any of the last four definitions where s is of incomplete occurrence and universal-positive, as in such valid inferences as 'It possesses absence of contact with a monkey because it possesses reality'. This is because [in the case of (a)] one can find no example of an absence of s to which the counter-positiveness is limited by the limiting relation of the provability, nor can one find an example of a mutual absence to which the couterpositiveness is limited by the state of s having its locus which is limited by the limiting relation of the provability; and because [in the case of (b)] one can find no example of unlimited locus in s in such inferences as 'It possesses absence of contact with a monkey because it possesses reality'"[36].

That is indeed a very helpful clarification in that it informs us as to what Gangeśa

specifically has in mind when he uses the term 'universal-positive' with which to criticize the five definitions of non-deviation. Universal-positives are those cases where there is one unnegatable term among those of the pervasion. Thus, in the case of such inferences as 'It is nameable because it is knowable', Gangeśa and his school claimed that such terms as 'nameable' and 'knowable' are unnegatable, particularly the term 'knowable', which in Sanskrit is in form of a noun 'knowableness' (jñeyatva) due to a linguistic habit, and therefore the requirement that 'an object never occurs except when another object is present' is not satisfied. And this requirement is the basis of all five definitions mentionned above. Consequentially, they, too, are not satisfied in terms of that case.

Obviously, one can dismiss Gangeśa's criticism as nothing more than a sectarian observation about an universal law in which his creed does not operate very well, and hence not worthy of consideration. Further, we already assumed that those five definitions, which are logically equivalent to each other and convey sufficiently Vasubandhu's notion of inseparable connection, are also equivalent logically to the valid definition of pervasion, which one can at best design. So, there is no need to argue about the validity of Gangeśa criticism. Besides, if taken at its face value, the inference of the type 'It is nameable because it is knowable' poses some very serious difficulties. For instance, although Goekoop attempted to show why all five above definitions apply very well to the inference of the form 'It has fire because it has smoke', but not at all to that of the form 'It is nameable because it is knowable', in spite of the correct assertion he made that "From a purely logical point of vue the five definitions are correct...",[37] one can easily derive a contradiction from the inference of the latter form, which thus would eliminate itself from any further discussion, let alone any further

proving and inferring. In fact, not long ago Potter pointed out that if one takes the famous Naiyāyika motto, according to which "to be is to be knowable and nameable" from which the above inference of the latter form clearly originates, at its face value, one can arrive at the following paradox: "In Sanskrit or any other sufficiently rich language the term 'unnameable' or its translation can be uttered. Now the motto, as applied to this word, produces a paradox: since the word 'unnameable' is admitted as a name, there exist unnameables, but since everything which exists is nameable, those unnameables are nameable, which is self-contradictory".[38] To alter this paradox with some substitute words, one can have the following self-contradiction for the above inference: something is nameable because it is knowable

Unnameable is that something and it is surely knowable

Therefore, unnameable is nameable because it is something knowable.

Obviously, as Potter himself recognized, such mottos and inferences as those just referred to are not to be taken at their face value but within the system in which they operate, so that they can be properly understood and evaluated. Goekoop in his testing has taken that inference at its face value and therefore run the risk of being improper in his evaluating those five definitions.

Yet, precisely because of the presence of various serious difficulties in that inference, that it is worth looking into. In fact, if we arrive at the paradox "the unnameable is nameable", it immediately reminds us of the Russell paradox concerning the class theory, in which a falsehood of the type[39]

$$(\exists x)((x \in x) \leftrightarrow -(x \in x))$$

is provable. It thus leads us to the question of whether Vasubandhu's theory of pervasion is related to the class theory or not, the answer to which we will return to at the end of this chapter. Here, we need to remark that Gangeśa's

criticism is far from being valueless if properly taken and evaluated. In fact, we know that given a certain class logic, if we are to translate the statements of a certain quantificational logic into it, a translation which is known to be realizable by rules, then there are statements in that class logic which are not expressible in terms merely of validity of quantificational logic.[40] And this is in effect the origin, which gives rise to the notion of class in the first place. Thus, the alleged unnegatable terms which Gangeśa refers to are not so much unnegatable as class-related terms. We know this, because the inference 'It is nameable because it is knowable', if based upon the strict Naiyàyika interpretation of it, is actually none other than that of identity, on account that 'nameable' and 'knowable' are both properties of one object. The strict interpretation which we alluded to is this. It is often noted that "according to the Nyàya there are some entities the absences of which have no locus; such an entity is the property of being nameable (vàcyatva, abhidheyatva), or the property of being knowable (jñeyatva)"[41]. Now, given the fact that the Naiyàyika "insists that every term in a valid knowledge must correspond to some existent entity in the universe", one wonders whether <u>vàcyatva</u> and <u>jñeyatva</u>, two valid terms for him, are designating one or two entities. At first look, it seems that they must designate two. However, a second look would convince otherwise thanks to the explanation by Uddyotakara. In his commentary <u>Kiranàvali</u>, while addressing himself to the problem of class, Uddyotakara mentions six rules which prevent something from being a class and of which the second rule called "equipollence" (tulyatva) can be stated as follows: an expression 'x-tva', which applies to exactly the same individuals as another expression 'y-tva', may not designate a second universal distinct from the one 'y-tva' designates.[42] Thus, the inference 'It is nameable because it is knowable' is actually a tautology, for it links two terms which not only apply to the same entities but which

furthermore designate the same entity.

What we have then in relation to that inference is not an inference of the type belonging to the logic of identity or quantification, but rather to class logic. To compare it with the inference of the type 'It has fire because it has smoke', as Goekoop has done, is therefore unjustified if not "unexamplified", as Gangeśa would say. To be sure, the latter type can be taken to contain the notion of class implicitly within itself, just as the standard Aristotelian syllogism. However, with the debate concerning the question as to whether Indian logic, particularly the logic of Dignàga and his school, is intensional or extensional, going on,[43] and in view of Dignàga's rejection of the class theory of the sort which Uddyotakara represent and which we have referred to above, it is better to differentiate of those two types of inferences. Moreover, the inference 'It is nameable because it is knowable' can be derived easily from Uddyotakara's equipollence rule, while the inference 'It has fire because it has smoke' cannot, simply on account of the fact that the predicates of the first inference not only apply to the same entities but also designate the same entity, while those of the second do neither. Fire and smoke do not apply to exactly the same entities, since we have fire of a hot iron, which does not have smoke, nor do they designate the same entity, which is a natural consequence of the first case. That fundamental difference should not be surprised at, since it has been suggested that Uddyotakara's equipollence rule can be formulated and should be interpreted as the axiom of extensionality in set theory: if A and B are sets and if every element of A is an element of B, and conversely, then A = B:

(12) $$x = y \longleftrightarrow (\forall w)(x \in w \longleftrightarrow y \in w)$$

Even if this formulation and interpretation[44] is to be proved wrong or unfit, there is no doubt whatsoever as to what case that rule applies and the connotation it

carries in the inferences of the type 'It is nameable because it is knowable'. But if that formulation or some similar one of the same form is proved to be correct together with a number of other axioms, one can expect that a paradox of the above sort would naturally result.

In this connection, it must be pointed out that while deriving the afore-mentionned interesting paradox of the unnameable from the motto "to be is to be knowable and nameable", Potter made an apology for the Naiyàyika, saying that if we could derive such a paradox, it is not the fault of the Naiyàyika system since, he argued, within that system there would be some mechanism which could bar such terms as 'unnameable' from the category of the nameable and hence the paradox to occur; rather it is our fault to separate that motto from the universe of ideal language of theirs and then wrongly apply to the universe of ordinary discourse, which invites that paradox to appear. This apology is however unnecessary and misconstrued. For apparently Potter forgot that various systems of ideal language of the present century, which in certain sense are infinitely more rigourous and vastly better organized than that of the Naiyàyika, still run into various and serious paradoxes, the number of which is no less than seventeen according to one recent counting and which led one famous mathematical logician into the "painful" realization that the present-day mathematical theories may be in serious error[45]. And this is not to mention various paradoxes which seem to be inherent the language of our everyday life such as the Liar paradox of Epimenides or the Speaker paradox of Nàgàrjuna. Thus, if a paradox could be derived from the Naiyàyika main doctrine of "to be is to be knowable and nameable", why should one have the need to apologize for it? In fact, if a paradox occurs within a system, one should spend time finding out why and from where it arises, so as to be able to assess its consistency as well as its validity. Potter's apology somehow sounds curious and nostalgic; it reminds us of the days when Uddyotakara was still

alive and heatedly engaged into debate with his opponents.

The apology aside, it is now quite plainly clear that what Gangeśa means when he refers to the non-applicability of five above definitions of the non-deviation is not that they fail to apply to the universal-positive cases defined either in terms of unnegatable terms or in terms of the lack of dissimilar examples, but that they fail to apply to certain cases in a class logic. We pause rather long in this discussion at the criticism made by Gangeśa so as to be able to explicitly delineate the basic ideas that the term 'universal-positive' conveys through its examples given by Mathurànàtha and the usual interpretations such as Goekoop's or Ingalls's were unable to elucidate. Such a delineation is indispensable if we are to appreciate fully its implications not only for the five definitions of non-deviation, but also for the definition of inseparable connection. This is not merely because we can identify non-deviation with inseparable connection, and all the definitions concerning them are hence all equivalent, as has been seen. But what is more is that Gangeśa uses the same argument he advances with which to criticize the definitions of non-deviation, to criticize the definition of inseparable connection, which asserts that such a definition "does not apply to the cases of universal-positive"[46]. The interesting implications of this critical remark lie not so much in what it says as in what it does not say, for as has been noted, the statement that "it does not apply to the cases of universal-positive" does not merely point to the lack of dissimilar examples, but furthermore to the lack of dissimilar examples in the case of a class logic. Thus, although there may very well be the situation where Gangeśa does not, indeed, mean what we interpret it to be by that statement, there should not be any doubt whatsoever as to the possible help that such an interpretation would render us in our search for a correct and reasonable understanding of Vasubandhu's theory of pervasion and its

definition by inseparable connection, since it can at least serve as a stimulus which prompts us into questioning the validity and consistency of that theory and indicates the direction in which the line of questioning should lead.

That situation, though improbable it be, must be warned of, because we are quite aware that other alternative interpretations such as Goekoop's are not without evidence on their parts. We did, for instance, sometimes refer to the phrase "the lack of dissimilar examples" in the above paragraph. This phrase can be easily recognized as a free translation of the exact definition of what universal-positive is, which a number of Navya-naiyàyika logicians have presented since the days of Uddyotakara. In his Siddhànta-muktàvalì, Viśvanàtha Pañcànana gives, for example, this definition: "Universal-positive is what has no dissimilar instances"[47]; and adds further that "...as in a proposition like 'A jar is nameable because it is knowable', for there, since everything is nameable, there is no dissimilar instance"[47]. A contemporary of his, Annambhatta, also proposes a definition along that line, saying that "universal-positive is that which has the pervader always positive, as in an inference like 'A jar is nameable because it is knowable, as a cloth', for in this case there is no negative pervasion of the knowability and the nameability, since everything is both knowable and nameable"[48]. To these definitions, Staal offers the following formulation[49]

(13) $\neg(\exists x)\neg A(s,x)$ or $(\forall x)A(s,x)$

Now, we know that among various logical fallacies Vasubandhu lists the case of an inference based upon the converse relation, which we have discussed previously. This relation allows his opponent to render Vasubandhu's true thesis that whatever is arising due to an effort is non-eternal, into a false one that whatever is non-eternal is arising due to an effort. The recognition of the wrong application of that

relation and hence, of the origin of the falsehood by him clearly shows that he must be aware of the law of contraposition, which later Kumàrila Bhatta succinctly puts as follows: "If the relation of pervader and pervaded holds betwen two entities, it follows that the converse relation holds betwen their negations"[50]. By this law, we can transform formula (2) into an equivalence

(14) $(\forall x)(A(h,x) \rightarrow A(s,x)) \leftrightarrow (\forall x)(-A(s,x) \rightarrow -A(h,x))$

which says that Per(A,B) iff Per(-B,-A), and vice versa. But, obviously formula (14) and hence (2) would not hold, if (13) is valid, since the right member of (14) in that case cannot be defined. Thus, if Vasubandhu's theory of pervasion is indeed based upon the law of contraposition, then Gangeśa's criticism interpreted within the boundary of Navya-naiyàyika definition of the universal-positive, as Ingalls and Goekoop have done, is quite valid. In fact, the notion of universal-positive can only be conceived in parallel with that law. However, if Vasubandhu's theory did not base itself upon it, then we have quite an entirely different situation. So, it is imperative to inquire as to whether his theory did indeed base itself upon it or not.

As Staal has pointed out, the classification of inference into three types among which is the universal-positive has its origin in the theory of so-called "three characteristics of h", which, if using Dharmakìrti's exposition, can be formulated as follows:

(i) "occurrence of h in the inferred only"

(15) $(\forall x)(h(x) \rightarrow A(x,p))$

where p stands for the inferred.

(ii) "occurrence of h in similar instances only"

(16) $(\forall x)(h(x) \rightarrow (Si(x,p) \wedge s(x)))$

(iii) "non-occurrence in dissimilar instances of h only":[51]

(17) $(\forall x)-(h(x) \rightarrow -s(x))$

These three so-called characteristics was announced for the first time by Vasubandhu in his Tarka-śàstra[52]. Some people claimed that it is Dharmakìrti who in turn gives them a quantified form by his introducing into them the particle eva, "only, just"[53]. However, such a claim seems to be ill-founded, especially in view of the fragmentary state of our knowledge concerning Vasubandhu's logical works, which derives mainly from the Chinese or Tibetan translations. Thus, the said announcement in Tarka-śàstra is today known to us through the Chinese translation of that also fragmentary work, which therefore has no guarantee as to the exact wording of the Sanskrit version, particularly when it is translated by the hands of Paramàrtha, who sometimes departed from the original quite considerably, as has been seen in the case of his translation of the Abhidharmakośa. So, without too much involving ourselves into this matter right here, we hold that the theory of the three characteristics of h in its quantified form has been expounded by Vasubandhu, and that formulas (15)-(17) describe in symbolic language that theory. In this connection, it must be further noted that it is not that "In later texts the place of anumeya is taken by paksa and the place of asapaksa by vipaksa", as Staal claimed, since those terms, i.e. paksa and vipaksa, were already occurring in Vasubandhu's works, and since we know that Dharmakìrti, following Dignàga's footstep, generally employed the latter's terminology rather than Vasubandhu's[54]. The repeated use of the term avyabhicàra by him, instead of avinàbhàva, in the Nyàya-bindu as well as in the Pramànavàrttika is the case in point.[55]

Now, given those three characteristics of h, one wonders whether the deduction of a general inference of the form expressed by formula (2) is possible. The answer to this question according to Staal is that it is possible only if the law of contraposi-

tion is assumed. But, as Berg correctly pointed out[56], the need for this law there is actually arisen from Staal's formal system rather than from the three characteristics given by Vasubandhu. In Staal's system, the characteristics (ii) and (iii) are formalized as follows:

(a) $(\forall y)(A(h,y) \rightarrow (y = \alpha x((x \neq p) \wedge A(s,x))))$

(b) $(\alpha x{-}A(s,x)){-}A(h, \alpha x{-}A(s,x))$

Now, if we are to deduce (2) from (b), the law of contraposition must be assumed, because (b) implies the contrapositive of (2) through the law

$$(\alpha x F(x))G(\alpha x F(x)) \longleftrightarrow (\forall x)(F(x) \rightarrow G(x))$$

given in Staal's system, and such deduction would give us the right member of the equivalence (14):

$$(\forall x)(-A(s,x) \rightarrow -A(h,x))$$

However, if we formulate the three above characteristics in terms of Berg's system or of ours, as has been seen previously, no such law of contraposition is needed, since we can deduce (2) from (16) and (17) quite easily on account that (16) is analogous to definition (7), and (17) to (11). Thus, one would tend to agree with Berg's assessment that "Staal's endeavor to establish an isomorphic image of the analyzed natural language in his own formal system is both logically and pedagogically unfortunate".[57]

Interestingly enough, Staal's formulation, despite its "both logically and pedagogically unfortunate" character, throws a rather curious light upon the criticism made by Gangeśa against the aforementionned five definitions of non-deviation and that of inseparable connection. Remember that Goekoop has recognized the logical equivalence of these six definitions not only to each other among themselves, but also to the valid definition of what pervasion is, when he formulated them all in terms of first order predicate calculus, which would give in his system

(g1) $(y)\{Ay \rightarrow -(Ex)[(z)(Bz \rightarrow -Szx) \wedge Ryx]\}$

(g2) $(y)\{Ay \rightarrow -(Ex)[(w)((Ez)(Bz \wedge Szw) \rightarrow (x \neq w) \wedge Ryx]\}$

(g3) $(y)\{Ay \rightarrow (x)[(z)(Bz \rightarrow -Szx) \rightarrow -Ryx]\}$

where (g1) is an expression of definitions Nos 1 and 2, and I must add, definition of inseparable connection, which Goekoop himself recognized as a variant of definition No 1, (g2) an expression of definitions Nos 3 and 5, and (g3) an expression of definition No 4. He then compared them with the valid definition of pervasion

(g4) $(x)[(Ey)(Ay \wedge Ryx) \rightarrow (Ey)(By \wedge Syx)]$

and realized that they are indeed equivalent to (g4) and are therefore correct "from a purely logical point of view". However, he went on to observe that "in the case of universal-positives the condition

(g5) $(Ex)(y)(By \rightarrow -Syx)$

is not fulfilled". Consequentially, (g4) which is the expression of the definition of pervasion, which he himself constructed and hence must have regarded as valid, does not satisfy (g5); so the definition itself does not satisfy the notion of pervasion.[58] These interesting inconsistencies would not have our attention, were it not for the fact that condition (g5) is another expression of formula (13). And the condition posed by (13) is applicable to the definitions of pervasion and to inference only if the law of contraposition expressed by (14) is assumed, as Staal's above-mentionned formulation clearly indicates. Yet, not once did Goekoop refer to that law, although he continued claiming that the five definitions and the definition of inseparable connection are correct, due to their being equivalent to his definition of pervasion, which, we assume, must be valid at least in his view. Otherwise, one would wonder why he bothered to construct it after all.

Such an intriguing situation occurs probably on account of his thinking of himself as being but a messenger of Gangeśa's thought. In fact, Gangeśa did base his criti-

cism upon the universal-positive cases without mentioning at any time the law of contraposition in the context of his examination of the notion of pervasion. If we exclude the possibility of his basing his criticism upon the notion of class for a moment, we are compelled to recognize then that he must base it upon that law. Under the light of Staal's formulation discussed above, this possibility is the most likely, since although Gangeśa did not refer to that law within his investigation of the notion of pervasion, he lived in a period when the transformation of the three characteristics of h discovered by Vasubandhu into three types of inference was already complete and established. It was him who opened the period of Navya-nyàya and contributed to the popularization and the advancement of that classification. This new classification, despite its having the origin in the three characteristics of h, can be said to have almost no common foundation, which will be seen shortly, with the logic based upon the theory of three characteristics of h. It divides inferences into three types in accordance with whether s is universal, empty or neither. In the case where s is universal, it is called "universal-positive". If it is empty, it is called "universal-negative". If it is neither, it is named "positive-negative". Gangeśa, following the footsteps of Uddyotakara, already has given us this classification with its definition[59]. Note that all three of them are defined in terms of s and not of h, because this is a very important distinction, which seems to be missed by most of the authors after Gangeśa, including those of today.

For instance, Viśvanàtha, commenting on the verse "Inference is of three kinds" in his Siddhànta-muktàvalì, says: "Inference is of three kinds, according as it is universal-positive, universal-negative or both positive and negative. Of these, that which has no dissimilar instances is universal-positive, like 'A jar is nameable because it is knowable', for there, there is no dissimilar instances, on account that

everything is nameable. That which has no similar instance is universal-negative, like 'Earth is different from other things, because it has smell', for there, on account of the fact that the difference from the thirteen entities such as water etc... has not already been definitely known, a similar instance, or what definitely has the thing to be inferred, is wanting. That which has both similar and dissimilar instances is positive-negative, like 'It has fire because it has smoke', for it has both similar instances, such as kitchen, and dissimilar instance, such as lake".[60] By explaining the three types of inference in that way, Viśvanàtha considers thus the theory of three types of inference as identical with that of three characteristics of h, which is not the case. This is because while Gangeśa defines his classification in terms of s, Vasubandhu, and as will be seen, Dignàga classifies theirs in terms of h. This confusion is rather widespread at Viśvanàtha's time. Annambhatta, without the latter's ambiguity, explicitly refers to the three kinds of h and calls them respectively as positive-negative, universal-positive and universal-negative. He says:

> "h is of three kinds: positive-negative, universal-positive and universal-negative. Positive-negative is what has both positive and negative pervasion, as in the case there being something having smoke and fire is the thing to be inferred, the statement that 'where there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen' is a positive pervasion; and the statement that 'where there is no fire there is no smoke either, as in the lake' is a negative pervasion. Universal-positive is what has the pervader always positive, like 'A jar is nameable because it is knowable, as in the cloth', for in this case there is no negative pervasion of the knowability and the nameability, on account that everything is both knowable and nameable. Universal-negative is what has the pervader always negative, like 'Earth is different from other things, because it has smell, whatever is not different from other things does not have smell, and this is not so, therefore that is not so', for in this case there is no positive example for the statement that 'whatever has smell is different from other

things', on account of the fact that paksatva is always earth"[61].

Thus, Annambhatta infuses the theory of three types of inference with the theory of the three characteristics of h to create a confusion that "h is of three kinds: positive-negative, universal-positive and universal-negative".

This confusion is still prevalent today. Matilal, for instance, although he[62] succeeds in differentiating Dignàga's concept of "universal-positive" from that of Uddyotakara as well as in giving correctly Gangeśa's definitions of his three types of inference, fails to make clear why the latter two offer such a new theory and what are the consequences it would bring with respect to Dignàga's concept. Instead, he goes on discussing Uddyotakara's and Gangeśa's view, pointing out these men using Dignàga's language and examples, and thus giving a rather erroneous impression that there is no radical differences betwen the latter's logic and that of the former two at all. It can be even said that Matilal does not regconize the significance of the statement made by Gangeśa concerning the universal-positive cases that in these case s is the "everpresent property", which Matilal himself speaks of. In the case of Staal and hence of Goekoop, this confusion is even more monumental and not the least interesting. Staal starts out by showing that in his formal system one can deduce formula (2) from (16) and (17) only if the law of contraposition is assumed. He then criticizes Stcherbatsky and others for failing to realize that (16) and (17) are equivalent and "that this equivalence constitutes a logical relationship, namely, contraposition"[63]. And this logical relationship is thus conceived to be the foundation of Dharmakìrti's logic, if not of Dignàga and Vasubandhu. Finally, he continues on to show that that relationship is also the cornerstone of Gangeśa's logic which was to dominate the rest of Indian logic after Dignàga and Dharmakìrti. In such a presentation, Staal even fails to differentiate, as Matilal does, the

arguments betwen Dignàga and Uddyotakara, i.e. whether h or s also should be considered to be universal, although he does mention the latter's name in passing. Thus, for Staal from the time Vasubandhu discovers the three characteristics of h down to the days of Viśvanàtha, Annambhatta and others, there is not one slight difference of views concerning those three characteristics, despite Uddyotakara's argument and Gangeśa's new definitions. The confusion is therefore complete.

As has been noted, this confusion of today's researchers has its origin in the confusion of other previous authors among whom we already mentionned Viśvanatha and Annambhatta as their representatives. In fact, after quoting these two authors and formalizing their statements about the three types of inference, Staal observes that "in these various texts contraposition is postulated with reference to pervasion and inference in the following terms:

$$V(h,s) \longleftrightarrow V(\text{negation of } s, \text{ negation of } h)"$$

So, when Viśvanàtha defines ambiguously universal-positive as "that which has no dissimilar instances", he implicitly helps Staal into connecting, then identifying that definition with that of the second characteristic expressed by formula (16), and from it, into seeing the presence of the law of contraposition in the standard form of Indian inference as is written in formula (2). Now, we have indicated that the theory of the three characteristics of h is entirely different from the classification of inferences into three types, because while the former bases itself upon h, the latter has its foundation in s. This difference is radical and fundamental on account of the fact that it would give us two entirely different kinds of logic, one based upon the theory of pervasion, the other upon the law of contraposition. And Berg must be credited with the distinction of being the first to recognize that fundamental difference.

In his review of Staal's paper "Contraposition in Indian logic"[64], after pointing

out that "the recognition of this law (i.e. of contraposition) is clearly dependent on the author's peculiar formalization in terms of restricted variables" and that "under another, more direct, interpretation..., the problem of contraposition in this particular context vanishes", Berg goes on commenting upon Staal's discussion of that law, in which comment he connects that law with the Navya-naiyàyika classification of inferences into three types "according to whether the sàdhya is (a) universal, (b) empty, or (c) neither". He further adds the obvious remark that "the Navya-nyàya logicians imposed the restriction on the law of contraposition that cases (a) and (b) must be excluded, for otherwise the counterparts of the two main subformulas of the law could not be items of valid knowledge". This remark, though obvious it is, is rather interesting in that it gives us a slightly furtive view of what realy constitutes the foundation for the Navya-naiyàyika classification of inferences. In fact, it opens the way for recognition that the Navya-naiyàyika, Gangeśa included, found their logic mostly and mainly upon the law of contraposition. And it is from the standpoint of this law that they look and judge other logical systems. Having said that, it must be further added that that does mean that we attribute to Berg the claim that Gangeśa's logic is based mainly upon the law of contraposition. It is our own. The significance of this claim lies in the fact that it not only shows us what is the basis of Gangeśa's criticism of the definitions of non-deviation and that of inseparable connection, but it furthermore throws some light on the question of whether or not Dignàga and his school's logic is based upon the same law of contraposition, as Staal indicated. In effect, the second point is the most interesting feature of Staal's monumental error and confusion.

That the post-Gangeśa logicians regard their logic as founded upon the law of contraposition is undoubtedly self-evident. upon reading their writings. Let's

take the case of Annambhatta, which we have cited above. He defines the type of positive-negative inference as follows: "Positive-negative is what has both positive and negative pervasion, as in the case there being something having smoke and fire being the thing to be inferred, the statement that 'where there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen' is a positive pervasion, and the statement that 'where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in the lake', is a negative pervasion". This definition is surely a statement of the law of contraposition, as Staal recognized and formulated it into equivalence (14), after having quoted Kumārila's view and Keśavamiśra's commentary about it.[65] Thus, there is no doubt whatsoever as to the position of that law in the post-Gangeśa logic. In Gangeśa's logic itself, although a distinction is made, the universal-positive case with respect to h and the universal-positive case with respect to s are also compounded in his attempt to arrive at a "conclusive definition of pervasion", in which not only the cases of the positive-negative type are taken into account, but also those of the universal-positive too. As a consequence, it must be concluded that his logic is equally based upon that law. In fact, his so-called "conclusive definition" is nothing but a series of eight definitions stringed together so as to insure that all the cases, irrespective of whatever their nature is, are included,[66] although it aims primarily at overcoming the restriction that the law of contraposition they unknowingly use imposes upon them, which is that all the cases where s is universal or empty must be excluded on account of the fact that that law is inapplicable to them. So, later logicians such as Viśvanātha and Annambhatta set out to simplify it and at the same time preserve its original intent, which is to define pervasion in such a way that all the cases are encompassed, in spite that they do away with all the niceties that Gangeśa employs to decorate his definition such as the use of relative and demonstrative pronouns in place of the usual terms h and s, a feature which some modern researchers regard as

"interesting" and having "a formal character". Thus, Annambhatta defines it as "the state of h having a common locus with s, which is not a counterpositive of an absolute absence, which has a common locus with h".[67] Viśvanàtha offers a similar definition, which says: "pervasion is said to be the state of h having the same locus with s, which must not be the counterpositive of an absence resident in the locus having h"[68]. The "conclusive definition" proposed by Gangeśa can therefore be formulated as follows:[69]

(18) $(\exists x)(h(x) \ \& \ s(x) \ \& \ (\forall x)(h(x) \rightarrow (\forall F)(-F(x) \rightarrow -(\forall y)(s(y) \rightarrow F(y))))$

which may not be an equivalent to the valid definition of pervasion, as Goekoop claimed. Staal already pointed out "numerous criticisms", which it elicites and which are not at all without foundation.[70] It is not our task here to inquire further into this problem. Suffice it to say that with the introduction of the idea of locus into it to serve as the main condition, the "conclusive definition" evidences a rather regretable regression from the process of formalization of logic.

So, leaving aside the interpretation of Gangeśa's criticism of the five definitions of non-deviation and that of inseparable connection in terms of class logic and looking at it from the standpoint of a traditional commentator who understand the term 'universal-positive' exactly as what it supposed to mean, we arrive at a rather interesting discovery that Gangeśa bases his criticism not so much upon the notion of class, which we surmise, might still be very confusing to him, as upon his view concerning the foundation of his logic. That foundation is none other than the law of contraposition. And in studying other logical systems, he forthwith projects that view upon them. Consequently, he thinks that Vasubandhu and Dignàga's definitions of inseparable connection and of nondeviation can be interpreted in that law. The result is therefore quite predictable that they do not encompass the cases which

that law imposes. However, we have shown that that law does not operate in Vasubandhu's theory of three characteristics, nor is it considered therein to be a law at all. At most, it serves as a rubric under which he would list all the logical fallacies subsumed under the name "converse". Together with Berg, we further showed that the theory of three characteristics of h discovered by Vasubandhu and subsequently developped by Dignàga and Dharmakìrti needs not and should not be formulated in terms of that law, as Staal claimed and Gangeśa and his successors such as Viśvanàtha and Annambhatta understood. Thus, it can be said that Gangeśa's criticism of the five definitions of nondeviation and that of inseparable, as far as they are concerned, is not valid and has arisen due to a misunderstanding on his part of their proper role. And from this misunderstanding, all the confusions originate, leading finally to Staal's formulation, which claims that the law of contraposition must be operating in the logic of three characteristics of h.

To be sure, that misunderstanding also has its own origin. We have indicated that despite his distinction betwen the universal-positive case with respect to h and the universal-positive case with respect to s, Gangeśa finally ends up in infusing them together to fit his view on the foundation of his logic and his classification of inferences into three types, which both are based upon the law of contraposition. Confusions such as his are not at all surprising when viewed within the framework of his time. A contemporary of his, for instance, by the name Manikantha still explains the term 'universal-positive' not with respect to s, as Gangeśa has explicitly done, but on the contrary, with respect to h, as if it were a new term for one of three characteristics in Vasubandhu's or Dignàga's logic. And if we go back further, we will immediately recognize that the aforesaid misunderstanding and confusions are not even begun with Gangeśa and others, but at least with Dharmottara. In his commentary

Nyàyabindutìkà, Dharmottara already understands the characteristics (16) and (17) in terms of the law of contraposition, as Stcherbatsky refers to and subsequently Staal formulates it.[71] After having explained the three characteristics of h in terms given by Dharmakìrti, Dharmottara poses the following problem together his answer:

> "Now, when it is said the occurrence in similar instances only, does it not necessarily follow that there is only non-occurrence in the dissimilar instances? Why then are two clauses mentioned? The answer is as follows. Either the positive or the negative should be used, each with necessity, and not otherwise. So, for the sake of emphasizing it, both clauses are mentioned. If both clauses are used without necessity, however, the following result would occur that whatever occurs in similar instance and does not occur in dissimilar instance is h. And then there would be [such invalid inferences as] 'It is black, because it is that person's child, as in the children we see', where the state of being that person's child is h. Therefore, both the positive and the negative should be used only with necessity so that the connection of the proving h with its s. would follow necessarily. And since they should be used with necessity and without exception, of both only one should be used and not two, that is, that with necessity either the positive or the negative should be used. Thus, for the pedagogic sake, both clauses are mentioned".[72]

Clearly, asking the question and answering it in that way "can only be explained by assuming that the author knew the law of contraposition and its relevance in the present context", as Staal put it. Undoubtedly, in the above passage it is quite apparent that Dharmottara has viewed, knowingly or unknowingly, the theory of three characteristics of h in terms of that law. He therefore must be credited with the distinction of being the creator of all sorts of confusions and misunderstanding that his succeeding fellow logicians suffer, including Gangeśa and Staal, in later times up to the present days. In fact, Staal himself has already recognized the origin of such favorite inferences as 'It has contact with a monkey because it is this tree', which, as has been seen, Raghunàtha and Mathurànàtha constantly cited.

in their works commenting upon Gangeśa's writings, in the above example given by Dharmottara, i.e. 'It is black because it is that person's child'. Thus, thanks to Staal's formulation, despite its "both logically and pedagogically unfortunate" character, we can now see not only why Gangeśa criticizes the five definitions of nondeviation, which, it must be acknowledged, are correct "from a purely logical point of view", but also where he derives his criticism. Consequently, without much further ado, except the suggestion concerning the problem of class logic in Vasubandhu's logical writings, we can dismiss Gangeśa's critical remarks simply as a misunderstanding, and return to the definitions of nondeviation and of inseparable connection previously formulated.

Our formulation of those five definitions of nondeviation is basically Berg's, as a comparison of formulas (7)-(11) with those (i)-(v) would evidently show, with one exception which is that we substitute our symbol = of identity for his of class on account of the reasons stated before. We have also indicated that Vasubandhu's definition of inseparable connection is a variant of the first definition and hence can be expressed by the same formula (7), if not (11). However, we have not stated the justification for the use of our symbol =, and one may wonder whether it is justified after all, especially in view of the widespread popular belief that Vasubandhu upholds the so-called theory of "universal flux"[73]. Further, we said nothing about the possible definition of the symbol within Vasubandhu's logic. Now is the opportunity to approach these problems and to see what solutions we would get for them. First, in the present fragmentary state of Vasubandhu's logical works, no statement is preserved in relation to the question of identity, or for that matter, any other kind of logical relations. Second, we do not even know whether he ever discusses the problems of that kind in his writings when they are still preserved in their complete state. Nevertheless, based upon his theory of descriptions, we must assume, of necessity, that he would have to

have been aware of those logical relations, including that of identity, on account of the fact that without such an assumption that theory becomes inconceivable. To have a term n substituted for by a predicate N such that there is a description (ix)N(x) without being aware of the presence of some sort of relation betwen them is rather hardly thinkable. In fact, in such operations the identity relation is already supposed; otherwise, they cannot even start itself in the first place. Again, some sort of relation must be posited in Vasubandhu's definition of inseparable connection. So, although we have no explicit statement from his works concerning with the question of logical relations, there is no doubt whatsoever as to the use he makes of them. In subsequent centuries when his discovery is further developped in the hands of Dignàga and Dharmakìrti, we know that three sorts of relation are discussed, which they considered as fundamental and which can serve as criteria for differentiating three kinds of logic. Of these relations the first is that of negation which we may find in such inferences as 'There is no jar here because there is no perception of it'. The second is called identity relation of the type 'This is a tree because it is the śiśampa'. The third sort is the so-called "causal" relation such as that found in the favorite inference 'It has fire because it has smoke'.[74] Leaving aside for a moment the negative relation, the other two are clearly recognizable in Vasubandhu's works. The identity relation is already referred to above in connection with the theory of descriptions. Nonetheless, the example given by Dharmakìrti is rather interesting in that it does not merely express concretely that relation in a specific case, but what is more, it poses again the problem of the class. This is because to say that the <u>śiśampa</u> has a identity relation to the tree is saying that tree is a set A of which the <u>śiśampa</u> is a member among others. Thus, this relation is not entirely identity, rather it is a membership relation. Hence, the identity

relation expressed in Vasubandhu's theory of descriptions is not wholly identical with that intended by Dharmakīrti to mean. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that the so-called identity relation of the latter sort is unknown to Vasubandhu. We will show that it is due to the discovery of that relation that prompts him into a new formulation of logical reasoning and a new definition of pervasion, which subsequent logicians were to called "internal pervasion".

The third sort of relation is quite ubiquitous in most fragments still preserved of Vasubandhu's logical works. The special feature of this relation lies in the fact that it is called "causal relation", or to be more precise, "consequential relation". The example given for it is following: 'It has fire because it has smoke'. That inference in order to be valid must, since the time of Vasubandhu, have the statement showing the "inseparable connection" betwen fire and smoke, which usually reads "whatever has smoke has fire". So, here we have a transitive relation rather than a causal relation, since in terms of relation, the example is of the form

(19)

$$\begin{array}{ccc} A & = & B \\ B & = & C \\ \hline A & = & C \end{array}$$

(Obviously, it is also of the form: $((p \rightarrow q) \,\&\, p) \rightarrow q)$, but it needs not concern us here). Therefore, the so-called causal relation is actually a relation of transitivity. And hence, in terms of inferential mode, it is a <u>modus ponens</u>. In the <u>Vādavidhi</u> Vasubandhu still talks mostly of this relation and its <u>modus ponens</u>. And this should not surprise us, since given the transitive relation we can always deduce the rest. E.g., given R(A,B) and R(B,C), we have not only R(A,C), but also R(A,A), which is the expression of a reflexive relation in the case B=A, and R(A,B) and R(B,A), which is the expression of a symmetric relation when A=C.

Interestingly enough, once such a relation is established, that is, a relation which is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, we can easily define the notion of identity as follows:[75]

(20) $x = y \leftrightarrow (\forall w)((r(x,w) \leftrightarrow r(y,w)) \ \& \ (r(w,x) \leftrightarrow r(w,y)))$

which can be further simplified into

(21) $x = y \leftrightarrow (\forall w)(w(x) \leftrightarrow w(y))$

which again can be rewritten into formula (12)

$$x = y \leftrightarrow (\forall w)(x \in w \leftrightarrow y \in w)$$

to express the axiom of extensionality. And this is the interesting point, since it is evident that the notion of identity can be defined in terms of the notion of class, and the notion of pure equality in terms of equivalence relation. Note that equivalence relation is a relation which is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. Thus, one can, within this context, take the identity relation to mean exactly what Dharmakīrti intended it to mean, which is a class relation. And hence, even within the purview of the Vàdávidhi the former relation can also be defined in terms of the latter. Consequently, without stretching too much the rule of substitution in Vasubandhu's theory of descriptions, we can say that the identity relation in that work can be interpreted as a class relation. It follows then that formulas (7)-(11) can be rewritten into Berg's formulas (i)-(v) without risking any confusion over of the question of class in Vasubandhu's logic.

Now, having defined the notion of pervasion in formulas (5)-(11), it is quite easy to see how Vasubandhu would construct his logical schemata. In the olden days, although we have explicit schemata of inference, none of them is specifically discussed, except the ten-membered form that the Jaina claimed for themselves.[76] By the time of Caraka, he recognized the need for correct logical reasoning in medical sciences for diagnostic purposes, so his famous medical book, the Samhita, devoted

one of its sections to the discussion of various aspects of logical reasoning in medicine.[77] Succeeding Caraka, Gautama Aksapàda for the first time in Indian history set out to systematize most of the knowledges concerning epistemology and logic of his period into a system of aphorisms, which he called the Nyàya-sùtra or the Book of Logic, although as any book of its time the world over of similar title, it does not exclusively deal with logic as such, but also with a host of other problems of extraneous interest. In this Nyàya-sùtra he explicitly specified that any form of reasoning must have five following members:

1. Thesis: This mountain is fire-possessing
2. Reason: Because it is smoke-possessing
3. Example: As in the kitchen
4. Application: And this is so
5. Conclusion: Therefore that is so.[78]

This form of reasoning were to endure up to Vasubandhu's time without any scrutiny and improvement. Clearly, by looking at it, one can easily recognize that it is some sort of reasoning by analogy, though not having attained the desirable formal degree, as one would like. And due to this apparent defect, one might question whether it is an inference schema after all. In any case, when Vasubandhu first starts writing about logic, he still accepts that five-membered schema. There is, however, an unprecedented improvement, which finally detaches Indian logic from the empirical legacy of Caraka's medical diagnostics and of Gautama's analogy reasoning, and launches it on the road to a genuine science of logic. And this improvement is none other than the inquiry into what the conditions are which, given $A(h,x)$, allow one to infer $A(s,x)$ for each x, leading to the birth of the theory of three characteristics of h.

In the Tarka-śàstra as well as in a report given by Hui Chao, Vasubandhu still

talks about the five-membered schema[79]. But in the same Tarka-śastra he discovers that given an inference of the form $(\forall x)(A(h,x) \rightarrow A(s,x))$, in order to infer $A(s,x)$, we must have $A(h,x)$, and h in $A(h.x)$ must satisfy three following conditions:[80]

(i) h occurs in s.

(ii) h occurs in similar instances (only).

(iii) h not occurs in dissimilar instances.

We have formalized these three conditions, which used to be called "three characteristics", in the above formulas (15)-(17). Once given these three conditions, it can be readily seen that they are forced upon Vasubandhu to repudiate the five-membered schema and replace it with a new one, since inference now is not based upon the analogy anymore, but upon a much stronger ground, which is the deducibility of various components involving therein. Thus, in his next logical work, the Vadavidhi, Vasubandhu does indeed repudiate the five-membered schema, an act which were to create a considerable criticism from his opponents throughout history, and have it replaced with a three-membered, which generally has the following form:

1. Thesis: The mountain is fire-possessing

2. Reason: Because it is smoke-possessing

3. Premise: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen[81].

The third member is defined by Vasubandhu to be a statement of the pervasion, which ascertains the "inseparable connection" betwen the thesis and the reason. In other words, it is of the form

$$(\forall x)(A(h,x) \longrightarrow A(s,x))$$

so, when there is a reason h such that

$$(\forall x)A(h,x)$$

one can always deduce the thesis s that

$$(\exists x)A(s,x)$$

Now, what is wholly novel in this new three-membered schema and which distinguishes it from the five-membered of Old Gautama as being a new discovery is not that it reduces the cumbersome five members to the manageable three, although this is what it exactly does, but that it introduces the premise to state precisely the pervasion relation betwen the first and the second members and to constitute the third member. Why is this introduction a new discovery? Because it is derived from Vasubandhu's theory of three characteristics. We have shown that given the conditions (i)-(iii) as expressed by formulas (15)-(17), we can always deduce (2), which, as has been seen, is also the expression of the third member. Therefore, it is not without reason or merely due to the cumbersome character of the five-membered schema that Vasubandhu repudiate the old five-membered schema and has it replaced with a new three-membered one. And this conclusion is further confirmed by the present-day method of proof, which is that given formulas (15)-(17), we can always deduce (2), as has been shown previously. Thus, for the first time in Indian history of logic, one is told why a certain form of inference is of the type as it is and not otherwise. This is indeed the culminating point of Vasubandhu's achievement and genius.

Further still, although the third member of the new schema is written in the form

$$(\forall x)(A(h,x) \longrightarrow A(s,x))$$

in actuality it must be of the form

(22) $$(\forall x)((A,x) \ \& \ (\exists x)(A(h,x) \longrightarrow A(s,x))) \longrightarrow A(s,x))$$

since it states not only that 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire', but also that 'as it is in the kitchen', which specifies explicitly that the universe described by the former is not an empty universe. However, if that is in fact the case, as a number of authors have maintained, one can easily see that the three conditions expressed by

formulas (15)-(17) are not at all necessary. In effect, it would tranfer the new three-membered schema back to the old way of inference, which is reasoning by analogy, of the Nyàya-sùtra. Hence, the logical step would be to dispense all together the inserted formula

(23) $(\exists x)(A(h,x) \longrightarrow A(s,x))$

and to retain only the necessary part of the pervasion expressed by (2). This is expectedly what Vasubandhu does in his probably last logical writing, the Tarka-śàstra II. In the Pramànasamuccaya, Dignàga reported that there is a book by the name Tarka-śàstra, which upholds the theory that the example given in the third[83] member of the new schema is not necessary and therefore can be discarded. Although he vehemently criticized this theory, he did not tell us who its author was. More curiously still, he also cited that book in several other instances where he showed approval for its ideas[84]. This situation is further complicated by some of his commentators who wrongly gives it a plural ending and thus leads others into believing that there may be more than one book by the name Tarka-śàstra[85]. Actually, such a belief has been entertained by Tucci who, together with the fact that the Tarka-śàstra quoted by Dignàga maintains a two-membered schema while the Chinese translation of a book by the same name has the old five-membered, is of the opinion that the latter, which from now on will be called the Tarka-śàstra I, is different from the former, which we already named Tarka-śàstra II. Now, that the Tarka-śàstra I is one of Vasubandhu's works, if not his first writing in the logical matter, is certainly undoubted, and we therefore have no need to discuss further.[86] As for the Tarka-śàstra II, Frauwallner[87] already pointed out the untrustworthy character of the plural ending and hence had disposed of the notion that the name Tarka-śàstra is not a proper name, but a general name for a class of writings dealing with tarka. Now, we add the following evidence to

show that the two-membered schema, although it is criticized by Dignàga and others, is actually employed by Vasubandhu in his own other works. For instance, in the Abhdharmakośa, we have the inference of the form 'If one needed a cause for destruction, one would need one for every destruction'.[88] Similarly, in the Karmasiddhiprakarana Vasubandhu sometimes applies that inferential form to his argumentation such as 'If a thing is stable, it has no movement', or 'If it has no movement, it is constantly stable', or 'If it is not stable, it also has no movement', without ever referring to the third member of the three-membered schema.[89] Therefore, to assert as Tucci did that the two-membered schema of inference "was certainly not accepted by Vasubandhu" is surely wrong. In fact, the inferences of the form 'If it has no movement, it is constantly stable' can be expressed exactly by formula (2)

$$(\forall x)(A(h,x) \longrightarrow A(s,x)$$

without the need for the inserted formula (23), once the conditions in (15)-(17) are stated, since one can deduce (2) from (15)-(17).

That conclusion is rather interesting in many ways. First, it leads us to the recognition that with the newer two-membered schema of inference Vasubandhu could resolve all together the difficulty posed by Gangeśa concerning the universal-positive cases, on account of the fact that in this newer formulation, given

(24) $(\forall x)(h(x) \longrightarrow g(x))$

one can deduce

(25) $(\forall x)h(x) \longrightarrow (\forall x)g(x)$

This new powerful form of deduction is later on recognized by Arcata Dharmakaradatta,[90] who understands that the example given in the third member serves neither the proving nor the disproving of a thesis, but merely as a guide to an unintelligent fellow, although it is generally criticized and neglected by most of other logicians, inclu-

ding, of course, Dignàga and Gangeśa. And thanks to that recognition, Arcata was able to show that one can draw a valid conclusion of the type 'All is momentary' from a premise 'Whatever is real is momentary', a point missed by Gangeśa in his criticism of Vasubandhu's definition of inseparable connection.

In order to carry out that inference, one needs however implicitly the notion of class as it is defined by (20)-(21). This is also true in the case of the aforesaid inference 'This is a tree because it is a <u>śimśapa</u>' given by Dharmakìrti. For in either instances are buried class quantifiers, which, when fully written , become "mixedly universal and existential". Thus, although the statement that 'This is a tree because it is a <u>śimśapa</u>' can be written in the form

(26) $$(\forall x)(f(x) \rightarrow g(x))$$

what it actually conveys is of the form

(27) $$(\exists W)(\forall Z)(\forall x)(x \in Z \leftrightarrow x \in W)$$

where W stands for the class of trees in general, and Z for the class of <u>śimśapa</u> trees in particular. And that which is expressed by (27) is not satisfactorily expressed by (26) due to the mixed prenex quantifiers of the former. So, one may say that a class logic has been ushed in by Vasubandhu with his introduction of the two-membered schema of inference. How this logic is discussed and evaluated by him, we presently do not know, as no fragment related to it is preserved. Yet, this does not mean that he is not aware of the usefulness which such a logic presents in certain cases. The examples given above make it amply clear.

Up to this point, we describe Vasubandhu's logic as we understand it from a limited number of fragments known and preserved to us from his logical writings. We said nothing of the character of this logic, nor of the kind of symbols we used. This is because of our belief that in studying a logic such as Vasubandhu's we

should not be prejudiced even as to the kind of tool we employ for carrying out our work, since it might lead us to an erroneous conclusion. Now, with the work at its end it becomes eminently clear that we can distinguish at least three major kinds of logic in his writings. First, we have the logic of identity. Second, the logic of quantification. These two logics are combined to produce such expressions as formulas (7)-(11), for instance. They are of the simplest kinds, and this should not be surprising. As Quine has remarked in his introduction to the reprinting of Whitehead and Russell's Incomplete symbols: Descriptions that "An important thing about thus absorbing all singular terms other than variables is that the logic of quantification and identity no longer needs to be conceived otherwise than in its simplest form, involving just predicate letters, variables, quantifiers, truth functions, and "=",[91] so why should Vasubandhu's logic be different in view of his theory of descriptions? In those same formulas, one can easily recognize the presence of a functor F. And this functor in effect indicates that sooner and later it would be forced upon Vasubandhu to arrive at a class logic. Why? Because in certain statements, which we already have seen, the logic of identity and quantification would not be able to fully convey their import. Thus, a class logic must be conceived, although we are not at all completely clear at the present time as to its exact content due to the lack of materials in Vasubandhu's logical fragments. Once, these three kinds of logic are established, it naturally follows that the symbols we used are generally belonging to them without distinction. There is no need, hence, to specify on our part what system of symbols we employed. They are used as and if they are fit for exploring Vasubandhu's logic and for no other purposes.

Having defined his logic and its content, what conclusion can we draw from it then? We have seen that pervasion is the fundamental notion of Vasubandhu's logic and thereby

wholly determines the subsequent development of his logical discoveries. There are two sources which give rise to this notion. The first is the recognition that in order that any inference of any form is to be valid, there are certain conditions which it must fulfill. Thus, given an inference of the general form

$$(\forall x)(A(h,x) \longrightarrow A(s,x))$$

Vasubandhu points out that it must satisfy the three conditions expressed by formulas (15)-(17). The recognition of these conditions leads to the establishment of the necessary relation betwen h and s, which he calls "the inseparable connection" or pervasion. The other source is derived mainly from the theory of descriptions itself. We have said at the beginning that this theory holds not only that given an n there is always an N such that (ix)N(x), but also that given an n there is always an F such that F(x). And from it we can have an inference-schema of the form

$$((\forall x)(f(x) \supset g(x)) \quad \& \quad (\ x)f(x)) \supset (\ x)g(x)$$

as expressed in formula (1). So, in this respect it must not be overemphasized that it is the theory of descriptions which prompts Vasubandhu into the inquiry of the conditions of an inference and not otherwise. Consequently, this theory plays a decisive role in this logical domain.

Once the notion of persavion is defined, various logical formulations of the new type are needed, among which the most prominent is certainly the reduction of the five-membered schema of reasoning by analogy to the fullpledged formal three-membered, and then even to the two-membered schema. We have indicated that the reduction of the old five membered schema to the new three-membered one is not the work of chance, but of deliberate efforts and reasons. Needless to say, it is not Dignàga's contribution as it has been hitherto asserted. But the interesting feature lies in the second reduction of the new three-membered schema to the even newer two-membered one. This

reduction is interesting, because for the first time the validity of an inference is established not upon a reference to some extra-logical entity, but upon the strength of itself. And thus, the notion of formal deduction attains its culminating point. Unfortunately, this line of thought never got hold of Vasubandhu's successors who constantly had it subject to criticism and therefore were snubbed in the bud. Their failure to appreciate its importance is perhaps the single most important contributing factor to the stagnancy of Indian formal thought and science after him. Nevertheless, if the validity of an inference is decided upon itself, what are then the statements of the sort 'a statement depends for its truth upon there being something in the universe'? This question, we will examine in the next chapter.

N O T E S

1. See for instance Staal, Negation and the law of contradiction in Indian thought, BSOAS XXV (1962) 52-71; also Pandey, The problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1963, pp 13-16.

2. Staal, Contraposition in Indian logic, Logic, methodology and philosophy of science Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, ed. Ernest Nagel et al., Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, p 634.

3. Nyàya-sùtra i.1.36-38: sàdhyasàdharmyàt taddharmabhàvì dṛṣṭànta udàharanam/ tadviparyayàd và viparìtaṃ vyatireky udàharanam/ udàharanàpekṣas tathety upasaṃhàro na tatheti và sàdhyasyopanayaḥ/.

4. Abhidharmakośa ii. 46a: yadà tarhi sadṛśà utpadyate/ na te nirviśesà bhavanti/ katham idaṃ jñàyate/ kṣiptàkṣiptabalidurbalakṣiptasya vajràdeś ciràśutarapàtakàlabhedàt tan mahàbhùtànàṃ parinàmaviśeṣasiddheḥ/ nàtibahuviśeṣabhinnàs tu saṃskàràḥ saty apy anyathàtve sadṛśà eva dṛśyante/ antimasya tarhi śabdàrciḥkṣaṇasya parinirvàṇakàle ca ṣaḍàyatanasyottarakṣaṇàbhàvàt sthityanyathàtvam nàstìty avyàpinì lakṣanavyavasthà pràpnoti/.

5. Barlingay, A modern introduction to Indian logic, Delhi: National Publishing House, 1965, p 109. A similar, though less exact, statement is made by Uno. See Uno, The concept of Vyàpti in the Nyàya school, Acta Asiatica III (1962) 16-29: "In the early Nyàya texts, the idea of vyàpti could be defined only by such figurative and illustrative manner as mentioned above or by passive expressions like niyata-sàhacarya (...) or avinàbhàva (...). It is only in the later Nyàya texts that the term vyàpti comes into being...". In this same article, he made some remarks about symbolic logic and the Navya-nyàya logic which sound rather strange. Thus, although he said, "I wish to avoid, in this paper, an easy compromise of these two systems...", he still used, nevertheless, the symbolic language! See pp 23 & 25.

6. Staal, The theory of definition in Indian logic, JAOS LXXXI (1961) 122-126; Annambhatta, Tarka-samgraha, in Le compendium des topiques d'Annambhatta, ed. & transl. Foucher, Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1949, pp 11-14: ativyàptir nàmàlakṣye lakṣaṇa-sattvam; yathà goḥ śṛṇgitvaṃ lakṣanaṃ kṛtaṃ cet, lakṣya-bhùta-go-bhinna-mahisì-àdàv ativyàptiḥ, tatràpi śṛṇgitvasya vidyamànatvàt, lakṣyatàvacchedakasàmànàdhikaraṇye sati, lakṣyatàvacchedakàvacchinnapratiyogitàka-bheda-sàmànàdhikaraṇyam ativyàptiḥ/ Avyàptir nàma lakṣyaikadeśàvṛttitvam, lakṣyaikadeśalakṣyatàvacchedakàśrayìbhùtakvacitlakṣye lakṣanàsattvam avyàptiḥ ity

arthaḥ, yathà goḥnìlarùpavattvam lakṣanaṃ kṛtaṃ cet lakṣyatàvacchedakàśrayìbhùtaśvetagavy avyàptiḥ, tatra nìlarùpàbhàvàt, avyàptis tu lakṣyatàvacchedakasàmànàdhikàraṇàtyantàbhàva-pratiyogitvam/ asambhavo nàma lakṣyamàtre kutràpi lakṣaṇàsattvaṃ yathà gor ekaśaphavattvaṃ gosàmànyasya dviśaphavattvenaikaśaphavattvasya kutràpy asattvàd, asambhavas tu lakṣyatàvacchedakavyàpakìbhùtàbhàva-pratiyogitvam//

7. Frauwallner, Vasubandhu's Vàdavidhih, WZKSOA I (1957) 104-146: Fragment 16a: gtan tshigs gźan gyi bsgrub par bya ba la gaṅ gis dmigs pa ñe bar bstan pa de ni dmigs pa mtshuṅs pa yin te/ dper na sṅa ma bźin du mi rtag par byas pa la/ ḥdi ni mi rtag pa ñid kyi gtan tshigs ma yin te glog la sogs pa la mṅon sum la sogs pa gźan gyis mi rtag pa ñid du grub paḥi phyir te/ gaṅ med par gaṅ yod pa de ni deḥi rgyu ma yin paḥi phyir ro// gźan ni ḥdi ni mi rtag pa ñid la gtan tshigs ma yin te ma khyab pahi phyir śin sems pa can la ñal ba bźin no źes ḥdi ñid rnam pa gźan du sbyar bar byed do. The word khyab pa which we underlined is certainly the rendering of vyàpti. Thus, there is no doubt whatsoever as to who first introduces that technical term as well as who uses it. For further informations concerning khyab pa and vyàpti, see for instance, Indices verborum Sanskrit-Tibetan and Tibetan-Sancrit to the Nyàyabindu of Dharmakìrti and the Nyàyabindutìkà of Dharmottara I, comp. Obermiller, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970, pp 101b-102b; also II, p 7a-b. From now on, all the fragments quoted here are from that article of Frauwallner, unless otherwise indicated; we will follow his numbering.

8. Vàdavidhi, Fragment 10: med na mi ḥbyuṅ baḥi don mthoṅ ba de rig pa rjes su dpag paḥo źes pa la/ don gaṅ źig gaṅ med par mi ḥbyuṅ be de ni deḥi med na mi ḥbyuṅ ba ste/ dper na meḥi du ba lta buḥo//. This is almost identical with the statement quoted in Uddyotakara's Nyàyavàrttika, ed. Vindhyeśvari Prasàda Dvivedi, Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, 1907, p 56: apare tu bruvate nàntarìyakàrthadarśnaṃ tad-vido'numànam iti/ asyàrthaḥ yo'rtho yam artham antarena na bhavati sa nàntarìyakaḥ.

9. Vàdavidhi, Fragment 4: de ḥdra ba daṅ med na mi ḥbyuṅ baḥi chos ñe bar ston pa gtan tshigs so źes pa ni/ don gaṅ sgra mi rtag pa ñid la sogs pa bsgrub par bya ba de ḥdra ba ste/ deḥi rigs can med na don gaṅ źig hgar yaṅ ḥbyuṅ ba ma yin pa ste/rtsol ba las byuṅ ba ñid ni mi rtag pa ñid lta bu daṅ du ba ni me lta buḥo źes pa de ni de ḥdra ba med na mi ḥbyuṅ baḥi chos can te/ de ñe bar ston pa ni ḥdis ñe bar bstan par byaḥo źes paḥi tha tshig go//.

10. Dharmakìrti, The Pramàṇavàrttikam of Dharmakìrti, ed. Raniero Gnoli, Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960, p 17: tasmàt svabhàvapratibandhàd

eva hetuḥ sàdhyam gamayati/ sa ca tadbhàvalakṣanas tadutpattilakṣano và/ sa evàvinàbhàvo dṛṣtàntàbhyàm pradarśyate/. It must not be forgotten, however, that Dharmakìrti opened his Pramànavàrttika with the verse

pakṣadharas tadaṃśena vyàpto hetus tridhaiva saḥ/
avinàbhàvaniyamàd hetvàbhàsàs tato'pare//

where the word "avinàbhàva" and not avyabhicàra is used. See also Arcata, Hetubindutìkà, ed. Sukhlaji Sanghavi, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1949, p 8, where the following verse is quoted

kàryakàranàbhàvàd và svabhàvàd và niyàmakàt/
avinàbhàvaniyamo'darśanàn na na darśanàt//

although we fail to spot it in Gnoli's edition.

11. Dharmottara, Nyàyabindutìkà, ed. Ščerbatskoi, Petrograd: Rossi'skoi Akademi' Nauk', 1918, p 25: tadapratibaddhasyeti/ tad iti svabhàva uktaḥ/ tena svabhàvenàpratibaddhas tadapratibaddhaḥ/ yo yatra svabhàvena na pratibaddhas tasya tadapratibaddhasya tadavyabhicàraniyamàbhàvaḥ/ tasyàpratibandhavisayasyàvyabhicàras tadavyabhicàras tasya niyamas tadavyabhicàraniyamas tasyàbhàvàt/ ayam arthaḥ/ na hi yo yatra svabhàvena na pratibaddhaḥ sa tam apratibandhaviṣayam avaśyam eva na vyabhicaratìti nàsti tayor avyabhicàraniyamaḥ/ avinàbhàvaniyamaḥ/ avyabhicàraniyamàc ca gamyagamakabhàvaḥ/ na hi yogyatayà pradìpavat parokṣàrthapratipattinimittam iṣṭam liṇgam/ api tv avyabhicàritvena niścitam/ tataḥ svabhàvapratibandhe saty avinàbhàva-niścayaḥ/ tato gamyagamakabhàvaḥ/ tasmàt svabhàvapratibandhe saty artho'rtham gamayen nànyatheti sthitam/. See also Arcata, Hetubindutìkà, p 204: tad anena tridhaiva sa ity asya trilakṣana eva sa heturah-vinàbhàvasya svasàdhyadharmàvyabhicàrasya....

12. Gangeśa, Tattvacintàmani, part II: Anumànakhanda by Gangesopàdhyàya with Mathurànàtha's commentary, Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, 1892, p 85: nàpy avinàbhàvah kevalaanvayiny abhàvàt/

13. Gangeśa, Op. cit., p 88: sàdhyàbhàvavad-vṛtti-bhinna. See also the comment by Raghunàtha, Tattvacintàmani-dìdhiti-prakàśa by Bhavananda Siddhantavagisa with Tattvacintàmani and Dìdhiti, ed. Mahàmahopàdhyàya Gurucharana Tarkadarshanatirtha, Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, 1911, p 299: avineti sàdhyam vinà sàdhyàbhàvavati yo bhàvo vṛttis tadvirahaḥ sàdhyam vinà abhàvaḥ sàdhyàbhàva-vyàpakìbhùtàbhàva-pratiyogitvam iti và/

14. Gangeśa, Op. cit., p 30 : sàdhyàbhàvavad-avṛttitvam.

15. Vàdavidhi, fragment 16a: gtan tshigs gźan gyi bsgrub par bya ba la gaṅ gis dmigs pa ñe bar bstan pa de ṅi dmigs pa mtshuṅs pa yin te/ dper na sṅa ma bźin du mi rtag par byas pa la / ḥdi ni mi rtag pa ñid kyi gtan tshigs ma yin te glog la sogs pa la mṅon sum la sogs pa gźan gyis mi rtag pa ñid du grub paḥi phyir te/ gaṅ med par gan yod pa de ni deḥi rgyu ma yin paḥi phyir ro// gźan ni ḥdi ni mi rtag pa ñid la gtan tshigs ma yin te ma khyab paḥi phyir śiṅ sems pa can la ñal bźin no źes ḥdi ñid rnam pa gźan du sbyar bar byed do/.

16. Vàdavidhi, Fragment 16b: rtsod pa bsgrub par bśad pa/ ḥdi skad rtsol ma thag tu byuṅ ba ñid kho nas mi rtag pa ñid ḥgrub kyi rnam pa gźan ni hdi mi rtag pa ñid la gtan tshigs ma yin te ma khyab pahi yaṅ yod na dgaḥ bar byed do źes pas ḥdi phyin ci log yin te/ brtsal ma thag tu byun ba ñid kyi phyir mi rtag pa kho naho źes brjod par ḥdod pa na/ brtsal ma thag tu byuṅ ba ñid kho naḥi phyir mi rtag go źes sgro btags paḥi phyir źeḥo/. These various objections clearly indicate that at the time of Vasubandhu's first formulation of what pervasion is, there seems to be numerous people who are not familiar with it, which leads Vasubandhu to explicitly delineating all the logical fallacies that one might commit. For the list, see Tucci, Buddhist Logic before Dinnàga, JRAS (1929) 485.

17. Vàdavidhi, Fragment 7: rtsod pa sgrub pa nas ma grub pa daṅ ma ñes pa daṅ hgal baḥi don ni gtan tshigs ltar snaṅ baḥo źes zer ro//de la ma grub pa la sogs pa ni dper brjod nas mtshan ñid ni ma yin te/ dper na mig gis gzuṅ bya yin paḥi phyir mi rtag go źes bya ba ma grub pa daṅ/ lus can ma yin paḥi phyir rtag go źes bya ba ma ñes pa daṅ/ bye brag pa rnams kyi dbaṅ po las byuṅ baḥi phyir mi rtag go źes bya ba ḥgal ba gcig dan/ graṅs can paḥi rgyu la ḥbras bu yod pa yin te/ yod pa skye baḥi phyir ro źes bya ba ḥgal ba gñis paḥo//. For a more complete text, including Dignàga's complaint, see Kitagawa, Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyû, Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu Saipan, 1965, pp 577-579; Also Tucci, Op. cit., 480-481.

18. Vàdavidhi, Fragment 4: de ḥdra ba daṅ med na mi ḥbyuṅ baḥi chos ñe bar ston pa gtan tshigs so źes pa ni / don gan sgra mi rtag pa ñid la sogs pa bsgrub par bya ba de ḥdra ba ste/ deḥi rigs can med na don gaṅ źig hgar yaṅ ḥbyuṅ ba ma yin pa ste/ rtsol ba las byuṅ ba ñid ni mi rtag pa ñid lta bu daṅ du ba ni me lta buho źes pa de ni de ḥdra ba med na mi ḥbyuṅ bahi chos can te/ de ñe bar ston pa ni ḥdis ñe bar bstan par byaḥo źes paḥi tha tshig go//

19. See, for instance, Indices verborum, Op. cit., p 18a-b & p 61a.

20. Uddyotakara, Nyàyavàrttika, p 56; also see note 8 above.

21. In fact, Vasubandhu might well have used the term nàntarìyaka himself, because according to Durvekamiśra, Hetubindutìkàloka, ed. Sukhlaji Sanghavi, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1949, p 317, the statement that "nàntarìyakàrthadarśanam tadvido'numànam" is Vasubandhu's. In commenting on Arcaṭa, Hetubindutìkà, p 69: ata evàcàryapàdair nàntarìyakàrthadarśanam tadvido'numànam iti/, he said: àcàryapàdair ity àcàryaVasubandhum abhisandhàyoktam/ nàntarìyakàrthadarśanam tadvido'numànam ity àsyàyam arthaḥ/ yorthaḥ kiṃcid antarena na bhavati sa nàntarìyakaḥ/ atra ca sàmarthyàdyam artham antarena na bhavati tan nàntarìyaka iti gràhyam/...

22. Frauwallner, Op. cit., fragment 4; Uddyotakara, Op. cit., p 55 & 131: tàdrg-avinàbhàvidharmopadarśanam hetuḥ; p 132: prayatnànantarìyakatvàdir anityatvasyàgner dhùmaḥ/.

23. This does not mean that the term avinàbhàva is not popular. In fact, if we look at the word-list of Hetubindu and Hetubindutìkà set up by Sanghavi's edition, it would become quite apparent that avinàbhàva is still very popular when compared with avyabhi-càra: The ratio is four to one in Hetubindu, despite Dharmakìrti's penchance for the latter in his Nyàyabindu and Pramànavàrttika. In Hetubindutìka, an even higher ratio is found: 16/1. The popularity of avinàbhàva is probably due to the constant usage that such critics as Uddyotakara, Vàcaspatimiśra etc... made of it. See, for instance, Vacaspatimiśra, Nyàyavàrttika-tàtparya-ṭìkà, ed. Rajeshwara Sastri Dravid, Benares: Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1925, pp 158-159, where he quotes Dharmakìrti's "kàryakàraṇabhà-vàd và svabhàvàd và niyàmakàt/ avinàbhàvaniyamo'darśanàn na na darśanàt//".

24. Gangeśa, Tattvacintàmani, pp 27-31: nanv anumiti-hetu-vyàpti-jñàne kà vyàptiḥ? na tàvad avyabhicaritatvam, tad dhi na (1) sàdhyàbhàvavad-avṛttitvam (2) sàdhyavad-bhi-nna-sàdhyàbhàvavad-avṛttitvam (3) sàdhyavat-pratiyogikànyonyàbhàvàsàmànàdhikaraṇyam (4) sakala-sàdhyàbhàvavan-nisthàbhàva-pratiyogitvam (5) sàdhyavad-anyàvṛttitvam và, kevalànvayiny abhàvàd iti/.

25. Bochenski, Formale logik, Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1962, pp 511-512; Staal, Correlations betwen language and logic in Indian thought, BSOAS XXIII (1960) 109-122; Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-nyàya logic, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard

University Press, 1951, p 93; Sen, A study on Mathurànàtha's Tattvacintàmani-rahasya, Wageningen, 1924, pp 49-50; Goekoop, The logic of invariable concomitance in the Tattvacintàmani, Dordrecht: D.Reidel Publishing Company, 1967, pp 23-34; Staal, Formal structure in Indian logic, Synthèse XII (1960) 279-286. Bocheński has the five definitions formulated as follows:

1. $gCs \equiv g(\dot{-}V/O/A)s$
2. $gCs \equiv g(\dot{-}V/O/V/O/D)s$
3. $gCs \equiv g(\dot{O}/D/G/O)s$
4. $gCs \equiv g(G/A/I/O/A)s$
5. $gCs \equiv g(\dot{-}V/D/O)s$

where gCs stands for the relation of percasion betwen h and s, which he called g and s, respectively, and where V, A, D, I, G and O stand for the relation of occurrence in, of absence of, of difference from, of residence in, of counterpositive of, and of locus of, respectively in the order listed. Staal criticizes that formulation and has them reformulated, using the theory of restricted quantification and restricted variables of the form of "$\alpha xF(x)$",

1. $V(h,s) =_d -A(h,\alpha yB(y,\alpha x(x \neq s)))$
2. $V(h,s) =_d -A(h,\alpha uB(u,\alpha zA(z,\alpha y(y \neq \alpha xB(x,s)))))$
3. $V(h,s) =_d \alpha xB(x,h) \neq \alpha y(y \neq \alpha xB(x,s))$
4. $V(h,s) =_d (\alpha yB)(-A(h, \alpha yB(y, \alpha x(x \neq s))))$
5. $V(h,s) =_d -A(h, \alpha y(y \neq \alpha xB(x,s)))$

Goekoop seems to reject the use of restricted variables and of restricted quantification and returns to the employment instead of Hilbert-Ackermann first order predicate calculus "without any modification":

1-2: $(y)(Ay \rightarrow -(Ex)((z)(Bz \rightarrow -Szx) \& Ryx))$

3&5: $(y)(Ay \rightarrow -(Ex)((w)((Ez)(Bz \& Szw) \rightarrow (x \neq w)) \& Ryx))$

4. $(y)(Ay \rightarrow (x)((z)(Bz \rightarrow -Szx) \rightarrow -Ryx))$.

26. Berg, Journal of Symbolic Logic XXXV (1970) 572-573.

27. Russell, Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types, American Journal of Mathematics XXX (1908) 222-262; Zermelo, Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre, Mathematische Annalen LXV (1908) 261-281. For an elementary discussion of the problem, see Quine, Methods of logic, New York: Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 1959, pp 248-252.

28. Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha of Sàyana-Màdhava, ed. Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar, Poona:

The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1924, p 27: tad uktam:

anyatra vartamànasya tato'nya-sthàna-janmani/
tasmàd acalatah sthànàd vrttir ity atiyuktatà//
yatrà'sau vartate bhàvas tena sambadhyate na tu/
taddeśinam ca vyàpnoti kim apy etan mahàdbhùtam//
na yàti na ca tatràsìd asti pascàn na càmśavat/
jahàti pùrvam nàdhàram aho vyasanasamtatih// iti/

The last verse of this passage is attributed directly to Dignàga by Dharmabhùsana in his Nyàya-dìpikà, quoted by Vidyàbhùsana, History of Indian logic Ancient Medioeval and Modern school, Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1922, pp 273-274; and by Randle, Fragments from Dignàga, London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1926, p 59:

na yàti na ca tatràste na paścàd asti nàmśavat/
jahàti pùrvam nàdhàram aho vyasana-samtatih//

iti Dinnàga-dùsita-dùsana-gana-prasara-prasangàt/.

29. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I, p 14a4: rtog pa źes bya ba ḥdi ji lta bu źig yin źe na,

miṅ daṅ rigs sogs su sbyor baḥo/

ḥdod rgyal baḥi sgra rnams la miṅ gi khyad par du byas nas rjod par byed de/ lhas byin źes bya ba daṅ/ rigs kyi sgra rnams la ci ste/ ba laṅ źes bya ba daṅ/ yon tan gyi sgra rnams la yon tan gyis te/ dkar po źes bya ba daṅ/ bya baḥi sgra rnams la bya baḥi sgo nas te / ḥtshed pa źes bya ba daṅ/ rdsas kyi sgra rnams la rdsas kyi sgo nas te/ dbyug pa can rva can źes bya ba lta buḥo//. Also Tattvasangraha of Àcàrya Shàntaraksita with the commentary 'Pañjikà' of Shri Kamalashìla, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968, p 452; and Vacaspatimiśra, Nyàyavàrttika-tàtparya-ṭìkà, pp 153-154: yadṛcchàśabdeṣu hi nàmnà viśiṣṭo'rtha ucyate ḍiṭṭha iti, jàtiśabdeṣu jàtyà gaur iti, gunaśabdeṣu guṇena sukla iti, kriyàśabdeṣu kriyayà pàcaka iti, dravyaśabdeṣu dravyena daṇḍì viṣànì iti/. Thus, the notion of jàti is defined functionally in terms of jàtiśabda, that is, in terms of a constructed concept, which possesses rather curiously a remarkable formal character. This is because Dignàga relies upon a linguistic device of classification of words into four categories invented by Patañjali, Vyàkarana-Mahàbhàsya of Patañjali, ed. Kielhorn, Bombay: Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1892-1909, p 19: catustayì śabdànàm pravarttiḥ, jàtiśabdà gunaśabdàḥ kriyà-śabdà yadṛcchàśabdàś caturthàḥ. It is further totally refined when Dignàga introduces his theory of words, which Dharmakìrti quotes in the Pramànavàrttikam, pp 62-63 as "ayam arthàn-taravyàvṛttyà tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhàgo gamyate, śabdo'rthàntaranivṛttiviśistàn eva bhàvàn àhety". See Lê Mạnh Thát, Thứ ký hiệu hóa thuyết tách nhận (apoha), Sàigòn, 1969; also Oberhammer, Der svàbhàvika-sambandha, ein geschichtlicher Beitrag zur Nyàya-Logik, WZKSOA VIII (1964) 131-181; Frauwallner, Dignàga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung, Ibid. III (1959) 81-16

30. Gangeśa, Tattvacintàmani, p 36: na ca tathàpi kapi-samyogy etad-vrksatvàd ity-àdy-avyàpya-vrtti-sàdhyaka-sad-dhetàv avyàptir iti vàcyam, nirukta-sàdhyàbhàvatva-viśista-nirùpità yà nirukta-samsargaka-niravacchinnàdhikaranatà tad-àśrayàvrttitvasya vivaksitatvàt/; p 39: laksanàntaram àha sàdhyavad-bhinneti/ sàdhyavadbhinno yah sàdhyà-bhàvavàn tad-avrttitvam ity arth/ kapi-samyogy etad-vrksatvàd ity-àdy-avyàpya-vrtti-sàdhyakàvyàpti-vàranàya sàdhyavadbhinnêti sàdhyàbhàvavato viśesanam iti pràñcah/ tad asat sàdhyàbhàvavad ity asya vyarthatàpatteh/ sàdhyavad-bhinnàvrttitvasyaiva samyaktvàt/; p 44: na ca kapi-samyogy etad-vrksatvàd ity-àdav etad-vrksasyàpi tàdrsá-sàdhyàbhàvavat-tvena yàvad-antargatatayà tan-nisthàbhàva-pratiyogitvàbhàvàd etad-vrksatvasyàvyàptir iti vàcyam/ kiñcid-anavacchinnàyàh sàdhyàbhàvàdhikaranatàyà iha vivaksitvàt/ itham ca kiñcid-anavacchinnàyàh kapi-samyogàbhàvàdhikaranatàyà gunàdàv eva sattvàt tatra ca hetor apy abhàva-sattvàn nàvyàptih/. See also Ingalls, Op. cit., pp 90-148.

31. Gangeśa, Tattvacintàmani, p 30: sàdhyàbhàvaś ca sàdhyatàvacchedaka-sambandhenàva-cchinna-sàdhyatàvacchedakàvacchinna-pratiyogitàko bodhyah/ tena vahnimàn dhùmàd ity-àdau samavàyàdi-sambandhena vahni-sàmànyàbhàvavati samyoga-sambandhena tat-tad-vahnitva-vahni-jalobhayatvàdy-avacchinnàbhàvavati ca parvatàdau samyogena dhùmasya vrttàv api na ksatih/. This is what Ingalls called Insertions 3 and 4. See Ingalls, Op. cit. p 94; p 47: sàdhyatvattvam ca sàdhyatàvacchedaka-sambandhena bodhyam/ tena vahnimàn dhùmàd ity-àdau vahnimat-tvàvacchinna-pratiyogitàkasya samavàyena vahnimato'nyonyàbhàvasyàdhikarane parvatàdau dhùmàder vrttàv api nàvyàptih/ sarvam anyat prathama-laksanokta-diśàvaseyam/

32. Gangeśa, Tattvacintàmani, p 42: nanv evam api nànàdhikarana-sàdhyake vahnimàn dhùmàd ity-àdau sàdhyàdhikaranìbhùta-tat-tad-vyaktitvàvacchinna-pratiyogitàkànyonyà-bhàvavati hetor vrtter avyàptir durvàrà/ pratiyogy-avrttitvam apahàya sàdhyavattvàvac-chinna-pratiyogitàkànyonyàbhàva-vivaksane tu pàñcamena saha paunaruktyam iti cen na vaksyamàna-kevalànvayy-avyàptivad asyàpy atra dosatvàt/

33. Gangeśa, Tattvacintàmani, p 43: yad và sàdhyavat-pratiyogikànyonyàbhàvapadena sàdhyavattvàvacchinna-pratiyogitàkànyonyàbhàva eva vivaksitah/ na caivam pañcamàbhedah tatra sàdhyavattvàcchinna-pratiyogitàkànyonyàbhàvavattvena praveśah/ atra tu tàdrśànyo-nyàbhàvàdhikaranatvenety adhikaranatva-praveśàpraveśàbhyàm eva bhedàt/ akhandàbhàva-ghatakatayà ca nàdhikaranatvàmśasya vaiyarthyam iti na ko'pi dosa iti dik/. See also p 47: yathà càsya na trtìya-laksanàbhedas tathoktam tatraiveti samàsah/.

34. Goekoop, The logic of invariable concomitance in the Tattvacintàmani, Dordrecht, 1967, pp 32-34 & 63-64. Although Goekoop recognizes such an equivalence, he fails to see why Gangeśa raises his criticism. Therefore, after having made the statement about the equivalence of these definitions, he follows Gangeśa rather erroneously and adds: "In the case of universal-positives the condition

$$(Ex)(y)(By \rightarrow -Syx)$$

is not fulfilled". This is rather unfortunate.

35. Gangeśa, Tattvacintàmani, p 46: sàdhyavad-anyeti/ atràpi prathama-laksanokta-rìtyà hetau sàdhyavad-anya-vrttitvàbhàva ity arthah/ tàdrśa-vrttitvàbhàvaś ca tàdrśa-vrttitva-sàmànyàbhàvo bodhyah/ tena dhùmavàn vahner ity-àdau dhùmavad-anya-jalahradàdi-vrttitvàbhà-vasya dhùmavad-anya-vrttitva-jalatvobhayàbhàvasya ca hetau sattve'pi nàtivyàptih//.

36. Gangeśá, Tattvacintàmani, p 47-48: sarvàny eva laksanàni kevalànvayy avyàptyà dùsayati kevalànvayiny abhàvàd iti/ pañcànàm eva laksanànàm idam vàcyam jñeyatvàd ity-àdi-vyàpya-vrtti-kevalànvayi-sàdhyake/ (dvitìyàdi-laksana-catustasya tu) kapi-samyogàbhàvavàn sattvàd ity-àdy-avyàpya-vrtti-sàdhyake'pi càbhàvàd ity arthah/ sàdhyatàvacchedaka-sambandhà-vacchinna-sàdhyatàvacchedakàvacchinna-pratiyogitàka-sàdhyàbhàvasya/ sàdhyatàvacchedaka-sambandhena sàdhyavattvàvacchinna-pratiyogitàkànyonyàbhàvasya càprasiddhatvàt/ kapi-samyogà-bhàvavàn sattvàd ity-adau niravacchinna-sàdhyàbhàvàdhikaranatvasyàprasiddhatvàc ceti bhàvah//.

37. Goekoop, Op. cit., pp 63-64. The example "It is nameable because it is knowable" is given on pp 62-63, although Goekoop fails to mention the peculiar character of the Navya-naiyàyika concept of nameability and knowability. Ingalls, Op. cit., pp 61-62 has referred to that pecularity and thus warned the reader of its possible implications in this particular case, in spite that he seemed to talk of nameability and knowability as two different entities, which is wrong. See further note 41.

38. Potter, Astitvam Jñeyatvam Abhidheyatvam, WZKSOA XII-XIII (1968/1969) 275-280; also Presuppositions in Indian philosophy, Englewood Cliff: J. Wiley & son, 1965.

39. Russell, The principles of mathematics, London: Cambridge University Press, 1903, pp 101-107. For a succinct demonstration, see Quine, Methods of logic, p 249; also Russell's Letter to Frege, in From Frege to Gödel, ed. van Heijenoort, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967, pp 124-125.

40. Quine, Methods of Logic, pp 255-231; Rosser, Logic for mathematicians, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953, pp 197-213.

41. Ingalls, Op. cit., p 61. That is a rather misleading statement, since vàcyatva and jñeyatva may be taken to be designating two entities, while in accordance with the Navya-naiyàyika, or at least with Udayana, they designate but one and only one entity.

42. Udayana, Praśastapàdabhàsyam with the Commentary Kiranàvalì of Udayanàcàrya, ed. Jitendra S. Jetly, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971, pp 22-23: dravyatvayogo dravyatva-samavàyah/ dravyatvam ity etàv ativaktavye yogagrahanam upalaksananiyamàrtham/ aparicchinnadeśatvàt tu sàmànyasamavàyayoh katham atraivedam nànyatreti pratyayaniyama iti kecid darśayanti tatredam uttaram atraiva dravyatvam vartate yatah ity ucyate/ ayam eva hi dravyatvasya svabhàvo yad etat samavàyam abhivyañjayet etàbhir vyaktibhih saha na rùpàdibhih/ gunatvam ca rùpàdivyaktìràdàya na prthivyàdivyaktìr ity àdivaksyate/ dravyatvam eva nàsti gotvàdivad anupalabdheh iti cet na kàryàśrayatopalaksanena sàdharmyenàbhivyaktasya sàsnàdisamsthànàbhivyaktagotvàdivat pratìteh/ anyathà kàryàśrayatvam api sàmànyàniyatam na vastv eva na syàt/ kàranatvam hi sàmànyena niyamyate kàryatvam ca/ tac ca svàbhàvikamabàdhanàt sàdhanàc caupàdhikam iti viśesah/

vyakter abhedas tulyatvam samkaro'thànavasthitih/
rùpahànir asambandho jàtibàdhakasamgrahah//

vyañjakadharmànupàdàya jàtiniràkarane gotvàdikam api na syàt/ na hi sàsnàsambandhàdyanavabhàsane kasya cid gaur iti pratyayànuvrttir apy asti tasmàd asti dravyatvam/

43. Kitagawa, Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyû, Tokyo, 1965, pp 3-9; Potter, Astitvam Jñeyatvam Abhidheyatvam, WZKSOA XII-XIII (1968) 279-80; Matilal, Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian philosophical analysis, The Hague: Mouton, 1971, pp 65-70.

44. Barlingay, A modern introduction to Indian logic, Delhi: National Publishing HOuse, 1965, pp 84-85; also Matilal, The Navya-nyàya doctrine of negation, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp 41-42, where jàti is defined as

$$(\exists x)(\exists y)(\exists z)(Rxyz \ \& \ (x \neq y) \ \& \ (y \neq z) \ \& \ (x \neq z))$$

45. Rosser, Logic for mathematicians, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1953, pp 200-207: "We now turn to a much more painful point, namely, the proof that there are conditions which determine no class. At least three such proofs are known. They called the Russell paradox, the Cantor paradox, and the Burali-Forti paradox.....

"In view of the fact that the paradoxes arose from logical principles which have been generally accepted for thousands of years, one might wonder if one does not run a risk with any of the presently proposed systems that a contradiction may appear after the

system has been generally accepted and in use for a long time. Apparently one does. According to a theorem of Gödel (see Gödel, 1931), if a system of logic is adequate for even a reasonable facsimile of present-day mathematics, then there can be no adequate assurance that it is free of contradiction. Failure to derive the known paradoxes is very negative assurance at best and may merely indicate lack of skill on our part..... In fact, there is the awkward possibility that present-day mathematics is actually in serious error, so that any formal system which gives a reasonable facsimile of present-day mathematics must contain contradiction..."

For an up-to-date account of the paradoxes, see Beth, Foundations of mathematics, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1959, pp 481-518, where the number of paradoxes are also listed.

46. Gangeśa, Tattvacintàmani, p 85: nàpy avinàbhàvah kevalànvayiny abhàvàt/.

47. Viśvanàtha, Nyàyàsiddhàntamuktàvalì, ed. Hariràma Śukla Śàstrì, Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1972, p 501: tatràsadvipaksah kevalànvayo/ yathà jñeyam abhidheyatvàd-ity-àdau/ tatra hi sarvasyaiva jñeyatvàd vipaksàsattvam/.

48. Annambhatta, Tarkasamgraha, ed. Foucher, p 134: anvaya-màtra-vyàptikam kevalànvayi, yathà ghato'bhidheyah prameyatvàt patavat/ atra prameyatvàbhidheyatvayor vyatireka-vyàptir nàsti/ sarvasyàpi prameyatvàd abhidheyatvàc ca//.

49. Staal, Contraposition in Indian logic, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, pp 638-639.

50. Kumàrila, The Mìmàmsàślokavàrtika of Kumàrila Bhatta, ed. Ràma Śàstrì Tailanga, Benares: Chowkhambà Sanskrit Series, 1898, pp 384-385: Section Anumànaparicchedah, verses 121-122:

sàhityamàtram pùrvoktam hetor tatropayujate/
vyàpyavyàpakabhàvo hi bhàvayor yàdrg isyate//
tayor abhàvayos tadmàd viparìtah pratìyate/
dhùmabhàve'gnibhàvena vyàpte'nagnis tataś cyutah//

51. Dharmakìrti, Nyàyabindu, ed. Śerbatskoi, Petrograd', 1918, pp 18-19: trairùpyam punar lingasyànumeye sattvam eva/5/ sapaksa eva sattvam/6/ asapakse càsattvam eva niścitam/7/.

52. Tarka-śàstra, Taishō 1633, p 30c20-21: 我立因三種相、是根本法、同類所攝、異類相離、

Tucci, Pre-Dinnàga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese sources, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929, p 13 has it retranslated into Sanskrit as follows: "asmàbhis trilaksano hetuh sthàpitah/ tadyathà paksadharmah sapaksasattvam vipaksavyàvrttiś ca/" In view of the discrepancies betwen Paramàrtha's translations and other Chinese and Tibetan versions of the same works, or sometimes betwen Paramàrtha's and the Sanskrit originals, as in the case of the Abhidharmakośa, which we have pointed out in the preceeding chapter, it is quite difficult to say whether the word "eva" ever occurs in the above passage.

53. Staal, Contraposition in Indian logic, p 634; Kajiyama, Bukkyô tetsugaku ni okeru meidai kaishaku, Kanakura hakushi koki kinen Indogaku Bukkyôgaku ronshû, ed. Tsukamoto Mekio, Kyoto: Heirakuji shôden, 1966, pp 423-438. It is true that Dignàga may not have introduced the particle eva. Vàcaspatimiśra, Tàtparya-tìkà, p 129 gives such a confirmation: "na ca samuccìyamàvadhàranam Dinnàgo mene, yad evam ùce vaiśesika-laksana-dùsanàvasare/ yadi rùpam eva càksusam tato na dravyam càksusam syàt tathà ca mahad-aneka-dravya-samavayàd rùpàc copalabdhir iti dravya-càksusatvàbhidhànam vyàhanyeta iti/ atra hi pùrvavad dravya-sahita-rùpam eva càksusam na gandha-rasàdìti śakyam samuccìyamànàvadhàranam/." The introduction of eva might therefore be due to the criticism of such men as Uddyotakara etc..., who complain of such restrictions. See Randle, Fragments from Dinnàga, p 33-36. However, the discussion of the particle eva already occurs in Vàdavidhi, Fragment 9: .rjes su dpag pahi śes pa yan hdi kho nas bsal te/ du bahi śes pa dan hbrel pa dran pa dag las kyan de byun gi me kho na las ma yin pas so// de las hbyun ba kho na ste/ mi hbyun ba ni ma yin no źes pa hdi yan hdir don du mnon par hdod do//. So, it is quite premature to state apodictically that it is Dharmakìrti who first introduces the particle eva. Furthermore, it is not even Dharmakìrti who first introduces it, because the Nyàyapraveśaka, ed. Ui, Tokyo: Tato shuppansho, 1932, p 363, irrespective of the question of whether it is the work of Dignàga or of Śankarasvàmin, who are both preceeded Dharmakìrti by at least one generation, already mentions that particle in connection with the theory of the three characteristics of h: hetus trirùpah/ kim punas trairùpyam/ paksadharmatvam sapakse sattvam vipakse càsattvam eva//. It must be further noted that Hsuan Tsang's translation of this sentence gives no clue whatever as to the presence of eva, althou it might be argued that his manuscript, not unlike Dhruva's, editor of The Nyàyapraveśa, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1968, p 1, does not have it; instead, it might have iti in place of eva. Hsuan Tsang, Jen min ju cheng li lun, Taishô 1630, p 11b6-7: 因有三相、何等為三、謂遍是宗法性、同品定有性、異品遍無性、

54. Vàdavidhi, Fragment 1: rnam par dpyad pa la hdod pahi don phyogs yin źes pa; also Uddyotakara, Nyàyavàrttika, p 106: pakso vicàranàyàm isto'rthah. Vàdavidhi, Fragment 21a: bdag med de ma dmigs pahi phyir mo gśam gyi bu bźin źes byas pa la/ ltag chod smra ba pos smras pa/ do gyis ñe bar dmigs pa rnams yod pa ñid du thob cin/ ñe bar dmigs bźin pa yin yan mgal mehi hkhor lo la sogs pa cun zad ni med pa kho naho źes paho//; also Fragment 14d: rtsod pa sgrub par byed paho// hdir ma nes pa ñid rnam pa gñis su rtsod do// chos mthun pas ni mi mthun phyogs la yan gtan tshigs yod pa ñid du rab tu bstan pa las sam/ chos mi mthun pa ñid kyis bsgrub bya ldog pa na gtan tshigs ldog pa med par bstan pa las so// de la gal te nes kyis tshos bya ñid ni chos mthun pa ñid kyis ma nes pa ñid du brjod na dehi tshe hdi bden mod/ tshos bya ñid la sogs pa la sogs pa med par mi rtag pa ñid mi mthon ba ni ma yin źes pa la sogs pahi lan phyogs sna ma dan hbrel pa ma yin no// chos mthun pa ñid kyis brjod pa ni ma yin gyi ho na ci źe na/ chos mi mthun pa ñid kyis te/ pha rol pos tshos bya min pa ñid la sogs pas sgra rtag pa ñid du brjod de/ de la bsgrub bya med pa la gtan tshigs med pa ñe bar bstan par bya na/ tshos par bya ba ma yin pa ñid bsgrub bya rtag pa ñid med pa la med par yan ma yin te/ dehi phyir ma nes paho//. Reading through these three quoted fragments, it becomes quite clear that not only the terms paksa and vipaksa were used by Vasubandhu, but also they were given by him appropriate examples. This is further confirmed by the Chinese translation of the Tarkaśàstra, which was done by Paramàrtha at the time when Dignàga's writings were still in vogue in India, and in which paksa and vipaksa were used, as Tucci correctly retranslated. See note 52 above. It is true that Dignàga, like Dharmakìrti some generations later, employed anumeya in place of paksa and apparently asapaksa in place of vipaksa, as is evidenced from quotations made by Vacaspatimiśra in his Nyàyavàrttika-tàtparyatìkà, p 120: atra Dinnàgena dhùmàd agni-rùpadharmàntaràanumànam agnideśayoh sambandhànumànam ca dùsayitvà' gni-viśistadeśànumànam samarthitam/ tathà càha

kecid dharmàntaram meyam lingasyàvyabhicàratah/
sambandham kecid icchanti siddhatvàd dharmadharminoh//
lingam dharme prasiddham cet kim anyat tena mìyate/
atha dharmini tasyaiva kimartham nànumeyatà//
sambandhe'pi dvayam nàsti sasthì srùyeta tadvati/
avàcyo'nugrhìtatvàn na càsau lingasamgatah//

na hi sambandha-dharmatayà lingam pramìyate/ api tu deśasamgatam ity arthah

lingasyàvyabhicàras tu dharmenànyatra drśyate/
tatra prasiddham tadyuktam dharminam gamayisyati// iti.

and p 179: atra Dinnàgena sapakse sann asan dvedhà paksadharmah punas tridhà pratyekam asapakse ca sad asad dvidhatvatah iti/. However there is no reason to so state as Staal did.

55. Once again, it must be noted that in so saying, we are of the opinion that Dharmakìrti totally adopted Dignàga's terminology and positions. Thus, despite the recurrence of avyabhicàra in the Nyàyabindu and in the Pramànavàrttika, the Hetubindu nonetheless opens its discussion with the verse borrowed from the Pramànavàrttika

paksadharmas tadamśena vyàpto hetus tridhaiva sah/
avinàbhàvaniyamàd dhetvàbhàsàs tato'pare//

where the term avinàbhàva is clearly self-evident, and employs this term throughout the text. See Steinkellner, Dharmakìrti's Hetubinduh, Teil I, Sitzungsberichte der Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, 252. Band, 1.Abhandlung, pp 30-99. Thus, on p 39, we read: "etallaksanas tridhaiva so hetus triprakàra eva, svabhàvah kàryam anupalabdhiś ceti yathànitye kasminś cit sàdhye sattvam agnimati pradeśe dhùmo'bhàve copalabdhilaksanapràptasyànupalabdhir ity atraiva trividhe 'vinàbhàvaniyamàt. paksadharmasya yathoktà vyàptir avinàbhàvah; sa trividhàd dhetor anyatra nàstìty atraiva niyata ucyate...."

56. Berg, Journal of Symbolic Logic, XXXV (1970) 574

57. Berg, Op. cit., p 575.

58. Goekoop, Op. cit., pp 63-64. This fact seems to be overlooked by Matilal in his Review of Goekoop's book in JAOS XCII (1972) 169-173, although he is quite critical of Goekoop's use of symbols. Probably it is due to the lack of appreciation of Goekoop's formal language that Matilal fails to recognize such a blatant inconsistency in the former's discussion of what pervasion is.

59. Gangeśa, Tattvacintàmani (Anumàna-khanda) edited with the Dìdhiti commentary of Raghunàtha and the sub-commentary of Gadàdhara, Benares: Chowkhambà Sanskrit Series, 1926, p 1326; Uddyotakara, Nyàyavàrttika, p 46.

60. Viśvanàtha, Nyàyasiddhàntamuktàvalì, ed. Narayancharan Shastri et.al., Varanasi, 1972 pp 464-466: anvayavyàptir uktaiva vyatirekàd..ihocyate/
traividhyam iti/ anumànam hi trividham kevalànvayikevalavyatirekyanvayavyatirekibhedàt/ tatràsadvipaksah kevalànvayì, yathà ghato'bhidheyah prameyatvàd ity-àdau, tatra hi sarvasyaivàbhidheyatvàd vipaksàsattvam/ asatsapaksah kevalavyatirekì, yathà prthivì itarebhyo bhidyate gandhavattvàd ity-àdau, tatra hi jalàditrayodaśabhedasya pùrvam aniścitatayà niścitasàdhyavatah sapaksasyàbhàva iti/ satsapaksavipakso'nvayavyatirekì, yathà vahnimàn dhùmàd ity-àdau, tatra sapaksasya mahànasàder vipaksasya jalahradàdeś ca sattvam iti//

61. Annambhatta, Tarkasamgraha, pp 132-134: lingam trividham: anvaya-vyatireki, kevalànvayi kevalavyatireki ca/ anvayena vyatirekena ca vyàptimad anvaya-vyatireki, yathà vahnau sàdhye dhùmavattvam yatra dhùmas tatràgnih yathà mahànasaity anvaya-vyàptih/ yatra vahnir nàsti tatra dhùmo'pi nàsti yathà mahàhradaiti vyatirekavyàptih/ anvayamàtravyàptikam kevalànvayi, yathà ghato'bhidheyah prameyatvàt patavat, atra prameyatvàbhidheyatvayor vyatireka-vyàptir nàsti, sarvasyàpi prameyatvàd abhidheyatvàc ca/ vyatirekamàtravyàptikam kevalavyatireki, yathà prthivì itarebhyo bhidyate gandhavattvàt, yad itarebhyo na bhidyate, na tad gandhavat, yathà jalam, na ceyam tathà, tasmàn na tatheti, atra yad gandhavat tad itara-bhinnam ity anvaya-drstànto nàsti, prthivìmàtrasya paksatvàt/. For a good discussion of paksatva, see Manikantha, Nyàyaratna, ed. Subrahmanya Sastri and V. Krishnamacharya, Madras: Madras Government Oriental Series, 1953, pp 109-115.

62. Matilal, Gangeśa on the concept of universal property (kevalànvayin), Logic Methodology and Philosophy of Science III, Proceedings of the third International Congress for Logic, Methodology and philosophy of Science, Amsterdam 1967, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1968, pp 531-542. The idea of using the concept of universal-positive for criticizing the definitions of vyàpti obviously has a long history. Beside Uddyotakara, we have Vallabha, Nyàyalìlàvatì, ed. Harihara Sastri and Dhundhiraja Sastri, Benares: Chowkhambà Sanskrit Series, 1927-1934, p 500; and Manikantha, Nyàyaratna, pp 45-46: na dvitìyah/ vyabhicàrah sàdhyàtyantàbhàvasàmànàdhikaranyam/ atas tadabhàvo'pi sàdhyàbhàvanirùpanàdhìn anirùpanah/ tathà ca kevalànvayini sàdhyàbhàvasyàprasiddher na vyabhicàritatvam śakyagrahanam iti// ata eva na trtìyah/ avinà avyatirekena bhàvo và vinà vyatirekena yo bhàvah, tasyàbhàvo và avinàbhàvah/ ubhayathàpi sàdhyàtyantàbhàvanirùpyatvàt kevalànvayini tasyàbhàvah//. See also Matilal, JAOS XCII (1972) 169-173.

63. Staal, Contraposition in Indian logic, p 636. The fact that Bocheński, Frauwallner, Stcherbatsky and others do not have any idea of the law of contraposition in relation to the theory of three characteristics may stem directly from their not regarding it as an expression of that law. In any case, Stcherbatsky did use the term 'contraposition' in connection with it. See, Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic II, Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1930, p 53. His criticisms of Bocheński is generally, however, justified, particularly in relation to Bocheński's various wrong assertions about Vasubandhu's as well as Dignàga, Dharmakìrti and others' logic.

64. Berg, Journal of Symbolic Logic, XXXV (1970) 574-575.

65. Keśavamiśra, Tarkabhàsà, ed. Śrì Shobhita Miśra, Bamaras: The Chowkhambà Sanskrit Series Office, 1953, pp 66-68: tad uktam:

vyàpya-vyàpakabhàvo hi bhàvayor yàdrg isyate/
tayor abhàvayos tasmàd viparìtah pratìyate//
anvaye sàdhanam vyàpyam sàdhyam vyàpakam isyate/
sàdhyàbhàvo'nyathà vyàpyo vyàpakah sàdhanàtyayah//
vyàpyasya vacanam pùrvam vyàpakasya tatah param/
evam pariksità vyàptih sphutì bhavati tattvatah//.

66. Gangeśa, Tattvacintàmani, pp 100-160: atricyate/ pratiyogy-asamànàdhikarana-yat-samànàdhikaranàtyantàbhàva-pratiyogitàvacchedakàvacchinnam yan na bhavati tena samam tasya sàmànàdhikaranyam vyàptih (1)...../ yad và pratiyogi-vyadhikarana-sva-samànàdhikaranàtyantàbhàvàpratiyoginà sàmànàdhikaranyam (2) yat-samànàdhikaranà-nyonyàbhàva-pratiyogi yadvan na bhavati tena samam tasya sàmànàdhikaranyam và (3), sva-samànàdhikaranànyonyàbhàvàpratiyogi-yadvatkatvam và (4),...../ athavànaupàdhi-katvam vyàptih tac ca, yàvat-sva-samànàdhikaranàtyantàbhàva-pratiyogitàvacchedakàvac-chinnam yat tat-pratiyogikàtyantàbhàva-samànàdhikaranam yat tena samam sàmànàdhika-ranyam (5),....., yad và yàvat-samànàdhikaranàtyantàbhàvàpratiyogi-pratiyogikàtyan-tàbhàvàsàmànàdhikaranyam yasya tasya tad evànaupàdhikatvam,(6)...../ yad và yat-sam-bandhitàvacchedaka-rùpavattvam yasya tasya sà vyàptih (7)..../ etad eva yàvat-sva-vyabhicàri-vyabhicàri-sàdhya-sàmànàdhikaranyam anaupàdhikatvam gìyate (8)/. Of these, the first is, of course, the most important, and as Matilal, JAOS XCII (1972) 171-172, has pointed out, it "is only a modified version of Manikantha's final definition", which in its turn "seems to be a modification of his eleventh definition". The 11th definition given by Manikantha, Nyàyaratna, p 43 reads: sàdhanatvàbhimatasamànàdhikaranàtyantà-bhàvàpratiyogi-sàmànàdhikaranyam, while his final definition is on page 55: vastutas tu pratiyogisamànàdhikaranàtyantàbhàvetara-svasamànàthikaranàtyantàbhàvàpratiyoginà saha sàmànàdhikaranyam yasya tad eva tasya vyàptir ity ucyate/

67. Annambhatta, Tarkasamgraha, p 124: vyàpter laksanam àha: yatra dhùmas tatra agnih ity abhinayah, sàhacaryaniyamah iti laksanam, sàhacaryam sàmànàdhikaranyam, tasya niyamah. hetu-sàmànàdhikaranàtyantàbhàvàpratiyogi-sàdhyasàmànàdhikaranyam vyàptih ity arthah/.

68. Viśvanàtha, Nyàyàsiddhàntamuktàvalì, ed. Narayancharan Shastri & Swetvaikuntha Shastri, Varanasi: The Chowkhambà Sanskrit Series Office, 1972, pp 232-246:

athavà hetumannisthavirahàpratiyoginà/
sàdhyena hetor aikàdhikaranyam vyàptir ucyate//69//

athaveti/ hetumati nisthà vrttir yasya sa tathà virahah abhàvah, tathà ca hetvadhikaranavrttir y'bhàvas tadapratiyoginà sàdhyena saha hetoh sàmànàdhikaranyam vyàptir ucyate//...../ vastutas tu pratiyogitàvacchedakasambandhena pratiyogyanadhikaranìbhùtahetvadhikarana-vrtty-abhàva-pratiyogità-sàmànye yat-sambandhàvacchinnatva-yad-dharmàvacchinnatvobhayàbhàvas tena sambandhena tad-dharmàvacchinnasya tad-hetu-vyàpakatvam bodhyam/ vyàpaka-sàmànàdhikaranyam ca vyàptih/....

69. Berg, Journal of Symbolic Logic XXXV (1970) 573; Staal, Correlations betwen language and logic in Indian thought, BSOAS XXIII (1960) 119-122; also, Means of formalisation in Indian and Western logic, Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia, Venezia 12-18 settembre 1958, Volume decimo, Florence: Sansoni Editore, 1960, pp 221-227; Goekoop, Op. cit., pp 109-152.

70. Calari Śesàcàrya, Pramàna-candrikà, ed. & transl. Susil Kumar Maitra, Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1936, pp 143-144: kecit pratiyogy-asamànàdhikaranah sàdhanasamànàdhikarano yo'tyantàbhàvah tasyàpratiyogi yat-sàdhyam tat-sàmànàdhikaranyam vyàptir ity arthah/ sàdhyasàmànàdhikaranyam vyàptir ity ukte parvato'gnimàn prameyatvàd ity atràtivyàptih/ tad vuyadàsàya sàdhanasamànàdhikaranàtyantàbhàvàpratiyogìti/ tàvat yukte vrksah samyogì dravyatvàd ity atràvyàptih/ tat-parihàràya pratiyogy-asamànàdhikaraneti/ samyogàbhàvasya pratiyogisamànàdhikaranatvàn nàvyàptir ity àhuh/ tad asat, ùrdhvadeśo vrstimàn adhòdese nadìpùràt/ yadà'dhodeśe nadìpùrah tadordhvadeśe vrstih yathà sampratipannam ity avyadhikaranànumàne'vyàpteh/. For further discussion, see Staal, Correlations betwen language and logic in Indian thought, pp 119-120.

71. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic II, p 53: "Therefore the function of the logical mark, owing to which it is able to create cognition of absent things, is nothing else than the necessity of an invariable concomitance betwen (the perceived mark and) the absent object. It follows that the word "necessary" must be referred to all the three aspects in which the mark manifests itself, since all these three forms, viz. 1.the positive concomitance of the mark with the deduced predicate, 2. its contraposition (or the inverted concomitance of their negations) and 3. the presence of the thus characterized mark upon the subject of the conclusion — all these..... must be ascertained as being necessary". (underline is ours); Staal, Contraposition In Indian logic, pp 634-638.

72. Dharmottara, Nyàyabindutìkà, ed. Šerbatskoi, Petrograd, 1918, p 20: nanu ca sapakṣa eva sattvan ity ukte vipakṣe'sattvam eveti gamyate eva/ tat kim artham punar ubhayor upàdànam krtam/ tad ucyate/ anvayo vyatireko và niyamavàn eva prayoktavyo nànyatheti darśayitum dvayor apy upàdànam kṛtam/ aniyame hi dvayor api prayoge 'yam arthah syàt/ sapakṣe yo'sti vipakṣe ca nàsti sa hetur iti/ tathà ca sati sa śyàmas tatputratvàd dṛśyamànaputravad iti tatputratvam hetuḥ syàt/ tasmàn niyamavator evànvayavyatirekayoḥ prayogah kartavyo/ yena pratibandho gamyeta sàdhanasya sàdhyena/ niyamavatoś ca prayoge'vaśyakartavye dvayor eka eva prayoktavyo na dvàv iti niyamavàn evànvayo vyatireko và prayoktavya iti śiksanàrtham dvayor upàdànam iti/

73. Mookerjee, Buddhist philosophy of Universal flux, Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1935; cf. Murti, Central philosophy of Buddhism, London: Allen & Unwin, 1953; also Staal, Negation and the law of contradiction in Indian thought: A comparative study, BSOAS XXV (1962) 52-71.

74. Dharmakìrti, The Pramànavàrttikam of Dharmakìrti, p 2: ta ete kàryasvabhàvànupalabdhilaksanàs trayo hetavaḥ/ yathà'gnir atra dhùmàt/ vṛkṣo'yam śimśapàtvàt/ pradeśaviśeṣe kvacin na ghaṭa upalabdhilakṣanapràptasyànupalabdheḥ/ yadi syàd upalabhyasattva eva syàn nànyathà/ tenopalabdhilakṣanapràptasattvasyety uktam bhavati/ tatra dvau vastusàdhanàv ekaḥ pratiṣedhahetuḥ/ svabhàvapratibandhe hi saty artho'rtham na vyabhicarati/ sa ca tadàtmatvàt/ tadàtmatve sàdhyasàdhanabhedàbhàva iti cet/ na/ dharmabhedaparikalpanàd iti vakṣyàmaḥ/ tathà càha/ sarva evàyam anumànànumeyavyavahàro buddhyàrùdhena dharmadharmibhedeneti/ bhedo dharmadharmitayà buddhyaàkàrakṛto nàrtho'pi/ vikalpabhedànàm svatantrànàm anarthàśrayatvàt/ tatkalpitavisayàd arthapratìtàv anarthapratilambha eva syàt/ kàryasyàpi svabhàvapratibandhaḥ/ tatsvabhàvasya tadutpatter iti/ etau dvàv anumeyapratyayau sàkṣàdanutpatter atatpratibhàsitve'pi tad-utpattes tad-avyabhicàrinàv iti pramànam pratyakṣavat/. Also, Hetubindu, p 39:etallakṣanas tridhaiva so hetus triprakàra eva, svabhàvaḥ kàryam anupalabdhiś ceti yathànitye kasmimścit sàdhye sattvam agnimati pradeśe dhùmo'bhàve copalabdhilakṣanapràptasyànupalabdhir ity atraiva trividhe'vinàbhàvaniyamàt/. And Nyàyabindu, pp 21-24: trirùpàni ca trìny eva lingàni/ anupalabdhih svabhàvakàryam ceti/ tatrànupalabdhir yathà na pradeśaviśese kvacid ghaṭa upalabdhilakṣanapràptasyànupalabdher iti/ upalabdhilakṣanapràptir upalambhapratyayàntarasàkalyam svabhàvaviśeṣaś ca/ satsvanyase upalambhapratyayeṣu yaḥ pratyakṣa eva bhavati sa svabhàvaḥ/ svabhàvaḥ svasatt-àbhàvini sàdhyadharme hetuḥ/ yathà vṛkṣo'yam śimśapàtvàd iti/ kàryam yathà agnir atra dhùmàd iti/ atra dvau vastusàdhanau, ekaḥ pratiṣedhahetuḥ/ svabhàvapratibandhe hi saty artho'rtham gamayet/ tadapratibaddhasya

tadavyabhicàraniyamàbhàvàt/. Note the use of avinàbhàva and of avyabhicàra in the last two passages. For Dharmakìrti then, there are at least three kinds of relations, i.e. negation, identity and "causality". The last two kinds are subsequently discussed in our presentation of Vasubandhu's position on this problem. The first kind, however, is left unsaid. This is because it is first introduced by Ìśvarasena, as Arcaṭa, Hetubindu-ṭìkà, p 167 unmistakenly indicated: "kecid upalabdhyabhàvamàtram anupalabdhim abhàvasya prasajyapratiṣedhàtmanaḥ pramànàntaratvena gamikàm icchanti ìśvarasenaprabhṛtayaḥ", which again is confirmed by Durvekamiśra, Pandita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradìpa, ed. Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955, p 108: "upalabdhyabhàvamàtram anupalabdhim ìśvaraseno manyate". And Ìśvarasena is Dharmakìrti's teacher, as Śàkyamati and Karnakagomin, Àcàrya-Dharmakìrteh Pramànavàrttikam (Svàrthànumànaparicchedah) svopajñavrttyà Karnakagomiviracitayà tattìkayà ca sahitam, ed. Ràhula Sànkrtyàyana, Allahabad, 1943, p 68 reported in their comment "àcàryasya śisya àcàryiyah kaścid àcàryagranthànabhijñah" upon the word "àcàryìyah kaścid" in the sentence "evam àcàryiyah kaścid anupalambhàd abhàvam bruvàna upàlabdhaḥ" in Dharmakìrti, The Pramànavàrttikam of Dharmakìrti p 15. Thus, as Steinkellner showed, the negative relation is not formally known in Dignàga's time, let alone Vasubandhu's. See Steinkellner, Bemerkungen zu Ìśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund, WZKSOA X (1966) 73-85. So, we passed it wholly undiscussed.

75. Hailperin, Remarks on identity and description in first-order axiom systems, Journal of Symbolic Logic, XIX (1954) 14-20. See also Beth, The foundations of Mathematics, pp 224-231.

76. Vàdidevasùri, Syàdvàdaratnàkàra, Poona: Arhat Mata Prabhakara, p 556; Bhadrabàhu, Daśavaikàlika-niryukti, Agamodaya, gàthà 49-50: jinavaynam siddham ceva bhannae katthaì udàharanam/. àsajja u soyàram heù vi kahiñci bhannejjà// katthai pañcàvayavam dasahà và savvahà na padisiddham na ya puna savvam bhannaì handì saviàramakhàyam//; Vàtsyàyana, Nyàyasùtrabhàsya, ed. Svàmì Dvàrikàdàsaśastrì, Vàrànasì: Bhàratìyavidyàprakàśanam, 1966, pp 47-48: Nyàya-sùtra 1.1.32: daśàvayavàneke naiyàyikà vàkye sañcaksate jijñàsà, saṁśayaḥ śakyapràptiḥ prayojanam saṁśayavyudàsa iti, te kasmàn nocyanta iti?/. It must be pointed out, however, that the term "Jaina" used here is primarily referring to the Svetàmbara Jaina, and not to the Digambara, who are known to have not taken note of the ten-membered form. See Daśavaikàlikà-niryukti, gàthà 137: te u painnavibhatti heuvibhattì vivakkhapadisc ditthato àsankà tappdiseho nigamanam ca/. Cf. Sukhlaji Sanghvi, Advanced Studies in Indian logic and metaphysics, Reprint Indian Studies past & present, 1961, pp 85-87

77. Caraka, Caraka-samhità I, ed. Vinayacandra Vàsistha & Jayadeva Śarmà, Ajamer: Àrya sàhitya mandala, 1954, pp 740 & 814: Vimànasthànam 4.3: trividham khalu rogaviśesa-vijñànam bhavati/ tadyathà— àptopadeśah pratyaksam anumànam ceti/. Vimànasthànam 8.27-32: imàni tu khalu padàni vàdamàrgajñànàrtham adhigamyàni bhavanti/ tadyathà— vado, dravyam guṇaḥ karma sàmànyam viśesah samavàyah, pratijñà, sthàpanà, pratisthàpanà, hetuḥ, upanayo, nigamanam, uttaram, dṛṣtàntaḥ, śabdah, pratyakṣa, anumànam aitihyam, aupamyam, samśayaḥ, prayojanam, savyabhicàram, jijñàsà, vyavasàyaḥ, arthapràptiḥ, sambhavaḥ, anuyojyam, anuyogaḥ, pratyanuyogo, vàkyadoṣo, vàkyapraśaṃsà, chalam ahetur atìtakàlam, upalambhah, parihàrah, pratijñàhànir abhyanujñà hetvantaram arthàntaram nigrahasthànam iti//.....// athà pratijñà/ pratijñà nàma sàdhyavacanam/ yathà nityaḥ puruṣa iti// atha sthàpanà/ sthàpanà nàma tasyà eva pratijñàyà hetudrstàntopanayanigamanaiḥ sthàpanà/ pùrvam hi pratijñà paścàt sthàpanà, kiṃ hy apratijñàtam sthàpayisyati/ yathà nityah purusa iti pratijñà/ hetuh akṛtakatvàd iti/ dṛṣtàntaḥ akṛtakam àkàśam tac ca nityam/ upanayo yathà càkṛtakam àkàśam tathà puruṣaḥ/ nigamanaṃ tasmàn nitya iti// atha pratisthàpanà/ pratisthàpanà nàma yà parapratijñàyà viparìtàrthasthàpanà yathànityah purusa iti pratijñà/ hetuḥ endriyakatvàt/ dṛṣtànto ghaṭa endriyakaḥ sa cànityaḥ/ upanayo yathà ghaṭas tathà puruṣaḥ/ nigamanaṃ tasmàd anitya iti//. Thus, betwen the years 50-150 A.D. when Caraka seemed to live, the five-membered schema of inference is already quite popular to such an extent that it becomes a part of pratical learning.

78. Nyàya-sùtra 1.1.32-39: pratijñàhetùdàharanopanayanigamanàny avayavàḥ/ sàdhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñà/ udàharanasàdharmyàt sàdhyasàdhanam hetuḥ/ tathà vaidharmyàt/ sàdhyasàdharmyàt taddharmabhàvì dṛṣtànta udàharanam/ tadviparyayàd và viparìtam/ udàharanàpekṣas tathety upasamhàro na tatheti và sàdhyasyopanayaḥ/ hetvapadeśàt pratijñàyàḥ punar vacanaṃ nigamanam//.

79. Tarka-śàstra, Taishō 1633, p 30c2-4: 論曰、聲無常、因功力生、無中間生故譬如瓦器因功力生、生已破滅、聲亦如是、故聲無常、
Hui Chao, Jen min i t'an, Taishō 1841, pp 144b29-c1: 如世親說五能立、亦不非於舊師
p 155b13-24: 解似同喻中云、世親及小乘外道、立有五分、慈尊無著陳那等、但立三分、合結為成於喻、是喻上之差別、普立於喻、是顯合結、無繁喻外別立二支、又云、瑜伽同類即當對法合支、對法既是喻說、何故復說合支、結既許同世親合支如何即別、又瑜伽引喻之言、為同為異、若其是總同類即是喻、何顯對法合支若別喻即說為同類、與世親合支何別、作斯會數、全不相當、知對法合結與世親不殊、……
p 157c11-14: 又據世親五支之中、明欲減略者、有二十五或二十一謂頌一有五、頌二有七、頌三有十、全頌有一、取捨如前、准此、只有二十三句、二十五句、一總不相當、或是寫錯、更勘餘本、

The report made by Hui Chao is rather curiously interesting in that it not only lets us know the existence of an abhidharma logic, but furthermore indicates repeatedly that Vasubandhu is aware of only the five-membered schema of inference. Such an indication is curious, because as we shall see, Kuei Ki, his teacher, already told us the contrary, which is that Vasubandhu created the three-membered schema. Besides, Hui Chao said that "Maitreyanàtha, Asanga, Dignàga etc... employed only the three-membered schema, while Vasubandhu, the hinayanist and the heretics used the five-membered one". This statement seems to be totally wrong as far as Asanga and Vasubandhu are concerned. Asanga is certainly known not to use the three-membered-schema of inference. See Wayman, The rules of debate according to Asanga, JAOS LXXVIII (1958) 29-40; also Tucci, Buddhist logic before Dinnàga, JRAS(1929)151-188. As to Vasubandhu, we not only know his using that schema from Kuei K'i, but also from other sources, particularly the Sanskrit ones. Thus, even in this case where he seems to be vaguely right in most of the time, Hui Chao still displays some indications which would cause him to be untrustworthy, as in the case of his report related to Nàgàrjuna and Vasubandhu's dates which we have discussed in a previous chapter.

80. Tarka-śàstra, Taishō 1633, p 30c20-21: 我立因三種相、是根本法同類所攝異類相違 . Once again, it must be pointed out that judging from the Chinese translation alone, it cannot be said, as Bocheński for instance has maintained, that the particle eva is not in the Sanskrit original, because beside Paramàrtha's sometimes capricious rendering, other translators are also known to disregard such particle. The case in point is Hsüan Tsang's translation of Nyàyapraveśakam. The present Sanskrit version has the following sentence "hetus trirùpah/ kim punas trairùpyam/ paksadharmatvam sapakse sattvam vipakse càsattvam eva//", which Hsüan Tsang renders as follows:因有三相、何等為三、謂遍是宗法性、同品定有性、異品遍無性, which clearly has no indication at all of the presence of the particle eva in the Sanskrit original. See Bocheński, Formale Logik, p 505-506, also note 53 above. For the Sanskrit and Chinese editions of the Nyàyapraveśakam, see Ui, Bukkyō ronrigaku, Tokyo: Tatto shuppansho, 1966, pp 309-337.

81. Kuei K'i, Jen min ji cheng li lun su, Taishō 1840, p 94a1-2: 世親菩薩論軌等說能立有二、一宗、二因、三喻、 ; Vacaspatimiśra, Nyàyavàrttika-tàtparyatìkà, p 298: atra vasubandhunà pratijñàdayas trayo'vayavà durvihità aksapàda-laksanena ity uktam/. There is no doubt whatsoever, therefore, as to who discovered the three-membered schema of inference.

82. Barlingay, The significance of Drishanta in Indian logic, Essays in Philosophy presented to Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan on his fiftieth birthday, ed. Chari, Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1962, pp 163-175; also A modern introduction to Indian logic, pp 144-151. Obviously, if the third member is defined as "that through which the the connection, i.e. the inseparable connection of the property in h with the property designated by s" and that "it must take the form of a specific parallel instance on "like a pot", plus the statement of the inseparable connection: "whatever has come about through an effort is not eternal'", as Vàdavidhi, Fragment 5, stated, then surely enough the third member must be included in the inference schema; and surely enough, Dignàga would defend it with vehement argumentation. See, Kitagawa, Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyû, pp 238-281.

83. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya IV, p 66b4-5: rtog ge pahi bstan bcos rnams su ni phyogs kyi chos ñid tsam gtan tshigs kyi sbyor ba yin no źes grags te/ dper na hdi byas pahi phyir źes pas sgra mi rtag par go bar byed pa lta buho//; Frauwallner, Vasubandhu's Vàdavidhih, WZKSOA I (1957) 145-146; Tucci, Buddhist logic before Dinnàga, JRAS (1929) 486-487.

84. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya III, p 44a7-bl: gal te rjes su dpag par bya ba ston pa ni dam bcah ba brjod par bya ba ste/ rtog gehi bstan bcos rnams su gźan gyi don rjes su dpag pa dgon pa de ji ltar yin źe na//; Frauwallner, Vasubandhu's Vàdavidhih, pp 144-145; Tucci, Op. cit., p 486.

85. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya III, p 44a7-bl; IV, p 66b4-5. With the ending rnams su both passages put rtog gehi bstan bcos, therefore, in the locative plural. We have not Tarkaśàstre, but Tarkaśàstresu. However, commenting on the same subject expressed by Pramànasamuccaya III, p 44a7-bl, Sàntaraksita, Vàdanyàyavipañcitàrthatìkà, ed. Rahùla Sàmkrtyàyana, Appendix to the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society XXI-XXII (1935/1936), p 66 says: "asmàkam tu tatrànumeyanirdeśo hetvarthavisayo matah ity api vacanam virudhyate yasmàt

tatreti tarkaśàstrasya sambandho'tràbhidhìyate/
prayogasya tu sambandhe bahu syàd asamañjasam//"

which unmistakingly refers to the Tarkaśàstra in its singular form. The same situation also occurs in Dharmakìrti's Pramànavàrttika and Hetubindu which further confirm the accuracy of Sàntaraksita's citation. See Frauwallner, Vasubandhu's Vàdavidhih, p 145, Fragments 2a & 2b. Commenting on Dharmakìrti, Pramànavàrttikavrtti p 421a4: grub bźin

du bstan pahi phyir yan smos pa yin par yan dogs par hgyur te/ mthun pa kho na la yod pa źes bya ba mi mthun pa las ldog pa grub mod kyi/ bsgrub par bya ba med pa la med pa smos pa bźin no, Karnakagomin, Àcàrya-Dharmakìrteḥ Pramànavàrttikam svopajñavrttyà Karnakagomiviracitayà tatìkayà ca sahitam, p 14 writes: kim punaḥ kvacit tarkaśàstre dṛṣṭaṃ niyamàrthaṃ vacanam ity ata àha sajàtìya evetyàdi. tatra yah san sajàtìye dvedhà càsaṃs tadatyaye sa hetur ity atràcàryìye hetulakṣane sajàtìya eva sattvam ity avadhàranena siddhe'pi vijàtìyàd vipakṣàd dhetor vyatireke yad etad asaṃs tadatyaya iti sàdhyàbhàve'sattvavacanaṃ tan niyamàrtham àcàryena vyàkhyàtam asaty eva nàstità yathà syàn nànyatra na viruddha iti. Dharmakìrti makes an almost identical statement in his Hetubindu, i.e. grub kyan nes par bya bahi phyir yan smos su dogs par hgyur te/ mthun pa la yod pa kho nas ldog pa la de med par grub mod kyi/ bsgrub par bya ba med pa la med pa źes smos pa bźin du//, so it receives an almost identical comment as Karnakagomin's from Arcata, Hetubindutìkà, p 13: kim punas tarkaśàstre dṛṣṭam kvacit niyamàrthavacanam ity ata àha dṛṣṭam sajàtìya eva ityàdi/ tatra yah san sajàtìye ity atràcàryìye hetulakṣane sajàtìya eva sattvam ity avadhàranena siddhe'pi hetor vyatireke/ kutra?/ sàdhyàbhàve/ yad etat asaṃs tadayaye iti asattvavacanaṃ tan niyamàrtham àcàryena vyàkhyàtam asaty eva nàstità yathà syàn nànyatra na viruddha iti/. So, there is no doubt whatever as to the existence of a book named Tarkaśàstra in its Sanskrit original. In this connection, it must be pointed out that Hui Chao, who was generally not very trustworthy, reported in his Jen min ju cheng li lun i chi yü, Taishō 1842, pp 161c27-162a4 in relation to the discussion of the three characteristics of h that "in explaining the three characteristics of h, Dignàga said that in order to grasp these objective characteristics, we must refute those old masters, irrespective of whether they are heretic or Buddhist; but someone said, we must first clarify these old masters' theory of three characteristics, which is said to be fully of three forms, as in the Tarkaśàstra etc...(....) Now what is called the understanding of the old is that like the Tarkaśàstra". 釋曰三相陳那釋云、即取義相、破古諸師、或外道師或內古師、有云先解古師三相、謂具三体如如宣諦等云詳彼說意、決定不然、謂彼意取聲上所作是初相、瓶上所作是第二相、虛空上無是第三相、非即取彼瓶等有法、今謂古解指如如宣諦

Thus, with this added new bit of information the identity of the Tarkaśàstra in Dignàga's writings must hence be no more problem.

86. Wen Kuei, Jen min ju cheng li lun shu, Dainippon Zokuzōkyō 86, p 335a9-13, where Vasubandhu is explicitly said to be the author of the Tarkaśàstra I. For a

fuller and authorative discussion of the problem, see Ui, Bukkyō ronrigaku, pp 147-165. Our assumption that Vasubandhu was still quite young when writing the Tarkaśāstra I is not at all at variance with Ui's conclusion nor is it with Dignāga's or Wen Kuei's, who otherwise have attributed the Vādavidhi to his youth. See Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp 32 & 114-115.

87. Frauwallner, Vasubandhu's Vādavidhih, p 144. See also note 85 above. Although it is generally and quite frequently agreed that the Tibetan translated versions of the Tripitaka are the best in terms of their faithfulness and their invaluable aid in controlling a Sanskrit manuscript when the reading of the latter gets rough, the case we faced here and numerous other cases throughout the Pramānasamuccaya, of which a cursory look through Kitagawa's translation would be sufficient, clearly pose serious questions as to the validity of that agreement. In Kitagawa's Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū, we have several blank spaces in the translated text with the words "This part is incomprehensible" etc... See also Kunst, Kamalaśīla's commentary on Śāntaraksita's Anumānaparīksā of the Tattvasangraha, MCB VIII (1946/1947) 106-216, where we also face with a similar situation.

88. Abhidharmakośa IV 3a-b, LVP pp 4-9: hetuh syāc ca vināśakaḥ/3b/ hetur eva ca vināśakaḥ syāt/ katham kṛtvā/ ghāsādyagnisambandhā gunāḥ pākajā utpannās tat eva tādrśād vā punaḥ pakvataratamotpattau teṣām vināśa iti hetur eva teṣām vināśakaḥ svāddhetvaviśiṣṭo vā/ na ca yuktam eva tādṛśād vā teṣām bhāvas tat eva tādṛśāc ca teṣām punar abhāva iti/ jvālāntareṣu tāvad dhetubhedakalpanām parikalpeyuḥ/ kṣārahimaśukta-sūryodakabhūmisambandhāt tu pākajaviśeṣotpattau kim kalpanām kalpayeyuḥ/ etc...

89. Karmasiddhiprakarana, ed. Yamaguchi, Kyoto: Hozōkan, 1951, p 7: ḥdi ltar yaṅ:

dnos po gnas na ḥgro ba med/
ḥgro ba med daṅ rtag tu gnas/

Obviously, statements of this type can also be formulated in terms of sentential logic. But since given a class logic or a quantificational logic, we can always transform them into a sentential logic. So, in the present study we are entirely silent about the presence of that logic, since it is not very relevant to the inquiry into Vasubandhu's philosophy as a whole. Besides, there are a number of good, though old, studies concerning it such as Schayer, Studien zur Indischen Logik, Bulletin internationale de l'Académie polonaise des Sciences et des lettres, Classe de Philologie, d'Histoire et de Philosophie (1932) 98-102 & (1933) 90-96; also Uber die Methode der Nyāya-Fors-

chung, Festschrift Moriz Winternitz, Leipzig, 1933, pp 247-257; Lê Mạnh Thát, Dựa vào việc nghiên cứu luận lý học trung quán của Nàgàrjuna, Tư Tưởng I (1967) 54-85.

90. Arcaṭa, Hetubinduṭìkà, p 62-63: yathàkramamanayor udàharanam àha -- yathà yat sat/ yad yat sad iti vìpsàpradhàno yac chabdaḥ/ tat sarvam iti tac chabdo'pi vìpsàpradhàna eva/ atra sarvagrahanena càśesaparigrahàd bahirvyàpter niràsaḥ/ yathà ghaṭàdayaḥ iti/ yasya sattvakṣanikatvayoḥ pratibandhaprasàdhakaṃ pramànaṃ ghaṭàdau pravṛttaṃ taṃ prati tatra smṛtisamàdhànàrthaṃ dṛṣtàntavacanam na sàdhyasiddhyatham/ dṛṣtàntamàtrataḥ sàdhyasiddher abhàvàt/. In this connection, it is rather interesting to observe that Hui Chao again in his Jen min i t'an, Taishô 1841, p 143a27-b14, after remarking that "logic is like a great light after a long darkness", proceeds to sketch a brief history of Buddhist logic, which seems according to him to begin with Asanga "who announces the eight-membered schema in order to establish the ultimate mystery, which is like eight pillars sustaining the heaven", then Vasubandhu "who describes the five-membered schema in order to clarify the profound mechanism of reality, which is like five mountains maintaining the balance of the earth", then Dignàga "who commands the attention of the world because of his outstanding genius and who establishes the three-membered schema which is like the sun, the moon and the stars", and finally Śankarasvàmin "who, responding to his time and for the sake of saving other beings, propagates the two 'awareness', which is like two lights". 因明論者、銓衡八門、總墨四章、九十六道之規模、二十八師之軌範、宗歸立破、道洽自他、宣大雄之玉音、是長夜之亮燭、故暢其鴻旨者乃樹正之司南、控彼宏綱者、誠破邪之巨杵、是以、法王肇出、初闢幽關、智將開生、重開奧府、無著繼八支以立宗、極同八柱以承天、世親陳五八以顯深幾、若五山鎮地、遙有陳那命世以秀出、等三立以類三光、天主應時、以挺生、張二悟而齊二耀、可謂超宇宙...

Now, in reading through that passage one is struck by the fact that Hui Chao gives us not only a run-down account of Buddhist logic, but also a fairly comprehensive, though not very accurate, report of the history of inference-schemata. He begins quite correctly with the eight-membered schema of Asanga, which does indeed have eight members, to wit 1. pratijñà, 2. hetu, 3. udàharana, 4. sàrùpya, 5. vairùpya, 6. pratyaksa, 7. anumàna and 8. àptàgama, although on page 155b13-14 he says to the contrary that "Vasubandhu, the hinayanists and the heretics employed the five-membered schema, while Maitrayanàtha, Asanga, Dignàga etc... used only the three-membered one". 世親及小乘外道立有五分、慈尊無著陳那等、但立三分、

He then talks about the five-membered and the three-membered schemata of Vasubandhu and Dignàga, respectively. And lastly, he refers to Sankarasvàmin and his so-called "two awarenesses". Śankarasvàmin did open his Nyàyapraveśakam with those two, i.e.

sàdhanaṃ dùṣanaṃ caiva sàbhàsam parasamvide/
pratyakṣam anumànaṃ ca sàbhàsaṃ tv àtmasamvide//

However, given the fact that Hui Chao mentions Śankarasvàmin's in terms of their inference-schemata and that the two awarenesses expressed by his opening kàrikà are nothing new, since it is Dignàga who inaugurates such a division, we may question as to whether the "two awarenesses" referred to by Hui Chao are indeed referring to the two-membered schema. If this is the case, then besides Vasubandhu and Arcaṭa, Śankarasvàmin also employs that schema. It is true that in the Nyàyapraveśakam he talks about the three-membered, and not the two-membered schema: etàny eva trayo'vayavà ity ucyante, and thus it precludes any possibility of Śankarasvàmin's using the latter schema. Nevertheless, in view of the difficulty in deciding who the author of the Nyàyapraveśkam was, notwithstanding the Chinese tradition which attributed it to Śankarasvàmin, Hui Chao's above report is worth noting. See The Nyàyapraveśa, ed. Anandshankar B. Dhruva, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1968, pp v-xxxv; also Ui, Bukkyô ronrigaku, pp 353-362. Curiously enough, Hui Chao dates the beginning of Buddhist logic with Asanga, a view which is destined to be shared by such great names as Jñànaśrìmitra. See Jñànaśrìmitranibandhàvalì, ed. Anantalal Thakur, Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959, p 506: Sàkàrasiddhiśàstram:

àryàsaṇgam anangajinnayavaho yad bhùpatìśo'nvaśàd/
àcàryo vasubandhur udghuramatis tasyàjñayà didyutat/
dignàgo'tha kumàranàthavihitàsàmànyasàhàyakas/
tasmin vàrtikabhàṣyakàrakṛtinor adyànavadyà sthitiḥ//

In any case, not long after Śankarasvàmin, Dharmakìrti already furtively introduced the possibility that the third member might not be needed in the Pramànavàrttika, p 20:

kàryakàranabhàvàd và svabhàvàd và niyàmakàt/
avinàbhàvaniyamo'darśanàn na na darśanàt/31/

although he thought otherwise. Probably due to this furtive introduction, Siddhasena Divàkara got hold of the notion of internal pervasion, which he expressed in his short little work, the Nyàyàvatàrasùtra, of 32 verses, written perhaps not too long after the appearance of Dharmakìrti's Nyàyabindu. Nyàyàvatàrasùtram, ed. Dalasukha Malwaniya, Bombay: Singhi Jain Śastra Śikshapitha Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1949, p 4:

antarvyàptaiva sàdhyasya siddher bahir-udàhṛtiḥ/
vyarthà syàt tad asadbhàve'py evam nyàyavido viduḥ/20/.

This notion of internal pervasion was subsequently commented upon by other Jain logicians up to the modern time such as Yaśovijayagani (1624-1688) in his Jainatarkabhàṣa, ed. Sukhlàljì Sanghavì, Ahmedabad: The Sanchàlaka-Singhì Jaina Granthamàlà, 1938, p 12: yat tu antarvyàptyà pakṣìyasàdhyasàdhanasambandhagrahàt pakṣasàdhyasamsargabhànam, tad uktaṃ pakṣìkṛta eva viṣaye sàdhanasya sàdhyena vyàptir antarvyàptiḥ anyatra tu bahirvyàptiḥ iti; tan na; antarvyàptyà hetoḥ sàdhyapratyàyanaśaktau satyàm bahirvyàpter udbhàvan avyarthatvapratipàd anena tasyàḥ svarùpaprayuktà'vyabhicàralakṣanatvasya, bahirvyàpteś ca sahacàramàtratvasya làbhàt, sàrvatrikyà vyàpter viṣayabhedamàtrena bhedasya durvacatvàt/ na ced evam tadàntarvyàptigrahakàla esa eva pakṣasàdhyasamsargabhànàd anumànavaikalyàpattiḥ vinà parvato vahnimàn ity uddeśya pratìtim iti yathàtantram bhàvanìyam sudhìbhiḥ/ ittham ca pakvàny etàni sahakàraphalàni ekaśàkhàprabhavatvàd upayuktasahakàraphalavad ity-àdau bàdhitaviṣaye, murkho'yam devadattaḥ tatputratvàt itaratatputravad ity-àdau satpratipakṣe càtiprasangavàranàya abàbhitavisayatvàsatpratipakṣatvasahitam pràg uktarùpatrayam àdàya pàñcarùpyam hetulakṣanam iti naiyàyikamatam apy apàstam; udeṣyati śakatam ity-àdau pakṣadharmatvasyaivàsiddheḥ, sa śyàmaḥ tatputratvàd ity atra hetvàbhàse'pi pàñcarùpyasattvàc ca, niścitànyathànupapatter eva hetulakṣanatvaucityàt/. However, owing to the peculiar position of the Jain on many problems, which is expressed mostly in terms of a "maybe" philosophy, the original notion of internal pervasion, as maintained by the Tarkaśàstra II, never got an acceptance it well deserved.

91. van Heijenoort, From Frege to Gödel, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, p 217. It must be noted that in this chapter we deliberately make no attempt at formulating a Vasubandhu logic, although it is quite tempting, particularly in connection with the question of proving the equivalence of the five definitions of non-deviation to each other and to the definition of inseparable connection. In fact, a formulation can be easily made, as Lê Manh Thát has shown, when such observations as Quine and Hailperin's are combined. See Lê Manh Thát, Dựa vào việc nghiên cứu triết học Vasubandhu, Sàigòn, 1968, pp 150-157; Hailperin, Op. cit. We deliberately make no effort here, because we believe that such a formulation, even if it is done, does not contribute anything specifically new to our understanding of Vasubandhu's philosophy in general; on the contrary, it may some further problems such as his formal rules, his set of axioms etc..., which, if to be dealt with judiciously, require too much time and space which are not otherwise available.

CHAPTER FIVE

A REEXAMINATION OF THE PERCEPTION

We have outlined in general the development of Vasubandhu's logical theories, the culminating point of which is the assertion that the validity of a proof depends upon its consistency rather than upon its reference to an extra-logical reality, as expressed by what later is known as the theory of internal pervasion[1]. This theory renders Vasubandhu's logic into an indeed formal logic in its fullest sense, which can justifiably be written in the form

$$(\forall x)(A(h,x) \longrightarrow A(s,x))$$

Given every x such that A(h,x), then A(s,x) is provable on the conditions posed by A(h,x) itself and by none other else. This is one of the most important results that philosophy ever arrives at and that indicates clearly Vasubandhu's philosophical excellence, not only on account of its being contributed to the establishment of a simple and easy way of deciding the truth and falsehood of an argument, but also of its ability to widen the range of accountability of the discourse universe of a given language. Thus, in ordinary language as well as in technical parlance, one may talk about the infinity and the like without their being ever ascertained as any sort of entities at all, let alone of their being observed or perceived or rendered into some kind of sense data. Their range of accountability, which is that of their being understood and talked about, lies in the fact of their being defined and proved to be consistent within a given context. However, once such theory is set up, the question of the position of the perception in relation to it immediately arises, since it is generally assumed that the basis of any theory is after all the objective fact given before one's conscious awareness, and that in order for that objective fact to be aware of, some relationship betwen it and the subject must exist, which is usually call

perception and the like. So, when the form $(\forall x)(A(h,x) \rightarrow A(s,x)$ is written, it carries with it a required re-examination of these perceptual relationships as a result. And this is what actually happens in Vasubandhu's trends of thoughts.

In the Abhidharmakośa Vasubandhu clearly states that "perception is the most decisive means of knowledge"[2], a position which he maintains subsequently with vigor in the Vādavidhi[3], where is defined also for the first time with any explicit precision what perception is. Consequently, if we are to describe how he proceeds to re-examine his theory of perception in the wake of his logical discoveries and to properly evaluate that re-examination within his philosophical perspective, the definition offered in the Vādavidhi must be our starting point. It runs as follows:

> "Perception is a cognition from the object itself only. When a cognition arises only on account of the object, by which it is designated, and not on account of anything else, then this cognition is perception. With this definition, false cognitions are rejected, for example the cognition of mother-of-pearl as silver, for this cognition is designated by silver as a silver-cognition, but does not arise on account of silver; rather it is evoked through mother-of-pearl. A conventional cognition is also rejected by this definition, for such a cognition is designated 'a cognition of pots' etc..., but does not arise on account of pots which are really existing, but rather on account of justapositions of the visible or tangible which are interpreted as pots. The pots themselves can in no way give rise to this cognition, because they [in terms of their plural number] are illusory and thus cannot serve as conditions. Finally, cognition by inference is also rejected by this definition, for such a cognition occurs through the cognition of smoke and the recollection of its inseparable connection with fire, but not through the fire itself. That from which only the cognition arises, and does not arise, is regarded as an object in this passage"[4].

We quote this rather extensive definition in its full text, since it offers a good many interesting clues to not only Vasubandhu's view of perception in the Vādavidhi

but also to a number of fascinating implications for his logical theories therein. Thus, one may cite, for example, his discussion of the so-called "conventional cognition", where indeed his theory of number is deliberated, which is strikingly modern. He says that one may have the cognition of pots, not in terms of pots as an entity, but in terms of pots as a number of single objects justaposited. This statement implies two things: first, that there is a plurality of pots, that is, "the number of numbers from 1 upo to any given number is that given number", and second, that that plurality is not defined as an entity, "which is really existing", but as a set of objects in which a set of numbers is used, each occurring only once, and "the number of numbers used as names is the same as the number of object"[5]. These two properties, which are nowadays used as two fundamental concepts for defining theory of number and without which it is impossible to effectuate the task, have therefore been long thought of. Similarly, his discussion of the nature of the inference in terms of the perception of the relationship betwen certain given terms within a schema provides us with a rather interesting view of his thinking about the process of reasoning and logical demonstration. These points and others appearing in the above-quoted passage thus have some bearing on Vasubandhu's thought in general, but we shall not consider them at this stage. Instead we will be concerned primarily with his definition of what perception is.

It says, "perception is a cognition from the object itself only", that is, "when a cognition arises only on account of the object, by which it is designated, and not on account of anything else, then this cognition is perception". So, perception is defined in terms of the object of perception, and not in terms of anything else. This is one of the most distinguishing features of Vasubandhu's theory of perception, which, as will be seen, has the most decisive effect upon its further development. Now, if

perception is defined in terms of the object and in that term only, the question naturally arises as to what the object is. This, Vasubandhu answers at the end of the quoted passage: "That on account of which only the cognition arises, and does not arise, is regarded as an object". Clearly then, object is defined as whatever gives rise to a cognition. But obviously such a definition of the object is not at all adequate even to specify the precise conditions in which an object can be taken as an object of perception and not as an object of any other mental activities. This inadequacy is not long to be recognized even by Vasubandhu himself. Dignàga tells us that "in the Vàdavidhàna, some things are explained differently" by Vasubandhu from those in the Vàdavidhi, which he devotes a section of his Pramànasamuccaya to criticize, where he goes farther to say that "the Vàdavidhi is not the work of the master Vasubandhu, or it is recognized by the master that the essence of his thought is not expounded therein".[6] Unfortunately, what "some things are explained differently" by Vasubandhu and how he criticizes his own definition of perception in the Vàdavidhàna are not known to us, since among the fragments preserved from the latter none is related to the question concerned. However, thanks to Dignàga's criticisms, we know that if the above-mentioned definition of perception were to be evaluated even by Vasubandhu himself, it must be evaluated on the following grounds.

First, the ambiguous wording of the definition. Dignàga points out that to say that "perception is a cognition from the object itself only" can be interpreted differently either as saying that perception is a cognition from any object, or as saying that perception is a cognition from just that object. In either case, it is not a satisfactory definition, because if it is the first alternative, it may be argued that perception is then confused with other mental acts such as recollection or affection which also has their own object; and if it is the second

then it is not a true definition on account of the fact that even in perception one needs more than just a mere object to have a perception of that object.[7] Second, the vagueness of the notion of object. We have seen Vasubandhu attempt at defining what object is. But to say that object is "that on account of which the cognition arises, and does not arise" is not even a definition at all, as Dignàga recognizes. He says that "one should state what is meant by the object of cognition, whether it is that with the appearance of which the cognition arises, or whether it is the things as they are which become the cause of the cognition, though they present to the cognition an appearance different from themselves"[8]. After giving those two alternatives he goes on to indicate that neither of them fares well. For in the first case, the cognition is of the appearance of the object, and not of the object, because the object is what constitutes it, which in Dignàga's as well as in Vasubandhu's view is the atoms; in the second case, if the cognition is of the object as it is, that is, of the atoms which constitute that object, the cognition then is of the atoms of the object, and not of the object by which it is designated.[9] And finally, the ambiguity of the definition itself. It says, "if a cognition arises only on account of the object by which it is designated and not on account of anything else, then it is a perception". But then, how is a cognition designated by the object? In what way? In which manner? And as Dignàga remarks, "a cognition cannot be designated without reference to the nature of its object"[10], and the nature of the object, as we have seen, is not defined by Vasubandhu in the above-quoted passage.

Through the afore-said critical analysis by Dignàga, we can at least have some idea as to how Vasubandhu might see and analyze the definition of perception of the Vàdavidhi in his later work, the Vàdavidhàna. But to critically analyze it is not an answer to the question of what perception is, although it may serve as a staging

ground for further inquiring. In fact, from what will be said, it is indeed the questions surrounding the definition of perception given by the Vàdavidhi which contributes further to the need, which is already felt by Vasubandhu in his logical framework, to solve once for all, all the nagging difficulties concerning them. So, although it is very difficult, if not impossible, to state definitely whether it is these questions rather than his logical theories which prompt him into the re-examination of his view of perception, we can be certain that in either case it is his logical writings, particularly the Vàdavidhi, which lay the ground upon which his various future views are to be developped. And this can be seen clearly in his Vimśatikà. In this work, Vasubandhu starts out with an attempt at defining explicitly what he means by the terms "object of the perception". And then, he tries to show how given such a view of the object, a theory of the perception must be set up. Consequently, in spite that the Vàdavidhàna is lost for our present purpose, we can rely upon the Vimśatikà to see how Vasubandhu conducts his inquiry into the problem of the perception.

The Vimśatikà begins with the thesis that "a cognition is not of the object", which immediately induces its opponent to response: "if a cognition is not of an object, then there is not the determination of time and place, nor the determination of conscious stream, and the result of an action is not justified".[11] Vasubandhu explains further what is meant by this response. He says:

> "What does that mean? If a cognition of the form etc..., without there being a form etc... as object, is produced from what is not an object such as form etc..., then why is it that it is produced in such-and-such place and not everywhere? And why is it that even in that place it is produced at a certain moment and not always? And that it is produced in the conscious stream of all those who are situated in that place and at that time and not

> only in the conscious stream of one of them, as in the case of the apprearance of hairs which occurs only to the conscious stream of those affected by the eye disease and not to that of the others? Why do the hairs, the bees etc... seen by those affected by the eye disease function as hairs etc..., and not others? The food, the drink, the clothes, the poison, the arms etc... which one sees in a dream do not effectuate the function of food etc..., while it is not so in others? The mirage city on account of it being non-existent does not effectuate the function of a city, while it is not so in others? Therefore, [if a cognition is not of the object] the determination of place and time, the non-determination of a conscious stream and the result of a function are not justified".[12]

Together with the just-quoted exposition, the above response thus state quite clearly how an object of perception must be defined. It must be defined in terms of its place, time, universality and function. These are the four criteria for judging whether an object is indeed an object. An object is that which is perceived in a certain place at a certain time, which is recognized by everybody who happens to be at that certain place in that certain time, and which is capable of effectuating a certain function. If any thing that fulfills those criteria must therefore be acknowledged to be an object of perception. Now, if we consider these criteria, they are not at all insufficient or inadequate. I saw the statute of the Great Buddha at the Todaiji when I happened to be there on a trip and not everywhere. And I happened to make that trip on a winter day, so I saw it on that winter day and not at all times. On that day there happened to be many people going pilsgrimage there and everybody saw it as I did, and it is not merely I who saw. And the statute , which I saw, did produce a mild noise for everybody to hear, when I lightly knocked at it. Thus, the statute of the Great Buddha at the Todaiji is indeed a true object of perception, and not an

image conjured up in my dream or in my imagination. Consequently, we must acknowledge that the above four criteria, i.e. place, time, universality and function, for judging an object are not at all unreasonable. In fact, they are quite satisfactory to a large extent, as we have seen in the given example. The thesis that "the cognition is not of an object" is therefore in a quite troubling situation, and it requires solutions.

Having stated definitely how an object of perception must be defined, the Vimśatikà now proceeds to give reason why the perception is not of an object, as the latter has just been defined. Note that the object is defined in terms of its place, time, universality and function. The Vimśatikà readily points out if an object of true perception can be so defined, so is the object of an untrue perception such as the perception I had in a dream about a certain object. For instance, I saw a beautiful and sensuous girl in my dream on a cool night last summer. That particular beautiful and sensuous girl that I saw happened to sit with me in my room, watching a sad movies on the television, So, I saw her in that room only, and not everywhere. Our sitting and watching the television together happened to be on that particular cool night only and not all times. Therefore, she appeared to me at that particular time only and not always. And our sitting together on that night led finally to my noctural pollution, which also drew out at the same time of my beautiful and sensuous dream with some regret on my part. That dreamt girl thus did effectuate a real function with an actual result, which is undeniably my pollution. Lastly, when I described her to my friend, he agreed that she was indeed a beautiful and sensuous girl. The girl I saw in the dream, hence did possess an universality, as has been defined. Clearly then, the object of an untrue perception does possess any and all the properties of an object of true perception. The criteria

set up for judging, and implicitly thereby for distinguishing, the object of a true perception from that of an untrue one are thus completely and wholly a failure. Once they failed, it is as good to say that the perception is not of an object as it is to affirm the contrary, as it is clearly indicated. Now that, it is so proved that one cannot reliably base oneself upon those four criteria for determining the object of perception, it is imperative that further solutions must be explored to see how it can be defined.

The Vimśatikà proposes that we consider the problem from the point of view of the atomic structure of the object itself. This, of course, is nothing startlingly new, since such a viewpoint is already expressed and attempted in the Abhidharmakośa. In that work, Vasubandhu tells us that according to the Vaibhàsika the physical entity can be analyzed into atoms and particles, which consist of the following fourteen kinds: atoms of earth, of fire, of water, of wind, of color, of sound, of smell, of taste, of touch, eye-atoms, ear-atoms, nose-atoms, tongue-atoms and body-atoms, of which the last five are distinguished primarily for the accounting[13] for the function of a conscious biological system such as human beings. Of these fourteen, the Vaibhàsika maintain that at least eight of them must join together to form a molecule for the actual perceptibility of a physical object, and they are the atoms of earth, fire, water, wind, color, odor, taste and touch. To these minimum eight, if the molecule is of ascoustic nature, a nineth atom, the atom of sound, must be added. Molecules of the other sense-organs similarly must have their respective atoms present, beside the nine atoms just spoken of. Thus, they consist of at least ten atoms each.[14] But granted these various combinations of the atoms to form a molecule for actual perceptibility of an entity, how are they in those combinations? What maintains them such that they are not falling apart?

Those questions are rather difficult to answer logically, particularly when atoms by definition are indivisible and hence have no parts. If they have no parts they surely cannot touch each other, thereby cannot enter into any combinations at all. The Vaibhàsika response that it is true that "if the atoms touch each other at any single site, then they must have parts; but the atoms, by definition, have no parts..... However, if they do not touch each other and the molecule does not fall apart when being crushed, that is because the wind-field concentrates or holds them together. Certain wind functions as dispersing force such as the wind at the period of world destruction, and certain wind as concentrating force as the wind at the period of world creation".[15] The Vaibhàsika further define the wind-field as a force-field[16]. So, for them despite the definition of the atom as being indivisible and having no parts, the atoms still can come into combinations to form a molecule for the actual perceptibility of an physical object. What the atoms do is to touch each other in their totality, that is, that they remain individual atoms, but mix with each other in a given field[17]. Therefore, if we were to perceive an object in certain shape of certain color, that is due wholly to the "dispositions of the atoms in a certain manner"[18], and can be accounted for in terms of these dispositions. The solutions to the problem of atomic formation are thus found in the theory of force-field, and those to the problem of molecular structure in the theory of the dispositions of the atoms. In both cases it must be admitted that the proposed solutions by the Vaibhàsika are not only sophisticated, but also very interesting, especially in view of the time distance separating them from us, since they immediately remind us of the current theory of chemical bonding, which contributes not a little to the elucidation of many atomic and molecular events hitherto unexplained or incomprehensible. The

Vaibhàsika would hold, for example, that if the water evaporates, that is because of the presence of the destructibility within its own nature, which in this case is the imbalance of the force field that holdsit together, that due to some influx of the energy from the external sources such as fire or the sun, leads to the liberation of the water into vapor.[19]

This rather sophisticated theory of the atomic structure given by the Vaibhàsika suffers, however, a fatal blow from their philosophical outlook which states that only the atoms are real things, the rest of what is constituted by them are mere descriptions. This position of theirs, we have discussed previously in Chapter Three. From the discussion therein, we learned that for them what is real is not capable of being crushed or analyzed away in any way, shape and fashion whatever[20]. The atoms by definition, satisfy such a condition, so they really exist. What are made up them because of such a make-up are surely to be crushed away such as a jar or to be mentally analyzed away into their ultimate elements such as water. They are, therefore, not existing really, but only as a convention, that is, that people agree that the jar exists, so it exists, and that is all of it. Such an existence has no reality whatever. It depends wholly upon the convention within a given community for its being labelled as existence. From such a distinction of what is real and what is not, it follows naturally that only and solely can and must the atoms be considered as the object of perception, since only and solely are they the real things, the things really existing in the physical world. The rest of what are in that world are made up by them, and hence, are capable to being crushed or analyzed away into their ultimate elements; they are therefore, of necessity, not the object of the perception, for the simple reason that what is not really existing cannot be truly perceived. It must be noted further that although today we cannot say with any certainty whether

the above theory of atomic structure was developped by the Vaibhàsika in response to their theory of what is real, or the other way around, we can be sure that such a theory of what is real, which carries with it the implication for other problem areas such as perception, did pose serious problems indeed for their theory of perception, which were to be expounded subsequently.

In fact, it is because of their theory of what is real that the Vaibhàsika try to explain how that real can be perceived. Thus, the Vaibhàsika from Kaśmir, for example, holds that we can perceive the atoms themselves but in their condition as molecular atoms, that is, the atoms in their minimum formation of eight and up.[21] What we perceive then is the actual real things, i.e. atoms, and not the labelled existence by the convention such as the molecule or the jar etc... Obviously, this is a rather credulous position to be believed. In the Abhidharmakośa, Vasubandhu already has serious doubts about it. He points out therein, for instance, in connection with the question of whether the atoms touch each other or not when forming a molecule, that if the atoms remain individual and to be held in a given site by an energy force, that is, that they keep some distance, however small and infinitesimal that may be, betwen themselves, "then what prevents the atoms from moving in that void created by the distance which separate them?". This notion of atomic movement spoken of by Vasubandhu sounds again rather strangely contemporary. But it is introduced as a device to break down the Vaibhàsika idea that one can even see the atoms, since if the atoms move around in the intersection separating them, then it is hardly possible for anyone to perceive anything, as in that whirlwind of atomic movement it is not easy to keep track of even the minimum eight atoms of the least molecule, which is actually perceptible, so as to be able to differentiate say, the introduction of a new atom from the old ones. Further, Vasubandhu notes that

why should one deny that the atoms do not touch each other, given the fact that the molecule is not other than the atoms which constitute it, and that they in the state of molecular formation do touch each other? "It is therefore absurd to deny on the one hand that the atoms touch each other and admit on the other that they touch when in a molecular formation". And lastly, he remarks that the question of whether the atoms touch each other or not in a molecule is that of spatial division. So, "if you admit that the atoms have spatial division, then surely they do have parts, which they may or may not touch; if on the other hand you deny it, then there is not the least reason why the atoms have parts, even if they touch each other".[22]

Through those three remarks, it becomes quite apparent that Vasubandhu is in a real deep dissatisfaction with the standard theory of what is real of the Vaibhàsika. In effect, even if we accept their theory of atomic structure, it is not still clear how it is that the atoms in a molecule of a minimum number are perceptible and not otherwise. This question is further confusing, when viewed in the light of the fact that "the molecule is not other than the atoms which constitute it". That is to say, if the atoms are real things, as defined by the Vaibhàsika, why then not the molecule, which is made of real things, i.e. the atoms? But foremost is the Vaibhàsika notion that the atoms touch each other in a molecular formation and not otherwise. As Vasubandhu puts it, "the question is simply whether they touch each other or do not touch each other".[23] It is not quite right to say that they touch each other in certain conditions and not in others, while touching each other is the property inherent in themselves. Thus, seemingly insouluble difficulties are brought about to the Vaibhàsika's theory of atomic structure by their philosophical speculations about what is real and what

is perciptible. We cannot help but feeling that the difficulties are immense and quite insoluble in view of their speculations. The Vaibhàsika theory of the object of perception is thus crumbled with those three critical remarks by Vasubandhu, despite their vastly attracting notions of atomic and molecular structure concerning that object. However, remarks, as being what they are, are not designed to seriously refute or uphold a theory, even how critical or otherwise they may be. So, for a soul-searching review of the Vaibhàsika theory of the object of perception, we have to wait untill Vasubandhu publishes his Vimśatikà, where a minute examination of it were to be carried out. The Vimśatikà writes:

> "These atoms, when in molecular formation, are not also the object of perception, because the atom, each being an individual thing, is not proved. Why is it not proved? Because
>
> if the atoms join each other at the same time by a number of six, then they have six parts/12a-b/
>
> If the atoms, six in all, join each other from six different direction, it follows then that they have six parts, each having its own site where the other cannot occupy.
>
> If all six occupy the same site, then their mass would be that of one sole atom/12c-d/.
>
> that is, if the site of one of them is also the site of all six, then on account of their all having the same site, their mass would be that of one sole atom, and on account of their being not different from each other, their mass would be not also visible.
>
> The Vaibhàsika from Kaśmir would response that "surely, the atoms do not join each other, because by definition, they have no parts; and we surely would not commit such a blunder; however, they join each other when in molecular formation". But then is the molecule of atoms an object other than the atoms themselves?
>
> If the atoms do not join each other, then what joins them in the case of molecular formation?/13a-b/
>
> Or because of the atoms having no parts, there is no joining of

them with each other. [In either case, the atom, each being individual thing] is not proved./13c-d/

that is, if the molecules do not join them with each other, then surely one should not say that on account of their having no parts, the atoms are not proved to be joining each other. In fact, your own evidence shows that the molecule joins each other on account of its having parts. Therefore, atom as an individual thing is not proved. So, one must admit either that the atoms join each other, or it is not so. [In the former case]

Once there is divers spatial division [when the atoms join each other from different directions], the indivisibility of the atoms is not logical/14a-b/

If the atoms have divers spatial orientations such as being before etc... up to spatial orientation of being under, if there is such a division of spatial orientations, then how can the indivisibility of the atoms themselves be logical?

And how about their shadow and their shadowing?

If there is no division of the spatial orientations of each atom, then how is it that at sunrise there is shadow in one place, and the light at another? In fact, there should not be any site other than that where the light is, [if there is no division of the spatial orientations of each atom]. And how about the shadowing of one atom by another, if the division of the spatial orientations of atom is not admitted? [If not admitted,] an atom would indeed not have the posterior portion from where to prevent the others from advancing towards front. And if there is no such prevention, all the atoms would be at the same site, and the molecule would have the mass of one sole atom, as has been said. If so, one may ask why not admitting that the shadow and the shadowing are belonging to the mass and not to the atom? But then would one admit that the mass is other than the atoms? we ask. To which, he responds: No.

If the mass is not other than the atoms, then the shadow and the shadowing are not of the mass/14d/

If it is not admitted that the mass is other than the atoms, then the shadow

and the shadowing are not its properties; that is quite established. But this deliberation about the position of whether there is atom or molecule, what is the use of thinking about it, if it is not for refuting their property such as being a physical entity etc...? What are then their property? Is it their state of being the object of the eye etc... and of being blue etc...? That is the question that must be examined.

If it is maintained that whatever is the object of the eye etc... must be of the property of being blue, yellow etc..., then is that thing indivisible or is it divisible? What then? If it is divisible, there is difficulty which we have just discussed.

> If it is indivisible, there is then no movement by steps, nor the grasping and the non-grasping at the same time, nor multiple activity of various figures, nor the non-seeing of the microbes/15

If as long as the object of the eye is thought of as an indivisible thing without parts and without multiplicity, then that long there should be no movement by steps on earth. Such is the meaning. That is because one moves everywhere thanks to the continuous movement of one's sole feet. There should also be no grasping of the anterior portion without not grasping its posterior at the same time, because it is not logical that one grasps and at the same time does not grasp the same object. There should also be no activity in various places of what is multiple and divisible such as the elephant and the horse etc..., because where there is one, there there is the other. So, how can their distinction be admitted? Further, how can something indivisible exist where there are two plus an intersection of void lying betwen them where they do not exist? And finally, there should be no reasons why the microbes in the water should not be seen, because they are just the same physical objects as anything grosser, if it is merely on account of their having different properties that makes them being different things, and not for any other reason. Therefore

when speaking of atoms, we must, of necessity, imagine some sort of division. And so, the atom as an individual thing is not proved".[24]

The lenghthy criticism mounted by Vasubandhu against the Vaibhàsika theory of the object of perception is given here in full, not only because of its being the most detailed and thourough exposition of his view about the problem concerned, but also because of our disagrement in a number of places with the only modern translation, i.e. Lévi's, of the Vimśatikà, which is immediately evidenced to anyone who cares to compare our rendering with that by Lévi, and which we would not, for want of space and its germaine character, care to discuss right here. In that lengthy criticism, Vasubandhu shows clearly how the Vaibhàsika theory of the object of perception runs itself into serious and insoluble difficulties. First, as we have said, the Vaibhàsika on account of their theory of what is real, maintain that only the atoms are real and worthy of being the object of perception, because they cannot be crushed or analyzed away by any means, and therefore are indivisible and have no parts. But for them to become actually perceptible, the Vaibhàsika say, they must gather, at least eight kinds of them, to form a minimum molecule. So, the Vaibhàsika are bound to explain how such a seemingly contradictory situation could occur, that is, that how is it that only the atoms can be the object of perception, but that they become perceptible only in some molecular formation? And their explanation is that the atoms remains the same indivisible and individual real things in their molecular formation as they are defined, but become perceptible in that condition because they join each other therein, that is, they mix with each other. Unfortunately, such an explanation not only fails to clear the various difficulties away for them, but further compounds the problems to such an extent that it can be said to be adding further burdens to what they already had.

That is because if the atoms are indivisible and have no parts or spatial dimensions, how can they join each other even in their molecular formation? Joining, or mixing or whatever terms the Vaibhàsika may use, presupposes, of necessity, some spatial dimension and orientation, as Vasubandhu points out in both the Abhidharmakośa and the Vimśatikà. If the atoms do not join each other, what then join them with each other in their molecular formation which allows the assertion that they join each other in that formation? In any case, joining supposes the existence of some divisible space, and the atoms as are defined would not in any way satisfy that condition. So, they are condemned perpetually to be nothing but the indivisible individual real things, and that is it. Furthermore, if it is said that that is the conclusion that the Vaibhàsika have intended and wished to be reached, then the question falls squarely upon the problem of showing how those atoms can become an object of perception. But, as Vasubandhu says at the beginning of the above quotation, "the atom as an indivisible individual real thing is not proved". Therefore, it would not be very surprising if one were to find out that it is even harder to prove that it is an object of perception. Surely, if what one see are atoms, and the atoms, being what they are, are by definition, capable of being reduced to but one atom in all respects, whether it is in relation to their mass or anything else. Once such a reduction occurs, all the consequences would follow naturally. There would be no movement on earth, because all the atoms are reduced to one atom, and that one atom happens to be of no parts and spatial dimensions whatsoever. There would be also no difference bewten various activities carried out by various parts of one body and by various living beings, for if everything is reduced to that one atom, then there is but the activity of that atom alone and nothing else so as to have the difference. There would be also no reason why the microbes in the water would

not be seen, as they are, by the same reduction, on the equal stance with any other grosser and bigger objects; but that is not what actually happens. So, for whatever merit the Vaibhàsika theory of atomic structure may have, it does not in any way contribute to the solution of the Vaibhàsika problem of the object of perception, which is viewed primarily in their theory of what is real.

Now, note that serious difficulties arising out of the Vaibhàsika solution of the problem of the object of perception are due mainly and primarily to their theory of what is real. Otherwise, as Vasubandhu has pointed out, one may maintain, for example, that since the molecule is made of atoms, which are "real things", it, too, is therefore a real thing capable and worthy of being the object of perception in its true sense and not merely in its conventional agreement. As a result, those serious difficulties are susceptible to two sortes of resolution, depending upon whether or not one accepts that Vaibhàsika theory of what is real. If one does not accept their premise of what is real within its conceived limitations, he can propose a new one such as that given by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośa, stating that since the molecule is made up of atoms, which are real, it must therefore be real, of necessity. But then, as Vasubandhu himself was to realize later on in his subsequent writings, such a proposed alternative would lead to the same deadend, not only because it carries with it a requirement of revising the definition of what is real since the reality of a molecule in that case is but a borrowed reality, a reality it borrows from the atoms, and hence is not even a reality at all when the atoms take their reality back for themselves; but also because there is no guarantee, even if the reality is gratitously granted to the molecule, that the perception thereof is actually the perception of a real molecule and not of a molecule one sees, say, in a dream, which we have previously described. So, if

one even rejects the Vaibhàsika theory of what is real, one does not fare any better, if not worse.

If on the other hand one does accepts their premise of what is real in whatever modified forms it may be, one is bound to squarely face the serious difficulties it gives rise to, which we have seen. These difficulties can be easily summed up as follows: the atoms are the real things, since they are indivisible into any other elements; but for them to be actually perceptible, they must form a molecule of at least eight of them in number; the molecule, however, is not real by definition, since it can naturally be analyzed into its components, which are of course atoms, and thus destroyed; the difficulty therefore arises as to how one can avoid the unpleasant conlusion that what one perceives is not something real at all, but something unreal, instead. This difficulty the Vaibhàsika fail to solve, as Vasubandhu points out above, with their commonsense theory that just as one does not easily see a single strand of hair, but can immediately recognize a mass of hairs, so does one with one single atom and with a molecule of atoms. Despite such a failure, it proved to be sufficiently challenging to many others such that a number of other alternative solutions were proposed, the most prominent among which was the holistic theory given by the Vaiśesika, stating that there is a whole which serves to unify the parts and which exists as an entity independently of and distinctly from the component parts, although it does penetrate them. In other words, if the atoms in order for them to be actually perceptible must gather to form a molecule, which is perceptible but not real on the same equal stance as the atoms, then there is an entity which arises whenever there is more than one atom in gathering and which lends itself to the perception for recognizing whatever things the atoms make up and perceptible.

The Vaiśesika do subscribe themselves to the atomic theory of the Vaibhàsika version with only two minor differences, namely, that for the former the atoms are not only real, but also eternal and absolutely imperceptible, while for the latter they, though real, are by no means (1) eternal and (2) absolutely imperceptible.[26] Their holistic theory offers, therefore, some very interesting features which cannot be ignored. Curiously, although Vasubandhu expressedly ascribes it to the Vaiśesika, the Vaiśesika-sùtra of Kanàda does not even once mention the term avayavin, "the whole"; instead, it is in the Nyàya-sùtra that both the term and the theory was announced and discussed explicitly for the first time. The Nyàya-sùtra first raises the problem of the whole in connection with its discussion of whether or not perception is but a form of inference.[27] It is pointed out that when one perceives a tree, all what one sees is not the whole tree, but a few parts of it, regardless of how many ways and how many places one may position oneself for the task of seeing, there is always some part of it which totally and permanently escapes his seeing. And yet, if one sees a tree, one immediately recognizes as such quite easily. What then constitutes the mechanism which allows one of such an immediate recognition? The only obvious answer is that that perception of the tree is just a form of inference of the same kind as the judgement that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. One used to see fire and smoke always connecting with each other in the kitchen; so, when one happens to notice some smoke rising up from the top of some mountain, one can reasonably conclude that there is indeed fire, which one does not see from the position one occupies, in that mountain. Similarly, there is always some part of the tree which totally and permanently escapes our look of it; yet if there is a tree, which one happens to see, one does not assert that one sees only a few parts of something, but that one

see a tree, and that is it. The act of seeing a tree is therefore of the same order as that of knowing the presence of fire in the mountain. In both cases, the object of cognition is only partially known. One sees only a few parts of the tree at any one time, just as one perceives only the smoke rising up from the mountain. The perception of the tree and the conclusion that there is fire, are both hence of inferential nature, the one, inference of the tree from the knowledge of its few parts, the other, of fire from smoke. Perception then is at most a form of inference.

In response to that unavoidable conclusion, the Nyàya-sùtra in the language of Vàtsyàyana, raises the question of whether if perception is indeed a form of inference, the object to be inferred in the case of the tree is merely the unseen part of the tree or the tree as a whole, which is something different from its parts, but at the same time is the whole of its parts. In the former case, if what one infers is the unseen part of the tree, then the knowledge of the tree is impossible, for the simple reason that the tree is neither the front part which is seen, nor the part which is unseen but inferred. From smoke one may infer and have the knowledge of fire in a given situation. But, unlike the fire, the tree cannot be known by the mere inference of the part which is unseen. One must conclude in this case, hence, that the tree is neither perceived nor inferred. In the latter case, if from what is seen of a tree, one infers not what is not seen, but the tree as a whole, then the knowledge that one has of the tree is neither of what is seen nor of what is not seen of the tree, but of the tree as a whole, since from what is seen, one may infer what is not seen, but not both of them. The tree as a whole is therefore different from and independent of both what is seen and what is not seen of the tree. Once such a conclusion is reached, one may as well go on to dispense with the inference and maintain that the tree as a whole is perceived at the same time as what is seen

of it is perceived. According to the Nyàya-sùtra then, it is the whole as an entity capable of being perceived independently of its parts and differently from them that makes our perception of what there is, possible. It is the whole which allows us to have the perception of a tree, despite of the fact that what we actually see is only a few parts of it that we happen to look at.

This rather interesting theory of the whole, which in some way is not very different from the gestalt theory of present-day psychology, was later developped further by Vàtsyàyana in his Nyàya-bhàsya and by Praśastapàda in his Padàrtha-dharmasamgraha, or otherwise known also as Vaiśesikasùtrabhàsya or Praśastapàda-bhàsya for short. And from them a host of other works were to draw their materials and problems for waging war against their critics. We have, for example, Uddyotakara's Nyàyavàrtika, Vacaspatimiśra's Nyàyavàrtika-tàtparyatìkà, Śrìdhara's Nyàyakandalì, Jayantabhatta's Nyàyamañjarì etc... But since Praśastapàda is known in all probability to have lived after Vasubandhu, and Vàtsyàyana may be shown to be the same case,[28] we may assume, therefore, that what they report in their works about the theory of the whole must have been current for some times at least before their writing it down. We must pay attention to such a situation, because as noted above, Vasubandhu ascribes that theory expressedly to the Vaiśesika, while in fact it is originated with the Nyàyasùtra, as has been seen, and not with the Vaiśesikasùtra, as what would be expected. Due to the non-existence today of any commentary on the latter work till the time of Praśastapàda, that is, to the time of Dignàga at least, we cannot be entirely certain as to how far such an ascription may be right and in what sense we should take it. Fortunately, although in the Vimśatikà, Vasubandhu dismisses the so-called Vaiśesika theory of the whole with one single remark, in the Abhidharma-kośa, his earlier work, he does devote a considerable space to the discussion of

it, despite his final contemptous conclusion, in which he calls what he discusses "an infantile theory".[29] Thanks to it, we know definitely what he has in mind when he refers to the Vaiśesika the theory that materials available now at our hand would indicate otherwise. The said discussion occurs in relation to his exposition of the possible destruction of the atoms at a certain period of time according to the Vaibhàsika. It runs as follows:

> "When the beings have gathered in a certain dhyàna, a levelling occurs to this world, that is what is called 'destruction'. The destruction occurs due to heat from seven suns, due to water from rain, due to wind from the disturbance of the energy-element. The effect of this destruction is that not even a small part of the whole thing would remain undestroyed. On this point, some Tìrthakara maintain, however, that the atoms, on account of their being eternal, would remain then 'living'. Why do they thus maintain? They say, if not, the world of various gross bodies would appear without any seed.
>
> Now, we have said that it is the seed of the wind, born from the actions beings, which specifically effectuates the appearance of a new world, and the catalytic agent of this wind is the wind remaining behind after the destruction. The sùtra of the Mahìśàsakà says that the seeds are imported by the wind from another world.
>
> Even so, they do not admit that the sprout etc... are arising up from the seed. Why? Because, they say, those things arise from their parts, and these in turn from their own parts, and thus up to the ultimate atoms.
>
> What then is this potentiality of the seeds etc... in relation to the sprout etc...?
>
> There is no potentiality whatsoever other than that which causes the atoms to approach each other, they say.
>
> What, again, is the catalytic agent of that approachment that they admit?
>
> They say that it is not logical for something to be born from something different from its kind.
>
> Why is it not logical?
>
> Because it would be not necessary, they say. There would thus be no necessity of the power of engendering, just like the appearance of a noise

born out of cooking. That is because a gunadharma can be born from a thing different from it, but it is not so for a real thing. A real thing must, in fact, be born from the real things of the same kind, just as the grass mat is born from the grass, the cloth from the thread.

But that would be illogical.

Why is it not logical, here?

Because that is introduced as a thesis is not proved.

What is not proved here?

They say that the grass mat is other than the grass and the cloth is other than the threads. But [that is not the case]. When the grass and the thread dispose themselves in a certain manner, then one has the notion of mat and cloth. It is just like a band of ant. How does that follow? Because when one's [eye] is in touch with a thread, one does not perceive the cloth. If the cloth indeed exists, why is it that it is not perceived at the same time? If it is thought that the cloth does not wholly exist in each thread, it follows then that the cloth is but a mere collection of the threads [disposing themselves in a certain manner]. What part of the cloth, then, is other than the threads? If it is maintained that multiple threads which serve as base for the cloth must be perceived for the cloth to be perceived, then when one perceives a mere fringe of the cloth, one must perceive the cloth, [which is not the case]. Otherwise, the cloth would never be perceived, because our sense-organs can never perceive the central and the extreme parts at the same time. If these parts must be perceived successively through their contact with the eyes, then there is no knowledge of the whole. Therefore, by its being perceived successively, the whole is but a determined ascertainement of the parts, and its notion is just like that of a wheel of fire. Moreover, in the case where the threads have different colors, belong to different kinds and dispose themselves in a certain manner, the cloth then would have no color etc... If it do have different colors etc..., then it should be admitted that even [for a real thing such as the whole] it can be created from things of different kinds. And if one side of the cloth is not of different colors, then in seeing it, one either does not see the cloth, or sees the cloth as of different colors. Further, if the cloth is made

of the threads disposing themselves in different manners, then it is of too different manners to be called even cloth. And there would be no recognition of either the color or the tangibility of the light of a fire because of the differences in its heating and lighting power from the beginning to the end.

Similarly, the atoms although being suprasensible, can be perceived when they gather in formation. It is just as the factors of performance of the eyes etc... must gather for their action; and it is like the perception of a dishevelled mass of hairs by those affected by the eye disease. For these, the atoms, just like the hairs, when there are only one of them, are suprasensible.

Because the notion of the atom is determined by the color etc... of the atom, then when there is the destruction of the color etc..., the atom is destroyed. They say that because the atom is a real thing, and being a real thing, it is different from the color etc..., therefore the non-destruction of the atom is proved, even when there is the destruction of the color etc... But such a differentiation is not logical, since no one differentiates: this is earth, water, fire, and that is their color etc... What is perceived by the eyes is known, because when the wool, the cotton, the flower, the saffron etc... are burnt, the notion of them is also becoming non-existent; the notion of them is found, therefore, only in the color etc... When a jar is subject to the actions of the fire, it is still recognized as a jar on account of its universal feature, which is that of configuration, just like [the recognition of] a band of ants. If no such a feature is perceived, there would be no recognition.

But what is the point of discussing further these infantile theories. So, let's stop here as long as there is just no more contradiction".[30]

Through the above criticisms by Vasubandhu of the theory of the whole in terms of its relation to the parts, we can see why he dismisses it with one single sentence in the Viṃśatikā. Those criticisms must be acknowledged not only as detailed, but also as thourough as one would like. As a visual aid, Vasubandhu selects the cloth and the

threads for the discussion of the theory of the whole and its relation to the parts, an aid which the Vaiśesika themselves are fond of using for illustrating their concept.[31] We have said that the Vaiśesika subscribe themselves to an atomic theory very similar to that of the Vaibhàsika. They are bound, therefore, to address themselves to the difficulties that the latter encounter. Most of the difficulties lie primarily in the need to account for the perceptibility of everyday things, if in their view there are in this world only atoms, which are not perceptible. The Vaibhàsika fail, as Vasubandhu shows, to provide a satisfactory answer for this problem. The Vaiśesika, in their turn, veer away from the Vaibhàsika and come up with a solution, according to which the perceptibility of everyday things is accounted for by the existence of a new entity, which they call the whole and which exists independently of and distinctly from the parts and is capable of making the parts appear with a certain unity to be perceptible. Thus, if the atoms are imperceptible and a mass of them is perceptible, that is because there exists a whole which renders that mass perceptible to a perceiver. This whole hence must be an entity independent of and distinct from the atoms, since only it is perceptible while the atoms are not. It is like the cloth in relation to the threads. The cloth is not the threads, nor are the threads the cloth. They are, each, an entity existing independently of and distinctly from each other. So, as far as reasoning goes, the Vaiśesika solution seems to be not at all unsatisfactory. Unfortunately, for them, the invention of such new entity as the whole raises serious doubts in the mind of their critics, particularly Vasubandhu, who at the time of his writing the Abhidharmakośa still goes along with the Vaibhàsika to maintain that just as the cloth is nothing but the threads disposing themselves in a manner, so are everyday things which are nothing but the atoms disposing themselves in a certain way. As a result, for Vasubandhu there is no such an entity as the whole

as is defined by the Vaiśesika. Basing himself upon the visual aid of the cloth and the threads, Vasubandhu points out the following reasons for denying there being such an alleged entity as the whole.

First, if there is such an entity as the whole, it exists, then, either in each of its parts or it does not. In the first case, when our visual organ directs itself towards a thread, it does not perceive the cloth; thus, the cloth does not exist in each thread. Similarly, to say that the whole does exist in each of its parts is therefore, demonstrably false. If the whole does not exist in each of its parts, then, as Vasubandhu puts it, the whole is but "a collection" of its parts, just as "the cloth is but a mere collection of the threads" disposing themselves in a certain manner. Secondly, if it is argued that the whole does exist in each of its parts, but that it requires several of its parts to be perceived in order for it to be likewise, then when one perceives the fringe of a cloth, which is consisted of more than one thread, one should be able to perceive the whole cloth, which is not the case. Thirdly, if it is said that the perception of the whole depends upon the perception of more than a mere fringe of the whole, then such a whole would never be perceived, because one can never see the fringe and, say, the center of the whole at the same time. Lastly, if it is maintained that the whole is perceived successively, then such a whole is no more an entity than the fire-circle created by hurling a torch in a full arc. Beside these four reasons, Vasubandhu further points out the cases of a variegated cloth and of a lamp, where the differences in color of the cloth and in lighting and heating of the lamp throughout its burning time constitute serious obstacles as to even deciding whether they do have a whole or not. The case of a variegated cloth is particularly painful to the Vaiśesika, for they hold that a real thing such

as the whole can, in their view, have only one quality such as color etc... at any one time; and now we have a whole cloth with many different colors, what then is this whole cloth? Numerous discussions and resolutions have been held and proposed by the equally numerous Vaiśesika commentators and followers subsequently to Vasubandhu to that question.[32] But they need not concern us here, since they do not offer any serious answer of distinction.

With those four reasons and their entailed implications, the holistic theory of the Vaiśesika is thus effectively challenged in the Abhidharmakośa. It is not surprising then that in the Vimśatikà Vasubandhu specifically singles it out as the first theory to be dismissed with a single sentence, while discussing the object of perception in terms of its atomic structure. The same practice of not referring to it at length is also evidenced in the Karmasiddhiprakarana,[33] where he examines the question of whether the configuration is to be regarded as a special kind of atom like color, or as some special aggregate of atoms, or as some real thing pervading the aggregates of color, the last of which is obviously intended to mean the whole of the Vaiśesika. In fact, thanks to his effective criticism of that holistic theory, subsequent history of its developments never gets beyond the task of answering and avoding them. And critics succeeding him are often content of making fun of it rather than trying to improve on his critical remarks. Thus, after reproducing various arguments against the holistic theory in a long passage, Vacaspatimiśra concludes them with this interesting and funny observation by his opponents: "The whole, which does not lend its aspect to cognition, and yet claims to be perceived, is like one who wants to purchase something without paying its price"[34]. So, the Vaiśesika, in so far as their theory of the object of perception is concerned, fail to resolve the difficulties, that the Vaibhàsika encounter, with

their notion of the whole. And with this failure is failed the attempt to define the object of perception in terms of their atomic structure.

We have seen then that to define such an object either by means of a set of conditions or by an analytical technic of finding out its true constituents leads to various difficulties. In criticizing the Vaiśesika notion of the whole in the Abhidharmakośa, Vasubandhu apparently still believes in the Vaibhàsika solution to the puzzle that prompts the Vaiśesika into searching and inventing their said notion in the first place. But it turns out in the end that the Vaibhàsika solution fares no better than that of the Vaiśesika, as he closely examines it in the Vimśatikà. The solution, as has been seen, is consisted of the assertion that after analyzing things into their various components, one may be able to define how such things would be in a given set of circumstances. The cloth is defined as a collection of threads disposing themselves in a certain manner. Similarly, the object of perception is an aggregate of atoms disposing themselves in a certain way etc... Despite their ingenious explanation of how the atoms dispose themselves, the Vaibhàsika, as the Vimśatikà shows, fail to account for their notion of disposition, especially in the purview of what they regard as real in contrast with what are merely conventional or simply unreal. The attempt to define the object of perception in terms of its atomic structure remains therefore undone. Now, some would try to accomplish it by setting up a set of conditions by which an object can be judged as to whether it satifies to be the object of perception. This set at the time of Vasubandhu reporting it is made up, as we have said, of four conditions, i.e. place, time, indenpendence of consciousness and universality. Unhappily, an object one dreams when in sleep can also satisfy all these four conditions, as the Vimśatikà readily points out. Further,

that it satisfies them cannot be denied on the ground of its being not "self-evidenced", since what one dreams is as perfectly self-evidenced as what one may see or hear while in the waking state.[35]

This last problem of self-evidence is all the more complicated, due to the Vaibhàsika subscription to the theory that everything is momentary, including the atoms, which the Vaiśesika is wise enough to regard as eternal. To say that something is momentary, is to affirm at the same time that one cannot even say that that something is perceived; instead, what one has in such a situation is an image of it. For in any given context, a perception requires a certain spatial distance betwen the object and the subject for the object to be perceived; and when there is such a distance, a time lapse must occur, during which the object is transmitted to the subject and during which the object, owing to its momentary existence, must change accordingly. To put it in terms of the Vimśatikà, one may say, "wh the notion of self-evidence such as "this is self-evident for me" occurs, the object then is not seen anymore, due to the fact that at that time the visual recognition of the object is barred and a differentiation of it by the consciousness is occurred".[36] On the other hand, if it is maintained that it is the image of the object, which serves as a proof of its being self-evident, after the transmitting period, then what would guarantee it as being self-evident of a true object, and not of an untrue one such as one occurring in a dream? They both have certain "images" of their own.[37] Within the boundary of the theory of momentariness, the question of the self-evidence of the object of perception thus appears to be hopelessly unanswerable. And to those who follow the Vaibhàsika footsteps in subscribing themselves to it, Vasubandhu's aforesaid criticism poses a serious, if not fatal, challenge, indeed. Many heroic attempts have been made by them, which include among other things, the

famous solution proposed by the author of Abhidhammatthasangaha and the new definition of perception advanced by Dignàga and further developped by Dharmakìrti and his followers.

According to the Abhidhammatthasangaha, the difficulties inherent in the notion of momentariness in relation to the task of constructing a theory of perception can be avoided, if one were to assume that each moment is divisible into seventeen sub-moments, which in turn are redistributed among the life cycle of a moment, that is, that each moment has its birth, its endurance and its death, and again its birth its endurance and so forth, untill there is a complete destruction of the world. The redistribution occurs as follows: two sub-moments are allotted to the nascent instant of the moment, one to its perishing instant, and the rest to its endurance. Within this scheme, the time required for the perception of an object to be completed is hence satisfied. It is reasoned that at its nascent instant, which lasts up to two sub-moments, the object causes the frame of an existent (bhavanga) to vibrate and thus starts the process of perception of that object, which by that triggered time still has fourteen more sub-moments to go, before it and the process of perception itself both would perish at the same final sub-moment. During that whole fourteen sub-moments, both the object and the perception would have enough time to present themselves to each other such that the requirement of self-evidence is satisfied, at the same time the theory of momentariness is upheld. This proposed solution is clearly very fascinating and requires further experimental investigations to see if the process of perception can be divided conveniently into seventeen sub-moments and if there are indeed such sub-moments to be spoken of. Yet, on the one hand one cannot escape the feeling of its being rather too crafty a solution. And on the other one may ask what is the point of introducing into the equation such subtleties, when

there is not even a satisfactory definition of what the object of perception is. Thus, despite its rather fascinating feature the Abhidhammatthasangaha solution never received any serious consideration from those who lived subsequently to its author[38].

Among the most prominents of these successors must be counted Dignàga and Dharmakìrti. For the former, all the above difficulties can be resolved, if, as he maintained, a new definition of what perception is, is introduced. Accordingly, perception is now defined as a cognition "free from verbal construction"[39]; and appropriately enough, its object is henceforth considered to be "something which is to be self-conscious of as it is and which is inexpressible"[40]. So, for Dignàga as well as for some of his predecessors whom he quoted, "for someone who has the ability to perceive, he perceives something blue, but not 'It is blue'; as for the object, he is aware of the object, but not of its attributes".[41] The object of perception is therefore beyond the realm of investigation and definition. It is simply "inexpressible", as Dignàga put it. Once the object is "free from conceptual and verbal construction", it follows naturally that the act of perceiving it itself must also, of necessity, beyond the realm of examination. It is some sort of instant flash, that one may have throughout one's whole life without it ever being grasped for one moment. It instantanously appears and instantanously vanishes without a trace. All the questions arising out around the act of perception and its object are thereby completely denuded of meaning and purpose, as they simply cannot apply to the new definition that Dignàga proposed for such an act. In fact, since any expressed cognition is by itself a conceptual and verbal construction, any definition of the object of perception is necessarily referring to the constructed object, but

not to the object as it is perceived during the flash of its perception. The realm of perception is, consequently, a private realm of each individual which he cannot communicate to others. It is the realm of absolute experience.

This new view about perception and its object was to become later the standard view accepted with few modifications by most of his followers such as Dharmakìrti, Prajñàkaragupta, Jñànaśrìmitra, Ratnakìrti etc... Dharmakìrti, for instance, although he modified Dignàga's definition of perception with an addition which makes it read as "perception is a cognition free from verbal construction and <u>without illusion</u>"[43], attempted to follow the latter almost words for words in the exposition of his view on the same problem in the <u>Nyàyabindu</u> as well as in the <u>Pramànavàrttika</u>.[44] If there is any serious difference betwen them, it must lie mainly in Dharmakìrti's new trial at defining what the object of perception is, which, as we have seen, is considered by Dignàga to be "inexpressible". It is defined as "something capable of producing an effect".[45] Unfortunately, this new definition fares no better than that of the Vaibhàsika or of the Vaiśesika, since if it were true, the girl I saw in my dream last night would be as real as my wife who slept beside me, for that girl did satisfy my sexual fantasy to such an extent that a noctural pollution by me had occurred. Curiously enough, the example just given, which, of course, came from the <u>Vimśatikà</u>, as has been seen, was never cited by any of Dharmakìrti to refute that rather shaky and old definition. It is an old definition, because in his investigation Vasubandhu did list the "ability to produce an effect" as one among the four possible criteria for judging whether something is an object of perception or not, as we have described above. In the final analysis, it is the new definition of perception proposed by Dignàga which lays the foundation upon which Dharmakìrti and his successors such as Prajñàkaragupta, Ratnakìrti etc... develop their views and

positions regarding what is real and what is not.[46]

Thus, despite these heroic attempts the problems raised by Vasubandhu in the Vimśatikà remain unresolved concerning the act of perception and its object. To say, as Dignàga did, that the object of perception is "inexpressible", is certainly not very helpful. To affirm in accordance with Dharmakìrti's new definition of what is real is surely to invite back all sorts of unreal entities which he tries to bannish away. The solution proposed by the Abhidhammatthasangaha sounds more realistic; but its excessive precision lends itself to doubts and suspicions more easily than to belief and credibility. So, it remains as what it is, a heroic attempt. What are then, in Vasubandhu's view, the resolutions to the problems which he raises in the Vimśatikà? We have seen that Vasubandhu criticizes the notion that an object can be exhaustively defined and knowed to be exactly what it is, a notion which is extensively held and widely accepted at his time. It is reflected in the conduct of various schools of thought which he cites as examples the Vaibhàsika and the Vaiśesika. Both of these schools classify everything into a number of categories which they hold to be the embodiment of the truth. Accordingly, they view what their respective founder says to be the last authority on earth as to the truth or falsity of a statement. They would not weigh the sayings of their founder on the balance of facts; instead, they would interpret any new given fact in the light of the old sayings, which, if it is not readily congruent, will be mercilessly discarded. The theory of the object of perception discussed above is the case in point. Both the Vaibhàsika and the Vaiśesika must have known each other repsective theories concerning that problem. But their discussion, if it shows anything, merely shows that they fail to take into consideration the fundamental question, which goes beyond even the problem of the object of

perception and which can be put as follows: if there are more than one explanation for the same object, the question is not merely which one is right, but furthermore why is it that there are more than one explanation.

The answer by Vasubandhu to the problems he raises in the Vimśatikā concerning the act of perception and its object is given within the framework of the answer intended to the question just mentioned. It is this framework which would clarify for us the reasons why the answer is given as it is. Note that at his time Vasubandhu was aware of the existence of more than one view regarding the object of perception, and further that new results in mathematical sciences, particularly trigonometry and astronomy, have been acquired under the masterful works of such leading figures as Āryabhatta and the Pataliputra school of his days[47]. The latter development is of particular interest to us, since with the application of the trigonometry to the astronomy it is possible for the mathematical sciences at that time to confirm what is already known in the logic founded by Vasubandhu a few decades earlier, which is that given each x such that A(h,x), it is always possible to prove A(s,x) within the conditions posed by the A(h,x) itself alone and by none other else. In fact, when the mathematical treatises of the Pataliputra school was introduced to China some two hundred years later on, the Chinese astronomers of such stature as I Hsing went so far as to prefer the calculated values obtained by them, using the calculation techniques from these treatises, to the observed values, which they gathered from various astronomical stations, about the positions of stars.[48] Given this context of intellectual atmosphere and his own discoveries in the field of logic, there is probably but one alternative available to Vasubandhu for answering those aforesaid numerous questions about the perception and its object.

First, it must admit that the perception, as it is defined and described by the Vaibhàsika and the Vaiśesika, simply does not exist and cannot be proved by any means. Secondly, it must accept the truism that what one knows of an object is from the knowledge one has about that object. Thus, if one were to stand in front of an object totally beyond one's understanding for the first time, one at least has the notion that it is something, however strange and incomprehensible though it may be. As a result, there are always some primitive notions upon which new knowledges are acquired and built up. The perception being part of the total knowledge is certainly having primitive notions of its own from which to proceed. The characterization of perception must therefore take these notions into consideration. What one knows even in the case of perception, of an object must thereby come from the knowledge one has about that object, no matter however primitive and superficial that knowledge may be. To put it in terms of the Vimśatikà, "whatever one knows is merely just what causes one to know, there is no bodily appearance nor speech whatever"[49]. Such an assertion states nothing but a truism, which is quite well-known even to those who are likely to be the least used to reflect about themselves, and which is that whatever one knows about something, even in the case of perception, it derives not from that something, but from the knowledge one has about it, for the simple reason that only the knowledge about it and not it itself is capable of instructing us as to what it is. The book is there. If I perceive the book, which results into the knowledge I have about it, it is not the action of the book or anything of that kind which creates in me my awareness of it; rather it is my perception of its being there, that is, my knowledge of its presence there, that makes me aware of it. If my friend happens to enter the room, he sees the book and may

notice something about it, which perhaps had escaped my attention previously. From this, he might have a different perception about the book from mine. Thus, one may say that the book seems to disclose new perspectives to its new perceivers. Yet, in reality what we have in the present case is an improvement of our knowledge, his and mine, over the old one regarding the book. It is not because of the mere presence of the book that one perceives the book; rather it is from the knowledge of the book that I perceive it.

Similarly, it is not because of the mere presence of an object that the perception of that object occurs; rather it is from the knowledge one has about it that one perceives it. This statement is indeed a truism, since everyone is quite aware of the fact that when one is born, one is born not merely into a world of things, but also into the world of knowledge, the primary means of expression of which is none other than language. From the moment of that first cry on, one is constantly subject to the conditioning of the latter world to such an extent that even the former world sometimes seems to fade away to some people. It is that world of knowledge that one relies upon to perceive the world of things and that supplies one for the first time some primitive notions for the task of perceiving the world of things to be carried out. Furthermore, it is that world of knowledge that serves as the basis upon which the perception of the world of things may proceed. In spite of its being a truism, the above assertion of the Viṁśatikà that "whatever one knows is merely just what causes one to know" is commonly and almost universally interpreted as being a statement emanating from a so-called idealistic philosophy, as we have pointed out in Chapter One. It is alleged to mean that only "mind" exists and there is nothing else, and that "all cognition of external objects is false, because there are no external objects, only Vijñàna (consciousness) is real" etc...[50] Yet, from what has

been said above, it is curious that such alleged interpretations have been repeatedly proposed and widely accepted. Not only did Vasubandhu recognize the four criteria for judging whether something is an object of perception or not, he also faithfully examined the atomic theory of perception advanced by the Vaibhàsika within the framework in which it is given. The fact that Vasubandhu declared the criteria and the theory both to be unsatisfactory or "unproved" in the Vimśatikà, does not mean that he regarded cognition of external objects to be false because of there being no external objects, or that he rejected perception as a means of knowledge and considered what one knows is merely "a reflection of one's own mind". In fact, if Vasubandhu was able to prove the criteria and the theory both to be unsatisfactory, it is because he implicitly accepted the standard view which gives rise to them both. Otherwise, it is futile even to talk about such things as space or atom, let alone of proving or disproving them, since in order to argue, for instance, that the Vaibhàsika notion of the atomic indivisibility is not logical, the notions of space and parts must be used, which, if the above alleged idealist interpretation were true, become entirely meaningless, if not self-contradictory, on account of the fact that these notions are valid only in so far as one accepts there being such things as atoms to which they are applied and about which they are employed for explanation.

It is true that commentators of periods subsequent to Vasubandhu have mostly understood his above assertion to be of entirely idealist character, and that they attempted to reconstruct his view along that line of understanding, which is clearly manifested in the writings of Dharmapàla and his school.[51] Nevertheless, there is no excuse whatever in stating, as most writers of the present century did, that what is expressed in the Vimśatikà is a "doctrine of absolute idealism" of some sort.[52]

On the contrary, it must be said that what is expressed therein is a restatement of a truism, of what is already known, which is that what one knows in whatever form it may be of an object is not the object itself, but the knowledge one has about it. It is a truism simply because it is a tautologous proposition. But it seems as if it is due to this tautologous character that it is overlooked for most of the times. When someone says 'he knows something', we immediately think that that something is the direct object of his knowing, without ever wondering how that something can be the direct object of his knowing. Surely, the object cannot be identified with his knowing; nor is the converse true. For the object is there for others to see and know, which cannot be transplanted into the head of its seer or knower. Thus, when a statement such as 'he knows something' is made, what it actually means is that 'he knows something through the knowledge of that thing', which, though necessary, is clearly tautologous. For how can anyone know something without being through the knowledge of that thing? Yet, due to the overlooking of that tautology the statement 'he knows something' is mostly taken solely for what it is and considered to be philosophically sufficient and self-evident, which is not what it is at all. As a result, the Vaibhàsika and their like were busied themselves with the task of defining and determining what the sense organs are, how they know the object, what the object is etc..., without ever asking how they knows these things in the first place to begin with. Their failure to do such asking constitutes therefore the fundamental error that brings their system with all sorts of difficulties, which we have seen.

The main task that Vasubandhu sets himself up for in the Vimśatikà is hence explicitly delineated, which consists of correcting the error that have been plaguing the Vaibhàsika way of thinking. It demonstrates quite cogently once for

all that knowledge is basically a self-knowledge, just as consciousness is basically self-consciousness. This is, in effect, one of the primary features which characterizes and differentiates the human consciousness and knowledge from whatever possesses some of its ressemblants such as, say, the intelligence of a robot. Everybody is quite aware that when someone says "he knows something", it is taken as a matter of course that not only is he assumed that he knows something, but further that he knows that he himself knows something. This notion of self-knowledge and self-consciousness is both so obvious and trifle a truism that one may wonder whether it is worth being labored upon. Yet, we have seen the Vaibhàsika fail to take note of it, and this is not to mention others of their contemporaries such as the Vaiśesika, the Naiyàyika, the Mìmàmsaka etc...who also fail in a similar way. And it is still not so strange a failure as it may appear to be. The most strange failure, we must admit, belongs to the multitude of researchers of the present century, who go on interpreting the above truism as some profound thesis of the absolute idealism and the like, according to which nothing exists except the consciousness. Such is the most strange failure, not merely because it indicates their failure to understand Vasubandhu's thought even in a general way, but what is more, because it is evidenced of their failure even to understand a trifle truism, which they must be quite well aware of. Now, let us see how such a state of affairs has resulted.

The notion of self-knowledge and self-consciousness is expressed unequivocally in the first verse of the Vimśatikà, which reads as follows: "Whatever one knows is just merely what causes one to know;/its/ object is unreal, because it is a self-knowledge, just like the seeing of unreal hairs and moon etc... of a person who is affected with an eye-disease".[53] There is, of course, nothing particularly

new or startlingly innovative in the just-quoted statement. Everyone knows that whatever one knows is just what causes one to know, and what one knows of the object is surely not the object itself, for the simple reason that one's knowledge cannot in any way be identified materially or physically with the object, but the knowledge of the object. So, the object appearing in that knowledge of the object is no more real than the knowledge itself. The object of what one knows, when appearing in that knowledge of the object, must therefore, of necessity, be unreal, as the Vimśatikà puts it. But such an appearance of the object in the knowledge concerning it in the quality of an unreal object is possible only if there exists already a mechanism for it to be accommodated. And that mechanism is none other than self-knowledge and self-consciousness. It is this mechanism which gives the knowledge and the consciousness the power to go beyond the assigned task of a photographic equipment intended for reproducing faithfully the image of what there is, and to proceed to reconstruct what there is in the image of what they conceive it must be. Again, there is nothing particularly new in this notion of self-knowledge and self-consciousness. From the historical point of view, one already sees it appearing in the writing of Maitreyanàtha, which Vasubandhu himself read and wrote a commentary upon. This writing, the Madhyàntavibhàga, in the third verse of its first chapter clearly states that "consciousness is born as a self-awareness of object, being, self and cognition; and it has no object; on account of its having no object, it itself is not existing".[54] Consciousness is thus conceived as self-consciousness, which should not be taken, however, as a new kind of consciousness, because there is no such new kind on account of the fact that the object of the self-consciousness does not exist, for that object is also the object of the consciousness, of which the self-consciousness is aware. What is

expressed in the Madhyàntavibhàga I.3 is therefore perfectly clear in that although the mechanism of self-knowledge and self-consciousness does exist, it by no means postulates that there is such entity as self-knowledge or self-consciousness, or that there is a world of objects belonging to that entity alone. To Vasubandhu as well as to Maitreyanàtha then, there is a mechanism which makes it possible for both the knowledge of an object and the self-knowledge of that object, to be aware of, although they seem to fail to specify in detail how that nechanism would work. This failure of theirs was to become later on the point of dispute among their followers, which contributed heavily to the clarification of the notion of self-knowledge and self-consciousness which we have spoken of above.

For Dignàga, "a cognition which cognizes an object such as a thing of color etc..., has the awareness of both the object and itself; and the cognition of that cognition also has the awareness of that cognition which is in conformity with the object and the awareness of itself; otherwise, if the cognition of an object has only the awareness of the object, or if it has only the awareness of itself, the cognition of cognition would then be indistinguishable from the cognition of the object". So, for him "that cognition has two forms is known from the difference betwen the cognition of an object and the cognition of that cognition"[55]. This is the first clear statement on the number of form the self-knowledge and the self-consciousness may have, which, as will be seen, is to be disputed. Dignàga states that every cognition is self-cognition, that is, that it cognizes the object and it cognizes itself at the same time. Thus, in order to distinguish the cognition of an object from the cognition of a cognition, two forms of cognition must be assumed, the first of which is none other than the cognition of the object itself. In this

form, given a cognition C_1 we would expect that it has the awareness of itself I_1 and the awareness of the object O_1. The cognition C then can be written in the form: $C_1 = I_1 + O_1$. The second form of cognition is the cognition of a cognition. In this form, given a cognition C_2 it again has the awareness of itself I_2 and the awareness of an object, which in this case happens to be a cognition, O_2. The second form of cognition thus can be written: $C_2 = I_2 + O_2$. But, since O_2 is a cognition, which in this case, say, is of an object, so $C_2 = I_2 + (I_1 + O_1)$. What would follow, then?

Suppose that cognition is assumed, as the Vaibhàsika did, to have only one form, in which the cognition has only the awareness of the object, but not of itself. Then, $C_1 = O_1$, and $C_2 = O_2$. In this case, the cognition of a cognition becomes identical with the cognition of an object, for if we substitute O_2 by C_1, $C_2 = O_1$. One must conclude hence that if the cognition has only one form, it would then always be a cognition of object. There is no possibility for it ever to become the cognition of a cognition. On the other hand, if the cognition has two forms, that is, that it is aware not only of the object, but also of itself, then every cognition is distinguishable: $C_n = I_n + (I_{n-1} + O_{n-1})$. Further, as a corollary the theory of two forms may resolve the dilemma of self-evidence previously described by pointing out that the object will always be present, once it is cognized.[56]

The theory of two forms of cognition given by Dignàga is thus clearly the first attempt to formulate explicitly the notion of self-knowledge and self-consciousness suggested by Maitreyanàtha and logically developped by Vasubandhu in their critical remarks against the Vaibhàsika theory of the object of perception. And the result is rather quite interesting, in that it gives us a definite reason why the Vaibhàsika and their like fail to take into consideration the notion of self-knowledge and

self-consciousness by indicating that it is logically impossible for them to do otherwise. However, one may wonder why there are only two forms of cognition, why not three, for example. In fact, not long after Dignàga, Dharmapàla maintains[57] that there are three forms, of which the first two have already been mentioned by Dignàga himself, and the third is the awareness of the awareness of itself. Dharmapàla insists that the third form is needed, for the second form of cognition is not general enough, since it is the awareness that is aware of the awareness of the object, and hence, is of a specific nature and of a specific object. It therefore must need a third form so that the self-awareness of the awareness of itself is guaranteed. This new form of cognition is not very fascinating by itself. Nevertheless, it points to a rather curious presupposition that the theory of two forms of cognition implicitly accepts, i. e. that every new cognition requires a new awareness of itself beside the awareness of the new object. Thus, if we have C_n cognitions, we would have I_n awareness of itself. Obviously, such a conception of the self-awareness may have been thought out in conformity with the theory of momentariness which Dignàga himself subscribes to and according to which nothing remains the same for even an instant. But suppose that since the self-awareness of a cognition always takes on the same form, regardless of when and where that cognition may occur, there is then only one awareness of itself beside numerous awareness of the object. In that case, $C_1 = I + O_1$, and $C_2 = I (I \quad O_1)$, and so on and so forth, untill $C_n = I + (I + O_{n-1})$.

Now, the most interesting feature derived from this new supposition is the indication that given C_n cognition, it would not be necessary for a subject to run through n series of cognitions, as Dignàga's formulation

$$C_n = I_n + O_n = (I_n + (I_{n-1} + (I_{n-2} + (I_{n-3} \ldots (I_1 + O_1)))))$$

would indicate. Rather, whenever a C_n cognition is given, on account of the supposition that all the I's are identical,

$$C_n = I + O_1$$

there is no need to run through n series of cognitions so as to be able to locate the cognition of an object O_1. This is true in most cases of cognition, where no distinction can be made betwen the awareness of the object and the awareness of itself. Curiously enough, if $C_n = I + O_1$ is true, no cognition of a cognition is possible, except when it is so designated, for no difference is made, whether n is equal to 1 or to a million. The observation is curious, not only because it fits in very well with what we experience ourselves in everyday life, but also because it seems to reflect what Maitreyanàtha and Vasubandhu say about the notion of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, as we understand it.

We have seen that Vasubandhu points out serious difficulties implicit in the Vaibhàsika theory of perception and their like. Now, thanks to the explicit formulation of the notion of self-knowledge and self-consciousness by Dignàga, we can see why the difficulties appear in the Vaibhàsika theory and how they can be resolved. The Vaibhàsika with their concept of one form of cognition are bound to identify the knowledge of an object with that object itself, and therefore are bound to address themselves to the problem of what is real, from which the aforesaid difficulties of theirs have arisen. In order to resolve them, it is imperative hence that an entirely new conceptual scheme must be introduced. The notion of self-knowledge and self-consciousness proposed by Vasubandhu in the Vimśatikà responses quite well to this requirement. What this trifle notion implies is that we cannot gratitously identify one's knowledge of an object with the object itself and attempt to substitute one's knowledge for it[58]; rather, that the object is known only in so far as our

knowledge concerning it is available. In other words, there is always the possibility that new knowledge can be derived from it different from what is already known. As a result, one cannot say anything final about an object, as the Vaibhàsika and others have claimed with their theory about what is real and what is not, about how an object can be truly defined, about which perception is true and which is not, in short, about everything that they can think of. At most, what one can say in such a situation is that as far as the object is concerned, it is known to us, given the state of our knowledge regarding it at the present time, as follows; and then proceed to describe how much we have known it, and with that amount of knowledge, how it can be defined so as a working hypothesis can be proposed and a common means of communication can be constructed among those concerned. What we think of any kind of object is therefore entirely limited by the knowledge we have of that object. Similarly, what we perceive of the world is entirely defined by the knowledge we have of that world, "just like the taimirika seeing unreal hairs, moon etc...". The limitations imposed on us by our knowledge in the way of our seeing or talking about an object is thus exactly like those affected by an eye-disease called timira, from which the just-quoted word taimirika, "the one affected by timira", derives, which Vasubandhu, true to his character, figuratively indicates. What is this disease called timira, then?

In all his writings, we fail to find any clear description relating to it, despite that not only is it used in the Vimśatikà, but also as early as in the Abhidharmakośa[59]. This latter fact thus definitely rules out any possibility of using the image of taimirika for contending that it is an illustration of an idealist philosophy and the like, since nobody, even those who attempt to establish some internal relationship betwen the Abhidharmakośa and the Vimśatikà,[60] ever dares maintain that some sort

of idealism exists in any of the various trends of thought expressed in the former. To find out what are the signs and symptoms of that disease as it is described and understood at the time of Vasubandhu is therefore very important not only for the correct understanding of the above figure of speech, but further for determining exactly what it means when it is used in the Abhídharmakośa and then in the Vimśatikà. In the Abhidharmakośa Vasubandhu displays a thourough familiarity with the medical theories, particularly those relating to embryology and foetology, as they are expressed in standard textbooks of medicine of his time, among which must be counted the Carakasamhità and the Suśrutasamhità as the most celebrated ones.[61] The Carakasamhità does not give, however, any description at all as to the signs and symptoms of the timira disease, nor its aetioloy and pathology; it merely lists the disease among the names of those derived from "the faults of the wind".[62] The Suśrutasamhità, on the contrary, presents a rather elaborate account of the disease not only in regard to its signs and symptoms and its aetiology and pathology, but also in regard to its treatment and its prognostication. Parts of its description reads as follows:

> "Ophthalmologists say that the human pupil is but of the size of a lentil seed, made of five elements with brightness. It is shown to be having the glittering brightness of the fire-fly with particles of light. It is of the form of a hole covered with coats on the outer side of the eye. It is of cold nature. Now, we shall describe the twelve dreadful diseases originating from it and the manifestation of the timira, which affects the coats only.
>
> When the exceedingly wicked disease infiltrates itself through the optical veins to lot itself in the innermost coat of the pupil, then one sees every thing just blurred. When the disease affects the second coat, the pupil becomes strongly agitated, and one sees bees, mosquitoes, hairs, nets, circles, flags, specks in the air, rings, and things seems to be enveloped in a gloomy mist, or as if laid under a sheet of water or as viewed in rain; a thing thought to be standing far away turns out to be near, and when thought to be near, [it is far away]; and because of the focal unsteadiness of the pupil,

one cannot see even with effort the excessively little eye of a needle. When the disease affects the third optical coat, one sees things at the top, but not those at the bottom. Even great object seems to be wrapped with a piece of cloth. One sees things with ears, noses and eyes turn upside down. When the disease becomes acute, it even colors the pupil. Thus, so long as the diease affects the lower part of the coat, one does not see what is near; if it affects the upper part, one does not see what is on the side; if it affects the lateral part, [one does not see what is on the top and what is at the botten]; if it affects the entire coat, one sees everything as if totally becoming confused. When the disease affects the center of the pupil itself, what one thinks as one, one sees it two. When the disease affects both sides of pupil, one thing becomes as three things; and when it affects the entire pupil, one sees one thing becoming many things.

Now, let's describe the timira. It is truly the disease which affects the most outer coat. When the pupil is completely obstructed by it, it is called terminal cataract, where when the sickness has not yet been so completely debilitating as to render it totally blind, one can still see the moon, the sun, the stars in the sky, a lightning flash or any other such bright, splendid and shining objects like them. The terminal cataract is called also nìlikà or kàca.

[As for the timira], in the traumatic case man sees thing as if moving, unclear, confused and distorted. In the bilious case, he sees strings of suns, of fire-flies, of rainbows and of lightning [like] colorful tail-feather of a pea-cock having a dark blue tint bordering on black. In the phlegmatic case, man sees a pack of white cloud having a deep white chowrie as something exceedingly gross flowing in the water on a cloudless day and moving up and down as if swimming in a deluge. In the red case, he sees the objects appearing red, wrapped themselves in a gloomy mist, having a greyish, blackish, and sometimes both colors. In the despairing case, man sees everything variously changing to become doubled or trebled or multipled and the stars and planets either defective or supplied with limbs floating around everywhere".[6]

Now, reading through the just translated description by the Suśrutasamhità, it becomes clear that what is called the timira of the optical coats is none other than some forms of cataract. In terms of present-days ophthalmology,[64] cataract is indicated by the opacity of the lens or of its capsule and characterized by some four following symptoms: (1) loss of the acuteness of vision, (2) complaint of seeing by the affected the fixed spots in the air, (3) occasional diplopia or polyopia, and (4) myopia at its incipcient stage. It can be classified into two forms either as progressive cataract or as degenerative cataract. The latter form is surely what the Suśrutasamhità called 'terminal cataract', linganàśa. And given the characterizations just mentioned, timira is thus evidently the progressive form of cataract, where dimness of vision, diplopia, polyopia, myopia and the like occur, as the Suśrutasamhità has colorfully and illustratively described them above. Although the above passage specifically states that only the cataract affecting the fourth optical coat can be considered to be truly timira, the author of the Suśrutasamhità actually regarded the disease affecting all four coats as timira, as he took care to so say explicitly in the section dealing with the prognosis of the disease[65], beside the vague reference to "the timira which affects only the coats" in the quoted description. This should explain for us why Vasubandhu speak of the taimirika "seeing hairs, moon etc...", a symptom which, according to the Suśrutasamhità, occurs only when "the disease affects the second coat, and the pupil becomes strongly agitated". In fact, such a symptom is universally taken as indicating the development of the cataract in its first stage by ancient physicians the world over. Thus, we have, for instance, a description by the famous Arabic doctor Hunain Ibn Is-Hāq[66] (809-877 A.D.) of similar tone. For Vasubandhu then, all the symptoms and signs of the disease

affecting all four optical coats described by the Suśrutasamhità are all belonging to those affected by the timira, and not only those which Suśruta attributed specifically to the true case of timira, i.e. the case where the disease affects only the fourth coat.

Such an understanding of the progressive cataract by Vasubandhu clearly indicates therefore that he must have been quite familiar with the Suśrutasamhità or one of its derived manuals, since only it, and not the Carakasamhità, has such a detailed description of the disease as we have above — of course, we cannot say anything about the lost medical texts unknown to us which might have been in vogue at Vasubhandhu's time. That there is such a familiarity should not be surprising in view of the fact that the text of the present-days Suśrutasamhità itself acknowledges that it comes from the hands of a certain Nàgàrjuna[67]. It has been alleged by a number of authors that this Nàgàrjuna, who is known to be the writer, besides the Suśrutasamhità, of several other texts on alchemy and medicine, is different from the Nàgàrjuna, famous founder of the Madhyamika school of philosophy and Vasubandhu's celebrated predecessor.[68] They pointed out, for example, that almost all the texts on alchemy and medicine authored by the former Nàgàrjuna are of late origin, which they dated to be about the eighth or nineth century A.D., although no definite proof was presented. Curiously enough, they failed, as Lê Manh Thát and others have subsequently indicated,[69] even to take note of the fact that textbooks on medicine and alchemy authored by a man named Nàgàrjuna have been translated into Chinese since the middle of the sixth century. Thus, it is hardly possible to date the author of those textbooks on medicine and alchemy by the name Nàgàrjuna as a man belonging to the eighth century or later, let alone of supposing that there are two Nàgàrjuna. Consequently, we consider the Nàgàrjuna, author of the present-days Suśrutasamhità,

and the Nàgarjuna, founder of the Madhymika school of philosophy and writer of several little textbooks on medicine and alchemy, as being all the same man. Once such a conclusion is reached, the fact that Vasubandhu shows a thourough familiarity with the Suśrutasamhità should not be very surprising to anyone, indeed. He must have read it at least once in the course of his investigation of Nàgàrjuna's thought and deeds, particularly of the notion of "emptiness" expressed by the latter in his celebrated Madhyamikakàrikà in relation to a similar notion described by Maitreyanàtha in the Madhyàntavibhàga, upon which Vasubandhu himself did write a commentary.

Now, given all the above descriptions related to the diseased condition called timira, what can we say about the simile of a taimirika "seeing unreal hairs, moon etc...", which Vasubandhu uses to describe the condition of our knowledge of the external world? Clearly, it cannot be said in the same way as it has been hitherto said by numerous authors, whom we have had chance to refer to many times previously. These authors thought that what is intended in that simile by Vasubandhu is to express his opinion or theory that nothing in this world exists, except what one's imaginative mind produces, just as the things that the taimirika sees are nothing but products of his own diseased eyes. These things have no real existence in the world at the time the taimirika sees them. They are as unreal as anything one can think of. So, in the opinion of these authors Vasubandhu's view about the world is exactly like that of a taimirika, who sees all sorts of things, but they are all unreal and they are all manifestations of his own disease and conditioned by it. If that were, in fact, Vasubandhu's view about the world, he must have been suffered miserably indeed a grande-scale timira and should have been deserved medical treatment rather than philosophical speculations which those said authors have been having

him subject to. And if that were in fact Vasubandhu's view about the world, it is curious that a taimirika should be able to see otherwise when he suffers the disease so as to be capable of pointing out a world different from his own. What are then the intended meaning of the above simile?

We have said that there are numerous contradictory views and theories about the world and about ourselves current and in vogue at Vasubandhu's time. Take, for example, the case of the atom, which we had the opportunity to discuss rather in detail above. We have seen that for the Vaiśesikà the atom is something eternal, imperceptible and having a special property called the whole, while for the Vaibhàsikà it has none of those things. Atom for them is something momentary, that is, constantly unstable and changing, perceptible with but one condition, and having no other properties. Clearly, something must go wrong in this case. The atom cannot be both eternal and changing at the same time, nor is it both perceptible and imperceptible, nor having and not having other properties at the same time. Clearly, someone must have seen the atom "as if unclear, confused and crooked", must have suffered some sort of timira, so as to describe two totally contradictory picture for the same thing. And this is not to mention numerous other views about the same entity called atom, which are widely propounded at Vasubandhu's days. Thus, we have, for instance, the curious notion of the Jains that the atom has a soul of its own and they therefore should not even hurt the atom by doing anything violent to it, otherwise one will suffer a sin. In front of these various and seemingly always contradictory views about such a simple entity as the atom, it is surprising that not many of them succeed in thinking in the same way as Vasubandhu and few of his predecessors have done. Have they ever thought that not only something may have been wrong with their opponent's view, but also something might have gone wrong within

the view of their own itself. They seem content in clinging each to their own view in a perfect equanimity and self-confidence, and proceed to criticize woolly-nilly whatever they disagree or displease.

Given such a state of affair, it is no wonder then that whatever one perceives or knows of the external world appears to Vasubandhu as nothing more than "the seeing of hairs, moon, etc... by a taimirika", in so far as that external world is conceived by the Vaibhàsika or by the Vaiśesika. In fact, it would be a great surprise if it appears otherwise to him, since with those various and contradictory views previously mentioned even a relatively uneducated person must have some suspicion that something has gone wrong among them. Furthermore, while all the holders of contradictory views agree that they are all talking about the same atom, clearly then, if there is one entity called atom and there are more than one view concerning it, it follows naturally that something must have gone wrong of these views, which, as has been seen, are most of the times blatantly contradictory with each other, and not of the atom, which in the final analysis can offer but one view of itself. Consequently, it must be admitted that when all the views about atom current at his days are taken together, they present to Vasubandhu an indeed excellent case of not only diplopia, but also polyopia and others, which perfectly characterize the disease symptoms of a taimirika. For him, the failure and error of the Vaibhàsika and their like lies in the fact that they identify what they know of the object with the object itself and thus exclude any possibility of testing and verifying the knowledge they have as to whether it can be so identified. And this failure and error, as we have said, stems from a far more fundamental and serious one, which is that of lacking a theory of self-knowledge and self-consciousness. Lacking that rather

trifle theory, the Vaibhàsika and their like are logically bound, as we have proved above, to effectuate, of necessity, the identification of what they know of an object with that object itself.

Of course, there is nothing wrong in making such an identification, which is, as far as we know, the process by which the knowledge concerning an object can be built up. What is wrong, however, in the case of the Vaibhàsika and their like is that they think that what they know of an object exhausts that object and can be truly identified and is identical with it. Thus, while the identification is carried out within the limit of the theory of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, one is always conscious of the fact that it is one's own knowledge concerning a thing which one tries to identify with that thing. The awareness of this fact is lost in the case of the Vaibhàsika and their company. And that loss is bound to occur, of necessity, since the truism of self-knowledge and self-consciousness seems to be always out of their reach. As a result, all the difficulties, which have been given rise to by both the Vaibhàsika and the Vaiśesika theory of perception, cannot be resolved within the boundary of their respective theory. They are indeed unsolvable and can never be hoped to be solved within that boundary, no matter how hard we try to modify it. So, as we have said, a new conceptual scheme must be introduced, and the truism of self-knowledge and self-consciousness responds quite well to this requirement. This truism simply asserts that there is no knowledge without one's knowing that one knows, and due to this condition of human knowledge what anyone knows of any object is not identical with that object itself, rather it is the knowledge of that object which causes one to be aware of it. Therefore, just as a <u>taimirika</u>, whose eyes are affected by the cataract, may see all sorts of things which we with normal eyes would not see, those whose view is affected by some bias

may see an object differently from what we see. So, only after one realizes the self-evident truth of the self-knowledge and self-consciousness, can one be able to recognize why and how various contradictory views cited above concerning the Vaibhàsika and the Vaiśesika arise and how they can be disposed of. This is the intended task of the Vimśatikà and also the meaning of the simile of taimirika.

Having thus said, one can easily see where and how numerous misinterpretations done on Vasubandhu, and particularly on the Vimśatikà, by serious and sometimes authoritative scholars have been originated. These scholars, when they attached the label of idealism to Vasubandhu, must have thought that what he asserts in the Vimśatikà and especially in the simile of the taimirika is all about the external world, about the external object. We do not know why this shallow reading of the work has occurred. But it appears quite clear to us that such a reading is a misinterpretation of Vasubandhu's thought, indeed a great misinterpretation, for the simple reason that it is what it is, a misinterpretation, when looking from the vintage point of what has been said above. To be sure, one can certainly suggest some circumstances under which the said shallow reading might have occurred, of which the most prevalent is undoubtedly the understanding of the term avabhàsana, which we have translated as self-knowledge. This term is usually rendered as "appearance"[70], and in the whole writings of Vasubandhu we have no indication whatever as to what it may mean. However, when one Dignàga's works, particularly the Pramànasamuccaya and the Àlambanaparìksà, it becomes quite clear that that term does not mean "appearance" or anything of that sort. Rather, it is a technical term used to indicate the state of one's knowing that one knows something. Thus, when Dignàga says, for instance, that "the cognition which cognizes the object, a

thing of color etc..., has the appearance of the object and the appearance of itself"[71], what he actually means is that when someone knows something, he knows that something and he knows that he knows that something. In other words, when a cognition cognizes an object, it has the awareness of that object and the awareness of itself. Avabhàsana must therefore be rendered as self-knowledge, because one cannot know an object without being aware that one knows that object. Once it is so understood, it becomes quite evident that the thesis announced in the first verse of the Vimśatikà, which reads as follows "whatever one knows is just merely what causes one to know, its object is unreal because it is a self-knowledge, just like the seeing of unreal hairs, moon, etc... by a person who is affected by the cataract", cannot be interpreted in any way other than that of announcing of the truism of self-knowledge and self-consciousness. It is probably owing to the failure of correctly understanding the term avabhàsana that numerous misinterpretations previously referred to have originated. Obviously, this is merely a suggestion, and as we have said, we do not precisely why they have occurred in the first place.

After determining and describing the way in which various difficulties which the Vaibhàsika and the Vaiśesika theories have given rise to are dealt with by Vasubandhu, it becomes increasingly imperative that he must dispose these theories altogether without any hope of ever salvaging them either partially or totally. There is no question of testing them individually to see if any of them is corresponding with facts. In their place, a new theory of perception is needed. This new theory must respond not only to the requirement of Vasubandhu's newly introduced notion of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, but also to the requirement that his logical discoveries pose. With respect to the notion of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, perception must be defined as a certain sort of knowledge which is knowing

the object, but also knowing itself at the same time. In other words, when I perceive something, not only am I perceiving it, but also am I aware that I perceive it at the same time. Given this requirement of the notion of self-knowledge, it is no wonder then that in the Vàdavidhi, which we quoted previously, Vasubandhu has defined the perception as "a cognition arising just from the object by which it is designated", a definition which Dignàga heavily criticizes, among other things, upon the ground that the object of perception is unnameable.[72] For if I am aware that I perceive something, I would at least designate it with some primitive words such as the word 'something'. The notion that the object of perception is inexpressible is thereby altogether foreign to Vasubandhu's thought. In fact, as will be seen, it is the nameability of things which sets in motion various processes of consciousness, which Vasubandhu were to describe in his Trimśikà as deriving from the "description of self and things", àtmadharmopàcara. For him, it is unthinkable that the object of something is inexpressible. This is one of the great differences which distinguishes Vasubandhu from Dignàga. And in this respect, it must be admitted that Dignàga's notion of inexpressibility is a rather poor, if not absurd notion. Anyone who reads the section dealing with the perception in his Pramànasamuccaya can hardly escape the feeling that something must be wrong with it, especially when he tries to goad the Abhidharma definition of perception into his own view[73]. So, for the requirement of the notion of self-knowledge, Vasubandhu defines the perception in terms of the expressibility of its object.

When the perception is so defined, it obviously can be tested as to its truthfulness and falsehood, despite that it is some sort of knowledge which is different from others. It can also be ascertained as to what constitutes its object, as to whether it is really existing or merely dreamt up or produced by exhaustion in the

desert. In short, it is one form of the knowledge which is capable of falling into error as easily as any other, and therefore is susceptible to be tested appropriately as it is required. This capability of being fallen into error of the perception and its susceptibility to being tested are possible only if the perception is defined as it has been, which is that it is a cognition "arising from just the object, by which it is designated". Indeed, one do not see how various optical illusions, for example, are detected if it were not for the fact that the perceiver expresses what he sees in the terms of what he sees and deems appropriate. Thus, the Müller-Lyer illusion can be recognized only when a subject, seeing two lines with their sets of end-arrows pointing to different directions, expresses what he sees either in terms of long or short lines, although they are both known to be of equal length. This is in effect an indication of the contemporaneity of Vasubandhu's thought and its excellence.

We have said at the beginning of this chapter that it is mainly due to his logical discoveries, particularly in regards to his theory of pervasion, that prompts Vasubandhu into inquiring into the nature of perception. From what has been described, it becomes quite clear that perception is but a part of the knowledge and it is also subject to the determination of language. It has therefore no more preponderance over other parts of that knowledge than those parts themselves. This, if given each x such that A(h,x) and that A(s,x) is proved on the conditions posed by A(h,x) itself alone and by nothing else, then the validity of such a proof is of no less weigh than the validity, say, of a true perception is. Clearly then, one is as perfectly at home in facing the notion of infinity, which by definition one can never hope to see, as one would be in standing in front of a tree which is presently blocking one's way back home. Surely, we cannot say for certain as to

specifically when Vasubandhu's logical discoveries are of such nature that they give rise to serious doubts in his mind about the nature of perception. What we certainly know is that by proving logically that a logical proof can be valid without having recourse to any extra-logical entity, Vasubandhu must have felt that language seems to have a way of showing itself. It is probably from this feeling that even in the Vàdavidhi he already defined the perception in terms of the language with which its object is connected: "Perception is a cognition arising just from the object by which it is designated". By this connecting of the perception with language, Vasubandhu for the first time discovers probably the real reason why there are so many different views and theories concerning the same thing current during his days, and certainly at the same time that there is certain unity in the process of human knowledge, the basis of which is none other than the human language. We will see that it is due to his perception of that unity based upon the foundation of language that he opens his other major work, the Trimśikà, with the thesis that "thanks to the description of self and things", the process of knowledge becomes possible. Now, if every process of knowledge is dependent upon language, it is quite natural to ask how language is related to things and how it is known. This is the subject of our two next chapters.

N O T E S

1. Supra vide, p 221-222. It must be pointed out further here that although Siddhasena Divàkara seems to be the first logician to use the term "internal pervasion", antarvyàpti, this by no means indicates its Jaina origin, since not only is the concept of internal pervasion is originated with Vasubandhu, as has been said, but further no Jain has ever written any tract which deals exclusively with it. On the contrary, it is in the Vasubandhuist logical tradition that one such work is found. It is authored by Ratnàkaraśànti and carried the name Antarvyàptisamarthana, the Sanskrit text of which is published by Haraprasàda Śàstri in Six Buddhist Nyàya Tracts, Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica Series, 1910.

2. Abhidharmakośa IV ad 2d, LVP p 5: na ca drstàd garistham pramànam astìti. Cf. Ibid. IX p 461, LVP 231: katham punar idam gamyate skandhasamtàna evedam àtmàbhidhànam vartate nànyasminn abhidheya iti/ pratyaksànumànàbhàvàt/ ye hi dharmàh santi tesàm pratyaksam upalabdhir bhavaty asaty antaràye/ tadyathà sannàm visayànàm manasaś ca/ anumànam ca/ tadyathà pañcànàm indriyànàm/ tatredam anumànam/ sati kàrane kàranàntarasyàbhàve kàryasyàbhàvo drsto bhàve ca punar bhàvas tadyathànkurasya/ saty eva càbhàsapràpte visaye manaskàre ca kàrane visayagrahanasyàbhàvo drstah punaś ca bhàvo'ndhabadhiràdìnàmanandhàbadhiràdìnàm ca/ atas tatràpi kàranàntarasyàbhàvo bhàvaś ca niścìyate/ yac ca tatkàranàntaram tadindriyam ity etad anumànam/. Also Vimśatikà, ed. Lévi, Paris: H. Champion, 1925, p 8: pramànavaśàd astitvam nàstitvam và nirdhàryate sarvesàm ca pramànànàm pratyaksam pramànam garistham ity....

3. Vàdavidhi, Fragment 20a-20b: sgra mi rtag ste rgyumtshan can ñid kyi phyir bum pa bźin źes byas pa la/ ltag chod smra ba pos smras pa/ re źig bum pa kho na mi rtag ces pa hdi la gtan tshigs ci źig ces pa// hdi la rtsod sgrub byed pas bśad pa hdi ni yan dag pa ma yin paho źes so// cihi phyir na mthon bahi don yan gtan tshigs kyi bsgrub byar brjod pas ni ma yin te// bdag ñid kyis mthon bahi yan ste/ rgyu mtshan can gyi bum pa ni śin tu hbyun ba ma yin no źes so//.

4. Vàdavidhi, Fragment 9: don de las rnam par śes pa mnon sum źes pa/ yul gan gis rnam par śes pa tha sñad bya ba de kho na las gal te de skye źin gźan las ma yin la/ de las gźan las kyan ma yin pahi śes pa de mnon sum ste/ dper na gzugs la sogs pahi śes pa dan bde ba la sogs pahi śes pa bźin źes paho// hdis ni hkhrul pahi

śes pa bsal te/ dper na ña phyis la rdul gyi śes pa lta buho// de ni dnul gyis dnul gyi śes paho źes tha sñad byed la de dnul las skye ba yan [ma] yin gyi/ ña phyis kho nas de bskyed par bya baho// kun rdzob pahi śes pa yan hdis gsal te/ de ltar ni bum pahi śes pa [bum pahi śes pa] źes pa hdi ltar de bum pa la sogs pa rnams kyis tha sñad bya źin/ de de rnams las hbyun ba ni ma yin te/ de rnams ni kun rdzob tu yod pa ñid kyis rgyu ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir ro// gzugs la sogs pa de ltar yan dag par źen pa rnams kho na las de hbyun no/ rjes su dpag pahi śes pa yan hdi kho nas bsal te/ du bahi śes pa dan hbrel pa dran pa dag las kyan de byun gi me kho na las ma yin pas so// de las hbyun ba kho na ste/ mi hbyun ba ni ma yin no źes pa hdi yan hdir don du mnon par hdod do//. Cf. Uddyotakara, Nyàyavàrttika, p 40: apare punar varnayanti tato'rthàd vijñànam pratyaksam iti yasyàrthasya yad vijñànam vyapadiśyate yadi tata eva tad bhavati nàrthàntaràd bhavati tat pratyaksam; to which Vacaspatimiśra adds the following in his Nyàyavàrttikatàtparyatìkà, p 150: tad evam pratyaksalaksanam samarthya Vàsubandhavam tàvat pratyaksalaksanam vikalpayitum upanyasyati apare punar iti. Also Simhasùri, Nyàyàgamànusàrinì Nayacakravrtti, ed. Muni Jambuvijaya, Bhavnagar: Śrì Àtmanand Jain Granthamàlà Serial no. 92, 1966, p 96: idànìm Vasubandhoh svaguroh tato'rthàd vijñànam pratyaksam iti bruvato...

5. B. Russell, Our knowledge of the external world, London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1949, p 193; also, The Principles of Mathematics, London: Allen& Unwin, 1956, pp 121-123.

6. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 16a5-6: dehi rjes la gźan gyis byas pahi mnon sum brtag par bya ste/

rtsod sgrub slob dpon gyi ma yin/ nes par sñin po med par dgons/
gźan du cha śas su gsun hgyur/ des na kho bos brtag par byaho//

rtsod pa sgrub pa ni slob dpon dbyig gñen gyi ma yin no/ gan gi phyir rtsod pa sgrub pa de la ni slob dpon gyis sñin po med par dgons pa ste/ de lta ma yin na cha śas can du mdzad par hgyur ro/ de na kho bos kyan tshad ma la sogs pa cun zad cig brtag par byaho//. See also Masaaki Hattori, Dignàga On Perception, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp 186-187 for various Tibetan variants, and pp 114-115 for an interesting discussion of the passage. From now on, whenever we cite Dignàga's Pramànasamuccaya, we will use, as we have done in citations in some of previous chapters, Vasudhararaksita and Sen-rgyal's transla-

tion of the Peking edition published by the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo-Kyoto, vol. 130, and refer all variant readings and other translation to Hattori, Dignàga On Perception, in so far as the discussion of perception is concerned.

7. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 16a7-b2: don de las skyes pahi rnam śes mnon sum yin źes bya ba hdir/

kun la don hdi źes brjod na/ gan de de hbah źig las min/

gal te de la źes bya ba hdis rkyen kun brjod pa yin na ni/ śes pa gan yul gan la skyes pa dehi tha sñad du byahi/ de hbah źig las ni ma yin no// dmigs pahi rkyen hbah źig las śes pa ni ma yin no/ sems dan sems las byun ba rnams bźi las skye baho źes grub pahi mthah las hbyun bahi phyir ro//

dmigs paho źe na dran sogs kyi/ śes pahan gźan la ltos ma yin//

gal te don de las źes pa hdis yul tsam yin na ni/ dran pa dan rjes su dpag pa dan mnon par hdod pa la sogs pahi śes pa yan dmigs par bya ba gźan la mi ltos te/ dud pa la sogs pa dmigs nas me la sogs pahi śes pa skye ba ni ma yin no//

8. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 16b3: gzugs la sogs pa ñid la dmigs pa la don du brjod par bya gran na/ ci śes pa skye ba de ltar snan ba de la de bźin du dmigs nas skye be yin nam/ de ste gźan du snan du zin kyan ji ltar yod pahi de rgyur hgyur ba yin gran//

9. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 16b4-7: de las cir hgyur źe na/ gal te ji lta ba de las śes pa skye na ni de ltar na bsags pa la dmigs pa yin pahi phyir lna po kun rdzob par hgyur te/ de ñid la dmigs pa yin pahi phyir ro// snon po la sogs par snan bahi śes pa la don de las skyes pahi śes pa mnon sum du hgyur ro źes hdod pa de lta na ni/ tshogs la de dag la khas blans pa bden yan yod pahi rdzas kyi rnam pa ñid thob ste/ de ñid rdzas la sogs pa ñid du snan bas na rdzas dan grans la sogs pahi rnam pa yan hthob bo// de ste ji ltar yod pa rgyur hgyur na ni/ de ltar rdzas la sogs pa ni thal bahi ñes par mi hgyur te/ de ltar na de dag med pahi phyir ro/ de ltar na yan gan la tha sñad du bya ba ste de ni hthob par mi hgyur te/ de dag so so la śes pa yod pa ma yin no/ so so ba de dag hdus pa rgyu yin yan de hdus par yod pa la sogs pa ni khas ma blans so//

10. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 17a1-3:

don gyi tshul gyis dben pa yan/ brjod bya ma yin
śes pa thams cad don gyi tshul dan bral na yan tha sñad du bya bar mi nus so
yul hdihi yan/

spyi yi tshul gyis bstan par bya/ des na tha sñad du mi bya //
rnam par śes pa lna rnams kyi yul ni yul dehi spyihi tshul gyis tha sñad du bya ba yin gyi ran gyi no bohi tshul gyis tha sñad du bya be ni ma yin no/ spyihi no bohi tshul las ni gzugs la sogs pa tha sñad du byed do/ dehi phyir rnam par śes pa lna rnams kyi yul ni tha sñad du bya bar mi nus so źes bya ba ni rtsod pa sgrub pa laho//

11. Vimśatikà ad 2:

yadi vijñaptir anarthà niyamo deśakàlayoh/
samtànasyàniyamaś ca yuktà krtyakriyà na ca//

12. Vimśatikà p 3: kim uktam bhavati/ yadi vinà rùpàdyarthena rùpàdivijnaptir utpadyate na rùpàdyarthàt/ kasmàt kvacid deśa utpadyate na sarvatra/ tatraiva ca deśe kadàcid utpadyate na sarvadà/ taddeśakàlapratisthitànàm sarvesàm samtàna utpadyate na kevalam ekasya/ yathà taimirikànàm samtàne keśàdyàbhàso nànyesàm/ kasmàd yat taimirikaih keśabhramaràdi drśyate tena keśàdikriyà na kriyate na ca tadanyair ba kriyate/ yad annapànavastravisàyudhàdi svapne drsśyate tenànnàdikriyà na kriyate na ca tadanyair na kriyate/ gandharvanagarenàsattvàt nagarakriyà na kriyate na ca tadanyair na kriyate/ tasmàd arthàbhàve deśakàlaniyamah samtànàniyamah krtyakriyà ca na yujyate//. For the sake of comparison, we give here the Tibetan translation which Lévi relies upon partly to reconstruct the just-quoted passage. Vimśatikà TT. 5558 p 234a5-b2: ji skad du bstan par hgyur źes na/ gal te gzugs la sogs pahi don med par gzugs la sogs pahi rnam par rig pa hbyun ste gzugs la sogs pahi don las ma yin na/ cihi phyir yul la lar hbyun ba thams cad na ma yin/ yul de ñid na yan res hgah hbyun ba thams cad du ma yin/ yul dan dus de na hkhod pa thams cad kyi sems la nes pa med pa hbyun la hgah tsam la ma yin/ ji ltar rab rib can ñid kyi sems la skra la sogs pa snan gi/ gźan dag la ni ma yin / cihi phyir gan rab rib can gyis mthon bahi skra dan/ sbran bu la sogs pas skra la sogs pahi bya ba mi byed la/ de ma yin pa gźan dag gis ni byed// rmi lam na mthon bahi bzah ba dan btun ba dan bgo ba dan dug dan mtson la sogs bas tas zas dan skom la sogs pahi bya ba mi byed la/ de ma yin pa gźan dag gis ni byed/ dri zahi gron khyer yod pa ma yin pas gron khyer gyi bya ba mi byed la/ de ma yin pa gźan dag gis ni

byed/ hdi dag don med par med du hdra na yul dan dus nes pa dan/ sems nes pa med pa dan bya ba byed pa hdi dag kyan mi run no źe na//.

13. Vimśatikà p 3: na khalu na yujyata yasmàt/

deśàdiniyamah siddhah svapnavat

svapna iva svapnavat/ katham tàvat/ svapne vinàpy arthena kvacid eva deśe kimcid bhramaràràmastrìpurusàdikam drśyate na sarvatra/ tatraiva ca deśe kadàcid drśyate na sarvakàlam iti siddho vinàpy arthena deśakàlaniyamah/

pretavat punah/

samtànàniyamah

siddha iti vartate pretavat katham siddhah samam/

sarvaih pùyanadyàdidarśane// 3

pùyapùrnà nadì pùyanadì/ ghrtaghatavat/ tulyakarmavipàkàvasthà hi pretàh sarve'pi pùyapùrnàm nadìm paśyanti naika eva/ yathà pùyapùrnàm evam mùtrapurìsàdipùrnàm dandàsidharaiś ca purusair adhisthitàm ity àdigrahanena/ evam samtànàniyamo vijñaptìnàm asaty apy arthe siddhah/

svapnopaghàtavat krtyakriyà

siddheti veditavyam/ yathà svapne dvayasamàpattim antarena śukravisargalaksanah svapnopaghàtah/ evam tàvad anyànyair drstàntair deśakàlaniyamàdicatustayam siddham/.

Thus, here Vasubandhu gives more than one example to refute both the necessity and the sufficiency of the four criteria offered by his opponents, although even an mere example is more than equal to the task, as we have demonstrated in our discussion It must be added that the sensuous and somewhat erotic-laden example we used is not our own; it is Vasubandhu's, as the just-quoted passage clearly indicates. Moreover, it needs to be pointed out that subsequently to the said passage, Vasubandhu immediately gives another example concerning the problem of hell. For him, hell does not exist, physically or otherwise. What is called hell is actually the thinking of the person who has done the most terrible acts to others about these acts. So, for him hell is the feeling of being guilty felt and recognized by the one who has that feeling. This is one of the most interesting outgrowth of ethical theories from his investigation of perception. We will have chance to return to this problem later on.

14. Abhidharmakośa II ad 22, LVP pp 144-149: sarva ime dharmàh pañca bhavanti/

rùpam cittam caitasikàś cittaviprayuktàh samskàrà asamskrtam ca/ tatràsamskrtam caivotpadyate/ rùpinàm tu dharmànàm ayam niyamah/

kàmo'stadravyako'śabdah paramànur anindriyah/

sarvasùksmo hi rùpasamghàtah paramànur ity ucyate/ yato nànyataro vijñàyeta/ sa kàmadhàtàv aśabdako'nindriyaś càstadravyaka utpadyate nànyatamena hìnah/ astau dravyàni catvàri mahàbhùtàni catvàri copàdàyarùpàni rùpagandharasasprastavyàni/ sendriyas tu paramànur aśabdako navadravyaka utpadyate daśadravyako và/ tatra tàvat

kàyendriyì navadravyah

kàyendriyam atràstìti so'yam kàyendriyì/ tatra nava dravyàni/ tàni càstau kàyendriyam ca/

daśadravyo'parendriyah//22

aparam indriyam yatra paramànau tatra daśa dravyàni/ tàny eva nava caksuhśrotraghranajihvendriyànàm cànyatamam/ saśabdàh punar ete paramànava utpadyamànà yathàkramam navadaśaikàdaśadravyakà utpadyante/ asti hìndriyàvinirbhàgì śabdo'pi ya upàttamahàbhùtahetukah/ katham ihàvinirbhàge bhùtànàm kaścid eva samghàtah kathina utpadyate kaścid eva drava usno và samudìrano và/ yady atra patutamam prabhàvata udbhùtam tasya tatropalabdhih/ sùcìtùnìkalàpaspárśavat saktulavanacùrnarasavac ca/ katham punas tesu śesàstitvam gamyate/ karmatah samgrahadhrtipaktivyùhanàt/ pratyayalàbhe ca sati kathinàdìnàm dravanàdibhàvàt apsu śaityàtiśayàdausnyam gamyata ity apare/ avyatibhede'pi tu syàc chaityàtiśayah/ śabdavedanàtiśayavat/ vìjatas tesu tesàm bhàvo na svarùpata ity apare/ santy asmin dàruskandhe vividhà dhàtava iti vacanàt/ katham vàyau varnasadbhàvah/ śraddhànìya eso'rtho nànumànìyah/ samspandato gandhagrahanàt tasya varnàvyabhicàràt/ rùpadhàtau gandharasayor abhàva uktas tena tatra tyàh paramànavah sadsaptàstadravyakà ity uktarùpatvàt na punar ucyante/

kim punar atra dravyam esa dravyam àhosvid àyatanam/ kim càtah/ yadi dravyam eva dravyamgrhyate atyalpam idam ucyate astadravyako navadaśadravyaka iti/ avaśyam hi tad dravyasamsthànenàpi bhavitavyam/ tasyàpi paramànusamcitatvàt/ gurutvalaghutvayoś cànyatarena ślaksnatvakarkaśatvayoś ca/ śìtenàpi kvacit jighatsayà pipàsayà ca/ athàpy àyatanadravyam grhyate ayibahv idam ucyate astadravyaka iti/ caturdravyako hi vaktavyo yàvatà bhùtàny api sprastavyàyatanam/ kimcid atra dravyam eva dravyam grhyate yad àśrayabhùtam kimcid atràyatanam dravyam grhyate yad àśritabhùtam/ evam apibhùyàmsi bhùtadravyàni bhavanty upàdàyarùpànàm pratyekam bhùtacatuskàśritatvà

atra punar jàtidravyam grhyate/ bhùtacatuskàntarànàm svajàtyanatikramàt/ kah

punar yat sa evam vikalpena vaktum/ chandato'pi hi vàcàm pravrttir arthas tu parìksyah/

ukto rùpinàm sahotpàdaniyamah/.

15. Abhidharmakośa I ad 43, LVP pp 86-93:

ubhàbhyàm api caksurbhyàm paśyati vyaktadarśanàt/

ubhàbhyàm api caksurbhyàm paśyatìty àbhidhàrmikah/ tathà hi dvayor vivrtayoh pariśuddhataram darśanam bhavati/ ekasmimś conmìlite caksusi dvitìye càddhanimìlite dvicandràdigrahanam bhavati/ naikataràn yathìbhàvàt/ na càśrayavicchedàd vicchedaprasango vijñànasya deśàpratisthitatvàd rùpavad iti/

yadi caksuh paśyati śrotram śrnoti yàvan mano vijànàti kim esàm pràpto visaya àhosvid apràptah/

caksuhśrotramano'pràptavisayam

tathàhi dùràd rùpam paśyaty aksisthamañjanam na paśyati/ dùràc chabdam śrnoti/ sati ca pràptavisayatve divyam caksuhśrotram iha dhyàyinàm nopajàyeta/ ghrànàdivat/ yady apràptavisayam caksuh kasmàn na sarvam apràptam paśyati dùram tiraskrtam ca/ katham tàvad ayaskànto na sarvam apràptam ayah karsati/ pràptavisayatve'pi caitatsamànam/ kasmàn na sarvam pràptam paśyaty añjanam śalàkàm và/ yathà ca ghranàdìnàm pràpto visayo na tu sarvah/ sahabhùgandhàdyagrahanàt/ evam caksuso'py apràptah syàn na tu sarvah/ manastvarùpitvàt pràptum evàśaktam/ kecit punah śrotram pràptàpràptavisayam manyante/ karnàbhyantare'pi śabdaśravanàt/ śesam tu ghrànajihvàkàyàkhyam/

trayam anyathà//43

pràptavisayam ity arthah/ ghrànam katham pràptavisayam/ nirucchvàsasya gandhàgrahanàt/ keyam pràptir nàma/ nirantarotpattih/ kim punah paramànavah sprśanty anyonyam àhosvin na/ na sprśantìti kàśmìrakàh/ kim kàranam/ yadi tàvat sarvàtmanà sprśeyur miśrìbhaveyur dravyàni/ athaikadeśena sàvayavàh prasajyeran/ niravayavàś ca paramànavah/ katham tarhi śabdàbhinispattir bhavati/ ata eva yadi hi sprśeyur hasto haste'bhyàhatah sajyetopalaś copale/ katham citam pratyàhatam na viśìryate/ vàyudhàtusamdhàritatvàt/ kaścid vàyudhàtur vikiranàya pravrtto yathà samvarttanyàm kaścit samdhàranàya yathà vivarttanyàm iti/ katham idànìm niruttarapràptyà pràptavisayam trayam ucyate/ tad evaisàm niruttaratvam yan madhye nàsti kimcit/ api khalu samghàtàh sàvayavatvàt sprśantìty adosah/ evam ca krtvà'yam api granthe upapanno bhavati vibhàsàyàm/ kim nu sprstahetukam sprstam utpadyate àhosvid

asprstahetukam iti praśnayitvàha kàranam prati/ kadàcit sprstahetukam asprstam utpadyate yadà viśiryate/ kadàcid asprstahetukam sprstam yadà cayam gacchati/ kadàcit sprstahetukam sprstam yadà cayavatàm cayah/ kadàcid asprstahetukam asprstam yadà vàtàyatanaraja iti/ yadi paramànavah sprśeyur uttaraksanàvasthànam syàd iti bhadantavasumitrah/ na sprśanti nirantare tu sprśtasamjñeti bhadantah/ bhadantamatam caistavyam/ anyathà hi sàntaràn àm paramànunàm śùnyesv antaresu gatih kena pratibàdhyeta/ yatah sapratidhà isyante/ na ca paramànubhyo'nye samghàtà iti/ ta eva te samghàtàh sprśyante yathà rùpyante/ yadi ca paramànor digbhàgabhedah kalpyate sprstasyàsprstasya và sàvayavatvaprasangah/ nocet sprstasyàpy aprasangah//.

16. Abhidharmakośa I ad 12, LVP pp 21-23:

bhùtàni prthivìdhàtur aptejovàyudhàtavah/

ity ete catvàrah svalaksanopàdàyarùpadhàranàd dhàtavaś catvàri mahàbhùtàny ucyante/ mahatvam esàm sarvànyarùpàśrayatvenaudàrikatvàt/ athavà tadudbhùta-vrttisu prthivyaptejovàyuskandhesv esàm mahàsamniveśàtvàt/ te punar ete dhàtavah kasmin karmani samsiddhàh kim svabhàvàś cety àha

dhrtyàdikarmasamsiddhàh

dhrtisamgrahapaktivyuhanakarmasv ete yathàkramam samsiddhàh prthivyaptejovàyu-dhàtavah/ vyuhanam punar vrddhih prasarpanam ca veditavyam/ idam esàm karma/ svabhàvas tu yathàkramam

kharasnehosnateranàh//12

kharah prthivìdhàtuh/ sneho'bdhàtuh/ usnatà tejodhàtuh/ ìranà vàyudhàtuh/ ìryate'nayà bhùtasroto deśàntarotpàdanàt pradìperanavad itìranà/ vàyudhàtuh katamo laghusamudìranatvam iti prakaranesu nirddistam sùtre ca/ tat tu laghutvam upàdàyarùpam apy uktam prakaranesu/ ato ya ìranàsvabhàvo dharmah sa vàyur iti karmanà'sya svabhàvo'bhivyaktah/

17. Abhidharmakośa I ad 20a-b, LVP pp 38-39: tasmàd ràśivad eva skandhàh prajñaptisantah/ rùpìny api tarhy àyatanàni prajñaptisanti pràpnuvanti/ bahùnàm caksuràdiparamànùnàm àyadvàrabhàvàt/ na/ ekaśah samagràn àm kàranabhàvàt visayasahakàritvàd và nendriyam prthag àyatanam syàt/. Also Ibid. I ad 44a-b, LVP pp 93-94: kim punar ebhiś caksuràdibhir àtmaparimànatulyasyàrthasya graha-nam bhavaty àśuvrttyà ca parvatàdìnàm alàtacakràdivad àhosvit tulyàtulyasya/

yàni tàvad etàni pràptavisayàny uktàny ebhih

tribhir ghrànàdibhis tulyavisayagrahanam matam/

yàvanto hìndriyaparamànavas tàvanto hi visayaparamànavah samety vijñànam janayanti/ caksuhśrotràbhyàm tv aniyamah/ kadàcid alpìyàmso yadà vàlàgram paśyati/ kadàcit samà yadà dràksàphalam paśyati/ kàdàcit bhùyàmso yadà mahàntam parvatam paśyaty unmisitamàtrena/ evam śrotrena maśakameghàdiśabdaśravane ghosam/ manas tv amùrttivad eveti nàsya parimànaparicchedah sampradhàryate/ katham punar esàm caksuràdìndriyaparamànùnàm samniveśah/ caksur-indriyaparamànavas tàvad aksitàrakàyàm ajàjìpuspavad avasthitàh/ acchacarmàvacchàditàs tu na vikìryante/ adharauttaryena pindavad avasthità ity apare/ na cànyonyam àvrnvanti sphatikavad acchatvàt/ śrotrendriyaparamànavo bhùrjàbhyantaràvasthitàh/ ghrànendriyaparamànavo ghatàbhyantarena śalàkàvat/ àdyàni trìnìndriyàni màlàvad avasthitàni/ jihvendriyaparamànavo'rdhacandravat/ vàlàgramàtram kila madhyajihvàyàm jihvendriyaparamànubhir asphutam/ kàyendriyaparamànavah kàyavad avasthitàh/ strìndriyaparamànavo bherìkatahavat/ purusendriyaparamànavo'ngusthavat/ tatra caksurindriyaparamànavah kadàcit sarve sabhàgà bhavanti kadàcit tat sabhàgàh/ kadàcid eke sabhàgàh eke tatsabhàgàh/ evam yàvaj jihvendriyaparamànavah/ kàyendriyaparamànavas tu sarve sabhàgà na bhavanti/ pradìptanarakàbhyantanràvaruddhànàm api hy aparimànàh kàyendriyaparamànavas tatsabhàgà bhavanti/ sarvaih kila vijñànotpattàv àśrayo viśìryate/ na caika indriyaparamànur visayaparamànur và vijñànam janayati/ samcitàśrayàlambanatvàt pañcànàm vijñànakàyànàm/ ata evànirdarśanah paramànur adrśyatvàt//.

18. <u>Abhidharmakośa</u> IV ad 3c, LVP pp 10-12: yac càpi kimcit sapratigham rùpam asti tad avaśyam paramànau vidyate/

na cànau tat

na ca samsthànam paramànau vidyate dìrghàdi/ tasmàd bahusv eva tathà samnivistesu dìrghàdiprajñaptih/ atha matam samsthànaparamànava eva tathà samnivistà dìrghàdisamjñàm labhanta iti/ so'yam kevalah paksapàtas tesàm asiddhatvàt/ siddhasvalaksanànàm hi tesàm samcayo yujyate/ na ca samsthànàvayavànàm varnàdivat svabhàvah siddha iti kuta esàm samcayah/ yat tarhi varnaś càbhinno bhavati samsthànam ca bhinnam drśyate mrdbhàjanànàm/nanu coktam yathà krtvà varne dìrghàdisamjñà prajñapyate yathà ca pipìlikàdìnàm abhede pankticakràdìnàm bhedah prajñàyate tathà samsthànasyàpi/ yat tarhi tam api dùràd và varnam apaśyantah sthànvàdìnàm dairdhyàdìni

paśyanti varnam eva te tatràvyaktam drstà dìrghàdiparikalpam kurvanti/ panktisenàparikalpavat/ ittham caitad evam/ yat kadàcid anirdhàryamàna paricchedam samghàtamàtram avyaktam drśyate kim apy etad iti/ athedànìm kàyasya gatim niràkrty samsthànam ca tatra bhavantah sautràntikàh kàm kàyavijñaptim prajñapayanti/ samsthànam eva hi te kàyavijñaptim prajñapayanti/ na tu punar dravyatah/ tàm ca prajñapayantah katham kàyakarma prajñapayanti/ kàyàdhisthànam karma kàyakarma yà cetanà kàyasya tatra tatra pranetrì/ evam vànmanaskarmanì api yathàyogam veditavye/.....

19. Abhidharmakośa IV ad 3b, LVP pp 7-8: yadi ca kàsthàdìnàm agnyàdisamyogahetuko vinàśah syàd evam sati pàkajànàm gunànàm pakvataratamotpattau hetuh syàc ca vinàśakah/ hetur eva ca vinàśakah syàt/ katham krtvà/ ghàsàdyagnisambandhà gunàh pàkajà utpannàs tata eva tàdrśàd và punah pakvataratamotpattau tesàm vinàśa iti hetur eva tesàm vinàśakah svàddhetvaviśisto và/ na ca yuktam yata eva tàdrśàd và tesàm bhàvas tata eva tàdrśàc ca tesàm punar abhàva iti/ jvàlàntaresu tàvad dhetubhedakalpanàm parikalpeyuh/ ksàrahimaśuktasùryodakabhùmisambandhàt tu pàkajaviśesotpattau kàm kalpanàm kalpayeyuh/ yat tarhy àpah kvàthamànàh ksìyante kim tatràgnisamyogàh kurvanti/ tejodhàtum prabhàvato vardhayanti yasya prabhàvàd apàm samghàtah ksàmaksàmo jàyate yàvad atiksàmatàm gato'nte na punah samtànam samtanoti/ idam atràgnisamyogàh kurvanti/ tasmàn nàsti bhàvànàm vinàśahetuh/ svayam eva tu bhanguratvàd vinaśyanta utpannamàtràvinaśyantìti siddha esàm ksanabhangah ksanabhangàc ca gatyabhàvah/ gatyabhimànas tu deśàntaresu nirantarotpattau trnajvàlàvat/ gatyabhàve ca samsthànam kàyavijñaptir iti siddham/

20. Abhidharmakośa I ad 20a-b, LVP pp 37-39: yadi ràśyarthah skandhàrthah prajñaptisantah skandhàh pràpnuvanti/ anekadravyasamùhatvàt ràśipudgalavat/ na/ ekasyàpi dravyaparamànoh skandhatvàt/ na tarhi ràśyarthah skandhàrtha iti vaktavyam/ na hy ekasyàsti ràśitvam iti/ kàryabhàrodvahanàrthah skandhàrtha ity apare/ pracchedàrtho và/ tathà hi vaktàro bhavanti tribhih skandhakair deyam dàsyàm iti/ tad etad utsùtram/ sùtram hi ràśyartham eva bravìti yat kimcid rùpam atìtànàgatapratyutpannam iti vistarah/ pratyekam atìtàdirùpasya skandhatvam tatra vijñàpyate/ sarvam etad atìtàdi rùpam ekaśo rùpaskandha iti/ na śakyam evam vijñàtum/ tat sarvam aikadhyam abhisamksipyeti vacanàt/ tasmàd ràśivad eva

skandhàh prajñaptisantah/ rùpìny api tarhy àyatanàni prajñaptisanti pràpnuvanti/ bahùnàm caksuràdiparamànùnàm àyadvàrabhàvàt/ na/ ekaśah samagrànàm kàranabhàvàt visayasahakàritvàd và nendriyam prthag àyatanam syàt/ vibhàsàyàm tùcyate yady àbhidhàrmikah skandhaprajñaptim apeksate/ sa àha paramànur ekasya dhàtor ekasyàyatanasyaikasya skandhasya pradeśah/ atha nàpeksate/ sa àha/ paramànur eko dhàtur ekam àyatanam ekah skandha iti/ bhavati hi pradeśe'pi pradeśivad upacàro yathà pataikadeśé digbhe pato digbha iti/. See also Chapter Three of the present work and Abhidharmakośa IV ad 4, LVP pp 139-142:

yatra bhinnena tadabuddhir anyàpohe dhiyà ca tat/
ghatàrthavat samvrtisat paramàrthasad anyathà//

21. Abhidharmakośa I ad 43d, LVP pp 88-90: śesam tu ghrànajihvàkàyàkhyam/
trayam anyathà// 43

pràptavisayam ity arthah/ ghrànam katham pràptavisayam/ nirucchvàsasya gandhàgrahanàt/ keyam pràptir nàma/ nirantarotpattih/ kim punah paramànavah sprśanty anyonyam àhosvin na/ na sprśantìti kàśmìrakah/ kim kàranam/ yadi tàvat sarvàtmanà sprśeyur miśrìbhaveyur dravyàni/ athaikadeśena sàvayavàh prasajyeran/ niravayavàś ca paramànavah/ katham tarhi śabdàbhinispattir bhavati/ ata eva yadi hi sprśeyur hasto haste'bhyàhatah sajyetopalaś copale/ katham citam pratyàhatam na viśìryate/ vàyudhàtusamdhàritatvàt/(.....)/ na sprśanti nirantare tu sprṣṭasamjñeti bhadantah/ bhadantamatam caiṣṭavyam/ anyathà hi sàntaràǹam paramànùnàm śùnyeṣv antareṣu gath kena pratibàdhyeta/ yatah sapratidhà isyante/ na ca paramànubhyo'nye samghàtà iti/ ta eva te samghàtah sprśyante yathà rùpyante/ yadi ca paramànor digbhàgabhedah kalpyate sprṣṭasyàsprṣṭasya và sàvayavatvaprasangah/ nocet sprṣṭasyàpi aprasangah//.

22. Vimśatikà pp 7-8: nàpi te samhatà visayo bhavanti/ yasmàt paramànur ekam dravyam na sidhyati/ katham na sidhyati/ yasmàt/

ṣaḍkena yugapad yogàt paramànoh ṣadamśatà/

ṣaḍbhyo digbhyah ṣadbhih paramànubhir yugapadyoge sati paramànoḥ ṣadamśatà pràpnoti/ ekasya yo deśas tatrànyasyàsambhavàt/

sanàm samànadeśatvàt pindaḥ syàd anumàtrakaḥ// 12

atha ya evaikasya paramànor deśah sa eva sanàm/ tena sarvesàm samànadeśatvàt sarvah pindah paramànumàtrah syàt parasparavyatirekàd iti na kaścit pindo drśyah syàt/ naiva hi paramànavah samyujyante niravayavatvàt/ mà bhàd esa dosaprasangah/

samhatàs tu parasparam samyujyanta iti kàśmìravaibhàsikàs ta idam prastavyàh/ yah paramànùnàm samghàto na sa tebhyo'rthàntaram iti/

paramànor asamyoge tatsamghàte'sti kasya sah/

samyoga iti vartate/

na vànavayavatvena tatsamyogo na sidhyati// 13

atha samghàtà apy anyonyam na samyujyante/ na tarhi paramànùnàm niravayavatvàt samyogo na sidhyatìti vaktavyam/ sàvayavasyàpi hi samghàtasya samyogàn abhyupagamàt/ tasmàt paramànor ekam dravyam na sidhyati/ yadi ca paramànoh samyoga isyate yadi và nesyate/

digbhàgabhedo yasyàsti tasyaikatvam na yujyate/

anyo hi paramànoh pùrvadigbhàgo yàvad adhodigbhàga iti digbhàgabhede sati katham tad àtmakasya paramànor ekatvam yojyate/

chàyàvrtì katham và

yady ekaikasya paramànor digbhàgabhedo na syàd àdityodaye katham anyatra chàyà bhavaty atràtapah/ na hi tasyànyah pradeśo'sti yatràtapo na syàt/ àvaranam ca katham bhavati paramànoh paramànvantarena yadi digbhàgabhedo nesyate/ na hi kaścid api paramànoh parabhàgo'sti yatràgamanàd anyenànyasya pratighàtah syàt/ asati ca pratighàte sarvesàm samànadeśatvàt sarvam samghàtah paramànumàtrah syàd ity uktam/ kim evam nesyate pindasya te chàyàvrtì na paramànor iti/ kim khalu paramànubhyo'nyah pinda isyate yasya te syàtàm nety àha/

anyo na pindaś cen na tasya te// 14

yadi nànyah paramànubhyah pinda isyate na te tasyeti siddham bhavati/ samniveśaparikalpa esah/ paramànuh samghàta iti và// kim anayà cintayà laksanam/ tu rùpàdi yadi na pratisidhyate/ kim punas tesàm laksanam caksuràdivisayatvam nìlàditvam ca/ tad evedam sampradhàryate/ yat tac caksuràdìnàm visayo nìlapìtàdikam isyate kim tad ekam dravyam atha và tad anekam iti/ kim càtah/ anekatve dosa uktah/

ekatve na kramenetir yugapanna grahàgrahau/

vicchinnànekavrttiś ca sùksmànìkàà ca no bhavet// 15

yadi yàvad avicchinnam nànekam caksuso visayas tad ekam dravyam kalpyate prthivyàm kramenetir na syàd gamanam ity arthah/ sakrtpàdaksepena sarvasya gatatvàt/ arvàgbhàgasya ca grahanam parabhàgasya càgrahanam yugapanna syàt/ na hi tasyaiva tadànìm grahanam càgrahanam ca yuktam/ vicchinnasya cànekasya hastyaśvàdikasyà-nekatra vrttir na syàd yatraiva hy ekam tatraivàparam iti katham tayor viccheda

isyate/ katham và tad ekam yat-pràptam ca tàbhyàm na ca pràpyam antaràle tacchùnyagrahanàt/ sùksmànàm caudakajantùnàm sthùlaih samànarùpànàm anìksanam na syàt/ yadi laksanabhedàdeva dravyàntaratvam kalpyate mànyathà/ tasmàd avaśyam paramànuśo bhedah kalpayitavyah sa caiko na na sidhyati/ tasyàsiddhau rùpàdìnàm caksuràdivisayatvam asiddham iti siddham vijñaptimàtram bhavatìti//.

23. Sylvain Lévi, Matériaux pour l'étude du système vijñaptimàtra, Paris: H. Champion, 1932, pp 52-55; also, Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956, pp 374-377; Ui, Shiyaku taishô Yuishiki nijuron kenkyû, Tokyo: Iwanami shoin, 1953. Hamilton's translation from the Chinese version is too old to deserve mentioned here.

24. Abhidharmakośa I ad 13d, LVP pp 24-25: uktam bhagavatà rùpyate rùpyata iti bhiksavas tasmàd rùpopàdànaskandha ity ucyate/ kena rùpyate/ pànisparśenàpi sprsto rùpyate iti vistarah/ rùpyate bàdhyate ity arthah/ tathà hy arthvargìyesùktam

tasya cet kàmayànasya chandajàtasya dehinah/
te kàmà na samrdhyanti śalyaviddha iva rùpyate//

rùpasya punah kà bàdhanà/ viparinàmotpàdanà/ pratighàto rùpenety apare/ paramànurùpam tarhi rùpam na pràpnoty arùpanàt/ na vai paramànurùpam ekam prthag bhùtam asti/ samghàtastham tu tad rùpyata eva/. It is especially owing to this position that the atom can never be existing in an isolated state, that the Vaibhàsika try at all cost to find a reasonable solution to the molecular formation of atoms, and that the thrust of Vasubandhu's above criticism becomes really forceful with regards to its destructive character.

25. Abhidharmakośa I ad 20a-b, LVP p 39: tasmàd ràśivad eva skandhàh prajñaptisantah/ rùpìny api tarhy àyatanàni prajñaptisanti pràpnuvanti/ bahùnàm caksuràdiparamànùnàm àyadvàrabhàvàt/ na/ ekaśah samagrànàm kàranabhàvàt visayasahakàritvàd và nendriyam prthag àyatanam syàt/. Now compare with Ibid. I ad 44a-b, LVP p 94: na caika indriyaparamànur visayaparamànur và vijñànam janayati/ samcitàśrayàlambanatvàt pañcànàm vijñànakàyànàm/ ata evànirdarśanah paramànur adrśyatvàt//. Clearly, the Vaibhàsika contradiction is indeed quite poignantly painful. To say on the one hand that each atom is "a birth-gate of the knowledge", and on the other that atom never exists in the isolated state and that in that

state it is not susceptible to perception, is almost amount to setting up a dilemma so that they will never be able to resolve.

26. Vaiśesikasùtra IV.1.1-14; & VII.1.1-32: sadakàranavat tan nityam/ tasya kàryam lingam/ kàranabhàvàd dhi kàryabhàvah/ anityam iti ca viśesa-pratisedhabhàvah/ avidyà ca/ mahaty anekadravyavattvàd rùpàc copalabdhih/ adravyavattvàt paramànàv anupalabdhih/ rùpasamskàràbhàvàd vàyàv anupalabdhih/ anekadravyena dravyena samavàyàd rùpaviśesàc copalabdhih/ etena rasagandhasparśesu jñànam vyàkhyàtam/ tad abhàvàd avyabhicàrah/ samkhyàh parimànàni prthaktvam samyogavibhàgau paratvàparatve karma ca rùpidravyasamavàyàc càcksusàni/ arùpisv acaksusatvàt/ etena gunatve bhàve ca sarvendriyajñànam vyàkhyàtam//IV.1.// uktà gunàh/ gunalaksanam coktam/ idam evam gunam idam evam gunam iti coktam/ prthivyàm rùparasagandhasparśà dravyànityatvàd anityàh/ agnisamyogàc ca/ gunàntarapràdurbhàvàt/ etena nityesv anityatvam uktam/ apsu tejasi vàyau ca nityà dravyanityatvàt/ anityesv anityà dravyànityatvàt/ kàranagunapùrvàh prthivyàm pàkajàś ca/ apsu tejasi vàyau ca kàranagunapùrvàh pàkajà na vidyante/ agunavato dravyasya gunàrambhàt karmagunà agunàh/ etena pàkajà vyàkhyàtàh/ ekadravyavattvàt/ anor mahataś copalabdhyanupalabdhì nitye vyàkhyàte/ kàranabahutvàt karanamahattvàt pracayaviśesàc ca mahat/ tadviparitam anu/ anu mahad iti tasmin viśesabhàvàd viśesàbhàvàc ca/ ekakàlatvàt/ drstàntàc ca/ anutvamahattvayor anutvamahattvàbhàvah karmagunair vyàkhyàtah/ anutvamahattvàbhyàm karmagunà agunàh/ etena dìrghatva-hrasvatve vyàkhyàte/ karmabhih karmàni gunair gunàh/ tad anitye'nityam/ nityam parimandalam/ avidyà vidyàlingam/vibhàvàd mahàn àkàśah/ tathà càtmà/ tadabhàvàd anu manah/ gunair dig vyàkhyàtà/ kàranena kàla iti//VII.1//. See further Umesha Mishra, Conception of matter according to Nyàya-Vaiśesika, Allahabad: Syt.Umesha Mishra, 1936, pp 64-159.

27. Nyàyasùtra II.1.31-37, with Vàtsyàyana's commentary:

pratyaksam anumànam ekadeśagrahanàd upalabdheh// 31

yad idam indriyàrthasamnikarsàd utpadyate jñànam vrksa iti etat kila pratyaksam tat khalv anumànam eva/ kasmàt/ ekadeśagrahanàt vrksasyopalalabdheh/ arvàgbhàga-mayam grhìtvà vrksam upalabhate na caikadeśagrahanàt vrksah/ tatra yathà dhùmam grhìtvà vihnim anuminoti tàdrg eva tad bhavati//

kim punar grhyamànàd ekadeśàd arthàntaram anumeyam manyase/ avayavasamùha-pakse avayàntaràni dravyàntarotpattipakse tàni càvayavì ceti/ avayavasamùhapakse

tàvad ekadeśagrahanàd vrksabuddher abhàvah nàgrhyamànam ekadeśàntaram vrkso grhyamànaikadeśavad iti/ atha ekadeśagrahanàd ekadeśàntaràanumàne samudàya-pratisanghànàt tatra vrksabuddhih/ na tarhi vrksabuddhir anumànam evam sati bhavitum arhatìti/ dravyàntarotpattipakse nàvayavy anumeyah asyaikadeśasambaddhasy-àgrahanàt grahane càviśesàd anumeyatvàbhàvah/ tasmàd vrksabuddhir anumànam na bhavati/ ekadeśagrahanam àśritya pratyaksasyànumànatvam upapàdyate/ tac ca

na pratyaksena yàvat tàvad apy upalambhàt// 32

na pratyaksam anumànam/ kasmàt/ pratyaksenaivopalambhàt/ yat tad ekadeśagrahanam àśrìyate pratyaksenàsàv upalambhah/ na copalambho nirvisayo'sti/ yàvac càrtha-jàtam tasya visayah tàvad abhyanujñàyamànam pratyaksavyavasthàpakam bhavati/

kim punas tato'nyad arthajàtam/ avayavì samudàyo và/ na caikadeśagrahanam anumànam bhàvayitum śakyam hetvabhàvàd iti/

anyathàpi ca pratyaksasya nànumànatvaprasangah tat pùrvakatvàt/ pratyaksa-pùrvakam anumànam sambaddhàv agnidhùmau pratyaksato dhùmapratyaksadarśanàd agnàv anumànam bhavati/ tatra yac ca sambaddhayor lingalinginoh pratyaksam yac ca lingamàtrapratyaksagrahanam naitad antarenànumànasya pravrttir asti/ na tv etad anumànam indriyàrthasannikarsajatvàt/ na cànumeyasyendriyena sanni-karsàd anumànam bhavati/ so'yam pratyaksànumànayor laksanabhedo mahàn àśrayitavya iti/

na caikadeśopalabdhir avayavisadbhàvàt// 33

na caikadeśopalabdhimàtram/ kim tarhi/ ekadeśopalabdhih tatsahacaritàvayavy-upalabdhiś ca/ kasmàt/ avayavisadbhàvàt/ asti hy ayam ekadeśavyatirikto'vayavì tasyàvayavasthànasyopalabdhikàranapràptasyaikadeśopalabdhàv anupalabdhir upapanneti/

akrtsnagrahanàd iti ced na kàranato'nyasyaikadeśasyàbhàvàt/ na càvayavàh krtsnà grhyante avayavair evàvayavàntaravyavadhànàd nàvayavì krtsno grhyate iti nàyam grhyamànesv avayavesu parisamàpta iti seyam ekadeśopalabdhir anivrttaiveti/ krtsnam iti vai khalv aśesatàyàm satyàm bhavati akrtsnam iti śese sati/ tac caitad avayavesu bahusv asti avyavadhàne grahanàd vyavadhàne càgrahanàd iti/

anga tu bhavàn prsto vyàcastàm grhyamànasyàvayavinah kim agrhìtam manyate yenaikadeśopalabdhih syàd iti na hy asya kàranebhyo'nye ekadeśà bhavantìti tatràvayavavrttam nopapadyata iti/ idam tasya vrttam yesàm indriyasannikarsàd grahanam avayavànàm taih saha grhyate yesàm avayavànàm vyavadhànàd grahanam taih saha na grhyate/ na caitat krto'sti bheda iti/

samudàyyaśesatà và samudàyo vrksah syàt tatpràptir và ubhayathà grahanàbhàvah/

mùlaskandhaśàkhàpalàśàdìnàm aśesatà và samudàyo vrksa iti syàt pràptir và samudàyinàm iti ubhayathà samudàyabhùtasya vrksasya grahanam nopapadyate iti/ avayavais tàvad avayavàntarasya vyavadhànàd aśesagrahanam nopapadyate/ pràptigrahanam api nopapadyate pràptimatàm agrahanàt/ seyam ekadeśagrahana-sahacarità vrksabuddhir dravyàntarotpattau kalpate na samudàyamàtre iti// prasangotpàttà avayaviparìksà

sàdhyatvàd avayavini sandehah// 34

yad uktam avayavisadbhàvàt iti ayam ahetuh sàdhyatvàt/ sàdhyam tàvat etat kàranebhyo dravyàntaram utpadyate iti anupapàditam etat/ evam ca sati vipratipattimàtram bhavati vipratipatteś càvayavini samśaya iti//

sarvàgrahanam avayavyasiddheh// 35

yady avayavì nàsti sarvasya grahanam nopapadyate/ kim tat sarvam/ dravyaguna-karmasàmànyaviśesasamavàyàh/ katham krtvà/ paramànusamavasthànam tàvad darśana-visayo na bhavati atìndriyatvàd anùnàm/ dravyàntaram càvayavibhùtam darśana-visayo nàsti darśanavisayasthàś ceme dravyàdayo grhyante te niradhisthànà na grhyeran grhrante tu kumbho'yam śyàma eko mahàn samyuktah spandate asti mrmayaś ca iti/ santi ceme gunàdayo dharmo iti/ tena sarvasya grahanàt paśyàmah asti dravyàntarabhùto'vayavìti//

dhàranà'karsanopapatteś ca// 36

avayavyarthàntarabhàtu iti/

samgrahakàrite vai dhàranà'karsane/ samgraho nàma samyogasahacaritam gunàntaram snehadravatvakàritam apàm samyogàd àme kumbhe agnisamyogàt pakve/ yadi tv avayavi-kàrite abhavisyatàm pàmśuràśiprabhrtisv apy ajñàsyetàm dravyàntaràanutpattau ca trnopalakàsthàdisu jatusamgrhìtesv api nàbhavisyatàm iti/

athàvayavinam pratyàcaksanàko mà bhùt pratyaksalopa ity anusañcayam darśana-visayam pratijànànah kim anuyoktavya iti/

ekam idam dravyam ity ekabuddher visayam paryanuyojyah/ kim ekabuddhir abhinnàrthavisayeti/ àhosvit bhinnàrthavisayeti/ abhinnàrthavisayeti ced arthàn-taràanujñànàd avayavisiddhih/ nànàrthavisayeti ced bhinnesv ekadarśanànupapattih/ anekasminn eka iti vyàñatà buddhir na drśyata iti//

senàvanavad grahanam iti cen nàtìndriyatvàd anùnàm// 37

yathà senàngesu vànàngesu ca dùràd agrhramànaprthaktvesv ekam idam ity upapa-dyate buddhih evam anusu sañcitesv agrhramànaprthaktvesv ekam idam ity upapa-dyate buddhir iti/ yathà grhramànaprthaktvànàm senàvanàngànàmàràt kàranàntaratah

prthaktvasyàgrahanam yathà grhramànajàtìnàm palàśa iti và khadira iti và nàràj jàtigrahanam bhavati yathà grhramànapraspandànàm nàràt spandagrahanam grhramàne càrthajàte prthaktvasyàgrahanàd ekam iti bhàktah pratyayo bhavati na tv anùnàm agrhramànaprthaktvànàm kàranatah prthaktvàgrahanàd bhàkta ekapratyayo'tìndriyatvàd anùnàm iti/

idam eva ca parìksyate kim ekapratyayo'nusañcayavisayah àhosvin neti/ anusañcaya eva senàvanàngàni/ na ca parìksyamànam udàharanam iti yuktam sàdhyatvàd iti/

drstam iti cet/ na tad visayasya parìksopapatteh/ yad api manyate drstam idam senàvanàngànàm prthaktvasyàgrahanàd abhede naikam iti grahanam na ca drstam śakyam pratyàkhyàtum iti/ tac ca naivam tad visayasya parìksopapatteh/ darśanavisaya evàyam parìksyate/ yo'yam ekam iti pratyayo drśyate sa parìksyate kim dravyàntara-visayo và athànusañcayavisaya iti/ atra darśanam anyatarasya sàdhakam na bhavati/ nànàbhàve cànùnàm prthaktvasyàgrahanàd abhede naikam iti grahanam atasmims tad iti pratyayah yayà sthànau purusa iti/ tatah kim/ atasmims tad iti pratyayasya pradhànàpeksitvàt pradhànasiddhih/

sthànau purusa iti pratyayasya kim pradhànam/ yo'sau puruse purusapratyayas tasmin sati purusasàmànyagrahanàt sthànau puruso'yam iti/ evam nànàbhùtesv ekam iti sàmànyagrahanàt pradhàne sati bhavitum arhati/ pradhànam ca sarvasyàgrahanàd iti nopapadyate/ tasmàd abhinna evàyam abhedapratyaya ekam iti/

indriyàntaravisayesv abhedapratyayah pradhànam iti ced na visesahetvabhàvàt drstàntàvyavasthà/ śrotràdivisayesu śabdàdisv abhinnesv ekapratyayah pradhànam anekasminn ekapratyayasyeti/ evam ca sati drstàntopàdànam na vyavatisthate viśesahetvabhàvàt/ anusu sañcitesv ekapratyayaḥ kim atasmims tad iti pratyayah sthànau purusapratyayavat/ athàrthasya tathàbhàvàt tasmims tad iti pratyayah yathà śabdasyaikatvàd ekah śabda iti/ viśesahetuparigrahanam antarena drstàntau samśayam àpàdayata iti/ kumbhavat sañcayamàtram gandhàdayo'pìty anudàharanam gandhàdaya iti/

evam parimànasamyogaspandajàtiviśesapratyayàn apy anuyoktavyah tesu caivam prasanga iti/

ekatvabuddhis tasmims tad iti pratyaya iti viśesahetur mahad iti pratyayena sàmànàdhikaranyàt/ ekam idam mahàc ceti ekavisayau pratyayau samànàdhikaranau bhavatah tena vijñàyate yan mahat tad ekam iti/ anusamùhàtiśayagrahanam mahat-pratyaya iti cet/ so'yam amahatsu anusu mahatpratyayo'tasmims tad iti pratyayo bhavatìti/ kim càtah/ atasmims tad iti pratyayasya pradhànàpeksitvàt pradhànasiddhir iti bhavitavyam mahaty eva mahatpratyayeneti/

anah śabdo mahàn iti ca vyavasàyàt pradhànasiddhir iti cet/ na mandatì-
vratàgrahanam iyattànavadhàranàd yathà dravye/ anuh śabdo'lpo manda ity etasya
grahanam mahàn śabdah patus tìvra ity etasya grahanam/ kasmàt/ iyattànavadhà-
ranàt/ na hy ayam mahàn śabdah iti vyavasyan iyàn ayam ity avadhàrayati yathà
badaràmalakabilvàdìni/

samyukte ime iti ca dvitvasamànàśrayapràptigrahanam/

dvau samudàyàv àśrayah samyogasyeti cet ko'yam samudàyah/ pràptir anekasya
anekà và pràptir ekasya samudàya iti cet/ pràpter agrahanam pràptyàśritàyàh/
samyukte ime vastunì iti nàtra dve pràptì samyukte grhyete/

anekasamùhah samudàya iti ced na dvitvena samànàdhikaranasya grahanàt/ dvàv
imau samyuktàv arthàv iti grahane sati nànekasamùhàśrayah samyogo grhnate / na ca
dvayor anvor grahanam asti/ tasmàn mahatì dvitvàśrayabhùte dravye samyogasya
sthànam iti/

pratyàsattih pratìdhàtàvasànà samyogo nàrthàntaram iti cet/ na arthàntara-
hetutvàt samyogasya/ śabdarùpàdispandànàm hetuh samyogah/ na ca dravyayor gunàn-
taropajananam antarena śabde rùpàdisu spande ca kàranatvam grhyate tasmàd
gunàntaram pratyayavisayaś càrthàntaram tatpratisedho và kundalì guruh
akundalaś chàtra iti/ samyogabuddheś ca yady arthàntaram na visayah arthàntara-
pratisedhas tarhi visayah/ tatra pratisidhyamànavacanam/ samyukte dravye iti yad
arthàntaram anyatra drstam iha pratisidhyate tad vaktavyam iti/ dvayor mahator
àśritasya grahanàn nànvàśraya iti/

jàtiviśesasya pratyayànuvrttilingasyàpratyàkhyànam pratyàkhyàne và pratyaya-
vyavasthànupapattih/ vyadhikaranasyànabhivyakter adhikaranavacanam/ anusamavasthànam
visaya iti cet/ pràptàpràptasàmarthyavacanam/ kim apràpte anusamavasthàne tad-
àśrayo jàtiviśeso grhnate/ atha pràpte iti/ apràpte grahanam iti cet/ vyavahita-
syànusamavasthànasyàpy upalabdhiprasangah vyavahite'nusamavasthàne tadàśrayo
jàtiviśeso grhnate/ pràpte grahanam iti cet/ madhyaparabhàgayor apràptàv anabhi-
vyaktih/ yàvat pràptam bhavati tàvaty abhivyaktir iti cet/ tàvato'dhikaranatvam
anusamavasthànasya/ yàvati pràpte jàtiviśaso grhnate tàvad asyàdhikaranam iti
pràptam bhavati/ tatraikasamudàye pratìyamane'rthabhedah/ evam ca sati yo'yam
anusamudàyo vrksa iti pratìyate tatra vrksabahutvam pratìyeta yatra yatra hy
anusamudàyasya bhàge vrksatvam grhyate sa sa vrksa iti/ tasmàt samuditànusama-
vasthànasyàrthàntarasya jàtiviśesàbhivyaktivisayatvàd avayavyarthàntarabhùta iti//

See also Nyàyasùtra IV.2.4-17 and Vàtsyàyana's commentary thereof.

28. Although Vàtsyàyana's date is usually put at around the years 350-425 A.D. (see Potter, The Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1970, p 44; Satischandra Vidyabhusana, Vàtsyàyana, author of the Nyàyabhàsya, Indian Antiquary ILIV (1915) 82-88; Ui, The Vaiśesika Philosophy according to the Daśapadàrtha-śàstra, London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1917, pp 16-17), some die-hard traditionalists such as Mishra and alike still hold fast to their fanfastic date of 2nd century B.C. without any solid proof at all. (see Umesha Mishra, History of Indian Philosophy II, Allahabad: Tirabhukti Publications, 1966, pp 33-41; Shri Kaviràjaji, Introduction to the English translation of the Nyàyabhàsya by Ganganatha Jha, Poona; Poona Sanskrit Series, 1939). Now, with the new edition of the Yuktidìpika (Ram Chandra Pandeya, Yuktidìpikà, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967), it is possible to identify beyond any doubt some of the Sàmkhya views which Vàtsyàyana cited in his Bhàsya and which scholars have long been aware (see for instance, Otto Strauss, Eine alte Formel der Sàmkhya-Yoga-Philosophie bei Vàtsyàyana, Beiträge zur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Bonn: Kommissionsverlag Fritz Klopp, 1926, pp 358-368; Sadhu Ram, References to Sàmkhya theories in Vàtsyàyana's Nyàyabhàsya, Adyar Library Bulletin XXII (1958) 8-24; G. R. F. Oberhammer, Paksilasvàmin's Introduction to his Nyàyabhàsya, Asian Studies II (1964) 302-322) with those of the famous Vindhyavàsin, who were to become a subject for rebuttal in Vasubandhu's Paramàrthasaptati, after the defeat in debate of the latter's teacher suffered at his hand. Vàtsyàyana thus quoted Vindhyavàsin. It follows naturally then that Vàtsyàyana Paksilasvàmin must have been living after Vasubandhu. His date must therefore be put at around "the first half of 5th century", as Oberhammer said, taking into consideration at the same time our reckoning of Vasubandhu's date and Vàtsyàyana's possible relationship with Dignàga (see Hattori, Dignàga On Perception, p 122 for the case of Dignàga's discussing Vàtsyàyana's view).

29. For Praśastapàda's date, see Frauwallner, Candramati und sein Daśapadàrtha-śàstram, Studia Indologica. Festschrift für Willibald Kirfel zur Vollendung seines 70. Lebensjahres, ed. Otto Spies, Bonn: Selbstverlag des Orientalischen Seminars der Universität Bonn, 1955, pp 65-85. Although the date given by Frauwallner might seem a little bit too late for Praśastapàda, there is no question whatever

as to the latter's indebtedness to Dignàga for his philosophical thinking. (see Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic I, p 346; Hattori, Dignàga On Perception, pp 15 & 138).

30. Abhidharmakośa III ad 100a-b, LVP pp 210-214:

samvartanyah punas tistrì bhavanty agnyambhuvàyubhih/ ekatra dhyàne sattvàh samam samvartante etasyàm iti samvartanì/ saptabhih sùryais tejahsamvartanì bhavati varsodakenàpsamvartanì vàyuprakopàd vàyu-samvartànì/ tàbhiś ca bhàjanànàm sùksmo'py avayavo nàvaśisyate/ atra tu kecit tìrthakarà icchanti/ paramànavo nityàste tadànìm śisyanta iti/ kasmàt ta evam icchanti/ mà bhùd abìjakah sthùlànàm pràdurbhàva iti/ nanu ca sattvànàm karmajah prabhàvaviśisto vàyur bìjam uktam/ samvartanìśìrsavàyur và tasya nimittam bhavi-syati/ vàyunà lokàntarebhyo bìjànyàhriyanta iti mahìśàsakàh sùtre pathanti/ evam api na te bìjàdibhyo'nkuràdìnàm utpattim icchanti/ kim tarhi/ svebhya evàvayavebhyas tesàm api svebhyah/ evam yàvat paramànubhyah/ kim idam bìjàdìnàm ankuràdisu sàmarthyam/ na kimcid anyatra tatparamànùpasarpanàt/ kim punah kàra-nam ta evam icchanti/ na hi vijàtìyàt sambhavo yukta iti/ kasmàn na yuktah/ aniyamo hi syàt/ śaktiniyamàn naivam bhavisyati/ śabdapàkajotpattvat/ citro hi gunadharmo dravyam tu naivam/ samànajàtìyebhyah eva hi dravyebhyah samàna-jàtìyànàm drstam utpàdas tadyathà vìranebhyah katasya tantubhyah patasyeti/ idam ayuktam vartate/ kim atràyuktam/ yad asiddham sàdhanàyodàhriyate/ kim atr-àsiddham/ anyo vìranebhyah kato'nyaś ca tantubhyah pata iti/ ta eva hi te yathàsamnivistàs tàm tàm samjñàm labhante/ pipìlikàpanktivat/ katham gamyeta/ ekatantusamyoge patasyànupalambhàt/ ko hi tadà satah patasyopalabdhau prati-bandhah/ akrtsnavrttau patabhàgo'tra syàn na patah/ samùhamàtram ca patah syàt/ kaś ca tantubhyo'nyah patabhàgah/ anekàśrayasamyogàpeksane daśàmàtra-samyoge patopalabdhih syàn na và kadàcit/ madhyaparabhàgànàm indriyenàsam-nikarsàt/ kramasamnikarse càvayavànàm caksuhsparśanàbhyàm avayavavijñànam na syàt/ tasmàt kramena samnikarsàd avayavivyavasàyàd avayavesv eva tadbuddhir alàtacakravat/ bhinnarùpajàtikriyesu tantusu patasya rùpàdyasambhàvàt/ citra-rùpàditve vijàtìyàrambho'pi syàt acitre ca pàrśvàntare patasyàdarśanam citra-darśanam và/ kriyà'pi citrety aticitram/ tàpaprakàśbhede và'gniprabhàyà àdimadhyànte tad rùpasparśayor anupapattih/ paramànvatìndriyatve'pi samastànàm pratyaksatvam yathà tesàm kàryàrambhakatvam caksuràdìnàm ca taimirikànàm ca vikìrnakeśopalabdhih/ tesàm paramànuvad ekah keśo'tìndriyah/ rùpàdisv eva ca

paramànusamjñànivesàt tadvinàśe siddhah paramànuvinàśah/ dravyam hi paramànur anyac ca rùpàdibhyo dravyam iti na tesàm vinàśe tad vinàśah siddhyati/ ayuktam asyànyatvam yàvatà na nirdhàryate kenacit imàni prthivyaptejàmsi ima esàm rùpàdaya iti/ caksuhsparśanagràhyàni ca prajñàyante dagdhesu cornàkarpàsakusumbhakunkumàdisu tadbuddhyabhàvàd rùpàdibhedesv eva tadbuddhih/ pàkajotpattau ghataparijñànam samsthànasàmànyàt panktivat/ cihnam apaśyatah parijñànàbhàvàt/ ko và bàlapralàpesv àdarah iti tisthatu tàvad evàpratisedhah/

31. Vaiśesikasùtra of Kanàda with the Commentary of Candrànanda, ed. Muni Śrì Jambuvijayaji, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1961, p 61: Sùtra VII.2.29 with Candrànanda's commentary: iheti yatah kàryakàranayoh sa samavàyah/VII.2.29/

gunàdayah samavàyino dravye/ atah samavàyam kathayati iheti yatah kàryakàranayoh pratyaya utpadyate iha tantusu patah iha ghate rùpàdayah iha ghate karma iti [sa] samavàyah/ kàryakàranagrahansyopalaksanatvàt jàter vyaktau viśesànàm ca nityadravyesu samavàyah ity uktam bhavati/

32. Śrìdharabhatta, Praśastapàdabhàsyam Śrìdharabhattapranìtayà Nyàyakandalìvyàkhyàyà samvalitam, Varanasi: Gangànàtha-Jhà-Granthamàlà, 1963, pp 75-77: yady api rùpam trayànàm tathàpy avàntarabhedàpeksayà tad api prthivyà eva vaidharmyam àha rùpam anekaprakàrakam iti/ atràpi ksitàv evety anusandhànìyam/ śuklapìtàdyanekavidham rùpam ksitàv eva nànyatrety arthah/ ekasyàm prthivìtvajàtau nànà rùpàni vyaktibhedena samavayanti/ kvacid ekasyàm api vyaktàv anekaprakàrarùpasamàv eśah yatra nànàvidharùpasambandhibhir avayavair avayavyàrabhyate/ katham etad iti cet/ ucyate yathàvayavair avayavyàrabdhas tathàvayavarùpair avayavìni rùpam àrabdhavyam avayavesu ca na śuklam eva rùpam asti nàpi śyàmam eva kim tu śyàmaśuklaharitàdìni/ na ca tesàm ekam rùpam evàrabhate nàparànìty asti niyamah pratyekam anyatra sarvesàm api sàmarthya darśanàt/ na ca parasparam virodhena sarvàny api nàrabhante eveti yuktam/ citrarùpasyàvayavinah pratìter arùpasya pratyaksatvàbhàvàc ca/ na càvayavarùpàni samuccitàny atra citradhiyà pratìyante tenaivàvayavì pratyaksa iti kalpanàyàm anyatràpi tathàbhàvaprasangenàvayavirùpocchedaprasangah tasmàt sambhùya tair àrabhyate/ tac càrabhyamànam vividhakàranasvabhàvànugamàc chyàmaśuklaharitàtmakam eva syàt citram iti ca vyapadiśyate/ virodhàd ekam anekasvabhàvam ayuktam iti cet/ tathà ca pràvàd ukapravàdah ekañ ca citrañ cety etat tac ca citrataram tatah iti/ ko virodho nìlàdìnàm na tàvad itaretaràbhàvàtmakah bhàvasvabhàvànugamàd anyonyasamśrayàpatteś ca/ svarùpànyatvam

virodha iti cet/ satyam asty eva/ tathàpi citràtmano rùpasya nàyu/ktatà/ vicitrakàranasàmarthya bhàvinas tasya sarvalokaprasiddhena pratyaksenaivopapàditvàt/ aci/tre/ pàrśve patasyeva tadàśrayasya citrarùpasya grahaprasangah tasyaikatvàd iti cen na anvayavyatirekàbhyàm samadhigatasàmarthyasyàvayavanànàrùpadarśanasyàpi citrarùpagrahanahetutvàt tasya ca pàrśvàntare'bhàvàt/ nanv evam tarhi nànàrùpair dvyanukair àrabdhe dravye na citrarùpagrahanam tad avayavarùpagrahanàbhàvàt/ ko nàmàha na tatheti na hi paramasùksmasya vastuno rùpam vivicya grhyate yasya tu vivicya grhyate tasyàvayavarùpàny api grhyante/ yas tv avyàpakàni bahùni citrarùpàniti manyate tasya nìlapìtàbhyàm àrabdham dvitantuke rùpànutpattir ekaikasyàvayavarùpasyànàrambhakatvàt/ atha matam tatrobhàbhyàm ekam citram rùpam àrabhyate tad anyatràpi tathà syàd aviśesàt/ vivàdàdhyàsitam citradravyam ekadravyasambandhi dravyatvàd itaradravyavat tadgatam rùpam ekam avayavirùpatvàd itaràvayavidravyarùpavat/.
See also Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, Agra: Agra University, 1964, pp 248-271 for various other views such as those of Uddyotakara, Vàcaspatimiśra etc...

33. Karmasiddhiprakarana, ed. Yamaguchi, Kyoto:Hôzokan, 1951, pp 2-3: ci ste kha dog bźin du rdul phra rab tu hdod dam/ hon te rdul phra rab kyi bye brag hdus pa źig yin nam/ hon te kha dog la sogs pa hdus pa la khyab pahi rdsas gźan gcig pu źig yin/

gal te rdul phra rab kyi bye brag cig yin na ni/ des ni hdus pahi cha śas re re la riṅ po ñid dam thuṅ ṅu ñid la sogs pa gzuṅ bar hgyur te/ dper na kha dog bźin no//

hon te rdul phra rab kyi bye brag hdus pa źig yin na ni// de kha dog gi rdul phra rab kyi bye brag hdus pa las khyad par ci yod de/ de dag kho na hdus pahi khyad par las riṅ po ham thuṅ ṅu la sogs par hgyur ro//

hon te kha dog la sogs pa hdus pa las khyab pahi rdsas gcig pu źig yin na ni/ de gcig pu ñid yin pahi phyir daṅ/ khyab pa yin pahi phyir cha śas re re la gzuṅ bar hgyur te/ thams cad la de yod pahi phyir ro//

yan na de gcig pu ma yin te/ cha dan char rnam par gnas pahi phyir ro// skye mched bcu ni rdul phra rab bsags pa dag yin no źes bya bahi grub pahi mthah daṅ yaṅ hgal bar hgyur ro// gzegs zan pahi gźuṅ gis yon hga can gyi rdsas su smra ba yaṅ spal bar hgyur ro//

34. Vàcaspatimiśra, Nyàyavàrtikatàtparyatìkà, p 478: so'yam amùlyadànakrayì svàkàram na jñàne samarpayati pratyaksatàm ca svìkartum icchaty avayavì/

35. Vimśatikà p 8: pramànavaśàd astitvam nàstitvam và nirdhàryate sarvesàm ca pramànànàm pratyaksam pramànam garistham ity asaty arthe katham iyam buddhir bhavati pratyaksam iti/

pratyaksabuddhih svapnàdau yathà.

36. Vimśatikà p 8:

sà ca yadà tadà

na so'rtho drśyate tasya pratyaksatvam katham matam// 16

yadà ca sà pratyaksabuddhir na bhavatìdam me pratyaksam iti tadà na so'rtho drśyate manovijñànenaiva paricchedàc caksurvijñànasya ca tadà niruddhatvàd iti/ katham tasya pratyaksatvam istam/ viśesena tu ksanikasya visayasya tadànìm niruddham eva tadrùpam rasàdikam và//

37. Vimśatikà p 9: nànanubhùtam manovijñànena smaryata ity avaśyam arthànubhavena bhavitavyam tac ca darśanam ity evam tad visayasya rùpàdeh pratyaksatvam matam/ asiddham idam anubhùtasyàrthasya smaranam bhavatìti/ yasmàt/

uktam yathà tadàbhàsà vijñaptih

vinàpy arthena yathàrthàbhàsà caksurvijñànàdikà vijñaptir utpadyate tathoktam/

38. Anùruddha, Abhidhammatthasamgaha, ed. Thích Minh Châu, Sài gòn: Viên Dai hoc Van Hanh xuất bãn, 1966, pp 91-97: atimahantam mahantam parittam atiparittam ceti pañcadvàre. manodvàre vibhùtam avibhùtam ceti chadhà visayappavatti veditabbà/ katham/ uppàdatthitibhangavasena khanattayam ekacittakkhanam nàma. tàni pana sattarasacittakkhanàni rùpadhammànamàyu. ekacittakkhanàtìtàni và bahucittakkhanàtìtàni và thitippattàneva pañcàrammanàni pañcadvàre àpàthamàgacchanti/ tasmà yadi ekacittakkhanàtìtakam rùpàrammanam cakkhussa àpàthamàgacchanti tato param dvikkhattum bhavange calite bhavangasotam vocchinditvà tam eva rùpàrammanam àvajjantan pañcadvàràvajjanacittam uppajjitvà nirujjhati. tato tassànantaram tam eva rùpam passantam cakkhuviññànam. sampaticchantam sampaticchanacittam. santìrayamànam santìranacittam. vavatthapenram votthapanacittam ceti yathàkkhamam uppajjitvà nirujjhanti/ tato param ekùnatimsakàmàvacarajavanesu yam kiñci laddhappaccayam yebbhuyyena sattakkhattum javati. javanànubandhàni ca dve tadàrammanapàkàni yathàraham pavattanti. tato param bhavangapàto/ ettàvatà cuddasa vìthicittuppàdà dve bhavangacalanàni pubbevàtìtakam ekacittakkhananti katvà sattarasacittakkhanàni paripùrenti tato param nirujjhati. àrammanam etam atimahantam nàma gocaram/ yàva tadàrammanuppadà pana appahontàtìtakam àpàthamàgatam àrammanam mahantam nàma. tattha javanàvasàne

bhavangapàto va hoti natthi tadàrammanuppàdo/ yàva javanuppàdà pi appahontàtìtakamàpàthamàgatam àrammanam parittam nàma. tattha javanam pi anuppajjitvà dvittikkhattum votthapanam eva pavattati tato param bhavangapàto va hoti/ yàva votthapanuppàdà ca pana appahontàtìtàkamàpàthamàgatam nirodhàsannam ärammanam atiparittam nàma. tattha bhavangacalanam eva hoti natthi vìthicittuppàdo/ iccevam cakkhudvàre tathà sotadvàràdisu ceti sabbathàpi pañcadvàre tàrammanajavanavotthapanamoghavàrasankhàtànam catunam vàrànam yathàkkamam àrammanabhùtà visayappavatti catudhà veditabbà/ vìthicittàni satteva cittuppàdà catuddasa catupaññàsa vitthàrà pañcadvàre yathàraham/ manodvàre panna yadi vibhùtam àlambanam àpàthamàgacchati tato param bhavangacalanamanodvàràvajjanajavanàvasàne tadàlambanapàkàni pavattanti tato param bhavangapàto. avibhùte àlambane javanàvasàne bhavangapàtova hoti natthi tadàlambanuppàdo/ vìthicittàni tìneva cittuppàdà daserità vitthàrena panethekacattàlìsa vibhàvaye/,..... It must be added further that when I say "despite its rather fascinating feature the Abhidhammatthasangaha solution never received any serious consideration from those who lived subsequently to its author", I do not, of course, indicate by any means that Anurudha had no followers. As a matter of facts, numerous commentaries have been written about his work, of which the famous Abhidhammatthavibhàvanìtìkà by Sumangalasvàmì has recently been edited by Bhadanta Revatadharma. (Revatadharma, ed. Àcàrya Anurudha viracita Abhidhammatthasangaho tathà Bhadanta Sumangalasvàmì dvàrà pranìta Abhidhammatthavibhàvanìtìkà, Varanasi: Bauddha Svàdhyàyasatra, 1965) What I meam thereby is the fact that it never received any critical investigation from such great figures as Vasubandhu, Dignàga etc...of the history of Indian philosophy in general. It thus becomes an article of faith rather than a subject of philosophical thinking proper.

39. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 14a4-7: de la

mṅon sum rtog daṅ bral baho

śes pa gaṅ la rtog pa med pa de mṅon sum mo/ rtog pa źes bya ba hdi ji lta bu źig yin źe na

miṅ daṅ rigs sogs su sbyor baho//

hdod rgyal bahi sgra rnams la miṅ gi khyad par du byas nas rjod par byed de lhas byin źes bya ba daṅ/ rigs kyi sgra rnams la ci ste/ ba laṅ źes bya ba daṅ/ yon tan gyi sgra rnams la yon tan gyis te/ dkar po źes bya ba daṅ/ bya bahi sgra rnams la bya bahi sgo nas te/ htshed pa źes bya ba daṅ/ rdsas kyi sgra rnams la rdsas kyi sgo nas te/ dbyug pa can rva can źes bya ba lta buho/ hdi la kha cig na re hbrel

ba khyad du byas pahi sgra yin no źes zer ro/ gźan dag ni don gyis stoṅ paḥi sgra hbah źig gis don rnams khyad par du byas śiṅ brjod do źes hdod do/ gaṅ la rtog pa de dag med pa de mṅon som mo//. Also Uddyotakara, Nyàyavàrttika, p 44: apare tu manyante pratyaksam kalpanàpodham iti/ atha keyam kalpanà/ nàmajàtiyojaneti yat kila na nàmnàbhidhìyate na ca jàtyàdibhir vyapadiśyate visayasvarùpànuvidhàyi paricchedakam àtmasamvedyam tat pratyaksam iti/. For further sources, see Hattori, Dignàga On Perception, pp 82-85. The weakness of Dignàga's idea is already quite apparent to Uddyotakara who "points out that neither the words 'pratyaksa' and 'kalpanàpodha' nor the sentence 'pratyaksam kalpanàpodham' can denote pratyaksa: if pratyaksa could be denoted by either of these words or by the sentence, it could not be free from kalpanà. He further observes that, if the word 'kalpanâpodha' were held to mean 'inexpressible in its specific feature' (svarùpato na vyapadeśyam), than everything would be regarded as pratyaksa, because a word expresses only the general feature (sàmànyâkàra) of a thing and not its specific feature (viśesâkàra). However, it would not be proper to say that a thing is "inexpressible' because its specific feature is inexpressible. A bràhmana may be spoken of by the word 'man', although this word does not express his specific feature. On the other hand, it would be self-contradictory to assert that the specific feature of pratyaksa is expressed by the word 'kalpanâpodha', since 'kalpanâpodha' signifies that the specific feature of pratyaksa is inexpressible. Lastly, if the word 'kalpanâpodha' were understood to express nothing, the definition would have to be regarded as utterly useless". (Hattori, Op. cit., p 83). Later on, Dignàga's followers such as Śàntaraksita and Kamalaśìla try to answer Uddyotakara's just quoted criticism by, interestingly enough, returning to Vasubandhu's original definition in his Vàdavidhi without explicit acknowledgement. They say that "being free from verbal construction' is not the same as "being inexpressible by words", it is only "being free from determining concepts". As Kamalaśìla puts it, "yato nànabhidheyàrthah kalpanàpodhàrtho varnitah, kim tarhi/ avikalpakàrthah/ avikalpakam api jñànam yady abhidhìyate śabdenàdhyavasàyànurodhàt tathàpi rùpàdivan na vikalpakatàm yàsyatìti yat kimcid etat//.(Tattvasangraha of Àcàrya Shàntaraksita with the Commentary Pañjikà of Shri Kamalashìla I, p 457). See also Śàntaraksita's verses 1238-1242:

evam pratìtarùpà ca yad evam kalpanà matà/
tàdàtmyapratisedhaś ca pratyaksasyopavarnyate// 1238

tadà'dhyaksàdiśabdena vàcyatve'pi na bàdhyate/
kalpanàviraho'dhyakse na hi sà śabdavàcyatà// 1239
anyathà rùpagandhàdeh savikalpakatà bhavet/
ato nàspadam evedam yad àhuh kudhiyah pare// 1240
yadi pratyaksaśabdena pratyaksam abhidhìyate/
katham tat kalpanàpodham ayuktam gamyate katham// 1241
pratyaksam kalpanàpodham vedyate'tiparisphutam/
anyatràsaktamanasà'py aksair nìlàdivedanàt// 1242

40. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 14b5-6: don hdi ñid smras pa
du mahi ño bohi chos can ni/ dbaṅ po las rtogs srid ma yin/
raṅ raṅ rig bya tha sñad kyis/ bstan bya min na dbaṅ pohi yul//
de ltar na re źig dbaṅ po lṅa las skyes pahi mṅon sum gyi śes pa rtog pa med pa yin yaṅ
Cf. Pramànavàrttikabhàsya (or Vàrttikàlamkàra) of Prajñàkaragupta, ed. Rahula Sàmkrtyàyana, Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953, p 298:
dharmino'nekarùpasya nendriyàt sarvathà gatih/
svasamvedyam anirdeśyam rùpam indriyagocarah//
For various readings, see Hattori, Op. cit., p 91.

41. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 14b2-4: chos mṅon pa las kyaṅ mig gi rnam par śes pa daṅ ldan pas sṅon po śes kyi sṅon poho sñam du ni ma yin no/ don la don du hdu śes kyi don la chos su hdu śes pa ni ma yin no źes gsuṅs so/ gal te de gcig tu mi rtog na rnam par śes pa lṅa po de hdus pa la dmigs pa ji ltar yin/ gaṅ yaṅ skye mched kyi raṅ gi mtshan ñid la so so raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can yin gyi/ rdsas kyi raṅ gi mtshan ñid la ni ma yin no źes kyaṅ ji ltar gsuṅs śe na/
der don du mas bskyed pahi phyir/ raṅ don spyi yi spyod yul can/
de rdsas du mas bskyed par bya bahi phyir na raṅ gi skye mched la spyihi spyod yul can źes brjod kyi/ tha dad pa la tha mi dad par rtogs pa las ni ma yin no/.
See Hattori, Op. cit., pp 26-27 & 88-89 for a translation and discussion of this passage; also Wayman, JAOS LXXXIX (1969) 436-437, for a comment on Hattori's. It is rather curious that in view of the profuse quotation of this Abhidharma definition of perception in the writings of those living subsequently to him (see de La Vallée Poussin, ed., Mùlamadhyamakakàrikàs de Nàgàrjuna avec la Prasannapadà Commentaire de Candrakìrti, p 74-75 for a few samples), Vasubandhu seems never pay attention to it in all his writings, including the Abhidharmakośa. Strangely still,

he proposes his own new definition, which, as we have seen, is in great variance with that of the satndard Abhidharma, which Dignàga and others quoted in their works.

41. Dharmakìrti, Nyàyabindu, ed. Šerbatskoi, Petrograd, 1918, pp 6-9: tatra pratyaksam kalpanàpodham abhràntam/ abhilàpasamsargayogyapratibhàsa-pratìtih kalpanà/ tayà rahitam timiràśubhramananauyànasamksobhàdy-anàhita-vibhramam jñànam pratyaksam//I.4-6//. Also, Pramànaviniścaya I, ed. Tilmann Vetter, Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 250. Band 3. Abhandlung, Wien, 1966, p 40: de la

mṅon sum rtog bral ma hkhrul ba/

rab rib dan myur du bskor ba daṅ grur śugs pahi hkhrugs pa la sogs pas hkhrul ba ma bskyed ciṅ rnam par rtog pa med pahi śes pa ni mṅon sum mo// rtog pa de yaṅ gaṅ źe na

rtog pa mṅon par brjod can gyi/

śes pa

rtog pa ni brjod pa daṅ hdrer ruṅ ba snaṅ bahi śes pa ste/ de daṅ bral baho// dbaṅ pohi śes pa la ni de srid pa ma yin te/

don gyi mthu yis ni/

yaṅ dag skye ba yin phyir ro//

Cf. Vetter's reconstruction: pratyaksam kalpanàpodham abhràntam timiràśubhramananauyànasamksobhàdyanàhitavibhramam avikalpakam jñànam pratyaksam. kà punah sà kalpanà?

abhilàpinì/

pratìtih kalpanà

abhilàpasamsargayogyapratibhàsà pratìtih kalpanà; tayà rahitam. indriyajñàne sà nàsti

arthasya sàmarthyena samudbhavàt//.

43. Dharmakìrti, Pramànavàrttika III ad 123a: pratyaksam kalpanàpodham. See also Hattori, Op. cit., p 83: "Dharmakìrti follows Dignàga in defining pratyaksa as kalpanàpodha in P(ramàna)V(àrtika) III, 123a, but he adds the term abhràntа to this definition in N(yàya)B(indu), I, 4, and P(ramàna)Vin(iścaya), 252b.3". (Words in parenthese are ours). There is a controversy as to whether Dharmakìrti's modification of Dignàga's definition represents an advance or a setback in the

theory of perception, but it needs not concern us here.

44. Dharmakìrti, Pramànavàrttika I (Gnoli's edition) ad 93-94a:

api pravarteta pumàn vijñàyàrthakriyàksamàn/
tatsàdhanàyety arthesu samyojyante'bhudhàyakàh// 93

na khalu vai vyasanam evaitad lokasya yad ayam asamketayann aprayuñjàno và śabdàn duhkham àsìta/ kim tarhi/ sarva evàsyàvadheya àrambhah phalàrthah/ nisphalàrambhasyopeksanìyatvàt/ tad ayam śabdàn api kvacin niyuñjànah phalam eva kimcid ihitum yuktah/ tac ca sarvam tyàgàptilaksanam istànistayoh/ tenàyam istànistayoh sàdhanam asàdhanam ca jñàtvà tatra pravrttivivrttì kuryàm kàrayeyam veti śabdàn niyuñjìta niyoge vàdriyeta/ anyathopeksanìyatvàt/

tatrànarthakriyàyogyà jàtih.....

Also ad 210-211:

sadasatpaksabhedena śabdàrthànapavàdibhih/
vastv eva cintyate hy atra pratibaddhah phalodayah// 210
arthakriyà'samarthasya vicàraih kim tadarthinàm/
sandhasya rùpavairùpye kàminyàh kim parìksayà// 211

na hi śabdàrtho'san san và kamcit purusàrtham uparunaddhi samàdadhàti và/ yathàbhiniveśam atattvàt/ yathàtattvam càsamìhitatvàt/ tad ayam pravartamànah sarvadà sadasaccintàyàm avadhìritavikalpapratibhàso vastv evàdhisthànìkaroti yatràyam purusàrthah pratibaddho yathàgnau śìtapratìkàràdih/ na hy atra śabdàrthah samarthas tadanubhavàptàv api tadabhàvàt/ tad ayam arthakriyàrthì tadasamartham prati dattànuyogo bhavitum na yuktah/.... See further Masatoshi Nagatomi, Arthakriyà, Brahmavidyà XXXI-XXXII (1967-1968) 52-72, for a detailed investigation of what "something capable of producing an effect" is. Also Tilmann Vetter, Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakìrti, Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 245. Band 2. Abhandlung, Wien, 1964, pp 49-59.

45. Vimśatikà p 4:

svapnopaghàtavat krtyakriyà

siddheti veditavyam/ yathà svapne dvayasamàpattim antarena śukravisargalaksanah svapnopaghàtah/. Cf. Abhidharmakośa IX 461, LVP p 233: yadi tàvat dravyatah/ sa bhinnasvabhàvàtvàt skandhebhyo'nyo vaktavya itaretaraskandhavat/ kàranam càsya vaktavyam/ asamskrto và/ atas tìrthikadrstiprasango nisprayojanatvam ca/ Also Karmasiddhiprakarana p 27: rnam par śes pa rnams ci źig de la rag las na/ gaḥ

gis na bdag dehu rten du rtog/ gal te skye ba yin no źe na/ bdag la ni khyad par du gyur pa med na/ cihi phyir rim gyis hbyuṅ/ gal te lhan cig byed pahi rgyu gah na la bltos pahi phyir ro źe na/ de dag las gźan pa la de skyed pahi nus pa yod par zi ltar khon du chud/ hon te hdug pa źig de la rag lus pa yin no źe na/ skyes nas mi gnas pa dag daṅ/ ltuṅ ba ma yin pa dag la hdug pa ci źig yod/ de bas na rten de hdra bahi rdsas ni mi hdod do//.

Comparing the last two views with the first, one can immediately see how radically Vasubandhu's thought changes from the Abhidharmakośa and the Karma siddhiprakarana to the Vimśatikà. In the first two works, he apparently holds fast to the view that what is real is capable of producing an effect or an useful action, which he himself criticizes in the last work. It must be added further here that appropriately enough, while commenting upon the above-quoted passage of the Abhidharmakośa, Yaśomitra links it with the theory of arthakriyà originated with Dharmakìrti through the citation of one of the latter's verses, which de La Vallée Poussin has pointed out. In this connection, it must be noted that given the doctrinal differences just said, we can safely assume that Karma-siddhiprakarana would be written before the appearance of Vimśatikà and after the Vyàkhyàyukti, the latter as is evidenced in the acknowledgement by Vasubandhu himself in the Karmasiddhiprakarana p 25: rnam par bśad pahi rigs pa las kyaṅ/ deṅ saṅ mdo sṅe thams cad ni mi snaṅ źes bsgrubs te/.

46. Ratnakìrti, Ksanabhangasiddhih, in Ratnakìrtinibandhàvalì, ed. A. Thakur, Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, 1957, p 62: yadi nàma darśane darśane nànàprakàran sattvalaksanam uktam àste arthakriyàkàritvam sattàsamavàyah svarù-pasattvam utpàdavyayadhrauvyayogitvam pramànavisayatvam sadupalambhakapramàna-gocaratvam vyapadeśavisayatvam ity-àdi tathàpi kim anenàprastutenedànìm eva nistankitena/ yad eva hi pramànato nirùpyamànam padàrthànàm sattvam upapannam bhavisyati tad eva vayam api svìkarisyàmah/ kevalam yad etad arthakriyàkàritvam sarvajanaprasiddham àste tat khalv atra sattvaśabdenàbhisamdhàya sàdhanatvenop-àttam/ Also Sàntaraksita, Tattvasamgraha ad 1213-1214:

pratyaksam kalpanàpodham abhràntam kalpanàyàh svarùpam abhilàpinì/
pratìtih kalpanà klptihetutvàdyàtmikà na tu// 1213
śabdàrthaghatanàyogyà vrksa ity-àdirùpatah/
yà vàcàm aprayoge'pi sàbhilàpeva jàyate// 1214

47. R. Billard, L'Astronomie Indienne, Paris: Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient, 1971, pp 16-18 & 69-97; D. A. Somayaji, A critical study of the Ancient Hindu Astronomy, Dharwar: Karnatak University, 1971, pp 4-14; Bibhutibhusan Datta & Avadhesh N. Singh, History of Hindu Mathematics, Lahore: Motilal Banarsi Das, 1935. It is of interest to point out that the area betwen Purusapura and Ayodhyà, where Vasubandhu spent most of his life and carried out most of his thinking and writing activities, lie numerous centers of astronomy and mathematics of which the most famous are those of Ujjayinì and Daśapura. In an inscription written in the year 473 A.D. for celebrating the restoration of a temple built in 436 A.D. found in Daśapura (modern Mandsaur) we read: "kecit svakarmany adhikàs tathànyair vijñàyate jyotisam àtmavadbhih". (Corpus inscriptionum indicarum III, Calcutta, 1888, p 82 line 10) After Candragupta II annexed that whole area probably in 390 or later in his Western campaign and opened an opportunity for Vasubandhu to become his Crown Prince's tutor, it was from Ujjayinì and Làta that astronomy and mathematics set out to conquer in reverse the whole India. It is therefore not at all irrelevant that Vasubandhu might have been deeply influenced by the concepts of astronomy and mathematics in his region in the development of his thought. This aspect of his relationship with astronomy and mathematics has not been seriously investigated, except a few interesting remarks by Anacker in his Vasubandhu: Three Aspects (Doctoral Diss., University of Wisconsin, 1970, pp 196-199). It would be quite rewarding to those who search it.

48. Beer, Ho Ping Yü, Lu Gwei Djen, Needham, Pulleyblank & Thompson, A 8th century meridian line: I Hsing's chain of Gnomons and the pre-history of the Metric system, Vistas in Astronomy IV (1961) 3-28 ; J. Needham, Science & Civilization in China III, London: Cambridge University Press, 1959, pp 201-206; IV, 1, 1962, pp 42-55; Li Ti, T'ang tai tien wen hsüeh chia Chang Sui, Shanghai: Shanghai Jen min ch'u pan xa, 1965, pp 39-57.

49. Vimśatikà p 9: yadi vijñàptimàtram evedam na kasyacit kàyo'sti na vàk/

50. Raju, Idealistic thought of India, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1953, pp 269-272 & 276-277ff; Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy I, London: Allen & Unwin LTD, 1923, pp 624-643; Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, pp 373-377; etc...

51. Dharmapàla, Vijñaptimàtrasiddhiśàstra, Taishô 1585; La Siddhi de Hiuan Tsang, transl. & ann. de La Vallée Poussin, Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1928-1929; Fukihara Shôshin, Gohôshû Yuishiki kô, Kyoto: Hôzôkan, 1955; Ueda Yoshifumi, Yuishiki shisô nyumon, Tokyo: Asoka shoin, 1964, pp 111-168.

52. Lévi, Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimàtra, p 7. See also n. 50.

53. Vimśatikà ad 1: vijñaptimàtram evaitad asadarthàvabhàsanàt/
yathà taimirikasyàsatkesacandràdidarśanam//

Here we translate avàbhàsana as "self-knowledge", for we think that its usual rendering as "appearance" gives rise to serious misunderstanding, which we have referred to above. In fact, the term does not even mean "appearance" at all. For instance, when Dignàga says, "dvyàbhàsam hi jñànam utpadyate svàbhàsam visayàbhàsam ca/ tasyobhayàbhàsasya yat sva-samvedam tat phalam/" (Pramànasamuccaya I p 15a7-8: raṅ rig la yaṅ hdir hbras bu/ śes pa ni snaṅ ba gñis las skyes te/ raṅ gi snaṅ ba daṅ yul gyi snaṅ baho/snaṅ ba de gñis las gaṅ raṅ rig pa de ni hbras bur hgyur ro//; Tattvàrtha(ràja)vàrtika of Akalanka, ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain, Benares: Jñànapìtha Mûrtidevì Jaina Granthamàlà, 1953, p 56; also Pramànavàrttikavrtti of Manorathanandin, ed. R. Sàmkrtyàyana, The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society XXIV-XXVI (1938-1940) p 228: svàbhàsam visayàbhàsam ca jñànam utpadyate/ tatra yat svasamvedanam tat phalam/; Hattori, Op. cit., pp 101-103), it is clear that àbhàsa is understood as svasamvedana, "self-knowledge" or "self-consciousness". Thus, it is quite misleading to say, as Hattori (Op. cit. p 102) does, that "That the consciousness (vijñàna) itself appears (àbhàti, pratibhàti, avabhàti, khyàti) as subject (svàbhàsa = gràhakâmśa, °-àkàra) and object (arthâbhàsa, visaya° = gràhyâmśa, °-àkàra) is a principal doctrine of the Yogàcàras". Such statement is misleading, because it tends to mean that for the Yogàcàras, among whom must be counted Vasubandhu, the object, as it is ordinarily understood, is nothing but an appearance of the consciousness, a doctrine which has no place in Vasubandhu's thought. In fact, it is the contrary, as is apparent in our discussion. It must be added further here that avabhàsana is for Vasubandhu synonymous with àbhàsa. In Vimśatikà ad 1a-b he uses the former, while in ad 17a-b he employs the latter.

54. Maitreyanàtha, Madhyàntavibhàga I ad 3, ed. Gadjin Nagao, Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964, p 18:

arthasatvàtmavijñaptipratibhàsam prajàyate/
vijñànam nàsti càsyàrthas tadabhàvàt tad apy asat// I.3

to which Vasubandhu adds the following comment: tatràrthapratibhàsam yad rùpàdibhàvena pratibhàsate/ satvapratibhàsam yat pañcendriyatvena svaparasantànayor/ àtmapratibhàsam klistam manah/ àtmamohàdisamprayogàt/ vijñaptipratibhàsam sad vijñànani/ nàsti càsyàrtha iti/ arthasatvapratibhàsasyànàkàratvàt/ àtmavijñaptipratibhàsasya ca vitathapratibhàsatvàt/ tadabhàvàt tad apy asat iti/ yat tadgràhyam rùpàdipañcendriyam manah sadvijñànasamjñakam caturvvidham tasya gràhyasyàrthasyàbhàvàt tad api gràhakam vijñànam asat/. Through our interpretation of the verse and its comment, it becomes quite evident that we do not understand the statement "nàsti càsyàrthas" as referring to an external object existing out there in the world, rather we understand it as referring to the object which we are aware of thanks to our svasamvedana, self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is thus functioning as an unity: the object one is aware of and the act of such an awareness are both non-existing, for the simple reason that although we have to know the object through our self-knowledge, such self-knowledge serves nothing but to indicate there being some object out there, and not some object in our head. In light of this new interpretation of ours, the first and most famous opening verse of the first chapter of the Madhyàntavibhàga becomes easily understood.

abhùtaparikalpo'sti dvayam tatra na vidyate/
śùnyatà vidyate tv atra tasyàm api sa vidyate// I.1

55. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 15b5-6: ci ste śes pa tshul gñis so źes ji ltar bya źe na/ yul śes pa daṅ dehi śes pahi/ dbye bas blo yi tshul gñis ñid/ yul ni gzugs la sogs pa ste gaṅ gis de śes pa ni don daṅ raṅ snaṅ baho/ yul śes pa ni gaṅ yul daṅ rjes su mthun pahi śes pa ste/ śes pa de snaṅ ba daṅ/ raṅ snaṅ baho/ de ltar ma yin te/ gal te gzugs ñid raṅ śes pa ham raṅ gi ṅo bor hgyur na ni śes pa yaṅ yul śes pa daṅ khyad par med par hgyur ro//. Cf. Pramànavàrttikabhàsya of Prajñàkaragupta, p 403: visayajñàna-tajjñànaviśesàt tu dvirùpatà/ visaye rùpàdau yaj jñànam tad arthasvàbhàsam/ visayajñàne tu yaj jñànam tad arthànurùpajñànàbhàsam svàbhàsam ca/ anyathà yadi visayajñànam arthàkàram eva syàt svàkàram eva và visaya/jñàna/jñànam api tadaviśistam syàt/. For other sources, see Hattori, Op. cit. p 108.

56. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 15b6-7: phyis rjes la skye bahi śes pa la yaṅ sñar riṅ du hdas pahi yul snaṅ bar mi hgyur te/ gaṅ gi phyir źe ma/ de yul ma yin pahi phyir ro/ dehi phyir śes pa la tshul gñis yod par grub bo//. Cf. Pramànavàrttikabhàsya of Prajñàkaragupta, p 409: na cottarottaràni jñànàni pùrvapùrvajñànavisayàbhàsàni syus tasyàvisayatvàt/. See also Hattori, Op. cit., pp 109-110. The notation we use here is a modified form of Hattori's.

57. Dharmapàla, Vijñaptimàtratàsiddhi, Taishō 1585 p 10b11-22: 然心心所一一生時、以理推徵、各有三分、所量能量量果別故、相見必有所依体故、如集量論伽他中說
仗境相所量、能取相自證、即能量及果、此三体無別
又心心所若細分別、應有四分、三分如前、後有第四、證自證分、此若爲者、誰證第三心分、況自應皆證故、又自證分應無有果、諸能量者必有果故、不應見分是第三果、見分或非量摄故、由此見分不證第三、證自体者必現量故、
cf. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang, pp 130-132.

58. The first clear statement on this problem is obtained by Hattori, Op. cit., p 108 who points out how the Vaibhàsika and their like identify the visayajñànajñàna with visayajñàna. Unfortunately, this same author fails to appreciate the truism that Vasubandhu and other "Yogàcàras" introduce to criticize such identification. Thus, he continues making statements of the type "The Yogàcàras do not admit the existence of the external object. They note that the object of the cognition in a dream has no corresponding reality, that one and same object is variously cognized by different persons etc., and they assert that the object is essentially immanent in the cognition" (Op. cit., p 104). What is more far from truth and more non-sensical?

59. Abhidharmakośa III ad 100 a-b, LVP 213: paramànvatìndriyatve'pi samastànàm pratyaksatvam yathà tesàm kàryàrambhakatvam caksuràdìnàm ca taimirikànàm ca vikìrnakeśopalabdhih/ tesàm paramànuvad ekah keśo'tìndriyah/. Cf. Vimśatikà ad 1:

vijñaptimàtram evaitad asadarthàvabhàsanàt/
yathà taimirikasyàsatkeśacandràdidarśanam// 1

60. Schmithausen, Sautràntika-Voraussetzungen in Vimśatikà und Trimśikà, WZKSOA XI (1967) 109-136. It must be added here that to talk about the so-

called "Sautràntika-Voraussetzungen" in the present state of our knowledge of the system is indeed quite a adacious task, especially when the informations are gathered mainly from a few commentators, which do not always agree with each other. Thus, while Schmithausen talks about "Ein schönes Beispiel für Idealismus auf der Basis des 'einschichtigen' Erkenntnisstromes der Sautràntikas bei Dharmakìrti", Hattori, Op. cit. pp 102-107, points out how critically Dharmakìrti evaluates the Sautràntika system. It is rather pointless to rely the tenets of a system to judge or classify Vasubandhu's thought, as we have emphatically stated in Chapter One of the present work. At best, it is misleading; at worst, it means nothing.

61. Abhidharmakośa III ad 15a-b, LVP pp 50-52: sa khalv esa gatideśasampràptyartham pràdurbhùto'ntaràbhavah

viparyastamatir yàti gatideśam riramsayà/

sa hi karmaprabhàvasambhùtena caksusà sudùrastho'pi svam upapattideśam preksate/ tatràsya màtàpitros tàm vipratipattim drstvà pumsah satah paumsno ràga utpadyate màtari striyàh satyàh straino ràga utpadyate pitari/ viparyayàt pratighah/ evam pathyate prajñaptau gandharvasya tasmin samaye dvayoś cittayor anyataràny atarac cittam samukhìbhùtam bhavaty anunayasahagatam và pratighasahagatam veti/ sa tàbhyàm viparyasto rantukàmatayà tam deśan àślisya tàm avasthàm àtmany adhimucyate/ tasmimś càśucau garbhasthànasampràpte jàtaharso' bhinivisate/ tato'sya skandhà ghanì bhavanty antaràbhavaskandhàś càntardhìyante ity upapanno bhavati/ sa cet pumàn bhavati màtur daksinakuksim àśritya prsthàbhimukha utketukah sambhavaty atha strì tato vàmakuksim àśrityodaràbhimukhì/ athedànìm napumsakamtad yena ràgenàślistam tathà tisthati/ na càsty antaràbhavo vyantarah/ sakalendriyatvàt/ atah strìbhùtah purusabhùto và'nupravisya yathàsthànam tisthati paścàt garbha àpyàyamàno napumsakam bhavatìti/ idam vicàryate/ kim asya śukraśonitamahàbhùtànyevendriyàśrayabhàvam àpadyante karmavaśàd àhosvit bhùtàntaràny eva karmabhir jàyante/ tàny upaśrityeti/ tàny evety eke/ anindriyam hi śukrasonitam antaràbhavena sàrdham nirudhyate sendriyam pràdurbhavati/ bìjànkuranirodhotpàdanyàyena yat tat kalalam ity àkhyàyate/ evam ca krtvedam sùtrapadam sùtre sunìtam bhavati màtàpitraśucikalalasambhùtayeti/ tayà dìrgharàtram yusmàbhir bhiksivah katasih savarddhità rudhirabindur upàtta iti/ bhùtàntaràny evety apare/ tadyathàparnakrimeh/ aśucisamniśrayotpa-

ttyabhisambandhivacanàt tu kalalasya sùtràvirodha iti/ evam tàvad andajàm jaràyujàm ca yonim pratipadyate/. Cf. Carakasamhità, Śàrìrasthànam III.3, vol. II, ed. Jaydev Śarma, Ajmer: Aryasahitya Mandal, 1957, p 59: purusasyànupahataretasah striyàś càpradustayonisonitagarbhàśayàyà yadà bhavati samsarga rtukàle yadà cànayos tathàiva yukte ca samsarge śukrasonitasamsargam antargarbhàśayagatam jìvo'vakràmati sattvasamprayogàt tadà garbho' bhinirvartate sa sàtmyarasopayogàd arogo'bhisamvardhate samyag upacàrai copacaryamànas tatah pràptakàlah sarvendriyopapannah paripùrnasarvaśarìro balavarnasattvasamhanasampadupetah sukhena jàyate samudàyàdesàm bhàvànàm//. Also Suśrutasamhità, Śàrìrasthànam III.4, ed. Jâdavji Trikumji Âchârya, Bombay: Tukârâm Jâvajî, 1915, p 271: tatra strìpumsayoh samyoge tejah śarìràdvàyur udìrayati tatas tejo'nilasannipàtàc chukram cyutam yonim abhipratipadyate samsrjyate càrtavena tato'gnisomasamyogàt samsrjyamàno garbhàśayam anupratipadyate ksetrajño vedàyità sprastà ghràtà drstà śrotà rasayità purusah srastà gantà sàksì ghàtà vaktà yo'sàyity evam àdibhih paryayavàcakair nàmabhir abhidhìyate daivasamgàd aksayo'cintyo bhùtàtmanà sahànvaksam satvarajastamobhir devàsurair aparaiś ca bhàvair vàyunàbhipreryamàno garbhàśayam anupraviśyàvatisthate//. It is very interesting to compare these various views to see how they are interrelated with each other both in terms of scientific outlook and philosophical speculations. Obviously, we cannot do it here, although with the above quotations we furnish some data which clearly bear out our assertion.

62. Carakasamhità, Sùtrasthànam XX. 11, vol. I, pp 330-331: tatràdau vàtavikàràn anuvyàkhyàsyàmah tadyathà nakhabhedaś ca vipàdikà ca pàdabhramśaś ca pàdasuptatà ca vàtakhuddatà ca gulphagrahaś ca pindikodvestanam ca grdhrasì ca jànubhedaś ca jànuviślesaś ca ùrustambhaś ca ùrusàdaś ca pàngulyam ca gudabhramśaś ca gudàtiś ca vrsanotksepaś ca śephahstambhaś ca vanksanànàhaś ca śronibhedaś ca vidbhedaś ca udàvartaś ca khañjatvam ca kubjatvam ca vàmanatvam ca trikagrahaś ca prsthagrahaś ca pàrśvàvamardaś ca udaràvestaś ca hrnmohaś ca hrddravaś ca vaksoddhasaś ca vaksoparodhaś ca vaksastodaś ca bàhuśosaś ca grìvàstambhaś ca manyàstambhaś ca kanthoddhvamsaś ca hanustambhaś ca osthabhedaś ca dantabhedaś ca dantasaithilyam ca mùkatvam ca vàksangaś ca kasàyàsyatà ca mukhasosaś ca arasamjñatà ca [agandhajñatà ca ghrànanàśaś ca] karnaśu-

lam ca aśabdaśravanam ca uccaihśrutiś ca bàdhiryam ca vartmastambhaś ca vartmasamkocaś ca timiram ca aksiśùlam ca aksivyudàsaś ca bhrùvyudàsaś ca śankhabhedaś ca lalàtabhedaś ca śiroruk ca keśabhùmisphutanam ca arditam ca ekàngarogaś ca sarvàngarogáś ca paksavadhaś ca àksepakaś ca dandakaś ca śramaś ca bhramaś ca vepathuś ca jambhà ca visàdaś ca hikkà ca atipralàpaś ca glàniś ca rauksyam ca pàrusyam ca śyàvàrunàvabhàsatà ca asvapnaś ca anavasthitatvam cety aśìtir vàtavikàrà vàtavikàrànàm aparisamkhyeyànàm àviskrtatam àvyàkhyàtàh//.

63. Suśrutasamhità, Uttaratantram VII. 1-24: athàto drstigatarogavijñànìyam adhyàyam vyàkhyàsyàmah/1/ yathovàca bhagavàn dhanvantarih/2/

masùradalamàtram tu pañcabhùtaprasàdajàm/
khadyotavisphulingàbhàm siddhàm tejobhir avyayaih// 3
àvrtàm patalenàksnor bàhyena vivaràkrtim/
śìtasàtmyàm nrnàm drstim àhur nayanacintakàh// 4
rogàms tadàśreyàn ghoràn sad ca sad ca pracaksmahe/
patalànupravistasya timirasya ca laksanam// 5
siràbhir abhisampràpya viguno'bhyantare bhrśam/
prathame patale doso yasya drstau vyavasthitah// 6
avyaktàni sa rùpàni sarvàny eva prapaśyati/
drstir bhrśam vihvalati dvitìyam patalam gate// 7
maksikàmaśakàn keśàn jàlakàni ca paśyati/
mandalàni patàkàś ca marìcìn kundalàni ca// 8
pariplavàmś ca vividhàm varsam abhram tamàmsi ca/
dùrasthàny api rùpàni manyate ca samìpatah// 9
samìpasthàni dùre ca drster gocaravibhramàt/
yatnavàn api càtyartham sucìpàśam na paśyati// 10
ùrdhvam paśyati nàdhastàt trtìyam patalam gate/
mahànty api ca rùpàni chàditànìva vàsasà//11
karnanàsàksiyuktàni viparìtàni vìksate/
yathà dosam ca rajyate drstir dose balìyasi// 12
adhahsthite samìpastham coparisthite/
pàrśvasthite tathà dose pàrśvasthàni na paśyati// 13

samantatah sthite dose sankulànìva paśyati/
drstimadhyagate dose sa ekam manyate dvidhà// 14
dvidhàsthite tridhà paśyed bahudhà cànavasthite/
timiràkhyah sa vai dośaś caturthapatalam gatah//15
runaddhi sarvato drstim linganàśah sa ucyate/
tasminn api tamobhùte nàtirùdhe mahàgade// 16
candràdityau sanaksatràv antarìkse ca vidyutah/
nirmalàni ca tejàmsi bhràjisnùnìva paśyati// 17
sa eva linganàśah tu nìlikàkàcasamjñitah/
vàtena càpi rùpàni bhramantìva sa paśyati// 18
àvilàny arunàbhàvo vyàvidhàni ca mànavah/
pittenàdityakhadyotaśakracàpatadihgunàn// 19
śikhibarhavicitràni nìlakrsnàni paśyati/
gauracàmaragauràni śvetàbhre pratimàni ca // 20
paśyed asùksmàny atyartham vyabhre caivàbhrasamplavam/
salilaplàvitànìva parijàdyàni mànavah// 21
tathà raktena raktàni tamàmsi vividhàni ca/
kaphena paśyed rùpàni snigdhàni ca sitàni ca // 22
haritasyavakrsnàni dhùmadhùmràni ceksate/
sannipàtena citràni viplutànìva paśyati// 23
bahudhà và dvidhà vàpi sarvàny eva samantatah/
hìnàdhìkàngàny athavà jyotìmsy api ca mànavah// 24

64. May's Manual of the Diseases of the Eye for students and general practitioners, rev. & ed. James H. Allen, Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1963, p 192; May & North's Manual of Diseases of the Eye, 13th ed. T. Keith Lyle et al., Philadelphia: Davis Co., 1968, pp 259-260; A. Sorsby, Modern Ophthalmology I, 2d ed., Philadelphia: The JB Lippincott Cop., 1972, pp 18-21.

65. Suśrutasamhità, Uttaratantram XVII.53-54:

aràgi timiram sàdhyam àdyam patalam àśritam/
krcchram dvitìye ràgi syàt trtìye yàpyam ucyate// 53.
ràgapràptesv api hitàs timiresu kriyà tathà /
yàpanàrtham yathoddistàh sevyàś càpi jalaukasah// 54

66. Hunayn ibn Is-Hâq al-'Ibâdî, Kitâb al-'ashr Maqâlât fî'l-'Ain, ed. Max Meyerhof, Cairo: Goverment Press, 1928, pp 130-131: al-mâ'; also Max Meyerhof, The Book of the Ten Treatises on the Eye ascribed to Hunain Ibn Is-Hâq, Cairo: Government Press, 1928, pp 68-69:"It (cataract) occurs in the space betwen the uvea and the lens, viz., in the hole of the uvea (the pupil) and is called hypokhyma, i.e. water. We informed you before that it is a thick moisture which coagulates in the hole of the pupil and prevents the lens from meeting the external light. When this disease is fully developpd, its diagnosis is easy, (but it is difficult in the first stages). In the first stage of its development there are symptoms which indicate its approach. He who is attacked by this disease sees in front of his eyes something resembling small flying bugs; some people see something like hairs, and other things resembling rays. When the affection becomes inveterate in them, vision ceases, the colour of the pupil is changed, and the light does not penetrate into it".

67. In commenting upon Suśrutasamhitâ, Sûtrasthânam I.1, Dalhana writes (The Sushrutasamhitâ of Sushruta with the Nibandhasamgraha Commentary of Shri Dalhanâchârya, ed. Jâdavji Trikumji Âchârya, Bombay, 1915, p 1b), idam pratisamskartrsûtram yatra yatra parokse lidprayogas tatra tatraiva pratisamskartrsûtram jñâtavyam iti/ pratisamskartâ'pîha Nâgârjuna eva/ atha śabdo'nantarârtha eva/.

68. P. C. Ray, History of Chemistry in Ancient and Medieval India, Rev. & ed. P. Ray, Calcutta: Indian Chemical Society, 1956, pp 117-118; Winternitz, History of Indian Literature II, transl. S. Ketkar et al., Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1933, pp 343-344; Lévi, Un nouveau document sur le bouddhisme de basse époque, BSOAS VII (1930-1931) 417-429; Tucci, Animadversiones Indicae, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (1930) 144-147; N. Dutt, Notes on the Nâgârjunakonda Inscription, IHQ VII (1931) 636-638; Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, An introduction to Buddhist Esoterism, Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1932, pp 67-68; Shashi Bhushan Dasgupta, An Introduction to Tantric Buddhism, Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1958, p 14; Agehananda Bharati,

The Tantric Tradition, London: Rider & Co., 1965, p 214; etc...

69. Lê Manh Thát, So thảo lich sử hình thành van hê Bát nhã. Sài gòn, 1968, pp 214-217; Jan Yün-hua, Nàgàrjuna, One or More?, History of Religions X (1970) 139-155; also Mochizuki Shinko, Bukkyo Daijiten, Kyoto: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyo kai, 1954-1963, pp 5000b-5001a. Cf. Chang sun Wu chi et al., Sui shu ching chi chih, Shanghai: Shang wu yin kuan, 1957, pp 108 & 109, where three following treatises of medicine by Nàgàrjuna are mentioned: 1/ Lung shu p'u sa Yüeh fang, 2/ Lung shu p'u sa Ho hsiang fa, and 3/ Lung shu p'u sa Yang hsing fang.

70. See above n. 53. It is not without interest to point out here that avabhàsana and àbhàsa are synonymous, and Tibetan translators take them as such. Vimśatikà ad 1 reads,

vijñaptimàtram evaitad asadarthàvabhàsanàt/
yathà taimirikasyàsatkeśacandràdidarśanam//

which the Tibetan translates (Ñi śu pahi tshig lehur byas ba, TT 5557 p 233d2):

hdi dag rnam par rig tsam ñid/ yod pa ma yin don snaṅ phyir/
dper na rab rib can dag gis / skra zla la sogs med mthoṅ bźin//

And Vimśatikà ad 17 reads,

uktam yathà tadàbhàsà vijñaptih smaranam tatah/
svapne drgvisayàbhàvam nàprabuddho'vagacchati//

which is translated as (Ibid., p 233e4-5)

dper na der snaṅ rnam rig bźin/ bśad zin de las dran par zad/
rmi lam mthoṅ ba yul med par/ ma sad bar du rtogs ma yin//

71. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 15a7-8: raṅ rig la yaṅ hdir hbras bu/ śes pa ni snaṅ ba gñis las skyes te/ raṅ gi snaṅ ba daṅ yul gyi snaṅ baho/ snaṅ ba de gñis las gaṅ raṅ rig pa de ni hbras bur hgyur ro//. Cf. Tattvàrtharàjavàrtika of Akalanka, p 56: dvyàbhàsam hi jñànam utpadyate svàbhàsam visayàbhàsam ca/ tasyobhayàbhàsasya yat svasamvedam tat phalam/.

72. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 17a1-3:

don gyi tshul gyis dben pa yaṅ/ brjod bya ma yin
śes pa thams cad don gyi tshul daṅ bral na yaṅ tha sñad du bya bar mi nus so/
yul hdihi yaṅ/
spyi yi tshul gyis bstan par bya/ des na tha sñad du mi bya//

rnam par śes pa lṅa rnams kyi yul ni yul dehi spyihi tshul gyis tha sñad du bya ba yin gyi/ raṅ gyi ṅo bohi tshul gyis tha sñad du bya ba ni ma yin no/ spyihi ṅo bohi tshul las ni gzugs la sogs pa tha sñad du byed do/ dehi phyir rnam par śes pa lṅa rnams kyi yul ni tha sñad du bya bar mi nus so..../

73. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 14b2-4: chos mṅon pa las kyaṅ/ mig gi rnam par śes pa daṅ ldan pa sṅon po śes kyi sṅon poḥo sñam du ni ma yin no/ don la don du ḥdu śes kyi don la chos su ḥdu śes pa ni ma yin no źes gsuṅs so/ gal te de gcig tu mi rtog na rnam par śes pa lṅa po de ḥdus pa la dmigs pa ji ltar yin/ gaṅ yaṅ skye mched kyi raṅ gi mtshan ñid la so so raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul caṅ yin gyi/ rdsas kyi raṅ gi mtshan ñid la ni ma yin no źes kyaṅ ji ltar gsuṅs śe na/

der don du mas bskyed pahi phyir/ raṅ don spyi yi spyod yul can// de rdsas du mas bskyed par bya bahi phyir na raṅ gi skye mched la spyihi spyod yul can źes brjod kyi/ tha dad pa la tha mi dad par rtogs pa las ni ma yin no//. Obviously, we cannot be sure entirely as to what the Abhidharma statements actually mean. We have pointed out previously that Vasubandhu does not include them in his Abhidharmakośa. It was only after Dignàga having them discussed that they became widely quoted (See Hattori, Op. cit., pp 88-89; Wayman, Op. cit.), although it is far from clear as to what these various authors meant. The dispute betwen Wayman and Hattori is a good indication of the state of affairs. In any case, as long as optical illusions are recognized as belonging to perception, it is rather ridiculous to maintain that the object of perception is "inexpressible". Certainly, if Dignàga wishes to fashion his theory of perception so as to be able to account for a yogi's so-called perception of what to him is inexpressible, he can by all means do so and conveniently maintain such a position; but that would be irrelevant here.

CHAPTER SIX

ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND FURTHER ON ITS MECHANISM

We have seen that as a consequense of his discovery of the theory of internal pervasion, Vasubandhu proceeds to re-examine various problems which surrounded numerous theories of perception proposed by equally numerous schools of his days and which were seemingly unsolvable, with the resulted realization that if those problems were to be resolved, an entirely new approach must be introduced the basic notion of which is that of self-knowledge. This notion consists in the assertion that every knowledge is, of necessity, self-knowledge. Once such an assertion is made, the theory that "for someone who has the ability to perceive, he perceives something blue, but not 'It is blue'; as for the object he is aware of it but not of its attributes", which the Abhidharmavijñànakàya first maintains and Dignàga further elaborates, is clearly not acceptable,[1] on account of the fact that when a knowledge is defined as self-knowledge, not only is it aware of something blue, but also it is aware that it is aware of something being blue. The notion of self-knowledge thus carries with it the implicit inclusion of language as one of its components, for as Trần Đức Thảo has put it, language is the immediate environment of consciousness[2]. In fact, we will see that Vasubandhu considers language not only as the immediate environment of consciousness, but also as the sole means through which it can operate. So, after having rejected the theory of perception upheld by the Vijñànakàyàbhidharma, he redefines perception as "a cognition arising just from the object by which it is designated". Perception is thus defined in terms of language in which it is expressed. Due to this fact, Dignàga launches a heavy attack against it, as has been said. Of course,

such an attack is not surprising at all, since that is what we would expect, because as we have said, the new definition advanced by Vasubandhu represents not only a radical view totally dissociated from all the established traditions known at his times, particularly that of the authoritative and influential Vijñànakàyàbhidharma whose view were to be developed and defended by Dignàga in his famous Pramànasamuccaya under the shadow of Vasubandhu's critical Vàda-vidhi, but also a completely novel view of such radical nature that it seems as if his contemporaries and successors fail to rightly appreciate it as is evidenced in Dignàga's criticisms.

The radical novelty of Vasubandhu's definition obviously lies in its connecting perception with the language in which it is expressed. Dignàga correctly recognizes this, to which he so strongly objects and criticizes, since "the objects of the five kinds of sense-cognition are inexpressible".[3] Indeed, as we have said, although Vasubandhu never expressedly shares the view given by the Vijñànakàya and thus never refers to it in his Abhidharmakośa, the notion that "the object of perception is inexpressible", which is defined as "being free from verbal construction", still does get mention in his work with some pronounced modification. So, he concedes that "the five kinds of sense-cognition is free from verbal construction" in so far as it is exempted from "the verbal constructions" of mental activity and of memory, but not free from verbal construction per se, since they are always accompanied by what is called "mental talking of inquiry and judgement".[4] Consequently, it can be said that the notion that the object of perception is inexpessible is thereby seriously put in doubt even in the Abhidharmakośa in spite of the fact that it is far from being clear as to what exactly the terms "verbal construction" and the like specifically

means, as is evidenced in Vasubandhu's discussion about them.[5] The novelty thus introduced by Vasubandhu marks a rather radical departure from the views generally held at his times. It is not therefore very surprising when Dignàga devotes a whole section of his Pramànasamuccaya for its evaluation.

That novelty is introduced, as has been seen, in an attempt to resolve various difficulties arising out of the problem of perception, which leads finally to the postulation of the notion of self-knowledge. Surely enough, if perception is defined in terms of self-knowledge as its primary contact, it follows then that that perception must be designated by the name of the object from which it arises. So, it is not enough to say that I see, but further that I see something. There is no such thing as pure perception, that is, perception which is not designated by the object which it perceives, but always perception of something. The reason why there is no pure perception but always perception of something when perception is defined in terms of self-knowledge, resides in the fact that self-knowledge in this case occurs only when perception occurs, and if perception is not designated by the name of its object so as to distinguish it from the self-knowledge itself, then both of them may be totally compounded into just one single unit which clearly identifies perception with self-knowledge, an undesirable identification. Moreover, it is a matter of course that perception is expressible in a given language. If I perceive a dog running from the house on my left, I surely can say so. And only in so saying, can someone else know that I do see the dog running from the house. It would be therefore very unfortunate to advance a theory of the type proposed by Dignàga, in which such a matter of course is totally ignored and disregarded in favor of some preconceived notion of what perception must be.

But since perception is defined in terms of the language in which it is expressed, the self-knowledge itself must be hence defined also in terms of that language. For self-knowledge is in itself a part of the process of perception. This whole complex of perception and self-knowledge is thus totally dependent upon language for its operation, a conclusion which, as has been seen, is already quite apparent in the Abhidharmakośa. In it, Vasubandhu expressly states that all five sense-cognition is not exempt from verbal construction per se, since they are always accompanied by "the mental talking of inquiry and judgement".[6] However, not untill the appearance of the Vādavidhi is the connection of perception with language flatly stated, and not untill the Vimśatikā is the notion of self-knowledge seriously considered and discussed. Nevertheless, the early recognition of the all-important function of language in any given mental activity shows how Vasubandhu's theory of description arises, which in turn gives rise to his logic and in the end prompts him into the re-examination of the problem of perception with the resulted discovery of the notion of self-knowledge. From what has been said, this notion, though important it is, is rather a trifle truism which everybody has taken for granted, namely, that if we ever know anything, such a process of knowing occurs in our head, and not somewhere else. Thus, in order to know something, we must know at the same time that we know that thing. The knowledge we have of the external world and everything else is therefore derived from our own self-awareness of the informations which are furnished to us through our senses and which have undergone the processing of our knowing ability. So, in order for whatever there is in this world to be known, it must, of neces-

sity, be translatable into informations which are capable of being processed by our own knowing ability. The object is thereby defined in terms of informations which it can give us and which are coded in a given language for our comprehension. Once such a conclusion is reached, it is quite natural for Vasubandhu to advance the thesis that "whatever there is, is just merely what causes one to know; its object is non-existing because it is a self-knowledge, just like the seeing of non-existing hairs and moon etc... by a person who is affected with cataract". For indeed whatever we know of an object is whatever informations it gives us, and these informations, in turn, will define what that object is. Thus, "whatever there is, is, in fact, just merely what causes one to know". But if that is so, it follows then that the object which is defined by the informations furnished to us by whatever there is out there should not surely be existing in the same way as whatever there is out there does, since that object thus defined is but the knowledge which we have of the informations given to us. And since it is but a knowledge itself, it is hence non-existing, because a knowledge, by definition, is self-knowledge, and self-knowledge is what makes one be aware of the presence of something. In short, it is in itself a form of informations which does not refer to itself, but to whatever it is intended to inform.

In this connection, it must be noted that the word "object" in the above-quoted statement by Vasubandhu carries in its original language not only the connotation "object" proper, but also the connotation "meaning".[6] Object is thus linguistically defined in terms of its meaning. Whatever one speaks of as object, it must carry with it some meaning for it to be understood. It hence is identified almost totally with its meaning. In other words, when an object is defined in terms of the information one knows of it, such an object is certainly but a form of self-

knowledge, because it serves merely as a means of referring us to something other than itself, to something out there which we wish to know or we come to know. For instance, when we speak of an house, the term "house" serves not only as a referring basis for something out there which we come upon to agree as an house, but also as a transmitting channel of informations which helps to define that something. In serving in these two capacities, what we speak of as house surely does not exist, or at least does not exist in the same way, as something out there does, which it is used to refer to, for the simple reason that the term "house" is but a description of that something. Note that description is defined as an "incomplete symbol" capable of being substituted for by other suitable expressions. Being a description, a term just functions to transmit informations so that something out there can be defined and properly known. What we know of an object is therefore merely these informations, which sometimes crystallized in one term and sometimes more. In this sense, we can say that an object is just the informations we know of it. And this proposition is quite pointedly expressed by the genius of Sanskrit language in exactly one word: artha, which, as has been said, is endowed throughout history with both connotations "object" and "meaning". Given this double connotation, it is no wonder that in Vasubandhu's view an object, when thus defined, is not existing. It does not exist, because it is merely informations intended for our self-knowledge. The question now is as to why when thus defined, it is not existing, and how such a state of affair comes about.

We have seen that the Viṃśatikā was the first writing by Vasubandhu to announce the above thesis that the object, when defined as informations, does not exist. It is quite natural then for us to look into it to see if it provides any justification

for such a position. In the last chapter, we have seen how the Vimśatikà tried to do exactly that providing by showing that what we know is merely just the informations which cause us to know, and not the objects themselves. It indicates (1) that the object we know may not be existing, e.g. what one sees in a dream, and (2) that since everything is changing constantly, the object, so changing, can never be known except as image, that is, as informations which it leaves behind. Given these two main reasons, the Vimśatikà arrives at the conclusion that "whatever there is, is just merely what causes one to know", as has been said. Clearly then, it fails to explicitly justify its position to the extent that we would like, especially in view of his theory of descriptions expressed in the Abhidharmakośa. In fact, Vasubandhu emphatically states therein in connection with the problem of the existence of the past and the future that "an object- of-consciousness can be nothing but a name, and the object which it refers to needs not exist",[7] so as to be able to explain why we can readily know and understand something in the past which, by definition, is no longer existing. Thus, it is through the means of names that things can be known and recorded. This observation plays a crucial role in the development of Vasubandhu's theory of descriptions in the Abhidharmakośa, as was quite apparent in our discussion above. Curiously, it does not come into play, however, in the Vimśatikà. As a result, the attempt to prove the thesis that "whatever there is, is just merely what causes one to know" loses some of its effectiveness. This loss must await the Trimśikà to be made up for.

The Trimśikà opens with the famous statement that "the description of self and things which functions in several ways is upon the transformation of consciousness", which leads finally to the equally famous conclusion that "the

transformation of consciousness is verbal construction by which what is verbally constructed does not exist, therefore whatever there is, is all just merely what causes one to know".[8] The whole life of a consciousness, including the self-knowledge itself, is therefore totally determined by what is termed as "verbal construction" by Vasubandhu. What is "verbal construction", then? Answering this question, unfortunately we do not have any clear statement from Vasubandhu himself, after a search is made through all his writings still extant. It seems as if such terms as "verbal construction" received wide usage and were easily understood at his times, not only to those within his immediate intellectual circle, but also to all the leaders of various philosophical and scientific schools of his days. Thus, we have the interesting definition by Vindhyavàsin, the noted Sàmkhya teacher who defeated Vasubandhu's master in a debate, according to which "perception is the activity of the sense-organs such as ear etc... without verbal construction".[9] Again, we do not know exactly what is meant by the term 'verbal construction' here, since no definition is given.

The first clear attempt at defining it explicitly is made in the Yogasùtra, in which verbal construction is defined as "the knowledge caused by words and devoid of any reality"[10]. However, it is rather difficult to determine approximately when that definition first made its appearance therein, although it is generally thought that the whole work must have appeared not long before the birth of Vasubandhu himself.[11] In any case, if we surmise that the Yogasùtra was written in betwen the third and the fourth century A.D., it would fit in very well with the state of affair just described, i.e. that people at Vasubandhu's

time have already taken for granted what the term 'verbal construction' precisely meant without bothering to elaborate any further about its meaning, because they knew exactly what it meant, as it was defined in the Yogasùtra. And this is not to mention the fact that even without the technically sounding definition by Patañjali, the term 'verbal construction' seemingly was taken to mean what it originally intended to mean, that is, that a statement can be construed in such a way that it can mean differently. Thus, in the Nyàyasùtra, 'verbal construction' is used to describe various logical "traps" that one may fall into in the course of a discussion or debate.[12] And this usage is clearly derived from the Mìmàmsaka ritual terminology where the term is employed to designate all the cases in which given a ceremony there are more than one rite or there are two variants of the same rite, which possess the same authority and bring the same result.[13] These cases are called "verbal construction", whose meaning is quite self-evident: there is actually only one rite, but due to different verbal constructions there are two or more, which, in final analysis, mean the same. In light of this historical development, the above definition by the Yogasùtra is hence fully justified and further clarifies some of the mysteries which surrounded the term and which led many researchers in this field to wrongly translate it as "imagination".[14]

"Verbal construction is that which is engendered by the knowledge of words and which is devoid of things"— śabdajñànànupàtì vastuśùnyo vikalpah. Surely enough, if two rites or two variants of the same rite have the same identical effect and are of the same identical authority in a given ceremony, then the only discerned difference betwen them can be made solely upon their wordings. This is what makes them into what the ritualists called "verbal construction". And that is what is

conveyed in the definition given by the Yogasùtra. The meaning of the term is therefore very clear up to at least Vindhyavàsin's and Vasubandhu's time. In fact, most of those who inherited Vasubandhu's philosophical legacy such as Bhartrhari, Aśvabhàva etc... made use extensively the notion of verbal construction without ever saying specifically what it meant.[15] Obviously, it was a standard term of philosophical language of the time, and its meaning was of no questionable ambiguity. Even when Dignàga attempted to establish its definition anew, still no significant deviation is found therein from what has been given by the Yogasùtra. Thus, having asked the question: "What, then, is this verbal construction?", Dignàga gives us the following answer:

> The association of name, genus etc... [with a thing perceived]. In the case of arbitrary words, an object distinguished by a name is expressed by a word such as Dittha. In the case of genus words, an object distinguished by a genus is expressed by a word such as "cow". In the case of quality words, an object distinguished by a quality is expressed by a word such as "white". In the case of action words, an object distinguished by an action is expressed by a word such as "cooking". In the case of substance words, an object distinguished by a substance is expressed by a word such as "staffbearer" or "horn-bearer". Here, with regards to these last words, some maintain that what is expressed by them is an object distinguished by a relationship, while some others hold that what is expressed is a thing qualified only by words which is devoid of object"[16].

With such a statement, Dignàga leaves no uncertain term as to what is meant by the expression "verbal construction". It is "the association of words with things perceived". But, in order to carry out such an association, it is necessary that one must know what a word is, and that such a word must be devoid of any reference to but one sole thing. Otherwise, if one does not know the name of a

thing, there is nothing to be associated with that thing. And if a word does refer to a specific thing and solely to that thing alone, then it cannot be used in any other case for other things. In short, as the Yogasūtra said, "verbal construction is that which is engendered by the knowledge of words and which is devoid of thing". Later, we have even more concise and explicit definitions such as that offered by Kamalaśīla: "verbal construction is a verbal cognition",[17] that is, every cognition is and must be a verbal cognition, which is a distant echo of the famous pronouncement by Bhartrhari that "there is not one single notion in this world which is not accompanied by words".[18] The meaning of the term "verbal construction" is thus clearly indicated. There is not even one shred of evidence for such translations as "imagination" or "conceptual construction" etc..., which contribute not a little to the misunderstanding, if not the distortion, of Vasubandhu's thought with such descriptions as "idealist" or "mind-only" etc..., and which give rise to such often repeated assertions as "The Yogācāra holds that consciousness is the sole reality" etc...[19]

Now, if verbal construction is just the "association of name with things perceived", then to say that "the transformation of consciousness is verbal construction" is to state that all the activities of our psychological life are totally determined by, and wholly dependent upon, our ability to manipulate and employ a given language, spoken or otherwise. It is probably due to the recognition of this characteristic observation in Vasubandhu's philosophy that leads Bhartrhari to his oft-cited remark that "all activity in the world is based upon words, which even the infant has recourse to through the instinct previously endowed".[20] In fact, as Vasubandhu describes it, the transformation

of consciousness just referred to is of three kinds, and all of them are naturally totally determined by, and wholly dependent upon, language for their operation, since as has been seen, the transforming process itself is just a verbal construction. The first kind of the transformation is that of the perceptual consciousness which allows us to perceive things through our sense-organs. That the operation of these perceptual activities depends upon language is certainly not very surprising, for we have seen why and how Vasubandhu defines perception in terms of the language in which it is expressed. The second and the third kind of transformation are those of what we may term as instinctive consciousness and processing consciousness. The instinctive consciousness is so called, owing to its description by Vasubandhu as "always accompanied by four afflictions known as notion of self, delusion of self, pride of self, and love of self". Being instinctive, it always co-exists with the perceptual consciousness except in the case of fainting, torpor and meditative trance. It again is totally determined by, and wholly dependent upon, language for its operation. The processing consciousness is similarly determined. What is here referred to as processing consciousness is usually designated by so-called store-consciousness or retribution-consciousness. The reason why we choose the former terminology will be clear subsequently. This processing consciousness is said to have "the seed of everything" and "to flow on like the current of a river". It is also called "the fundamental consciousness from which the five consciousnesses originate according to conditioning factors, whether all together or otherwise, as the waves arise upon the water". The five consciousnesses just referred to are obviously the perceptual consciousness of the five senses. So, although it is said to exist three kinds of transformation of consciousness, in

actuality there is but one transformation and one consciousness, for the processing consciousness is considered as the fundamental consciousness from which every other consciousness arises. The instinctive consciousness is conceived to be based upon it and having it as object. The perceptual consciousness of the five senses and of the brain is also similarly described, as has been seen. The relationship betwen these three kinds of transformation is thus clearly delineated.[21]

Given such a concept of the structure of consciousness, where every psychological activities, either perceptual or instinctive, are thought to be based upon a processing consciousness, "as the waves arise upon the water", one must explain why and how that processing consciousness is capable of giving rise to those activities whose foundation it claims to be. The answer to this problem is already found in the above-quoted thesis of the Trimśikà: "the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction". Evidently, if perception is defined in terms of the language in which it is expressed, and its foundation is the processing consciousness, then the transformation of that consciousness into a perception must surely be a verbal construction, pure and simple. The question remains, therefore, as to how that verbal construction occurs. In response to this, the theory of seeds is introduced. The notion of seed has a rather long history, and it is discussed widely in various early writings by Vasubandhu, particularly the Abhidharmakośa and the Karmasiddhiprakarana[22]. The introduction of this notion into these works is aimed at explaining primarily why the moral consequenses of an act do not perish at the moment when that act is done and finished. For instance, if I were to lie to someone, why is it that after the act of lying is physically and successfully accomplished,

I still feel guilty of it? Further, if I were to believe in the notion that every action of mine, depending on whether it is beneficial or unbeneficial to me and to others, would bring about corresponding result in some future time, the just-raised question becomes even more relevant, i.e. why is it that an act can bring about its consequence, once it is physically and materially done? For resolving these questions the notion of seed is employed. It is argued that just as a plant can sow their seeds in earth which later emerge as sprouts, so are the actions of man. Every action leaves behind it some seed, which "after hundred of aeons does not perish, and whose effects will ripen for living beings after having obtained its needed complex of conditions and its needed time".[23] So, if the effect still lingers on, after an action of mine had been done, it is because that action had sown a seed of its own, which, when necessary and sufficient conditions are available, has given rise to the just-said lingering effect.

The notion of seed is therefore a rather convenient device for clarifying the knotty problem of moral consequences of an action. And true to its original intention, Vasubandhu uses it mainly for that purpose in numerous discussions he has in the Abhidharmakośa and in the Karmasiddhiprakarana[24]. When passing to the Vimśatikà, however, we find nothing of the kind. Now, it is employed principally for elucidating the question of self-knowledge which he opens his book with. Remenber that that question is stated as follows: "Whatever there is, is just merely what causes one to know, its object is not existing because it is a self-knowledge". In order to make clear why the object defined as information "is not existing because it is a self-knowledge", Vasubandhu gives the following reason: "The seed of its own from which what causes one to know

arises as a self-knowledge of a thing when that seed arrives at the decisive point of its transformation, that seed on the one side, and the seed which arises as a self-knowledge of itself, on the other, these are the two that the Blessed One pronounced as the eye-field and the thing-field, respectively".[25] Reading this statement slowly, it becomes quite clear that the object defined as information does not exist, because it is just a seed of the self-knowledge, which, when arriving at the decisive statge of its transformation, allows us to have a perception, i. e. to be aware of something out there and of us here. The transformation of consciousness is thus the transformation of a seed at any given moment. Through the means of a seed, the so-called fundamental consciousness, that is, the processing consciousness tranforms itself into a perception. What is meant by the term "seed", then?

Although in his commentary upon Asanga's Mahàyànasamgraha Vasubandhu glosses the expression "seed" as "a special force", "a special power or potentiality",[26] this is certainly not the only possible gloss for it. In fact, as the author of the Abhidharmadìpa pointed out and Yaśomitra subsequently repeated it, not only does the term "seed" mean "a special force or power", it also means "an impression".[27] And this latter meaning does occur in Vasubandhu's writings. In truth, we can even say that he uses both the term "seed" and "impression" interchangeably and indiscriminately. For example, in the Karmasiddhiprakarana, we read:

> The state which impairs the seeds gradually becomes weak, weaker, and even more weaker, in the same manner in which there is a [gradual] diminution in boiling water, or in the velocity of a projected arrow, and because of this, when at the time of the emergence the conclusion of the projection is reached, through a special transformation of

the processing consciousness from one moment to the next and through the resumption of the seeds, the mental consciousness and subsequently the other consciousnesses also arise as their needed conditions exist. The processing consciousness, where there are only the various kind of seeds themselves, is influenced by the other beneficial and unbeneficial attributes arising together with the consciousnesses different from it, by means of their augmentation of these seeds according to circumstances. In accordance with the force of this special transformation of the series, the process of impression resumes, and desired and undesired effects are brought about. In reference to this, it has been said:

> "This citta which has limitless seeds continues in a stream,
> and when there arise proper conditions for it,
> it and its seeds become augmented.
> Augmented by them and resuming its course,
> it is able to give its effects in time,
> just as for the dyed lemon flower,
> the color appears in the core of its fruit""[28]

Here, Vasubandhu uses two expressions "the resumption of the seeds" and "the process of impression resumes" to signify exactly the same thing which is the process of the resumption of the seeds or impressions. This indiscriminate use of these two terms "seed" and "impression", which, besides the just-cited quotation, can be readily found in other passages of the same work,[29] does not, of course, incur any serious danger of being misunderstood by his contemporaries, since as has been noted, they are quite aware of that usage. The author of the Abhidharmadīpa is the case in point. He lived not long after Vasubandhu and could easily identify the meaning of the term "seed" as, among other things, "impression", as we have pointed out earlier. Now, with this identification,

let's return to the above statement by the Vimśatikā to see what exactly it means.

It says that "the seed of its own from which what causes one to know arises as a self-knowledge of a thing when it arrives at the decisive point of its transformation, that seed on the one side, and the seed which arises as a self-knowledge of itself on the other, these are the two that the Blessed One pronounced as the eye-field and the thing-field, respectively". We presently know that the terms "seed" and "impression" are synonymous and interchangeable in the texts of at least the Abhidharmakośa and the Karmasiddhiprakarana. And there is no reason why the same situation would not occur in the Vimśatikā. So, if we surmise that it actually occurs, the just-cited statement by the Vimśatikā simply means that when an impression is received from something out there, it causes one to be aware of the fact that one knows something out there and that one knows that one knows of that thing. Thus, the impression so received triggers into action two simultaneous operations designed to transform the seed of the processing consciousness into a full-pledged knowledge of the perceptual consciousness. First, it causes one to know that one receives the impression of something. And secondly, it causes one to know that one know that one receives the impression of that thing. These two simultaneous operations are intended for the transformation of a given seed into a perceptual knowledge, as has been said. Consequently, neither the impression which causes one to be aware of something, nor that which causes one to be aware that one is aware of that thing should exist independently or ever exist after all. They are just the seeds. And if the interpretation of it as an "impression", which to a very large extent is decidedly helpful and informative, may make us think of it as some sort of entity, which is very misleading, it also can be understood as "power" or

"potentiality", as has been noted. When it is so understood, the perceptual knowledge evolved from the seed is not, by nature, different from the seed itself at all, because as a seed, it exists as a potentiality, which needs appropriate conditions so as to be able to transform itself into an actuality. It is probably with this idea in mind that Vasubandhu glosses the term "seed" as "potentiality" in his commentary upon the Mahāyānasamgraha in order to forcefully emphasize the notion that there is but one knowledge which at different stages of its transformation is called by different names such as "seed", and that these names should not be construed to signify there being different entities at these different stages. Once, the seed which gives us the self-knowledge of a thing and the seed which causes us to be aware of that self-knowledge are evolved into but one perceptual knowledge of something out there, it is quite self-evident that neither of these seeds can be considered as existing independently by any means. To use Vasubandhu's own phrases, "the object does not exist because it is a self-knowledge". In fact, the seed, that is, the impression which causes us to be aware of something out there and which becomes therefore, of necessity, the object of our self-knowledge, how can it be said to exist? For it is going to be evolved and transformed into a knowledge itself. And for the same reason, how can it be an object, to begin with?

We have pointed out the double meaning of the term "object" used by Vasubandhu. Some thing is an object only in so far as it can have some meaning, that is, in so far as it can offer some information. Object is thus defined as information. So, when Vasubandhu says "the object does not exist because it is a self-knowledge", it also means that the object in this given context does not exist because it

is but information. In fact, only as information can it be identified with the self-knowledge in the subsequent subordinate sentence "because it is a self-knowledge". And in this sense it is synonymous with the term "seed" discussed above. The theory of transformation in the Vimśatikà is hence evidently clear. When an object defined as information supplies us with information, which were to become seed or impression, it, once so becoming, transforms itself through various stages of self-knowledge into a full-pledged knowledge of the perceptual consciousness. As a result, now we must take into account not only the interpretation of seed as impression or potentiality, but also the interpretation of it as information. This is, of course, a deductive observation, since the whole Vimśatikà does not make the latter interpretation abundantly clear. However, as will be seen, it is a correct observation which is to be corroborated by his later writing, the Trimśikà.

We have said that the Trimśikà opens with the famous thesis that "the description of self and things which functions in various ways is upon the transformation of consciousness". We are told further that this transformation of consciousness is of three kinds, i.e. the processing transformation, the instinctive transformation and the perceptual transformation, and these transformations are but verbal construction. We have also noted that the relationship betwen these three kinds of transformation is that of identity. That is to say that the consciousness by the processing transformation transforms itself into a perceptual consciousness which is the end-point of the perceptual transformation, while the instinctive transformation occurs along with the processing transformation, since "it is based upon the processing transformation and having the latter as its object". Given this identity relationship, it is no wonder that Vasubandhu simply says "the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction", as it is quite apparent that there is but

one transformation, which at different stages is called, it seems, by different names. In any case, we know for certain that there is only one transformation of consciousness, and this transformation is defined as a verbal construction. What, then, does it mean?

It simply means that the whole operation of a consciousness is a verbal construction, therefore it totally depends upon language for its working. Again, we repeated that Vasubandhu defines perception in terms of the language in which it is expressed. Perception as the end-point of the processing transformation once so defined, it follows that that which transforms itself into that end-point would be similarly defined. Consequently, it is necessary that the whole tranforming process itself must be defined as a verbal construction. Given this definition, it is not at all surprising when the seed, which is said to exist in the processing consciousness, that is, the consciousness which carried the processing transformation to its end-point, is defined in terms of the language in which it is expressed. For if perception is defined in terms of the language in which it is expressed and if the whole transforming process is but a verbal construction, then there is no other way but to similarly define the seed, which gives rise to that perception after the transforming process. The seed must hence be considered as some sort of information coded in a given language. It constitutes the basis upon which the whole transforming process of consciousness operates. So, the definition of the transformation of consciousness in terms of a verbal construction clearly points to the notion of the seed understood as information coded in a given language. The above observation that the term "seed" can be interpreted as "information" is thereby fully corroborated. And this is not very surprising. What surprises us is the fact that when this corroborated interpretation is taken into account with

the previously described notion of transformation of the Vimśatikà, a rather interesting and coherent picture of the theory of transformation emerges.

The Vimśatikà says that an impression, which is going to give us a self-knowledge of something and which later constitutes the thing-field, must transform itself to a decisive stage where the self-knowledge of something emerges. This transforming process according to the Trimśikà is a verbal construction. As a result, the impression or the seed left behind by something in our consciousness is actually the information which is to be processed. And this information must be coded in a given language and through the means of that language, since the transformation of a consciousness, which it is to be subjected to, operates only as a verbal construction and not otherwise. The theory of the transformation of consciousness given by Vasubandhu in the Vimśatikà and in the Trimśikà is thus clearly delineated. There is no ambiguity nor ambivalence as to what it means, which might cause confusion. Based upon it, Vasubandhu was able to recognize that an object when defined as a source of information, or more precisely as some sort of information, does not exist in virtue of that information, since what the information does is to refer to something outside of itself, to something out there, and further that when that information is processed, it becomes a knowledge of the object acquired by a given consciousness and not the object which it actually represents and informs. Failing to understand properly this theory of the transformation of consciousness of Vasubandhu can be said to be the root-cause of the wide-spread perception that his is an idealistic philosophy by numerous researchers which we have referred to above. Even Wayman, who correctly raises the question of whether Vasubandhu's Yogàcàra philosophy is an idealism by pointing out that if idealism were to be understood by such assertions as

"consciousness is the sole reality", then it is very difficult, indeed, to explain why Vasubandhu recognizes the independent existence of a category of dharmas which are associated neither with the consciousness nor with the matter, still seems to readily impute some sort of idealism to the Vimśatikà, if not the Trimśikà.[30] This is rather unfortunate.

Now, if it is the transformation of consciousness which makes it possible for an impression to evolve into a full-pledged knowledge, then how does the transformation occur? In the Trimśikà where the notion of transformation is specifically introduced and capitalized, Vasubandhu is content to say merely that "the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction" after having shown that it is of three kinds, and that is all. So, in so far as the Trimśikà is concerned, it does not give us any clear answer to the question just raised. Commentaries written upon it are, however, more instructive on this point. Thus, after asking "What is the transformation", Sthiramati offers the following response:

> "It is a state of becoming otherwise. When an effect obtains itself simultaneously with the instant of the destruction of the cause and characteristically differently from that instant of the cause, that is the transformation. At that instant, due to the complete processing of the impressions of verbal construction such as self etc... and due to the complete processing of the impressions of verbal construction such as thing etc..., the verbal construction arises as a self-knowledge of itself and as a self-knowledge of thing from the processing consciousness. This self-knowledge of itself and this self-knowledge of thing, owing to the verbal construction, function as objective fact as description of self etc... and as description of thing such as physical object etc... in all its eternity even without any external self or things, just like the description of hairs and circles by a person suffered from cataract. Is a description a term which does not means what it is and which does not apply to where it must be, just as when one uses the term "cow" to describe

a Bahika".[31]

According to Sthiramati then, transformation means that an impression, when left behind by an object in a so-called store-consciousness, transforms itself through the process of verbal construction to the point where it is able to initiate a consciousness into being aware of itself and of the impression. Once this self-awareness of itself and of the impression occurs, owing to its verbal construction it functions as a description of self or thing when there is depending as objective fact. In other words, when an impression through its process of transformation triggers a consciousness into a self-knowledge of itself and of the impression, the impression then becomes a description of the thing which depends upon it as an objective fact. In this sense, it is evidently clear that the transformation of consciousness is indeed a verbal construction. As matter of fact, the whole process of the transfomation is a processing of an impression into a description of a thing, no more no less. What we know of the world outside us is therefore totally dependent upon that processing. Through it, an impression left behind by an object can trigger our consciousness into an awareness of ourselves and of the impression which the object left behind. And from this awareness, we are able to form an exact description of the thing which the impression signifies. The awareness of oneself and of the impression is thus very essential to the operation of the process. In fact, without it, it is very difficult to conceive how the whole process of transformation can work at all, since the impression would remain as what it is. No end-point could be reached, and no description of a thing produced when there is depending as objective fact. The process of the transformation of a consciousness is hence clearly indicated by Sthiramati.

Dharmapàla provides a similar, if not identical, explanation of the working mechanism of the process. However, due to the view held by a number of authors that Dharmapàla in that respect does maintain some ideas widely and profoundly different from those of Sthiramati, we give here a translation of the often-cited passage of his and offer some elucidation of our own.

> "These consciousnesses transform themselves into verbal construction and what is verbally constructed. Because of this, what is verbally constructed does not exist. Therefore, whatever there is, is merely just what causes one to know.
>
> "The Commentary says: what are called 'these consciousnesses' are the three consciousnesses of transformation previously stated and their attributes. These consciousnesses are capable of transforming themselves into the seeing part and the seen part. Hence, there is the name 'transformation'. What is transformed into the seeing part is called 'verbal construction', that is because it can apprehend the seen part. What is transformed into the seen part is called the verbally constructed, that is because it is apprehended by the seeing part. Due to this precise reasoning, those real selves and things surely do not exist without what is transformed by the consciousness. For [without the consciousness] transforming itself into a grasping part and a grasped part, there should exist no independent thing. No real thing existswithout those two parts. Therefore, whatever there is, either compounded or uncompounded, either real or descriptive, it is with the consciousness".[32]

Reading that passage, Dharmapàla's notion of the transformation of consciousness is certainly not different from Sthiramati's, despite his avowed criticism of the latter's theory of one-form cognition and his rather curious way of parsing the Sanskrit sentence written by Vasubandhu. These two latter points need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that as far as his criticism of Sthiramati's theory of one-formed cognition goes, it seems to us not warranted and exceedingly

unconvincing, just like the case of his criticism of Dignàga's theory of double-formed knowledge and of his proposed view of three-formed one. As for his curious way of parsing Vasubandhu's Sanskrit sentence, it is true that from a purely grammatical point of view the parsing is unsound, if it is a matter of fact that Hsuan Tsang renders his original Sanskrit version faithfully and correctly, a supposition which one may subject to doubt and distrust in light of the latter's other translations whose Sanskrit originals are preserved and which show to deviate considerably from them.[33] In any case, the meaning of Vasubandhu's verse is quite clear, and an unsound parsing of it such as Dharmapàla's would not do any violent harm to it. In fact, the force of the meaning of that verse is such that it compells one to accept Dharmapàla's as the only possible parsing and explanation, even when the parsing is grammatically unsound. For if it is thought that the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction, it follows that there must be something verbally constructed. Otherwise, what is the point of talking about verbal construction? In truth, there would be no verbal construction, if there is no verbally constructed through which the verbal construction embodies itself. So, when Vasubandhu says "the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction", we would expect that he follows with the saying about the "verbally constructed", regardless of this saying is continued by another statement or not. As a result, we cannot accuse Dharmapàla of not understanding Vasubandhu's Sanskrit, which surely is not true by any shred of imagination; nor can we accuse him of carrying out violent interpretation of the latter's thought. Despite bad grammar, if we believe Hsuan Tsang's rendering of his Sanskrit faithfully and correctly, despite that, Dharmapàla still offers us through the above-quoted passage a

perfectly sound and intelligible account of Vasubandhu's theory of the transformation of consciousness.

When Dharmapàla says "these consciousnesses are capable of transforming themselves into the seeing part and the seen part", what he means actually is that the impressions are capable of transforming themselves into the self-knowledge of itself and the self-knowledge of the impression. For in the subsequent page[34], he specifically identifies the word "consciousness" with "seed"; and the term "seed" means "impression", as has been seen. Further, in his examination of the theory of double-formed cognition elaborated by Dignàga, Dharmapàla represents this theory in terms of the seeing and the seen parts[35]. So, what are designated by the seeing part and the seen part in Dharmapàla's terminology are actually called "the self-knowledge of itself" and "the self-knowledge of thing" by Dignàga[36]. The meaning of the above-cited statement by Dharmapàla is thus completely clear. It means that for him when an impression is left behind by an object, it is capable of transforming itself into a self-knowledge of itself and a self-knowledge of impression. It is due to this transformation that both of these self-knowledges do not exist, since they are destined finally to be transformed into a full-pledgeed knowledge. Consequently, "whatever there is, either compounded or uncompounded, either real or descriptive, is all just merely what causes one to know". Now, if we are to compare this view of Dharmapàla's with that of Sthiramati previously described, they are in the most perfect agreement. If Dharmapàla says "these consciousnesses are capable of transforming themselves into the seeing part and the seen part", Sthiramati would refrain "due to the complete processing of the impressions of

verbal constructions such as self etc... and due to the complete processing of the impressions of verbal construction such as thing etc..., the verbal construction arises as a self-knowledge of itself and as a self-knowledge of thing from the processing consciousness". Clearly then, it is not the interpretation of the transformation of consciousness as a transformation into the so-called seeing and the seen parts by Dharmapàla which makes his thought on this related matter "a kind of idealism"; nor is such an interpretation lacking in Sthiramati's commentary which endows his view with a "theory of reality", as has been widely alleged.[37] They are thus in the most perfect agreement in their presenting the theory of the transformation of consciousness proposed by Vasubandhu.

This most perfect agreement is obviously not very surprising to anyone familiar with what is said in the Vimśatikà. In it, Vasubandhu says, "the seed of its own from which what causes one to know arises as a self-knowledge of a thing what it arrives at the decisive point of its transformation, that seed on the one side, and the seed which arises as a self-knowledge of itself on the other, these are the two that the Blessed One called "the eye-field" and "the thing-field", respectively". Now, let take this statement and compare it with two above-cited passages by Sthiramati and Dharmapàla. It is quite apparent that both of the latter draw the core of their notion of the transformation of consciousness from precisely the statement just quoted. They all base their idea of transformation upon the evolution of the seed or impression into a self-knowledge of itself and a self-knowledge of the seed or impression. In short, despite of the lack on Vasubandhu's part in the Trimśikà of a clear exposition of his view on the transformation of consciousness, we can still reliably have a

decidedly exact notion of what it means thanks to the Vimśatikà and the works of Dharmapàla and Sthiramati.

The theory of the transformation of consciousness thus described here is therefore totally novel and entirely different from what is conceived in Vasubandhu's earlier works. For instance, in the Abhidharmakośa after asking the question "what is the stream of consciousness? what is the transformation? what is the decisive point?", he offers the following answer:

> "Stream of consciousness is the continuous flow of consciousness before an action. The arising of this flow and its becoming otherwise is the transformation. And when due to the particular character of the last transformation, it is capable of giving rise to an effect immediately after that last transformation, that is the decisive point of the transformation".[38]

The notion so defined by the Abhidharmakośa is thus clearly straightforward and very simple. It has nothing to do with the idea that the transformation of consciousness is the transformation of an impression into a self-knowledge of itself and a self-knowledge of the impression, which the Vimśatikà emphasizes and Sthiramati and Dharmapàla repeat in their respective works. The contrast betwen them is hence quite prominent. Obviously, one may ask as to why such a marked contrast occurs, which characterizes the radical departure of the Vimśatikà from the original and simple idea of the Abhidharmakośa about the theory of transformation. Yet, one cannot deny that the contrast does exist. In fact, we can say that that contrast marks not only two periods of Vasubandhu's thought, but also his thought as a whole from those of his contemporaries and predecessors, for nowhere can one find such notion of the transformation of consciousness as it is expressed in the Vimśatikà.

Of course, the notion of the transformation of consciousness in its various names has a long and involved history. It can be said to originate with the grammarians who, given the declensional nature of Sanskrit language, wonder why a word can decline without losing its original meaning. At first, it is a matter of change in samdhi for euphonic reasons, for instance e > a or i > y before a vowel. In describing these linguistic modifications, authors of various Pràtiśàkhyas talk about one sound becoming another. Thus, the Rgvedapràtiśàkhya records the rule that "the expression 'this to that' means becoming that, with reference to the sound which stands nearest to it".[39] And the Taittirìyapràtiśàkhya speaks of "the accusative case making the name of a product of transformation".[40] However, when the Astàdhyàyì of Pànini appears, instead of talking about the transformation of one sound into another, it has recourse to the doctrine of substitution of one sound for another and therefore poses the requirement that the substitute must be treated like the original except where it indicates otherwise.[41] Given this situation of two parallel theories of sound change, which seems mutually exclusive to each other, Patañjali offers a rather interesting solution. He says that substitution is also transformation. Why? Because substitution is but a transformation of the effect. What does this transformation of the effect means then? He gives the example that according to Pànini II.4.52 the root bhù is a substitute for the root as- when the latter has the suffix of the type àrdhadhàtuka. What happens in this substitution in his view is that with the new suffix the root as presents us with a new situation just like when a speaker talks to a listener first about some mango trees and then about some fig trees. The transformation of the effect

in both of the cases is not what occurs to the root as or to the trees, but what is happening to our understanding of them both. So, for Patañjali the transformation of the effect is thus a transformation of the mind, a buddhi-viparinàma.[42]

This rather curious notion of the transformation of the mind advanced here immediately reminds of the theory of the transformation of consciousness proposed by Vasubandhu. Obviously, we do not know exactly how far Vasubandhu derives his theory from that of Patañjali. The Abhidharmakośa has its share of citations from Pànini and numerous discussions as to the precise grammatical structure of a word or a sentence.[43] Yet, no explicit mention of Patañjali's name is made. It is also of great significance that Vasubandhu begins the Trimśikà with a thesis relating to the problem of descriptions known under the term "upàcàra" without making any attempt ever to define what that term means. As will be seen in the next chapter of the present work, the meaning given to it by commentators of that work is drawn primarily from Patañjali himself. It is evident then that if Vasubandhu takes for granted the meaning of upacàra, he must have taken for granted on the basis of Patañjali's explanation and must be satisfied with it. Given these circumstantial evidence, we cannot help but to conclude that Vasubandhu must have presented his theory of the transformation of consciousness upon Patañjali's notion of the transformation of the mind. Unfortunately, the question of how the transformation of the mind operates never receives any treatment in the latter's writing. As a result, we are forced to conclude also that even if Vasubandhu derives his theory of the transformation of consciousness from Patañjali's notion of the transformation of the mind, it is still with Vasubandhu

that it is properly understood and evaluated and is developed into a theory free of ambiguity and ambivalence. And that is the unique feature of Vasubandhu's theory of the transformation of consciousness which is not found elsewhere and which differentiates it from all the other notions of the transformation with which it is often held in comparison.[44] His is surely not susceptible to being compared with the Sàmkhya view of transformation, nor with the Vedànta doctrine of manifestation, for the simple reason that his is not conceived in terms of an ontology. Rather, it is, for all purpose, is a statement about the possible mechanism of the working of our knowing ability. Again, it is due to the failure of recognizing that characteristic feature which led numerous authors into calling Vasubandhu an "idealist" and into asserting that "according to the Vijñànavàdins the vijñàna is the source (àlayavijñàna) of all, including the seven functional consciousnesses (pravrttivijñàna) outside of which nothing really exists".[45] In fact, it is that characteristic feature which induces us into considering and finding the origin of Vasubandhu's theory in the notion of the transformation of the mind referred to in the work of Patañjali. Both of them get their insight from the study of the problems posed by the use of human language. Both of them arrive at similar conclusions, despite the difference in their original intent and approach. For Patañjali, the notion of the transformation of the mind is resorted to so as to enable him maintain the thesis that words are eternal, while for Vasubandhu no such thesis exists. He is driven to the theory of the transformation of consciousness by his own definition of what perception is, which in turn is a direct consequence of his logical investigation. In any case, his theory is unique in so far as its scope and delineation is concerned.

It says that the transformation of consciousness is nothing but the transformation of an impression into a self-knowledge of itself and a self-knowledge of the impression, which both result into a full-pledged perceptual knowledge which can be defined in terms of the language in which it is expressed. In short, it is a verbal construction. In this process of verbal construction, the notion of self-knowledge plays a decisive role, without which it is impossible to describe that transformation, as has been done. In fact, without it, no characteristic feature can be discerned in Vasubandhu's theory which is not found elsewhere among numerous authors which have recourse to the term "transformation". We have seen in the previous chapter that the notion of self-knowledge is introduced into his system as a result of his attempt at resolving the problem of perception. In the earlier days, perception is thought of as something inexpressible. It is a "pure sensation", a living intimate experience, which cannot be shared. This way of thinking of the perception turns out that it gives rise to more problems than it solves, which by Vasubandhu's time even seem unresolvable. The crux of the question is of course how to relate the perceptual experience with the verbal knowledge in which it is expressed. And this crucial question has been removed by Vasubandhu by first defining perception not as a pure sensation, but in terms of the language in which it is expressed eventually, as we have seen. And then he proceeds to give reason why such a definition is logically required. He points out as a matter of fact that every knowledge is by nature a self-knowledge, that is, if one knows some thing, not only does he know that thing, but also he knows that he knows that thing. This is what later is called by Dignàga the theory of the double-formed cognition. Once that notion of self-knowledge is accepted as a matter of fact, what remains is to elucidate

how it functions in the process of one's knowing something. This is resulted into the above theory of the transformation of consciousness. What is it then which gives rise to such an essential element of our consciousness life called self-knowledge?

In answering this question, be noted the statement by Sthiramati quoted previously. Sthiramati says that "due to the complete processing of the impressions of verbal construction such as self etc. and due to the complete processing of the impressions of verbal construction such as thing etc., the verbal construction arises as a self-knowledge of itself and as a self-knowledge of thing from the processing consciousness". Thus, according to him it is the verbal construction which arises as self-knowledge after having been processed, and it is the verbal construction which functions as impression which is being processed. In short, self-knowledge itself is nothing but a verbal construction in its turn. Obviously, such a observation should not be cause for any surprise, given the general thesis stated by Vasubandhu that the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction, which is to mean that the whole life of a consciousness is totally determined by and entirely dependent upon language, either spoken or otherwise, for its operation. What should be surprising is the conception that the impression can be treated as a verbal construction. What does it mean? Is Sthiramati giving us an account of Vasubandhu's view of the problem or is he injecting his own ideas into it?

In order to respond to these queries, let us see how and in what way an impression can be treated as a verbal construction. The most obvious way is to view it as referring to a verbal impression that one may receive from someone else. In that case, of course the impression is indeed a verbal construction.

If someone tells me something, he certainly makes an verbal impression on me. There is no questionable doubt about that. However, when Vasubandhu says that "the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction" and Sthiramati paraphrases it as meaning that "the verbal construction arises from the processing consciousness as a self-knowledge of itself and as a self-knowledge of the impression due to the complete processing of the impression of verbal construction such as self and thing etc...", the impression here referred to does not limit itself even primarily to the verbal impression caused by the utterances of others when these are made in some particular circumstances. For the transformation of consciousness is held to be of three kinds, which, as has been said, include not only the seeing and the hearing, but also others such as touching, thinking, tasting etc...; and these surely do not consist of any actual verbal impression, either spoken or otherwise, received from outside. Then, how can one say that the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction? How can the impressions processed by the verbal construction be considered as verbal impressions?

Answering this question, Vasubandhu proposes the following solution. He argued that although the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction, it can proceed only through "mutual influence". What is this "mutual influence"? Sthiramati responds that "by mutual influence it means that when the operation of processing its own impressions is complete, the consciousness of the eye etc... is a manifestation of the transformation of the processing consciousness as its impression arrives at the decisive point, and that that transformation of the processing consciousness is a manifestation of the consciousness of the eye etc...; thus through their mutual influence so long as they both function, that long such

and such verbal construction of multiple kinds would produce from the processing consciousness without the intervention of any thing else".[46] So, according to him if the transforming process is operated through the mutual infulence, it is the mutual influence betwen the processing consciousness and the perceptual consciousness, which Vasubandhu wishes to refer to.here and not to anything else. This, of course, is a perfectly normal interpretation of the term. However, it needs not be the only possible interpretation of it, especially when viewed within the context in which it is used.

The Trimśikà says:

> "The transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction; what is verbally constructed by it does not exist; therefore, whatever there is, is all merely what causes one to know. For consciousness has all the seed, the transformation of it proceeds in such and such ways through mutual influence so that such and such verbal construction is produced. When a previous processing is completed, the impressions of action together with the impressions of the double-formed cognition produce another processing different from it"[47].

What is said here is evidently clear: although the transformation of consciousness is operated through mutual influence so that a verbal construction would occur, the mutual influence does not necessarily mean only the mutual influence betwen the processing and the perceptual consciousnesses, for both of them must depend upon "the impressions of action" and "the impressions of the double-formed cognition" so as to be able to function in the first place. It is this dependence upon the impressions, which constitute the so-called seeds of the processing consciousness, that poses the problem of mutual influence betwen the processing consciousness and the perceptual consciousness in its clearest form. Surely,

the processing consciousness can influence the perceptual consciousness, because it is it which processes by means of transformation an impression into a perceptual knowledge. But the perceptual consciousness can influence the processing consciousness only in so far as the supply of the impressions is concerned, and nothing more. It is these impressions which, either arisen from our own action or from the double form of knowledge, directly influence the subsequent operation of the process. Therefore, it is the mutual influence betwen the impressions which determines the transformation of consciousness rather than the mutual influence betwen the processing consciousness and the perceptual consciousness, as Sthiramati maintains. If that is the case, the obvious conclusion must be that not only do the impressions influence each other, but also consciousness of each individual influences each other, since if the whole life of a consciousness is a verbal construction and verbal construction in itself is greatly depending upon the learning process, the influence of other consciousnesses upon our own must accordingly occur. We do not presently know whether Vasubandhu has actually been aware of the detrimental results, particularly in the field of intellectual performance, suffered by those who were deprived early in their childhood of the intellectual and emotional stimuli, which derive, of course, mainly from other human beings. But we do know that in in those cases detrimental results do occur, sometimes very damaging to them. So, when one defines the transformation of a consciousness as a verbal construction, one is irreversably committed to the proposition that one's own consciousness can be easily influenced by the consciousness of others just as theirs by one's own. The notion of mutual influence spoken of by Vasubandhu previously should therefore be considered as implying also the just-said proposition.

Such an interpretation of the notion of mutual influence is certainly not surprisingly new. In fact, it can even be found implicitly in Sthiramati's above view of the transformation of consciousness itself. When he says, "due to the complete processing of the impressions of verbal construction such as self etc... and due to the complete processing of the impressions of verbal construction such as thing etc..., the verbal construction arises from the processing consciousness as a self-knowledge of itself and as a self-knowledge of the impression", it is quite clear that he carefully refers to the impressions twice as "impressions of verbal construction". That is to say that even before its emergence as a self-knowledge, the impression is already tacitly taken to be a verbal construction. Such an understanding features even more prominently in Dharmapàla's commentary. After saying that "the mutual influence is the mutual influence betwen the eight action-consciousnesses and their accompanied seeing and seen parts, because they do have the force to mutually influence each other", he proceeds to list the four causal conditions which contribute to the realization of that mutual influence. Then he says:

> "Thus, these four causal conditions base themselves upon fifteen fields. Due to the objective difference betwen these fields, ten causal conditions must be established. What are those fifteen fields of base, then? First, the language field of base, that is to say, the linguistic fact that a notion arises when a thing is named. It means that if one bases oneself upon this field, one establishes the causal condition of accordance with what is said, because in so basing, language describes the objects in accordance with what one sees and hears. This is what is called the saying being the cause of what is said. Some commentaries say that that is the view of name as notion, because it is like relying upon words to appropriately say what one grasps. If we base ourselves on this view, it is quite clear then that the causal condition is the language field of base."[48]

Reading through that passage, one can immediately see that for Dharmapàla a word can be treated as a notion whenever it can give rise to a notion, that is, whenever the saying is what is said. In other words, if I were to say "this paper is white", this saying can be true or false. If it is true, that this paper is white, then my saying "this paper is white" is exactly what is said. This rather interesting theory of truth by Dharmapàla reminds us of the theory of truth as equivalence advanced by Frege in his attempt to criticize the Medieval concept of truth as concordance.[49] However, we need not engage here into a discussion of Dharmapàla's thought. What interests us is his connecting that theory with what one seens and hears, which is to mean that the truth can be ascertained not only by seeing, but also by hearing. Thus, in so formulating the theory of truth within the context of the notion of mutual influence, Dharmapàla clearly indicates his view that not only does mutual influence mean the mutual influence betwen various transforming processes of a consciousness, but also the mutual influence betwen various consciousnesses.

Again, it must pointed out that this interpretation of the notion of mutual influence is not unknown in Vasubandhu's writings. In fact, if Sthiramati does not explicitly acknowledge it, we can say that Dharmapàla draws his view out directly from them. For instance, in the Vimśatikà Vasubandhu poses and resolves the problem of mutual influence in the following terms:

> "If it is the transformation of its own stream which, when arriving at the decisive stage, gives rise to the self-knowledge of an object as what causes one to know, and if it is not the object which, when arriving at its decisive stage, so does for living beings, then how can one prove that for living beings the having social intercourse with good or bad friends, or the listening to good or bad doctrine would necessarily determine their what causes one to know, for in either case there is neither good or bad social

> intercourse nor good or bad doctrine?
>
> That is because of a mutual influence that what cause one to know are determined reciprocally.
>
> That is because of the mtual influence of what cause one to know that what cause one to know are reciprocally determined according to circumstances for all the living beings. Reciprocally means 'one upon the other'. Thus, it is due to what causes one to know given in one particular stream of consciousness that gives rise to what causes one to know in another particular stream of consciousness, and this occurs without any particular object whatever".[50]

Clearly then, to say that "it is due to what causes one to know given in one particular stream of consciousness which gives rise to what causes one to know in another" is to say that in the transformation of consciousness not only do various processes of the transformation influence each other, but also that various consciousnesses also do the same. This is, of course, nothing very startling, as it is plain that each human being must learn the language of his mother, either spoken or otherwise, so as to be able to function successfully in the task of developing his intellectual and other abilities in his later life. What is startling is its implication that the transformation of consciousness can be triggered by the effect of the transformation of another consciousness, and hence, that the self-knowledge, which plays an indispensable role in that transformation, is actually arisen due to the mutual interaction among various consciousnesses. In other words, self-knowledge is a product of social life in a given linguistic community. This view is startlingly new on account of the fact that it gives us for the first time a complete explanation of why and how the human consciousness functions in the way and fashion it does. It postulates for the first time that in order for a consciousness to function, two essential requirements must be fulfilled, which are those of language and of social life. Whether this postulate is true or false,

we must need further proof to deccide. Yet there is no doubt whatever that it is admittedly startlingly new, even in light of present-days studies on the matter. Of course, Vasubandhu is not unaware of the role played by human action in the process of transformation of a consciousness and in the arising of the self-knowledge in that process. In fact, in the above quotation from the Trimśikà, we have seen him emphasizing the role of human action through the saying that "when a previous processing is completed, the impressions of the action together with the impressions of the double-formed cognition produce another processing different from that one". Otherwise stated, it is the impressions acquired through various actions by an human being which begin and renew the continuous process of transformation undergone by the consciousness. Or more plainly, it is human actions expressed through the means of labor or otherwise which trigger the process of transformation of human consciousness in the first place to begin with. They are the leit-motif which sustains that process, and nothing else. However, in order for that process to be operated, the two essential requirements referred to above must be fulfilled. In short, we may say that for Vasubandhu the transformation is verbal construction only in so far as it is a concerted effort of human action, human language and human social life. And this is what is probably expressed by the notion of mutual influence in the previous statement that "the transformation of consciousness proceeds in such and such ways through mutual influence so that such and such verbal construction is produced".

It is with this view in mind that we translated the terms "vipàka" and "àlaya" as "processing" in place of what is usually rendered as "retributory" and "store", respectively, as it is quite apparent from what has been said. The last

two renderings seem to us to be unwarranted, although etymologically correct, because if the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction, then there is nothing in that transformation to be considered as either "retributory" or "store". Furthermore, vipàka means "ripening", which indicates explicitly a process by which a thing transforms itself from one state into another. And since the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction, the "ripening" of a linguistic impression can therefore be rendered by nothing better than "processing", especially when this latter term is understood in its current usage in the information science. As for the term "store", it is a correct rendering only when its Sanskrit source is written as àlaya. However, àlaya is not the only written Sanskrit source. Since the days of Paramàrtha, we know that it can be written as alaya, which means "not getting lost","not getting submerged". Thus, there is nothing in this reading to warrant its translating as "store",[51] regardless of how present-days discovered manuscripts of the Trimśikà read it, since they might represent only one way of reading it among others. Nevertheless, whether àlaya or alaya, its meaning is perfectly clear in so far as its qualifier, the "vipàka", is concerned. It means that when an impression is in the process of processing, it is there, it is not lost, it is stored there without getting lost. So, whether it means "store" or "not getting lost", it gives a perfectly meaningful attribute to its qualifier. As a result, we think that the so-called retributory or store consciousness is nothing but a processing consciousness in its fullest sense. Accordingly, we so translated.

Now, if the human consciousness is conceived as a processing consciousness

designed mainly to process various informations given all in a linguistic form, then the question arises as to how these linguistic informations are related to the things which they are intended to inform of. In other words, if the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction and what is verbally constructed by that verbal construction does not exist, then how can this non-existing "verbally constructed" be related to the things out there so that one can say that "all whatever there is, is just merely what causes one to know" or define perception in terms of the language in which it is expressed? This is the problem we will be discussing in the next chapter.

N O T E S

1. Abhidharmavijñànakàyapàdaśàstra Taishō 1539, p 559b27-c28: 有六識身、謂眼識耳鼻舌身意識。眼識唯能了別青色、不能了別此是青色、意識亦能了別青色、乃至未能了別其名、不能了別此是青色、若能了別其名、爾時亦能了別青色亦能了別此是青色、如青色黃赤白等色亦尒、耳識唯能了別声不能了別此是声、意識亦能了別声乃至未能了別其名、不能了別此是声、若能了別其名尒時亦能了別声亦能了別此是声、鼻識唯能了別香不能了別此是香、識意亦能了別香、乃至未能了別其名、不能了別此是香、若能了別其名、尒時亦能了別香、亦能了別此是香、舌識唯能了別味不能了別此是味、意識亦能了別味乃至未能了別其名、不能了別此是味、若能了別其名、尒時亦能了別味、亦能了別此是味、身識唯能了別觸不能了別此是觸、意識亦能了別觸、乃至未能了別其名、不能了別此是觸、若能了別其名尒時亦能了別觸、亦能了別此是觸、意識亦能了別諸法、謂或執是我、或執我所、或執爲断、或執爲常、或執無因、或執無作、或執損減、或執爲上、或執爲第一、或執清淨、或執解脫、或執出離、若惑若疑、若猶若豫、若貪若瞋若慢若癡、若麁若苦、若障若静若妙、若離若病若如瘡、若如癰、若如箭若惱害、若無常若苦若空若無我、若於因謂因、於緣謂緣、於滅謂滅、於道謂道、於行謂行、於出若有因若有起、若所見處、若有是事、若如理作引了別、若不如理作引了別、若如如理作引了別、若不如理作引了別。

Cf. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 14b2-4: chos mṅon pa las kyaṅ/ mig gi rnam par śes pa daṅ ldan pa sṅon po śes kyi sṅon poḥo sñam du ni ma yin no/ don la don du ḥdu śes kyi don la chos su hdu śes pa ni ma yin no źes gsuṅs so// gal te de gcig tu mi rtog na rnam par śes pa lṅa po de hdus pa la dmigs pa ji ltar

yin/ gaṅ yaṅ skye mched kyi raṅ gi mtshan ñid la so so raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can yin gyi/ rdsas kyi raṅ gi mtshan ñid la ni ma yin no źes kyaṅ ji ltar gsuṅs śe na/

der don du mas bskyed pahi phyir/ raṅ don spyi yo spyod yul can// de rdsas du mas bskyed par bya bahi phyir na raṅ gi skye mched la spyihi spyod yul can źes brjod kyi/ tha dad pa la tha mi dad par rtogs pa las ni ma yin no//. Commenting upon yadi pañca vijñānakāyāḥ savitarkāḥ savicārāḥ katham avikalpakā ity ucyante of the Abhidharmakośa I ad 33a-b, Yaśomitra writes in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed. N. N. Law, London: Luzac & Co, 1949, p 74: katham avikalpakāḥ ity ucyanta iti caksurvijñānasamangī nīlam vijānāti no tu nīlam iti vacanāt/. See also Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti, ed. de La Vallée Poussin, St. Petersburg: Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, 1931, pp 74-75: kalpanāpodhasyaiva ca jñānasya pratyakṣatvābhyupagamāt tena ca lokasya savyavahārābhāvāt laukikasya ca pramāṇaprameyavyavahārasya vyākhyātum iṣṭatvāt/ vyarthava pratyakṣapramāṇakalpanā samjāyate// cakṣurvijñānasamangī nīlam jānāti no tu nīlam iti cāgamasya pratyakṣalakṣanābhidhānārthasyāprastutatvāt pañcānām indriyavijñānānām janatvapratipādakatvāc ca nāgamād api kalpanāpodhasyaiva vijñānasya pratyakṣatvam iti na yuktam etat/ tasmāl loke yadi lakṣyam yadi vā svalakṣanam sāmānyalakṣanam vā sarvam eva sāksād upalabhyamānatvād aparoksam ataḥ pratyakṣam vyavasthāpyate tadviṣayena jñānena saha/ dvicandrādīnām tv ataimirikajñānāpeksayā'pratyakṣatvam taimirikādyapeksayā tu pratyakṣatvam eva//. Also, Kamalaśīla, Tattvasamgrahapañjikā, p 12.

2. Trần Đức Thảo, Du geste de l'index à l'image typique, La Pensée 147 (1969) 3-46 & 148 (1969) 71-111 & 149 (1970) 93-106; Le mouvement de l'indication comme forme originaire de la conscience, La Pensée 128 (1966) 3-24: "La conscience doit être étudiée tout d'abord dans sa "réalité" immédiate": le langage, entendu naturellement en son sens général, comme language gestuel et langage verbal".

3. Dignāga, Pramānasamuccaya I p 14b5-6: don ḥdi ñid smras pa/
du mahi ṅo bohi chos can ni/ dbaṅ po las rtogs srid ma yin/
raṅ raṅ rig bya tha sñad kyis/ bstan bya min na dbaṅ pohi yul //

de ltar na re źig dbaṅ po lṅa las skyes pahi mṅon sum gyi śes pa rtog pa med pa yin yaṅ/. Cf. Pramàṇavàrttikabhàṣya of Prajñàkaragupta, ed. Rahula Sàṃkrtyàyana, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953, p 298:

dharmino'nekarùpasya nendriyàt sarvathà gatih/
svasamvedyam anirdeśyam rùpam indriyagocarah//

See also Nyàyamumukha, Taishō 1628 p 3b13-19: 為自所悟性有現量及與比量、彼爭論等摽在此中、故唯二量、由此能了自共相故、非離此二別有所量為了知彼更立餘量、故本頌言、現等除分別、餘所說因生、此中現量除分別名、唯是有智於色等境遠離一切種類名言、假立為量諸門分別、由那共緣、現現別轉、故名現量、故說頌言、有法非一相、根非一切行、對內言詮離言是色根境界、

Also Nyàyapraveśa, ed. A. B. Dhruva, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1968, p 7: àtmapratyàyanàrtham tu pratyaksam anumànam ca dve eva pramàne// tatra pratyaksam kalpanàpodham jaj jñànam arthe rùpàdau nàmajàtyàdikalpanàrahitam/ tad aksam aksam prati vartata iti pratyaksam//.

4. Abhidharmakośa I ad 33: yadi pañca vijñànakàyàh savitarkàh savicàràh katham avikalpakà ity ucyante/

nirùpanànusmaranavikalpenàvikalpakàh/

trividhah kila vikalpah/ svabhàvàbhinirùpanànusmaranavikalpah/ tad esàm svabhàvavikalpo'sti/ netarau/ tasmàd avikalpakà ity ucyànte/ yathà ekapàdako'svo'pàdaka iti/ tatra svabhàvavikalpo vitarkah/ sa caittesu paścàn nirdeksyate/ itarau punah kim svabhàvau/ yathàkramam

tau prajñà mànasì vyagrà smrtih sarvaiva mànasì//

manovijñànasamprayuktà prajñà mànasìty ucyate/ asamàhità vyagrety ucyate/ sà hy abhinirùpanàvikalpah/ mànasy eva sarvà smrtih samàhità càsamàhità cànusmaranavikalpah/

5. Abhidharmakośa II ad 33a: vitarkavicàrayoh kim nànàkàranam/

vitarkacàràv audàyasùksmate

kasya/ cetasa iti paścàd vaksyati/ cittaudàrikatà vitarkah/ cittasùksmatà vicàrah/ katham punah anayor ekatra citte yogah/ kecid àhuh/ yathà'psu nisthyatum sarpih sùryaraśmibhir uparisthàt sprstam nàtiśyàyate nàtivilìyate evam vitarkavicàrayogàc cittam nàtisùksmam bhavati nàtyaudàrikam ity ubhayor api tatràsti vyàpàrah/ evam tarhi nimittabhùtau vitarkavicàràv audàrikasùksmatayoh pràpnuto yathà payaś-

càtapaśca sarpisah śyànatvavilìnatvayor na tu punas tat svabhàvau/ àpeksikì caudàrikasùksmatà bhùmiprakàrabhedàd ity àbhavàgràd vitarkavicàrau syàtàm/ na caudàrikasùksmatayà jàtibhedo yuktah// anye punar àhuh/ vàksamskàrà vitarkavicàràh sùtra uktàh/ vitarkya vicàrya vàcam bhàsate nàvitarkyàvicàryeti/ tatra ye audàrikàs te vitarkàh ye sùksmàs te vicàràh/ yadi caikatra citte'nyo dharma audàriko'nyah sùksmah ko'tra virodha iti/ na syàd virodho yadi jàtibhedah syàd vedanàsamjñàvat/ ekasyàm jàtau mrdvadhimàtratà yugapan na sambhavati/ jàtibhedo'py asti/ sa tarhi vaktavyah/ durvaco hy asàvato mrdvadhimàtratayà vyajyate/ naivam vyakto bhavati/ pratyekam jàtìnàm mrdvadhimàtratvàt/ naiva hi vitarkavicàràv ekatra citte bhavata ity apare/. Here, in this passage Vasubandhu knows that vitarka and vicàra are at least vàksamskàra, force of language. However, not untill the Pañcaskandhaka does he attempt to define clearly what exactly those two terms mean. See Pañcaskandhaka, Taishō 1612 p 849b27-29: 云何為尋、謂能尋求意言分別思惟差別等心所為性。云何為伺、謂能伺察意言分別思惟差別等心所為性。 and also Pañcaskandhaka, TT. 5560 p 238d3-4: rtog pa gaṅ źe na/ kun tu htshol bahi yid kyis brjod pa ste/ sems pa daṅ/ śes rab kyi bye brag gaṅ sems rtsiṅ baho// spyod (read: dpyod) pa gaṅ źe na/ so sor rtog pahi yid kyis brjod pa ste/ de bźin du gaṅ sems źi ba paho//, quoted in Yaśomitra, Abhidharmakośavyàkhyà I, Law ed., p 74: tathà hy anena pañcaskandhaka uktam/ vitarkah katamah/ paryeṣako manojalpaś cetanàprajñàviśeso yà cittasyaudàrikatà/ vicàrah katamah/ pratyeksako manojalpas tathaiva yà cittasya sùksmatà/. And this attempt is initiated probably because of his reading Asanga, Abhidharmasamuccaya, ed. P. Pradhan, Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1950, p 10 where similar definitions are found: vitarkah katamah/ cetanàm và niśritya prajñàm và paryesako manojalpah/ sà ca cittasyaudàrikatà// vicàrah katamah/ cetanàm và niśritya prajñàm và pratyaveksako manojalpah/ sà ca cittasya sùksmatà//.

6. Abhidharmakośa I ad 32: kati savitarkàh savicàràh katy avitarkà vicàramàtràh katy avitarkà avicàràh/

savitarkavicàrà hi pañca vijñànadhàtavah/

nityam ete vitarkavicàràbhyàm samprayuktàh/ avadhàranàrtho hi śabdah/

antyàs trayas triprakàràh

manodhàtur dharmadhàtur manovijñànadhàtuś càntyàh/ ete trayas triprakàràh/ tatra manodhàtur manovijñànadhàtuh samprayuktaś ca dharmadhàtur anyatra vitarkavicàràbhyàm kàmadhàtau prathame ca dhyàne savitarkàh savicàràh/ dhyànàntare'vitarkà vicàramàtràh/ dvitìyad dhyànàt prabhrtyàbhavàgràd avitarkà avicàràh/ sarvaś càsamprayukto dharmadhàtur dhyànàntare ca vicàrah/ vitarkas tu nityam avitarko vicàramàtro dvitìyavitarkàbhàvàt vicàrasamprayogàc ca/ kàmadhàtau prathame dhyàne vicàra esu triprakàresu nàntarbhavati/ sa katham vaktavyah/ avicàro vitarkamàtrah/ dvitìyavicàràbhàvàt vitarkasamprayogàc ca/ ata evocyate syuh savitarkasavicàràyàm bhùmau dharmàś catuhprakàràh/ savitarkàh savicàrà vicàravitarkavarjyàh samprayuktàh/ avitarko vicàramàtro vitarkah/ avitarkà avicàrà asamprayuktàh/ avicàro vitarkamàtro vicàra iti/

śesà ubhayavarjitàh//

daśa rùpìno dhàtavah śesà nityam avitarkà avicàrà asamprayogitvàt//

6a. <u>Vimśatikà</u> ad 1: vijñaptimàtram evaitad asadarthàvabhàsanàt/
yadvat taimirikasyàsatkeśondrakàdidarśanam//

Note that both of those meanings must have been current at Vasubandhu's time, as it is evidenced in Amarasimha, <u>Nàmalingànuśasana</u>, ed. Pandit Śivadatta, Bombay: Satyabhàmàbàì Pàndurañg, 1944, pp 331 & 412: II.9.90:

dravyam vittam svàpateyam riktham rktham dhanam vasu/
hiranyam dravinam dyumnam artha-rai-vibhavà api//

and III.3.86:

artho'bhidheyaraivastuprayojanivrttisu/
nipànàgamayostìrthamrsijustajale gurau//

7. <u>Abhidharmakośa</u> V ad 27: tenaivàtmanà sato dharmasya nityam kàritrakarane kim vighnam

yena kadàcit kàritram karoti kadàcin neti/ pratyayànàm asàmagrayam iti cet/ na/ nityam astitvàbhyupagamàt/ yac ca tat kàritram atìtànàgatam pratyutpannam cocyate tat katham

kim kàritrasyàpy anyad asti kàritram/ atha tan naivàtìtam nàpy anàgatam na pratyutpannam asti ca/ tenàsamskrtatvàn nityam astìti/ ato na vaktavyam yadà k(à)ritram na karoti dharmas tadà'nàgata iti/

syàd eṣa doṣo yadi dharmàt kàritram anyat syàt/ tat tu khalu nànyat

ato na bhavaty esa dosah/ evam tarhi sa eva

adhvàyogah

yadi dharma eva kàritram kasmàt sa eva dharmas tenaivàtmanà vidyamànah kadàcid atìta ity ucyate kadàcid anàgata ity adhvanàm vyavasthà na sidhyati/ kim atra na sidhyati/ yo hy ajàto dharmah so'nàgatah/ yo jàto bhavati na ca vinastah sa varttamànam dravyato'sti tathà'tìtam anàgatam càsti/ tasya

tathà satah/

ajàtanastatà kena

tenaiva svabhàvena sato dharmasya katham idam sidhyaty ajàta iti yo vinasta iti veti/ kim asya pùrvam nàsìdyasyàbhàvàd ajàta ity ucyate/ kim ca paścàn nàsti yasyàbhàvàd vinasta ity ucyate/ tasmàn na sidhyati sarvathà'py atràdhvatrayam/ yady abhùtvà bhavatìti nesyate bhùtvà ca punar na bhavatìti/ yad apy uktam samskrtalaksanayogàn na śàśvatatvaprasanga iti/ tad idam kevalam vànmàtram utpàdavinàśayor ayogàt/ nityam ca nàmàsti sa dharmo na ca nitya ity apùrvaisà vàco yuktih/ àha khalv api

svabhàvah sarvadà càsti bhàvo nityaś ca nesyate/
na ca svabhàvàd bhàvo'nyo vyaktam ìśvara cestitam//

yat tùktam uktatvàd iti/ vayam api brùmo'sty atìtànàgatam iti/ atìtam tu yad bhùtapùrvam/ anàgatam yat sati hetau bhavisyati/ evam ca krtvà'stìty ucyate na tu punar dravyatah/ kaś caivam àha/ varttamànavat tad astìti/ katham anyathà'sti/ atìtànàgatàtmanà/ idam punas tavopasthitam/ katham tad atìtam anàgatam cocyate yadi nityam astìti/ tasmàt bhùtapùrvasya ca hetor bhàvinaś ca phalasya bhùtapùrvatàm bhàvitàm ca jñàpayitum hetuphalàpavàdadrstipratisedhàrtham uktam bhagavatà asty atìtam asty anàgatam iti/ astiśabdasya nipàtatvàt/ yathà'sti dìpasya pràg abhàvo'sti paścàd abhàva iti vaktàro bhavanti yathà càsti niruddhah sa dìpo na tu mayà nirodhita iti/ evam atìtànàgatam apy astìty uktam/ anyathà hy atìtànàgatabhàva eva na sidhyet/ yat tarhi lagudaśikhìyakàn paribràjakàn adhikrtyoktam bhagavatà yat karmàbhyatìtam ksìnam niruddham vigatam viparinatam tad astìti/ kim te tasya tasya karmano bhùtapùrvatvam necchanti sma/ tatra punas tad àhitam tasyàm samtatau phaladànasàmarthyam samdhàyoktam/ anyathà hi svena bhàvena vidyamànam atìtam na sidhyet/ ittham caitad evam yat paramàrthaśùnyatàyàm uktam bhagavatà caksur utyadyamànam na kutaścid àgacchati nirudhyamànam na kvacit samnicayam gacchati/ iti hi bhiksavaś caksur abhùtvà bhavati bhùtvà ca partigacchatìti/ yadi cànàgatam caksuh syàn noktam syàd bhùtvà na bhavatìti/ varttamàne'dhvany abhùtvà

bhavatìti cet na/ adhvano bhàvàd anarthàntaratvàt/ atha svàtmany abhùtvà bhavati/ siddham idam anàgatam caksur nàstìti/ yad apy uktam dvayam pratìtya vijñànasyotpàdàd iti idam tàvad iha sampradhàryam/ yan manah pratìtya dharmaś cotpàdyate manovijñànam kim tasya yathà manojanakah pratyaya evam dharmà àhosvid àlambanamàtram dharmà iti/ yadi tàvat janakah pratyayo dharmàh katham yad anàgatam kalpasahasrena bhavisyati và na và tad idànàm vijñànam janayisyati/ nirvànam ca sarvapravrttinirodhàj janakam nopapadyate/ athàlambanamàtram dharmà bhavanti/ atìtànàgatam apy àlambanam bhavatìti brùmah/ yadi nàsti katham àlambanam/ atredànìm brùmah/ yadà tadàlambanam tathàsti tadàlambanam abhùt bhavisyati ceti/ na hi kaścid atìtam rùpam vedanàm và smarann astìti paśyati/ kim tarhi/ abhùd iti/ yathà khalv api varttamànam rùpam anubhùtam tathà tad atìtam smaryate/ yathà cànàgatam vartamànam bhavisyati tathà buddhyà grhyate/ yadi ca tat tathaivàsti vartamànam pràpnoti/ atha nàsti/ asad apy alambanam bhavatìti siddham/ tad eva tadvikìrnam iti cet/ na/ vikìrnasyàgrahanàt/ yadi ca tat tad eva rùpam kevalam paramànuśo vibhaktam/ evam sati paramànavo nityàh pràpnuvanti/ paramànusamcayavibhàgamàtram caivam sati pràpnoti/ na tu kimcid utpadyate nàpi nirùdhyata ity àjìvikavàd àlambito bhavati/ sùtram càpaviddham bhavati caksur utpadyamànam na kutaścid àgacchatìti vistarah/ aparamànusamcitànàm vedanàdìnàm katham vikìrnatvam/ te'pi ca yathotpannànubhùtàh smaryante/ yadi ca te tathaiva santi nityàh pràpnuvanti/ atha na santi/ asad apy àlambanam iti siddham/ yady asad apy àlambanam syàt trayodaśam apy àyatanam syàt/ atha trayodaśam àyatanam nàstìty asya vijñànasya kim àlambanam/ etad eva nàmàlambanam/ evam tarhi nàma eva nàstìti pratìyeta/ yaś ca śabdasya pràg abhàvam àlambate kim tasyàlambanam/ śabda eva/ evam tarhi yah śabdàbhàvam pràrthayate tasya śabda eva kartavyah syàt/ anàgatàvastha iti cet/ sati katham nàstibuddhih/ vartamàno nàstìti cet/ na/ ekatvàt/ yàvatà tasya viśesas tasyàbhùtvàbhàvasiddhih/ tasmàd ubhayam vijñànasyàlambanam bhàvaś càbhàvaś ca/ yat tarhi bodhisattvenoktam yat tat loke nàsti tad aham jñàsyàmi và draksyàmi và nedam sthànam vidyata iti/ apare àbhimànikà bhavanty asantam apy avabhàsam santam paśyanti/ aham tu santam evàstìti paśyàmìti ayam tatràbhipràyah/ itarathà hi sarvabuddhìnàm sadàlambanatve kuto'sya vimarśah syàt ko và viśesah/ ittham caitad evam/ yad anyatra bhagavatoktam etat bhiksur mama śràvako yàvat sa mayà kalpam avoditah sàyam viśesàya paraisyati/ sàyam avoditah kalpam viśesàya paraisyati/ sac ca sato jñàsyati asac càsatah sottaram ca sotta-

ratah anuttaram cànuttarata iti/ tasmàd ayam apy ahetuh/ sadàlambanatvàd vijñànasyeti/ yad apy uktam phalàd iti/ naiva hi sautràntikà atìtàt karmanah phalotpattim varnayanti/ kim tarhi/ tat apùrvakàt samtànaviśesàd ity àtmavàd apratisedhe sampravedayisyàmah/ yasya tv atìtànàgatam dravyato'sti tasya phalam nityam evàstìti kim tatra karmanah sàmarthyam/ utpàdane sàmarthyam/ utpàdas tarhy abhùtvà bhavatìti siddham/ atha sarvam eva càsti/ kasyedànìm kva sàmarthyam/ varsaganyavàdaś caivam dyotito bhavati/ yad asty asty eva tat/ yan nàsti nàsty eva tat/ asato nàsti sambhavah/ sato nàsti vinàśa iti/ vartamànìkarane tarhi sàmarthyam/ kim idam varttamànìkaranam nàma/ deśàntaràkarsanam cet/ nityam prasaktam/ arùpinàm ca katham tat/ yac ca tadàkarsanam tad abhùtvàbhùtam/ svabhàvaviśesanam cet siddha, abhùtvà bhavanam/ tasmàn naivam sarvàstivàdah śàsane sàdhur bhavati/ yad atìtànàgatam dravyato'stìti vadati/ evam tu sàdhurbhavati/ yathà sùtra sarvam astìty uktam tathà vadati/ katham ca sùtre sarvam astìty uktam/ sarvam astìti bràhmana yàvad eva dvàdaśàyatanànìti/ adhvatrayam và/ yathà tu tad asti tathoktam/ athàsaty atìtànàgate katham tena tasmin và samyukto bhavati/ taj jatad dhetvanúśayabhàvàt kleśena tadàlambane kleśànuśayabhàvàd vastuni samyukto bhavati/ asty eva tv atìtànàgatam iti vaibhàsikàh/ yatra netum śakyate tatràtmakàtmanaivam veditavyam/

gambhìrà khalu dharmatà//

nàvaśyam tarhy asàdhyà bhavatìti/ asti paryàyo yad utpadyate tan nirùdhyate/ rùpam utpadyate rùpam nìrùdhyate/ asti paryàyo'nyad utpadyate'nyan nirùdhyate/ anàgatam utpadyate varttamànam nirùdhyate/ adhvà'py utpadyate/ utpadyamànasyàdhvasamgrhìtatvàt/ adhvano'py utpadyate/ anekaksanikatvàd anàgatasyàdhvanah/ gatam etat yat prasangenàgatam/.

8. <u>Trimśikà</u> ad 1 & 17: àtmadharmopacàro hi vividho yah pravartate/
vijñànaparinàme'sau parinàmah sa ca tridhà//
vijñànaparinàmo'yam vikalpo yad vikalpyate/
tena tan nàsti tenedam sarvam vijñaptimàtrakam//

Here, although we adopt Lévi's reading of the first verse and thus translate it accordingly, we think that Dignàga's emendation of <u>vijñànaparinàme</u> to vijñàna<u>parinàmo</u> is better and should be preferred. For if the first <u>pàda</u> of the seventeenth verse reads as <u>vijñànaparinàmo'yam vikalpo</u>, then it is evident that the <u>àtmadharma-upacàra</u> of the first verse can be easily identified with vijñàna-

parinàma. Furthermore, despite the above Dignàga failed to give any reason for his emendation, if we read the Tibetan translation of the Trimśikà, such a reason can be found therein. So, the Sum cu pahi tshig lehur byas pa, TT. 5556 p 231b3-4, has the first verse read as follows:

bdag daṅ chos su ñer hdogs pa/ sna tshogs dag ni gaṅ byuṅ ba/
de ni rnam par śes par gyur/ gyur pa de yaṅ rnam gsum ste//

which indicates clearly that no locative case is attached to the expression rnam par śes par gyur, as Lévi's Sanskrit manuscript and Hsuan Tsang's Chinese version have. As a result, the first verse can be rendered as "the description of self and things which functions in many ways is the transformation of consciousness, (and) that transformation is of three kinds". From such a rendering, it is no wonder then that Mi-pham in his Sum cu pahi tshig lehur byas pahi mchan hgrel understands it to mean "bdag tu gdags pa daṅ chos su ñer hdogs pa/ sna chogs pa ste bdag daṅ sròg daṅ skye ba pa sogs bdag daṅ phuṅ khams skye mched sogs chos su hdogs pa dag ni gaṅ byuṅ ba/ de thams cad ni rnam par śes par gyur pa ñid do de las gźan du med do//, as Ruegg has pointed out. In any case, since the seventeenth verse has already stated that "the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction", and "descriptions of self and things" are a part of the verbal construction, as will be shown in the next chapter, the question as to which one of the above readings of the first verse best reflects Vasubandhu's original idea becomes, though of importance in itself, rather immaterial in this context. Therefore, in adopting Lévi's reading, we are not risking of having Vasubandhu's thought misunderstood. See Lévi, Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimàtra, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1932, p 63; David Seyfort Ruegg, On the term Buddhiviparinàma and the problem of illusory change, Indo-Iranian Journal II (1958) 279.

9. Siddhasena Divàkara, Sammatitarkaprakarana of Siddhasena Divàkara together with Abhayadevasùri's Vyàkhyà, ed. Sukhalal Samghavi & Becaradàsa Dośi, Ahmedabad: Gujaràtapuràtattvamandiragranthàvalì, 1928, p 533: śrotràdivrttir avikalpiketi vindhyavàsipratyaksalaksanam anenaiva nirastam/. Cf. Jayanta Bhatta, The Nyàyamañjarì of Jayanta Bhatta, ed. Sùrya Nàràyana Śukla, Benares: The Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1936, p 93: śrotràdivrttir aparair avikalpiketi pratyaksalaksanam avarni tad apy apàstam/. See also P. Chakravarti, Origin and development of the

Sàmkhya System of thought, Calcutta: Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1951, p 145ff; Hattori, Dignàga On Perception, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp 82-83; Frauwallner, Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sàmkhya-systems, WZKSOA II (1958) 114. One may wonder as to how far Vindhyavàsin is influenced by the Abhidharmavijñànakàyapàdaśàstra.

10. Yogasùtra I.9: śabdajñànànupàtì vastuśùnyo vikalpah, which is commented upon by Vyàsa, Pàtañjala-Yogadarśanam, ed. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, Vàrànasì: Bhàratìya Vidyà Prakàśana, 1963, pp 13-14: sa na pramànopàrohì na viparyayopàrohì ca/ vastuśùnyatve'pi śabdajñànamàhàtmyanibandhano vyavahàro drśyate/ tad yathà caitanyam purùsasya svarùpam iti/ yadà citir eva purusas tadà kim atra kena vyapadiśyate bhavati ca vyapadeśe vrttih/ yathà caitrasya gaur iti/ tathà pratisiddhavastudharmà niskriyah purusah tisthati bànah sthàsyati sthita iti/ gatinivrttau dhàtvarthamàtram gamyate/ tathànutpattidharmà purusa iti utpattidharmasyàbhàvamàtram avagamyate na purusànvayì dharmah/ tasmàd vikalpitah sa dharmas tena càsti vyavahàra iti//. To which the Tattvavaiśàradì of Vacaspatimiśra, ed, R.S. Bhattacharya, Vàrànàsì, Bhàratìya Vidyà Prakàśana, 1963, pp 13-14, adds the following: nanu śabdajñànànupàtì ced àgamapramànàntargato vikalpah prasajyeta nirvastukatve và viparyayah syàd ity ata àha sa neti/ na pramànaviparyayàntargatah/ kasmàd yato vastuśùnyatve'pìti pramànàntargatim nisedhati/ śabdajñànamàhàtmyanibandhana iti viparyayàntargatim/ etad uktam bhavati kvacid abhede bhedam àropayati kvacit punar bhinnànàm abhedam/ tato bhedasyàbhedasya ca vastuto'bhàvàt tatàbhàso vikalpo na pramànam nàpi viparyayo vyavahàràvisamvàdàd iti/ śàstraprasiddham udàharanam àha tadyatheti/ kim viśesyate kim tu bhinnenaiva caitrena/ tad idam àha bhavati ca vyapadeśe vrttih/ vyapadeśavyapadeśyayor bhàvo vyapadeśah viśesanaviśesyabhàva iti yàvat tasmàn vrttir vàkyasya yathà caitrasya gaur iti/ śàstrìyam evodàharanàntaram samuccinoti tatheti/ pratisiddho vastunah prthivyàder dharmah parispando yasya sa tathoktah/ ko'sau niskriyah purusah/ na khalu samkhyìye ràddhànte'bhàvo nàma kaścid asti vastudharmo yena puruso viśesyete tyarthah/ kvacit pàtah pratisiddhà vastudharmà iti/ tasyàrthah pratisedhavyàptàh pratisiddhàh/ na vastudharmànàm tad avyàpyatà bhàvàbhàvayor asambandhàd atha ca tathà pratìtir iti/ Laukikam udàharanam àha tisthati bàna iti/ yathà hi pacati bhinattìty atra pùrvàparìbhùtah karmaksanapracaya ekaphalàvacchinnah pratìyata evam tisthatìty atràpi/ pùrvàparìbhàvam

evàha sthàsyati sthita iti/nanu bhavatu pàkavat pùrvàparìbhùtayà vasthànakriyayà bànàd bhinnayà bànasya vyapadeśa ity ata àha gatinivrttau dhàtvarthamàtram gamyate/ gatinivrttir eva tàvat kalpità tasyà api bhàvarùpatvam tatràpi pùrvàparìbhàva ity aho kalpanàparamparety arthah/ abhàvah kalpito bhàva iva cànugata iva ca sarvapurusesu gamyate na punah purusavyatirikto dharmah kaścid ity udàharanàntaram àha tathànutpattidharmeti/ pramanaviparyayàbhyàm anyà na vikalpavrttir iti vàdino bahavah pratipedire/ tat pratibodhanàyodàharanaprapañca iti mantavyam//

To say as Vyàsa did that "vikalpitah sa dharmas tena càsti vyavahàra iti" is to express quite the thought of Vasubandhu concerning what is verbally constructed.

11. Karl H. Potter, The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, I, Delhi: Motilāl Banarsidass, 1970, p 17. According to Hauer, the whole work of the Yogasùtra can be analyzed in accordance with the progressive appearance of its text as follows:

Actual chapters and verses	Order of appearance	Text-title
I. 1-22	V, fourth century	Nirodha-Text
I. 23-51	II, fourth "	Īśvarapranidhàna-"
II. 1-27	III, ?	Kriyàyoga-"
II. 28- III. 55- IV. 1	I, second cent. B.C.	Yogànga-"
IV. 2-34	IV, fourth cent. A.D.	Nirmànacitta-"

See J. W. Hauer, Der Yoga: Ein Indischer Weg zum Selbst, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1958, pp 221-258; Hauer, Der Yoga als Heilsweg nach den indischen Quellen, Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1932, pp 81-127. Now, if we accept this classification of Hauer, it is quite apparent that the definition concerning vikalpa in the Yogasùtra I.9 must belong to Vasubandhu's time. However, despite its inguineity, Hauer's classification poses a rather serious threat to the logical development of the text itself, which immediately raises the question of its fitness and propriety. We need not go into its discussion right here, as space is not available, but be merely content that "Die endgültige Redaktion des gesamten yogasùtram wird also ins 4. Jahrhundert n. Chr. zu setzen sein", as Hauer affirms, an affirmation which serves our purpose here very well, indeed.

12. Nyàyasùtra I.2.10-17: vacanavighàto'rthavikalpopapatyà chalam/ tat trividham vàkchalam sàmànyachalam upacàrachalam ceti/ aviśesàbhihite'rthe vaktur abhipràyàd arthàntarakalpanà vàkchalam/sambhavato'rthasyàtisàmànyayogàd asambhùtàrthakalpanà

sàmànyacchalam/ dharmavikalpanirdeśe'rthasadbhàvapratisedha upacàracchalam/ vàkchalam evopacàracchalam tad aviśesàt/ na tad arthàntarabhàvàt/ aviśese và kimcit sàdharmyàd ekacchalaprasangah/. Note the interchangeable use of the terms vikalpa and kalpana in these verses.

13. Mìmàmsà-sùtra XII.3.10: ekàrthàs tu vikalperan samuccaye hy àvrttih syàt pradhànasya//. See also Mìmàmsàkośah VI, ed. Kevalànandasaraswatì, Wai: Prajñà Pàthashàlà Mandala Grantha Màlà, 1962, pp 3507-3510 under entry "vikalpa". And The Mìmàmsà Nyàya Prakàśa or Àpadevì: A Treatise on the Mìmàmsà system by Àpadeva, ed. F. Edgerton, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929, p 252: ataś ca prabalapramànabodhitaprajàpatidevatayà durbalapramànabodhitàgner bàdhah syàd iti cet/ satyam/ syàd bàdho yadi prajàpataye juhotìti kevalam prajàpatividhànam syàt/ vidhìyamànas tu prajàpatir mantravarnapràptam agnim anùdya tatsamuccito homoddeśena vidhìyate/ samuccitobhayavidhànàpeksayà'nyatah pràptam agnim anùdya tatsamuccitaprajàpatimàtravidhàne làghavàt/ ataś ca na bàdhakatvam nirapeksavidhànàbhàvàt/ yathà ca tvanmate'gniprajàpatyor ekahomoddeśena vidhànàt tulyàrthatvena vikalpe prasakte prajàpater na pàksikam agnibàdhakatvam/ samuccayavidhànàt/ evam mantravarnapràptam agnim anùdya tatsamuccitaprajàpatividhàne'pi na bàdhakatvam iti tulyam//

14. Sylvain Lévi, Matériaux pour l'étude du système vijñaptimàtra, p 106. Even for those who recognize that translation as unsatisfactory, they still consider it fit "in a Buddhist context". Thus, in her Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique, La Haye: Mouton & Co, 1964, p 273 Biardeau writes: "Cependant, d'autre part, la notion de vikalpa revient à chaque page du texte, sous la forme verbale ou comme substantif. Nous l'avons traduite jusqu'ici par "imagination", "imager", suivant en cela Sylvain Lévi dans ses Matériaux pou l'étude du système vijñaptimàtra. Mais une traduction qui convient dans un contexte bouddhiste a sans doute besoin de nuances pour passer dans le brahmanisme, d'autant plus que celui-ci connaît depuis longtemps la connotation mìmàmsiste du terme"....

15. Bhartrhari, Vàkyapadìya III.8:

vikalparùpam bhajate tattvam evàvikalpitam/
na càtra kàlabhedo'sti kàlabhedaś ca grhyate//

Note the above statement by Biardeau that "la notion de vikalpa revient à chaque page du texte", which is applied to Vàkyapadìya. Even Sthiramati does not care to explain what vikalpa means when used in the Trimśikà ad 17. He is content to say: "adhyàropitàrthàkàràh traidhàtukàś cittacaittà vikalpa ucyate"/, which is rather both curious and frivolous. In fact, in the enormous mass of commentaries written upon Vasubandhu's Trimśikà none that we know of offers any clear and precise definition of vikalpa, except Dignàga and the school he founds, which includes of course Dharmakìrti and Śàntaraksita.

16. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 14a4-7: rtog pa źes bya ba hdi ji lta bu źig yin źe na/ miṅ daṅ rigs sogs su sbyor baho/ hdod rgyal bahi sgra rnams la miṅ gi khyad par du byas nas rjod par byed de/ lhas byin źes bya ba daṅ/ rigs kyi sgra rnams la ci ste/ ba laṅ źes bya ba daṅ/ yon tan gyi sgra rnams la yon tan gyis te/ dkar po źes bya ba daṅ/ bya bahi sgra rnams la bya bahi sgo nas te/ htshed pa źes bya ba daṅ/ rdsas kyi sgra rnams la rdsas kyi sgo nas te/ dbyug pa can rva can źes bya ba lta buho// hdi la kha cig nà re hbrel ba khyad du byas pahi sgra yin no źes zer ro// gźan dag ni don gyis stoṅ pahi sgra hbah źig gis don rnams khyad par du byas śiṅ brjod do źes hdod do// gaṅ la rtog pa de dag med pa de mṅon sum mo//

17. Śàntaraksita, Tattvasamgraha ad 1213:

pratyaksam kalpanàpodham abhràntam kalpanàyàh svarùpam abhilàpinì/
pratìtih kalpanà klrptihetutvàdyàtmikà na tu//

Kamalaśìla, Tattvasamgrahapañjikà, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968, p 449: tatra savikalpakam ajñànasvabhàvam và caksuràdikam pratyaksam pramànam iti pratyaksasvarùpavipratipattih tan niràkaranena tallaksanam àha pratyaksam kalpanàpodham abhràntam iti/ tatra jñànasya kalpanàpodhatvam abhràntatvam cànùdya pratyaksatvam vidhìyate sarvatraiva laksyasya vidhìyamànatvàt/ yathà yah kampate so'śvattha iti/ laksyam atra pratyaksam tal laksanasyaiva prastutatvàt/ na tu kalpanàpodhàbhràntalaksanam prakrtam yena tad vidhìyata iti syàt/ kalpanàpratisedhàc ca jñànasya sàmarthyalabdhatvàt avatsà ghenur ànìyatàm iti yathà vatsapratisedhena goghenor iti ato jñànam iti noktam/ kà punar atra kalpanà'bhipretà yad apodham jñànam pratyaksam/ ity àha abhilàpinì pratìtih kalpaneti/ atha yasyàm klrptihetutvàdyàtmikàyàm śankarasvàmiprabhrtayo vistarena

dosam uktavantah sàpi kim grhìtavyà uta na/ ity àha klrptihetutvàdyàtmikà na tv iti/ grhyata iti śesah/ tena tadàśrayena ye dosàh parenoktà te tatpaksànangìkàràd eva nàvatarantìty uktam bhavati/ klrptih vyapadeśah tad dhetutvam jàtyàdìnàm iti boddhavyam yato jàtyàdiviśesam antarena na vyapadeśo'sti/ àdiśabdena śabdasamsargacittaudàrikasùksmatàhetù vitarkavicàràu tathà gràhyagrahakakalpanety evam-àdi grahìtavyam/ abhilàpah vàcakah śabdah sa ca sàmànyàkàrah sa vidyate yasyàh pratibhàsatah sà tathoktà//

18. Bhartrhari, Vàkyapadìya I. 123 (ed. Raghunàtha Sharma, Varanasi: Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, 1963)

na so'sti pratyayo loke yah śabdànugamàd rte/
anuviddham iva jñànam sarvam śabdena bhàsate//

yathàsya samhrtarùpà śabdabhàvanà tathà jñeyesv arthesùtpannenàpy avikalpakena jñànena kàryam na kriyate/ tadyathà tv aritam gacchatas trnalostàdisamsparśàt saty api jñàne kàcid eva sà jñànàvasthà yasyàm abhimukhìbhùtaśabdabhàvanàbìjàyàm àvirbhùtàsv arthopagràhinàm àkhyeyarùpànàm anàkhyeyarùpànàm ca śabdànàm pratyarthaniyatàsu śaktisu śabdànuviddhena śaktyanupàtinà jñànenàkriyamàna upagrhyamàno vastvàtmà jñànànugato vyaktarùpapratyavabhàso jñàyata ity abhidhìyate/ sa ca nimittàntaràd àvirbhavatsu śrutibìjesu smrtihetur bhavati/ tathaikesàm àcàryànàm suptasyàpi jàgrad vrttyà sad deśo jñànavrttiprabandhah/ kevalam tu śabdabhàvanàbìjàni tadà suksmàm vrttim pratilabhante/ tasmàt tàmasìm ceti tàmavasthàm àhuh/ tad etat samjñànam śabdaprakrtivikàrabhàvenàvirbhàvatirobhàvàvajasram pratyanubhavati//.

19. Chatterjee, The Yogàcàra Idealism, Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1962, p 59; Ruegg, The term buddhiviparinàma and the problem of illusory change, Indo-Iranian Journal II (1958) 279-280; etc...

20. Bhartrhari, Vàkyapadìya I.121-122:

itikartavyatà loke sarvà śabdavyapàśrayà/
yàm pùrvàhitasamskàro bàlo'pi pratipadyate//

sad api vàg vyavahàrenànupagrhìtam atha rùpam asatà tulyam/ atyantàsac ca prasiddham loke śaśavisànàdi pràptàvirbhàvatirobhàvam ca gandharvanagaràdi vàcà samutthàpyamànam mukhyasattàyuktam iva tesu kàryesu pratyavabhàsate/ samàvisthavàcàm ca svajàtisu bàlànàm api pùrvaśabdàveśabhàvanàsamskàràdhànàt tàsu tàsv atha kriyàsvanàkhyeyaśabdanibandhanà pratipattir utpadyate//

àdyah karanavinyàsah prànasyordhva samìranam/

sthànànàm abhighàtaś ca na vinà śabdabhàvanàm//
anàdiś caisà śabdabhàvanà pratipurusam avasthitajñànabìjaparigrahà/ na hy etasyàh katham cit pauruseyatvam sambhavati/ tathà hy anupadeśasàdhyàh pratibhàgamyà eva karanavinyàsàdayah/ ko hy etàn purusadharmàn anyatra śabdàtmikatàyàh kartum pratipàdayitum và samartha iti//. Note the familiarity of vocabulary betwen Bhartrhari and Vasubandhu.

21. <u>Trimśikà</u> ad 1-17:

àtmadharmopacàro hi vividho yah pravartate/
vijñànaparinàme'sau parinàmah sa ca tridhà//
vipàko mananàkhyaś ca vijñaptir visayasya ca/
tatràlayàkhyam vijñànam vipàkah sarvabìjakam//
asamviditakopàdisthànavijñaptikam ca tat/
sadà sparśamanaskàravitsamjñàcetanànvitam//
upeksà vedanà tatra anivrtàvyàkrtam ca tat/
tathà sparśàdayas tac ca vartate srotasaughavat//
tasya vyàvrtir arhatve tadàśritya pravartate/
tadàlambam manonàma vijñànam mananàtmakam//
kleśaiś caturbhih sahitam nivrtàvyàkrtaih sadà/
àtmadrstyàtmamohàtmamànàtmasnehasamjñitaih//
yatrajas tanmayair anyaih sparśàdyaiś càrhato na tat/
na nirodhasamàpattau màrge lokottare na ca//
dvitìyah parinàmo'yam trtìyah sadvidhasya yà/
visayasya upalabdhih sà kuśalàkuśalàdvayà//
sarvatragair viniyataih kuśalaiś caitasair asau/
samprayuktà tathà kleśair upakleśais trivedanà//
adyàh sparśàdayaś chandàdhimoksasmrtayah saha/
samàdhidhìbhyàm niyatàh śraddhàtha hrìr apatrapà//
alobhàdi trayam vìryam praśrabdhih sàmpramàdikà/
ahimsà kuśalàh kleśà ràgapratighamùdhayah//
mànadrgvicikitsàś ca krodhopanahane punah/
mraksah pradàśaìrsyàtha màtsaryam saha màyayà//
śàthyam mado'vihimsàhrìr atrapà styànam udbhavah/
àśraddhyam atha kausìdyam pramàdo musità smrtih//

viksepo'samprajanyam ca kaukrtyam middham eva ca/
vitarkaś ca vicàraś cety upakleśà dvaye dvidhà//
pañcànàm mùlavijñàne yathàpratyayam udbhavah/
vijñànànàm saha na và tarangànàm yathà jale//
manovijñànam sambhùtih sarvadàsamjñikàd rte/
samàpattidvayàn middhàn mùrchànàd apy acittakàt//
vijñànaparinàmo'yam vikalpo yad vikalpyate/
tena tan nàsti tenedam sarvam vijñaptimàtrakam//

22. Abhidharmakośa II ad 36: kasya punar ime pràptyapràptì/
pràptyapràptì svasamtànapatitànàm
na parasamtànapatitànàm/ na hi parakìyaih kaścit samanvàgatah nàpy asamtatipatitànàm/ na hy asattvasamkhyàtaih kaścit samanvàgatah/ esa tàvat samskrtesu niyamaah/ asamskrtesu punah pràptyapràptì
nirodhayoh//
sarvasattvà apratisamkhyànirodhena samanvàgatàh/ ata eva hi coktam abhidharme anàsravair dharmaih kah samanvàgatah/ àha/ sarvasattvà iti/ pratisamkhyànirodhena sakalabandhanàdilaksanasthavarjyàh sarva àryàh prthagjanàś ca kecit samanvàgatàh/ àkàśena tu nàsti kaścit samanvàgatah/ tasmàd asya nàsti pràptih/ yasya ca nàsti pràptis tasyàpràtir api nàstìti siddhàntah/ pràptir nàmàsti kimcit bhàvàntaram iti/ kuta etat/ àha sùtràt/ sùtre hy uktam sa esàm daśànàm aśaiksànàm dharmànàm utpàdàt pratilambhàt samanvàgamàd àryo bhavati pañcàngaviprahìna iti vistarah/ tena tarhi asattvàkhyair api samanvàgamah pràpnoti parasattvaiś ca/ kim kàranam/ sùtravacanàt/ ràjà bhiksavaś cakravarttì saptabhì ratnaih samanvàgata iti vistarah/ vasitvam atra samanvàgamaśabdenoktam/ tasya tesu ratnesu vaśitvam kàmacàra iti/ atra viśitvam samanvàgamo'nyatra punar dravyàntaram iti/ kuta etat kah punar evam ayogah/ ayam ayogah yad asyà naiva svabhàvah prajñàyate rùpaśabdàdivad ràgadvesàdivad và na càpi krtyam caksuhśrotràdivat/ tasmàt dravyadharmàsambhavàd ayogah/ utpattihetur dharmànàm pràptir iti cet/ asamskrtasya na syàt/ ye ca dharmà apràptà ye ca tyaktà bhùmisamcàravairàgyatas tesàm katham utpattih syàt/ sahajapràptihetukà cet/ jàtir idànìm kimkarì jàtijàtir và/ sakalabandhanànàm khalv api mrdumadhyàdhimàtrakleśotpattibhedo na syàt pràptyabhedàt/ yato và sa bhedas tat evàstu tad utpattih/ tasmàn notpattihetuh pràptih/ kaś caivam àhotpattihetuh pràptir iti/ kim tarhi/ vyavasthàhetuh/ asatyàm hi pràptau laukikamànasànàm àryaprthagjanànàm àryà ime

prthagjanà ima iti na syàd vyavasthànam/ prahìnàprahìnakleśatàviśesàd etat bhavitum arhati/ etac caiva katham bhavisyaty esàm prahìnah kleśa esàm aprahìna iti/ pràptau satyàm etat sidhyati tadvigamàvigamàt/ àśrayaviśesàd etat sidhyati/ àśrayo hi sa àryànàm darśanabhàvanàmàrgasàmarthyàt tathà paràvrtto bhavati yathà na punas tat apraheyànàm kleśànàm prarohasamartho bhavati/ ato'gnidagdhabrìhivad abìjìbhùte àśraye kleśànàm prahìnakleśa ity ucyate/ upahatabìjabhàve và laukikena margena/ viparyayàd aprahìnakleśah/ yáś càprahìnas tena samanvàgato yah prahìnas tenàsamanvàgata iti prajñapyate/ kuśalà api dharmà dviprakàrà ayatnabhàvino yatnabhàvinaś ca ye ta ucyante utpattipratilambhikàh pràyogikàś ceti/ tatràyatnabhàvibhir àśrayasya tadbìjabhàvànupaghàtàt samanvàgata upaghàtàd asamanvàgata ucyate samucchinnakuśalamùlah/ tasya tùpaghàto mithyàdrstyà veditavyah/ na tu khalu kuśalànàm dharmànàm bìjabhàvasyàtyantam santatau samuddhàtah/ ye punar yatnabhàvinas tair utpannais tad utpattir vaśitvàvighàtàt santateh samanvàgata ucyate/ tasmàd bìjam evàtrànapoddhrtam anupahatam pariprstam ca vaśitvakàle samanvàgamàkhyàm labhate nànyad dravyam/ kim punar idam bìjam nàma/ yan nàmarùpam phalotpattau samartham sàksàt pàramparyena và/ santatiparinàmaviśesàt/ ko'yam parinàmo nàma/ santater anyathàtvam/ kà ceyam santatih/ hetuphalabhùtàs traiyadhvakàh samskàràh/ yat tùktam lobhena samanvàgato'bhavyaś catvàri smrtyupasthànàni bhàvayitum iti/ tatràdhivàsanam lobhasyàvinodanam và samanvàgamah/ yàvad dhi tasyàdhivàsako'vinodako bhavati tàvat bhavyas tàni bhàvayitum/ evam ayam samanvàgamah sarvathàprajñaptidharmo na tu dravyadharmah/ tasya ca pratisedho'samanvàgama . iti/ dravyam eva tu vaibhàsikàh ubhayam varnayanti/

Karmasiddhiprakarana, ed. Yamaguchi, Kyoto: Daizokan, 1951, pp 9-10: ho na yul gźan du lus hbyuṅ bahi rgyu sems gyi khyad par las skyes pahi rluṅ gi khyad par de ñid rnam par rig byed yin mod che na/ ji ltar na rnam par rig par mi byed pa rnam par rig byed du hgyur/ reg byahi skye mched dge ba daṅ/ mi dge bar hdod pa hdi ni śàkyahi sras pohi ma yin no// ho na sems kyi khyad par las skyes pahi lus yul gźan du hbyuṅ ba de ñid rnam par rig byed yin mod ce na/ rnam par rig byed btags pa can yin gyi rdsas su yod pa ma yin te/ lus kyis rdsas du mahi btag ñid yin pahi phyir ro// rnam par rig byed ni rnam par rig par byed pa ma yin par yaṅ hgyur te/ dri la sogs pas gźan dag la rnam par rig par mi byed pahi phyir ro// dri la sogs pahi skye mched dge ba daṅ mi dge bar hdod pa hdi yaṅ śàkyahi sras pohi ma yin no// ho na yaṅ sems kyi khyad par las skyes pahi kha dog ñid rnam par rig byed yin mod ce na/ de ni sems kyi khyad par las skyes pa ma yin no/ ho na ci źe na/ raṅ gi sa

bon daṅ/ rluṅ gi khams kyi khyad par las skyes pa yin no// kha dog dge ba daṅ/ mi dge bar hdod pa hdi yaṅ śàkyahi sras pohi ma yin no//.

23. Karmasiddhiprakarana, p 11-12: kha cig na re gaṅ las tshe phyi mahi hbras bu yid du hoṅ ba hma mi hoṅ ba hgrub par hgyur bahi las hdas pa de yaṅ yod na ci ste hgrub par mi hgyur źes zer te/ las hdas pa yod do źes bya ba hdi ni hbras kyi steṅ du hbrum bu byuṅ ba yin te/ hdas pa źes bya ba gaṅ źig sṅon byuṅ la phyis med pa yin no// ho na bcom ldan hdas kyis/

bskal pa brgya dag sñed du yaṅ// las rnams chud źar mi hgyur te//
tshogs śiṅ dus daṅ ldan pa na// lus can rnams la hbras bur smin//

źes gsuṅs pa gaṅ yin pa ji lta bu/ chud zar mi hgyur te źes bya bahi don ci źe na/ hbras bu med par mi hgyur źes bya bahi tha tshig go/ de ltar yaṅ phyed hog mas bstan pa yin no// las rnams yun riṅ por yaṅ hbras bu daṅ/ bcas par lta bu su źig mi hdod/ de dag ñid ji ltar hbras bu hbyiṅ par hgyur/ hbras sa lu la sogs pahi sa bon bźin du rgyud yoṅs su hgyur pahi khyad par las sma/ raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi gnas skabs las źes bya ba dpyad par byaho// gal te raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi gnas skabs pa dag go na hbras bu hbyin par hgyur na ni ma źig pas na hbras bu hbyin par bstan par hgyur ro// de dag raṅ gi mtshan ñid du med pas dehi phyir źig pa źes bya ba ni ma yin no// ho na ci źe na/ gaṅ las bya ba mi byed paho// mi byed pa ji lta bu/ yaṅ hbras bu mi hphen paho//

24. Anguttara-nikàya III pp 404-409: Idhàham Ànanda ekaccam puggalam evam... pajànàmi... imassa kho puggalassa vijjamànà kusalà pi dhammà akusalà pi dhammà. Tam enam aparena samayena evam... pajànàmi: imassa kho puggalassa kusalà dhammà antarahità, akusalà dhammà sammukhìbhùtà, atthi ca khvà'ssa kusalamùlam asamucchinnam, tamhà tassa kusalà kusalam pàtubhavissati. Evam ayam puggalo àyatim aparihànadhammo bhavissatìti. Seyyathà pi bìjàni akhandàni apùtìni avàtàtapahatàni sàradàni sukhasayitàni sukhette suparikammakatàya bhùmiyà nikkhitàni; jàneyyàsi tvam Ànanda 'imàni bìjàni vuddhim virùlhim vepullam àpajjissantìti?

25. Vimśatikà ad 9: yatah svabìjàd vijñaptir yadàbhàsà pravartate/
dvividhàyatanatvena te tasyà munir abravìt//

kim uktam bhavati/ rùpapratibhàsà vijñaptir yatah svabìjàt parinàmaviśesapràptàd utpadyate tac ca bìjam yatpratibhàsà ca sà te tabhyà vijñapteś caksùrùpàyatanatvena yathàkramam bhagavàn abravìt/ evam yàvat sprastavyapratibhàsà vijñaptir

yatah svabìjàt parinàmaviśesapràptàd utpadyate/ tac ca bìjam yatpratibhàsà ca sà te tasyà kàyasprastavyàyatanatvena yathàkramam bhagavàn abravìd ity ayam abhipràyah/

26. Mahàyànasamgrahabhàsya, TT. 5551 p 277el-2: nas ñon moṅs bahi chos de dag rnams pa skyed pahi nus ba khyad par can gyi sbyor pa dan ldan pa ste/ de bskyed pahi nus pa daṅ ldan pa yaṅ sa bon thams cad pa źes brjod do/ don hdihi dpe ni ji ltar nas kyis bon la myu gu bskyed pahi rgyu ñid yod pas hdi ni dehi rgyu ñid do//

27. Abhidharmadìpa ad 261: Sàutràntikaparikalpite pratibìjakalpe citta-śaktibìjabhàvanàpakse nivrttottaram anyànanyatvàdidosàt/ nànyànanya iti bìjavàsanàvasthàne cittavinàśàbhyupagame ca madhyamàpratipatsiddhir iti cet/ na/ cittasvabhàvaśaktikiryàbhàve tadantadvayàsiddhau madhyamàpratipadanupapatteh khapuspamayadandavat/. Abhidharmakośavyàkhyà II, pp 68-69: sa eva ca śaktiviśesalaksanam bìjabhàvam àcàryena vyavasthàpitam dùsayati/ kim ayam śaktiviśesaś cittàd arthàntaramutànarthàntaram/ kim càtah arthàntaram cet siddham pràptir astìti samjñàmàtre tu vivàdah/ anarthàntaram cet/ nanv akuśalam kuśalasya bìjam abhyupagatam bhavaty akuśalasya ca kuśalam/ ko hi nàmaisnyasya tejaso'narthàntaratve saty ausnyam eva dàhakam adhyavasyen na tejah/ kuśalabìjam hy akuśale cet-asya vyàkrte và vartate/ evam akuśalabìjam kuśale cetasyàvyàkrte và vartate/ tathaiva càvyàkrtabìjam api kuśale càkuśale ca vartate/ sàsravabìjam cànàsrave'nàsravabìjam ca sàsrave cetasi vartata iti sàmkaryadosah prasajyata iti/ atra vayam brùmah/...../ śaktibìjam vàsanety eko'yam arthah/ evam akuśalàdivàsanàpi vaktavyà/..... See also Jaini, The Sàutràntika theory of bìja, BSOAS XXII (1959) 236-249; and his Introduction to the edition of the Abhidharmadìpa.

28. Karmasiddhiprakarana, pp 21-22: sems ni rnam pa gñis te/ te la gcig ni dehi sa bon rnams bsags pa yin no// gñis pa ni dehi dmigs pa daṅ/ rnam pa daṅ/ bye brag tha dad pa dag gis sna tshogs pa yin no// sems gñis pa ma tshaṅ bahi phyir sems med pa yin te/ dper na khri rkaṅ pa gcig pa la rkaṅ pa gźan ma tshaṅ pahi phyir/ rkaṅ pa med pa źes bya pa lta buho// sa bon ñams pahi gnas skabs de źan pa daṅ/ ches źan pa daṅ/ śin tu ches źan pahi rim pas chu tshan daṅ mdah hphaṅs pahi śugs hbri bahi tshul du des ldaṅ bahi dus hphaṅs pahi mthar thug pa na/ rnam par smin pahi rnam par śes pa la skad cig re re la hgyur bahi khyad par

las sa bon hjug pa sñed pas yid kyi rnam par śes pa daṅ/ phyis gźan dag kyaṅ rkyen ji lta ba bźin du hbyuṅ ṅo// rnam par smin pahi rnam par śes pa sa bon rnam pa sna tshogs khoṅ na yod pa de ñid la/ de las gźan pahi rnam par śes pa daṅ lhan cig hbyuṅ bahi chos gźan dge ba daṅ mi dge ba de daṅ de dag gis sa bon rtas par byed pahi sgo nas ji ltar rig par bsgo bar byed do// rgyud hgyur bahi khyad par de las stobs ji lta ba bźin du bga chags hjug pa rñed na tshe phyi ma la hbras bu hdod pa daṅ mi hdod pa mṅon par hgrub bo// de ñid kyi dbaṅ du byas nas/

sems hdi sa bon mthah yas pa daṅ ldan pa rgyun gyis hjug hgyur źiṅ/
sems lla raṅ rgyen byuṅ na de daṅ dehi sa bon rtas par hgyur/
de rtas rim gyis hjug pa rñed na dus su hbras bu hbyin pa hgrub/
ma du luṅ gahi me tog la bsgos tshon ni dehi śa dmar bźin/

źes bśad do/. The paragraph beginning with "sems ni rnams pa" and ended with "rkan pa med pa źes bya ba lta buho" is not translated in our text. However, we cite it here so as to give to what is translated a complete introduction for those who understand the Tibetan.

29. Karmasiddhiprakarana, p 18-19: hon te ma bsgribs la luṅ du ma bstan pa źig yin no źe na/ ci ste rnam par smin pa las skyes pa źig yin nam/ hon ta spyod lam pa źig gma/ bzohi gnas pa źig gma/ sprul pa źig yin/ te las cir hgyur źe na/ gal te rnam par smin pa las skyes pa źig yin na/ ji ltar srid pahi rce mohi sñoms par hjug pahi sems gyi mjug thogs su hog ma gźan brgyad kyis chod pa hdod pa na spyod pahi rnam par smin pahi sems mṅon du hgyur/ sñoms par hjug pa de yaṅ hdod pa na spyod pa par ji ltar thal bar mi hgyur/dehi mjug thogs su yaṅ mi gyo ba la sogs pahi sems ji ltar mṅon du hgyur te/ ji skad du gsus po che ched pohi mdo las/ hgog pa las lṅas pa reg pa du źig la reg lags/ gsus po che chen po gsum la ste/ mi gyo ba daṅ/ mtshan ma med pa laho źes gsuṅs pa lta buho// sṅan gyi las hphaṅs pahi rnam par smin pa hgog pa la sñoms par hjug par byed pa rnams kyis ldaṅ bahi dus tshigs sṅar bsams pa las mi hdah bar byed do źes bya ba hdi la yaṅ rigs pa ci źig yod/ re źig ji ltar na hgog pa la dmigs pa srid pahirce mohi sñoms par hjug pahi sems kyi mthar phyin pa na hdod pa na spyod pahi sṅan gyi bga chags rnam par smin pahi sems hgrub par bya bahi phyir hjug pa hthob kyi/ ches sṅa bar ni ma yin/ re źig cihi phyir rnam par smin pahi gzugs ni hdir chad na yaṅ mtshams mi hbyor la rnam par smin pahi sems ni mtshams hbyor/. And Karmasiddhiprakarana, pp 30-31: gal

te sems pa kho na lus kyi las su hgyur na/ sems nam par gyeṅs pa dga daṅ/ sems med pa dga la sems pa de med na/ sdom pa daṅ sdam pa ma yin pa gñis ltar yod ci na/ sems pahi khyad par gyi bag chags ma bcom pahi phyir sdom pa daṅ sdom pa ma yin pa gñis yod de/ khyad par smos pa ni gaṅ las sdom pa daṅ sdom pa ma yin pahi rnam par rig byed ma yin pa kun nas ldaṅ bar brtag pahi sems pa khyad par du bya bahi phyir ro// dehi bag chags bcom pa ci źe na/ ji ltar khas blaṅs pa bźin spoṅ ba daṅ spoṅ ba ma yin pahi sems pahi rgyu ma yin pa ñid do// gaṅ gis de bcom źe na/ sdom pa daṅ sdom pa ma yin pa gtoṅ bahi rgyu rnam par rig byed kun nas sloṅ bar byed par brtags pahi sems pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ/ de las gźan pahi gtoṅ bahi rgyus so//.

30. Alex Wayman, Review Article: The Yogàcàra Idealism, Philosophy East and West XV (1965) 65-73: "If Chatterjee's "Yogàcàra" is indeed the Yogàcàra person that Vasubandhu was, then Chatterjee's book is certainly a wonderful exposition of the Yogàcàra philosophy." A curious statement, indeed, especially after just pointing out "the dharmas or samskàras that are independent of mind (citta)"!

31. Sthiramati, Trimśikàvijñaptibhàsya, ed. Lévi, p 16: ko'yam parinàmo nàma/ anyathàtvam/ kàranaksananirodhasamakàlah kàranaksanavilaksanah kàryasyàtmalàbhah parinàmah/ tatràtmàdivikalpavàsanàpariposàd rùpàdivikalpavàsanàpariposàc càlaya-vijñànàd àtmàdinirbhàso vikalpo rùpàdinirbhàsaś cotpadyate/ tam àtmàdinirbhàsam rùpàdinirbhàsam ca tasmàd vikalpàd bahirbhùtam ivopàdàyàtmàdyupacàro rùpàdidhar-mopacàraś cànàdikàlikah pravartate vinàpi bàhyenàtmànà dharmaiś ca/ tadyathà taimirikasya keśondukàdyupacàra iti/ yac ca yatra nàsti tat tatropacaryate/ tad yathà bàhìke gauh/

32. Dharmapàla, Vijñaptimàtratàsiddhi, Taishō 1585 p 38c16-24:

是諸轉識變、分別所分別
由此遍皆無、故一切唯識

論曰、是諸識者、謂別所說三能變識及彼心所、皆能變似見相二分、立轉變名、所變見分說名分別、能取相故、所變相分名所分別、見所取故、由此正理、彼實我法離識所變皆定非有、離能所取無別物故、非有實物離二相故、是故一切唯有識無、若實若假皆不離識、…

33. To see how faithfull, or rather how unfaithfull, Hsuan Tsang's rendering of the Sanskrit texts, one needs to compare the first Sanskrit verse of the Trimśikà with its counterpart in Tsang's version:

àtmadharmopacàro hi vividho yah pravartate/

vijñànaparinàme'sau parinàmah sa ca tridhà//

由假設我法　有種種相轉

彼依識所變　此能變唯三

where the term parinàma is rendered differently by 所變 and 能變. In front of Tsang's capricious renderings such as that, it is quite ill-advised to state anything definitely about Dharmapàla, particularly when no Sanskrit original or its Tibetan translation of the latter's work is preserved.

34. Dharmapàla, Vijñaptimàtratàsiddhi, Taishô 1585 p 40a1-9:

由一切種識　如是如是變

以展轉力故　彼彼分別生

論曰、一切種識謂本識中能生自果功能差別、此生等流異熟士用增上果故名一切種、除離繫者非種生故、彼雖可證而非種果、要現起道斷結得故、有展轉義非此所說、此說能生分別種故、此識是体故立識名、種體本識無別性故、種識簡二言簡非種識、有種非識有識非種故、又種識言顯識中種、非持種識……

35. Dharmapàla, Vijñaptimàtratàsiddhi, Taishô 1585 p 10b2-16: 執有離識所緣境者、彼說外境是所緣、相分各行相、見分各事、是心心所自体相故、心與心所同所依緣行相相似、事雖攸等而心各異、識愛慧等相各別故、違無離識所緣境者、則說相分是所緣、見分各行相、相見所依自体各事即自證分、此若無者、應不自憶心心所說、如不曾更境必不能憶故、心與心所同所依根、所緣相似、行相各別、了別猛利等作用各異故、事雖攸等而相各異、識愛等体有差別故、然心心所一一生時、以理推徵、各有三分、所量能量量果別故、相見必有所依体故、如集量論伽他中說。

仏、境相所量、能取相自證
即能量見果、此三体無別。

36. Dignàga, Pramànasamuccaya I p 15b5-6: ci ste śes pa tshul gñis so źes ji ltar rtogs par bya źe na/

yul śes pa daṅ dehi śes pahi/ dbye bas blo yi tshul gñis ñid/ yul ni gzugs la sogs pa ste gaṅ gis de śes pa ni don daṅ raṅ snaṅ baho/ yul śes pa ni gaṅ yul daṅ rjes su mthun pahi śes pa ste/ śes pa de snaṅ ba daṅ/ raṅ snaṅ baho// de ltar ma yin te/ gal te gzugs ñid raṅ śes pa ham raṅ gi ṅo bor hgyur na ni śes pa yaṅ yul śes pa daṅ khyad par med par hgyur ro//. Cf. Pramànavàrttikabhàsya of Prajñàkaragupta, ed. Rahula Samkrtyàyana, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953, p 403:

visayajñànatajjñànaviśeṣàt tu dvirùpatà/

viṣaye rùpàdau yaj jñànam tad arthasvàbhàsam/ viṣayajñàne tu yaj jñànam tad arthànurùpajñànàbhàsam svàbhàsam ca/ anyathà yadi viṣayajñànam arthàkàram eva syàt svàkàram eva và viṣayajñànajñànam (text: viṣayajñànam) api tadaviśiṣṭam syàt/

37. Ueda Yoshifumi, Yuishiki shisô nyumon, Kyoto: Asoka shoin, 1964, pp 11-52; Two main streams of thought in Yogàcàra philosophy, Philosophy East and West XVII (1967) 155-165; Fukihara Shôshin, Gohô shû yuishiki kô, Kyoto: Hôzôkan, 1956, pp 34-72; Nagao Gadjin, Anei no shiki tempen setsu ni tsuite, Shûkkyô kenkyû IX (1933) 865-880.

38. Abhidharmakośa IX p 477: kà punah samtatih kah parinàmah ko viśesah/ yah karmapùrva uttarottaracittaprasavah sà samtatis tasyà anyathotpattih parinàmah/ sa punar yo'nantaram phalotpàdanasamarthah so'ntyaparinàmaviśistatvàt parinàmaviśesah/. Cf. Abhidharmakośa II ad 36d: kim punar idam bìjam nàma/ yan nàmarùpam phalotpattau samartham sàksàt pàramparyena và/ samtatiparinàmaviśesàt/ ko'yam parinàmo nàma/ santater anyathàtvam/ kà ceyam samtatih/ hetuphalabhùtàs traiyadhvikàh samskàràh/. The straightforwardness of these definitions is quite apparent when we compare them with that given by Sthiramati quoted previously. Although it begins with "ko'yam parinàmo nàma/ anyathàtvam/, which has some resemblance with those of the Abhidharmakośa, the rest of it does not have the slightest connection with them, as it reads: kàranaksananirodhasamakàlah kàranaksanavilaksanah

kàryasyàtmalàbhah parinàmah/ tatràtmàdivikalpavàsanàpariposàd rùpàdivikalpavàsanàpariposàc càlayavijñànàd àtmàdinirbhàdo vikalpo rùpàdinirbhàsaś cotpadyate/.....

39. Ṛgvedapràtiśàkhya I.56, ed. M.D. Shastri, Allahabad: Indian Press LTD, 1931: amum iti tadbhàvam uktam yathàntaram. Cf. II.15-21.

40. Taittirìyapràtiśàkhya I.28, ed. W.D. Whitney, Journal of the American Oriental Society IX (1871) 26: am vikàrasya. To which the commentator adds: am iti śabdo vikàrasyàkhyà bhavati/ am iti dvitìyàvibhakter upalaksanam/ yathà prathamapùrvo hakàraś caturtham/ atha nakàro nakàram/

41. Pànini, Astadhyàyì I.49-56: sasthì sthàneyogà/ sthàne'ntaratamah/ uranraparah/ alo'ntyasya/ àdeh parasya/anekàlśit sarvasya/ sthànivad àdeśo'nalvidhau/.

42. Pàtañjali, The Vyàkaranamahàbhàsya of Patañjali, ed. F. Kielhorn, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1962, p 31 & 137: vikàra àdesah/ ghàtayati ghàtakah/ varnavikàro nàrthavikàrah//...../// athavà kàryaviparinàmàt siddham etat/ kim idam kàryaviparinàmàd iti/ kàryà buddhih sà viparinamyate/ nanu ca kàryàviparinàmàd iti bhavitavyam/ santi caiva hy auttarapadikàni hrasvatvàni/ api ca buddhih sampratyaya ity anarthàntaram/ kàryà buddhih kàryah sampratyayah kàryasya sampratyayasya viparinàmah kàryaviparinàmah kàryaviparinàmàd iti// parihàràntaram evedam matvà pathitam katham cedam parihàràntaram syàt/ yadi bhùtapùrve sthànaśabdo vartate/ bhùtapùrve càpi sthànaśabdo vartate/ katham/ buddhyà/ tad yathà/ kaścit kasmaicid upadiśati pràcìnam gramàd àmrà iti/ tasya sarvatràmrabuddhih prasaktà/ tatah paścàd àha ye ksìrino'varohavantah prthuparnàs te nyagrodhà iti/ sa tatràmrabuddhyà nyagrodhabuddhim pratipadyate/ sa tatah paśyati buddhyàmràmś càpakrsyamànàn nyagrodhàmś càdhìyamànàn/ nityà eva ca svasmin visaya àmrà nityàś ca nyagrodhà buddhis tv asya viparinamyate/ evam ihàpi astir asmà aviśesenopadistah/ tasya sarvatràstibuddhih prasaktà/ so'ster bhùr bhavatìty astibuddhyà bhavatibuddhim pratipadyate/ sa tatah paśyati buddhyàstim càpakrsyamànam bhavatim càdhìyamànam/ nitya eva ca svasmin visaye'stir nityo bhavatir buddhis tv asya viparinamyate//.

43. Abhidharmakośa II ad 46c-d: jàtam ity eva tu na syàd asatyàm jàtau sasthìvacanam ca rùpasyotpàdah iti yathà rùpasya rùpam iti/ evam yàvad anityatà yathàyogam vaktavyà/ tena tarhy anàtmatvam apy estavyam anàtmabuddhisiddhyartham/ samkhyàparimànaprthaktva-samyogavibhàgaparatvàparatvasattàdayo'pi tìrthakàraparikalpità abhyupagantavyà ekadvimahàdanuprthaksamyuktaviyuktaparàparasadàdibuddhisiddhyartham/ sasthìvidhànàrtham ca rùpasya samyoga iti/ esà ca sasthì katham kalpyate/ rùpasya svabhàva iti/ tasmàt prajñaptimàtram evaitad abhùtvà bhàvajñàpanàrtham kriyate jàtam iti/ sa càbhùtvàbhàvalaksana utpàdo bahuvikalpah/ tasya viśesàrtham rùpasyotpàda iti sasthìm kurvanti yathà rùpasamjñaka evotpàdah pratìyeta mà'nyah pratyàyìti/ tadyathà candanasya gandhàdayah śilàputrakasya śarìram iti/ evam sthityàdayo'pi yathàyogam veditavyàh/. Cf. Abhidharmakośa IX p 472-473: asaty àtmani ka eva smarati/ smaratìti ko'rthah/ smrtyà visayam grhnàti/ kim tadgrahanam anyat smaranàt/ smrtim tarhi kah karoti/ uktah sa yas tàm karoti smrtihetucittaviśesah/ yat tarhi caitrah smaratìty ucyate/ tato hi caitràkhyàt samtànàt tàm bhavantàm drstvocyate caitrah smaratìti/ asaty àtmani kasyeyam smrtih/ kim arthaisà sasthì/ svàmyarthàt/ yathà kasya kah svàmì/ yathà goś caitrah/ katham asau tasyàh svàmì/ tadadhìno hi tasyà vàhadohàdisu viniyogah/ kva ca punah smrtir viniyoktavyà ya evam tasyàh svàmì mrgyate/ smartavye'rthe/ kim artham viniyoktavyà/ smaranàrtham/ aho sùktàni sukhaidhitànàm/ saiva hi nàma tadartham viniyoktavyèti/ katham ca viniyoktavyà/ utpàdanata àhosvit sampresanatah/ smrtigatyayogàd utpàdanatah/ hetur eva tarhi svàmì pràpnoti phalam eva ca svam / yasmàd dhetor adhipatyam phale phalena/ ca tadvàn hetur iti/ yo hy eva hetuh smrtes tasyaivàsau/ yaś càpi sa caitràbhidhànah samskàrasamùhasamtàna ekato grhìtvà gavàkhyasvàmìty ucyate sa càpi tasya deśàntaravikàrotpadam kàranabhàram cetasi krtvà na tu khalu kaścid ekaś caitro nàmàsti na càpi gauh/ tasmàt tatràpi na hetubhàvam vyatìty asti svàmibhàvah/ evam ko vijànatìti kasya vijñànam ity evam àdisu vaktavyesu tasya hetur indriyàrtham anaskàrà yathàyogam ity esa viśesah/.

44. Hacker, Vivarta, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz: Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 1953, pp 185-242; "Mandana ist also in seiner erkenntnistheoretischen Begründung des Monismus noch ebenso abhängig vom buddhistischen Idealismus wie Gaudapàda. Ganz ähnlich wie der Buddhist Vasubandhu alle Vorstellungsgegenstände sich aus dem 'Bewusstseinsspeicher' (àlaya-vijñàna) entwickeln lässt, so gehen sie für Mandana aus dem einen Geistigen (drastr, àtman) hervor. Vasubandhu nennt diese Wandlung parinàma; Mandana präfigiert dem Worte ein das Vielfältigwerden betonendes vi- und setzt vivartanàd và hinzu..."(p. 219).

45. Ruegg, On the term Buddhiviparinàma and the problem of illusory change, Indo-Iranian Journal II (1958) 279-280; cf. Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne, Paris: E. de Boccard, 1959, pp 89-93.

46. Sthiramati, Trimśikàbhàsya, p 36: anyonyavaśàd iti/ tathà hi caksuràdivijñàna svaśaktiparipose vartamànam śaktiviśistasyàlayavijñànaparinàmasya nimittam so'pi àlayavijñànaparinàmah caksuràdivijñànasya nimittam bhavati/ evam anyonyavaśàd yasmàd ubhayam pravartate/ tasmàd àlayavijñànàd anyenànadhisthatàd anekaprakàro vikalpah sa sa jàyate/

47. Trimśikà ad 17-19:

vijñànaparinàmo'yam vikalpo yad vikalpyate/
tena tan nàsti tenedam sarvam vijñaptimàtrakam//
sarvabìjam hi vijñànam parinàmas tathà tathà/
yàty anyonyavaśàd yena vikalpah sa sa jàyate//
karmano vàsanà gràhadvayavàsanayà saha/
ksìne pùrvavipàke'nyad vipàkam janayanti tat//

48. Dharmapàla, Vijñaptimàtratàsiddhi, Taishō 1585 pp 40a1-43a8:

由一切種識、如是如是變、
以展轉力故、彼彼分別生、

論曰、……展轉力者、謂八現識及彼相應相見分等
彼增互有相助力故、即現識等總名分別、應等分別
等是性故、分別數等、故言彼彼、此頌意說、離彼外
緣、由本識中有一切種、轉變差別受熏現行八種

識等展轉力故彼彼分別而亦得生、何假外緣方起分別、語等依起應知亦然、等種現行為緣生故、所說種現緣生分別、云何應知此緣生相、緣且有四、一因緣、……二等無間緣……三所緣緣、……四增上緣……如是四緣依十五處、義差別故立為十因、云何此依十五處立、一語依處謂諸名想所起語性、即依此處立隨說因、謂依此語、隨見聞等說諸義故、此即能說為所說因、有論說此是名想見、由如名字取相執著、隨起說故、若依說便駁此因、是語依處……

49. Frege, Der Gedanke: Eine logische Untersuchung, Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I (1918-1919) 58-77; also Reinhardt Grossmann, Reflections on Frege's philosophy, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969, pp 191-194; C. E. Thiel, Sinn und Bedeutung in der Logik Gottlob Freges, Meisenheim/Glan: Monographien zur Philosophischen Forschung, 1965.

50. Vimśatikà ad 18a-b: yadi svasamtànaparinàmaviśesàd eva sattvànàm arthapratibhàsà vijñaptaya utpadyante nàrthaviśesàt/ tadà ya esa pàpakalyànamitrasamparkàt sadasaddharmaśravanàc ca vijñaptiniyamah sattvànàm sa katham sidhyati asati sadasatsamparke taddeśanàyàm ca/

anyonyàdhipatitvena vijñaptiniyamo mithah/

sarvesàm hi sattvànàm anyonyavijñaptyàdhipatyena mitho vijñapter niyamo bhavati yathàyogam/ mitha iti parasparatah/ atah samtànàntaravijñaptiviśesàt samtànàntare vijñaptiviśesa utpadyate nàrthaviśesàt/

51. Lévi, La notation de tréfonds, in Matériaux pour l'étude du système vijñaptimàtra, pp 125-173; Lamotte, L'Alayavijñàna (le Réceptacle) dans la Mahà-

yànasamgraha (Chapitre II), MCB III (1934-1935) 169-255; also de La Vallée Poussin, Note sur L'Alayavijñàna, MCB III (1934/35) 145-168.

C H A P T E R S E V E N

O N T H E L A N G U A G E A B O U T W H A T T H E R E I S

From what has been said, it is quite clear that Vasubandhu conceives the transformation of consciousness to be a verbal construction, through which process whatever is verbally constructed does not exist and serves merely as "what causes one to know". The question immediately arises as to why that transformation can be so conceived and what is verbally constructed by it can be so described. To answer it, we need not do any searching further than the Trimśikà itself as the solution has already given therein. The proposed solution will help not only resolving the immediate question just raised, but also giving us a clear view of Vasubandhu's response to his initial philosophical concern. Note that he started out with the simple problem of whether object of consciousness is merely name, a problem derived from his critical study of the Vaibhàsika system. In this system, after barring from its universe of discourse a number of known ficttitious names such as "god", "self" etc... it is maintained that every other remaining name must be capable of designating a real object lying somewhere out there in the external world. Thus, according to it there must exist such entities as birth, decay, past, future etc..., since there exist corresponding terms for them in its universe of discourse. When Vasubandhu comes upon this system, he questions at once whether object of consciousness can be a name without postulating the existence of any sort of entities at all or not, which leads him interestingly to the theory of descriptions. He points out that if the Vaibhàsika maintains that the existence of an entity, say, birth must be postulated so as to be able to justify the meaningfulness of such statements as "I learned the birth of my son through the wire", where the word 'birth" is the object of the

verb 'learn", one could design a way by which the word 'birth' can be easily removed without the loss of any meaningful unit of the statement. One can say for example that "I learned my son having been born through the wire", or even more explicitly, that "I learned through the wire something which, having never existed before, exists and which is my son", etc... The word 'birth' hence can be definitely removed without losing what the statement is intended to say. It follows naturally then that even for those names which are accepted in the Vaibhāsika universe of discourse, it is possible to show still that there is no need to postulate for them any sort of entities at all, because they, too, can be substituted for by other expressions which do not name and which do not require any thing to be corresponded to them. In other words, such terms as birth, decay, past, future etc... are nothing but incomplete symbols. They are merely descriptions, which, being incomplete symbols, can be easily done away with as the circumstance demands. So, one can say "I learned the birth of my son" without any fear of an ontological commitment to the postulate of the existence of an entity called 'birth', for given the new device of descriptions one can as well say "the learned my son having been born", where no such name called 'birth' occurs or is required.

From that theory of descriptions, we have seen that Vasubandhu proceeds to inquire further into the nature of language with the result that new logical theories are discovered, laying the foundation for the logic of India to be developed by his numerous successors, among which the most lasting is perhaps the notion that the validity of a proof can be ascertained by basing exclusively upon itself and not upon anything else. This notion prompts him into the re-examination of the problem of perception, because if the validity of a proof can be ascertained upon itself, then what is the point of perceiving things, which up to his time is held to be

the sole judge of any argument. The re-examination of the problem rewarded him, as has been seen, with the realization that perception must be defined in terms of the language in which it is expressed, if it is to be free from all the pitfalls that numerous theories concerning it proposed in his days have fallen into. But once perception is so defined, it becomes quite apparent that a mechanism must be found to account for its being so. And here, Vasubandhu was forced to study not merely the perception, but the whole complex life of a consciousness which gives rise to a particular perception, with the result that a notion of self-knowledge must be postulated, saying that every knowledge is, of necessity, a self-knowledge, which is to mean that when I see something, not only do I see it, but also I must be aware of the fact that I see it. When that notion is postulated, it is obviously natural that an inquiry must be made to determine what originates it and how it works. And this results into the recognition that not only must perception be defined in terms of the language in which it is expressed, but also the whole consciousness must be so defined, for consciousness itself is nothing but a transformation, and this transformation of consciousness, in turn, is a verbal construction. Again, if it is indeed that the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction, then one must offer some explanation as to why it is so. That explanation, as has been said, will help not only answering the question just raised, but also giving us at the same time a complete response to Vasubandhu's initial philosophical concern. Why? Because although it is apparent that all the philosophical problems which subsequently occupied his attention can be traced genetically to his theory of descriptions, which is the first answer of his to his initial philosophical concern, no clear reason is given as to why his theory of descriptions is necessarily true and necessarily

applicable, that is to say why the essential rule of substitution can be valid. Returning to the above example, one may ask: why is it that it is possible to substitute the statement "I learned my son having been born" for "I learned the birth of my son" without the loss of any meaningful unit of it? Answers to this and similar questions have been hitherto unprovided for, in spite that they are very material to the understanding of the theory of descriptions. So, in responding to the problem of why the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction, Vasubandhu offers, interestingly enough, some of the answers just referred to, as will be seen. Why, then, is the transformation of consciousness a verbal construction?

We have said that the statement that the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction is a conclusion drawn from a thesis expressed in the Trimśikā. As a result, if any justification for it were to be found, it must be found therein. The thesis says that "the description of self and things which functions in several ways is upon the transformation of consciousness",[1] which can be understood historically in two ways. One is that it means to assert that the description of self and things is the transformation of consciousness. The other implies that it signifies the transformation of consciousness as the basis upon which the description of self and things functions. Which one of these two ways of understanding is correct will not be presently the subject of our discussion, for whether which is correct, the fact still is that the description of self and things is conceived to be indissolubly connected with the transformation of consciousness, regardless of how it is being indissolubly connected. Otherwise stated, whether the description of self and things is identical with or is based upon the transformation of consciousness, it remains a fact that

that description is indissolubly connected with that transformation of consciousness. So, so long as we do not know what precisely the term "description" means, we are not in the position to decide which of the two understandings better reflects its intended meaning which Vasubandhu wishes to express. What does description mean then?

To respond to this question, we again do not have a ready answer from Vasubandhu himself. And this is a rather curious state of affair on account of the important role that term plays in the above thesis. In fact, it appears quite early in his writings. We can find it in the Abhidharmakośa, for instance; and no definition concerning it is present, of course.[2] Consequently, we must assume once more that the term "description" is of current usage during his days and that it is widely and properly understood by the users without any need of stating specifically what it means. That this assumption is evidently correct can be readily established by making a survey of the source materials available to us today concerning the term. Thus, it already appeared in a number of texts belonging to what is usually designated as "the Minor Upanisad" with some clear and definite meaning.[3] It is regrettable, however, that these so-called Minor Upanisad cannot be determined satisfactorily as to the date of their appearance. Some hold them to be of a very late date, while others are more generous in granting them some hypothetical antiquity.[4] We are not in the position to discuss this problem right here, as it is not materially pertaining to our subject. In any case, even if we are to discuss it, at best we can arrive at some new uncertain hypothesis which might not fare any better than those already given. So, we are willing to presently pass under silence what those Minor Upanisads have to say about the term "description", and turn to other sources which are

recognized to be appropriately dated and in some instances give better indications as to what use the term might have been subject to. The first of these sources is none other than Patañjali's Mahàbhàsya.

In commenting upon Pànini I.1.1, Kàtyàyana raises the question of how one can know that vrddhi is referring to à, ài, and àu, and not the other way around, and then responds to it by saying that one can know the difference "from the usage of the Master, as is found in those related to the common and the Vedic speech". Addressing himself to this answer, Patañjali asks: "what does the expression 'from the usage of the Master' mean"? And here is his reply:

> "From the description of the Master. It is like what is done in the world and in the Vedas. In the world, when a child is born, the parents in a close room give name to him as Devadatta, Yajñadatta. From the description of these names, others knows that it refers to him. Similarly, in the Veda when a sacrifiant names his sacrificial ustensils as sphya, yùpa, casàla, etc. from the description of these names by those venerable men, others knows that they refers to them. So also here. Even here some say that the word vrddhi is the referant and à ài and àu are the referees, while others read the sùtra sici vrddhih /Pànini VII.2.1/ and illustrate it with à, ài and àu. Therefore, we understand that that with which another is referred to is a referant and those that are referred to are the referees".[5]

Reading through this passage, it becomes clear that to Patañjali description is an accepted usage of a certain name. When I call a flower a daisy, others will know it as a daisy only through the description, that is, the usage of that name 'daisy'. The synonyminity of these two terms 'description' and 'usage' is widely accepted long after Patañjali's days and survived even after Vasubandhu's time. Thus, Vàtsyàyana on one accasion at least in his commentary upon the Nyàyasùtra specifically equates "description" with "usage",[6] in spite

of the definition by the Nyàyasùtra itself which explicitly states otherwise concerning the term 'description'.

That term occurs nine times therein, i.e. Nyàyasùtra I.2.11, 14, 15; II.2.14, 30, 61, 62, 64; and IV.1.54, of which all except one are to be understood as the Nyàyasùtra itself defines them. The one exception is the case we just pointed out, connecting with Nyàyasùtra II.2.62 where Vàtsyàyana interpreted description to mean "usage". How does the Nyàyasùtra define and Vàtsyàyana understand the rest of other cases, then? The first series of occurrence of the term are concerned mainly with various logical "traps" arising out of the ambiguous use of language. The Nyàyasùtra describes these traps as follows:

> "Logical trap is the rebuttal of a statement by means of giving rise to a verbal construction of an object, and it is of three kinds: trap of words, trap of similarity and trap of descriptions. Logical trap of words is the verbal construction of an object different from what is intended by the speaker when that object is ambiguously spoken of by him. Logical trap of similarity is the verbal construction of an untrue object by means of connecting more similarity to that object than what it really possesses. Logical trap of descriptions is the denying the real existence of an object while presenting a verbal construction of a thing [in its place]. Now, is the logical trap of descriptions merely a logical trap of words on account of their being not different? No, it is not, because they possess different kinds of object. Further, if they are not different, it follows then that there is but one logical trap, for all those three above share some sort of common property."[7]

That is the full discussion of the question of logical traps given by the Nyàyasùtra. We translate it entirely here, not only because it deals with the term 'description' which presently is the subject of our research, but also because

of the similarity betwen the language it uses to discuss the problem it concerns and the language Vasubandhu employs himself in his writings, particularly in the Trimśikà. Thus, when the Nyàyasùtra defines the logical trap of descriptions as "the denying of the real existence of an object while presenting a verbal construction of a thing in its place", we cannot help but immediately think of Vasubandhu's statement that "the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction" and that "that transformation is the description of self and things". This close similarity of language does not, of course, amount to anything, except that it assures us the correctness of our approach to the vexing problem of defining what Vasubandhu himself left undefined, which is to say that if Vasubandhu did not care or bother to define any term which seems to us today to be of prime importance to the understanding of his thought, we can safely assume that he felt others have done it and had no need to repeat them.

What the above discussion given by the Nyàyasùtra offers is obviously not a clear and definitive definition of what description is. What it does is to give us a glimpse of the position that description occupies in the universe of human discourse. It points out, for instance, that someone holds the view that logical trap of descriptions is not different at all from logical trap of words. They are of the same kind of logical trap. Although the Nyàyasùtra together with its commentators through centuries fails to specify exactly who that someone is, we today knows that at least one of the authors of the Carakasamhità has held such a view.[8] So, within this respect we can be certain that description is but one form, if not the form, of language, which is capable of

being considered as identical with the language itself, regardless of how one might define description. As a result, even when no attempt is made to explicitly define description, the Nyàyasùtra by means of an exposition of various viewpoints concerning the relationship betwen the logical trap of words and the logical trap of descriptions, clearly sets the limit to which descriptions must belong and definitively situates them within the boundaries of language. Hence there is not the slightest ambiguity as to where their position must be, in so far as it is used in connection with the term 'verbal construct ion', and when it is used with that term.

Further, by so situating the descriptions, the Nyàyasùtra evidently attempts to specify precisely what they consist of. Here, in order to evaluate properly this attempt, we must know what the logical traps of words and of descriptions are. Vàtsyàyana tells us that the former kind of logical trap is of the following type. When someone says "navakambalo'yam mànavakah", which in Sanskrit can be taken to mean either as "this boy has a new blanket" or as "this boy has nine blanket", owing to the fact that the expression nava therein can mean either nine or new, he thus sets a logical trap of words up for himself, which his opponent may choose to lead him into by pointing out that if the boy has only one new blanket, then why did he say he has nine? If on the other hand the boy does have nine blanket, why did he say he has a new blanket? So, when a statement is capable of giving rise to various questions of the type just said, it belongs to the category of logical trap of words.[9] As for the logical trap of descriptions, Vàtsyàyana offers examples of the following kind. When someone says, "the platform yells", he is thus subject himself to a logical trap of

descriptions, because his opponent may respond, "the people on the platform yell and the platform does not yell". What his opponent does in this case is to deny "the real existence of the object" which his statement is intended at and which is here the people on the platform, while putting in its place "a verbal construction of a thing" which is to take the statement "the platform yells" to mean exactly as what each of its component word says, that is, "the platform yells" and nothing more.[10] Clearly then, both kinds of logical trap are but effectuated by means of word-twisting.[11] Although the Nyàyasùtra differentiates the fine distinction betwen the logical trap of words and the logical trap of descriptions by indicating that while the former kind is concerned only with the twisting of the primary sense of a word, the latter kind deals exclusively with the twisting of the secondary sense thereof,[12] it is sufficient for our purpose here to note that both of them occur through some sort of word-twisting, irrespective of whether it concerns with the primary or the secondary sense. Descriptions are thus consisted of words of some type. They are therefore not only situated in the domain of language, but also are represented by a class of words of their own. The components of the descriptions are hence explicitly specified. And from here on there is no question as to what description may mean, and we do not have to wait long to have an answer about it.

In the next chapter, when dealing with the problem of whether the object of a word is an individual thing or a class of thing, the Nyàyasùtra finds it necessary to state precisely what, in its opinion, description is. The significance of the choosing of that juncture to insert in its view about description will not be missed, as will be seen; and the reason why it chooses to do so at that juncture will be clear subsequently. What interests us at this point is how it defines the

term 'description'. It says: "description is that which is in the state of not being itself on account of its association, its position, its implication, its action, its estimation, its belonging, its environment, its connection, its fruition and its power, as in the case of the words 'brahman', 'platform', 'blanket', 'king', 'barley-meal', 'sandal', 'Ganges', 'cloth', 'food' and 'human being'".[13] What this definition says about the term 'description' is evidently clear. According to it, is description any term which does not refer to itself, but to something else. The examples it gives are further explained by Vàtsyàyana as follows:

> "To say that description is that which is in the state of not being itself is to say the naming of a word which does not apply to itself by means of that same word. This is because of (1) its association, as when someone says, "somebody bends the stick", he means the brahman does, /for/ the brahman is always associated with the stick. Or because of (2) its position, as when someone says, "the platform yells", he means the people on the platform do. Or because of (3) its implication, as when someone says, "somebody makes a mat, he means a straw mat, for the mat means a spread of the straw. Or because of (4) its action, as when someone says, "Death is the king", "Wealth is the king", he means these things do act like a king. Or because of (5) its estimation, as when the barley-meal is measured by means of an adhaka, one says "the barley-meal is of an adhaka. Or because of (6) its belonging, as when the sandal--wood is preserved in a tuft of grass, one says "the sandal of the grass-tuft". Or because of (7) its environment, as when someone says, "the cows roam about on the Ganges", he means "they roam about in the places near the Ganges". Or because of (8) its connection, as when someone says, "the cloth is black", he means, the cloth is connected with the black color. Or because

> of (9) its fruition, as someone says, "food is life". Or because of (10) its power, like the sayings "this man is the kingdom", "this man is the clan". On this point, it can be said that even the word 'class' should designate a particular object due either to its association or to its connection".[14]

With Vàtsyàyana's explanation, it is impressively clear as to what is meant by the statement that "description is that which is in the state of not being itself on account of its association, its position etc...". A word is a description when it does not refer to itself, but to something else. Thus, when someone says "the platform yells", the word 'platform' is a description because it does not designate an object named 'platform', but designate something else, which in this case happens to be the people standing upon it. Similarly, the statement that the cows roam about on the Ganges does not mean that the cows are roaming about on the water of the Ganges, what it means is that they roam about in the places near the Ganges. So, the expression "on the Ganges" is a description, because it does not refer to what it should refer, i.e. the water of the Ganges, but instead refer to something else, i.e. the places near it. The meaning of the term 'description' is hence completely determined and well defined. We can say, description is any term which does not refer to the object carrying that term, but refers instead to some other object which does not carry it. Once it is so defined, we can see immediately why the definition of description is inserted into the discussion of whether the object of a word is a particular individual thing or a class of thing; and from that we can evaluate the accuracy of Vàtsyàyana's understanding of the <u>Nyàyasùtra</u> when he glosses the term 'description' as 'usage', as has been pointed out.

We have seen that the Nyāyasūtra uses the term 'description' several times before it makes any attempt to state explicitly what it means by it at a juncture when the discussion of what the object of a word is reaches its high mark with the thesis that the particular individual thing is indeed the object of a word. The discussion runs as follows:

> "There is still doubt as to the relationship betwen [words] and individual things, form and class, because of [the presence] of descriptions. [Some maintain that the object of a word is a] particular individual thing on account of there being descriptions, where the word 'that', the group, the giving, the owning, the number, the accumulation, the decrease, the color, the compound and the pedigree are all applied to each individual thing. [We reply,] it is not so because that would be a progressus ad infinitum. Description is that which is in the state of not being itself on account of its association, its position, its implication, its action, its estimation, its belonging, its environment, its connection, its fruition and its power like the case of the words 'brahman','platform', 'mat', 'king', 'barley-meal','sandal', 'Ganges', 'cloth', 'food', and 'human being'. [So], form must be [the object of a word], because one can rely upon it to establish the determination of each being. [We reply that it is not so] because it does not apply to the act of consecration etc... as is in the case of the clay-cow, where even [the requirements of] individual thing and of form are correctly fulfilled. [So, the object of a word is] the class of thing. [We reply that] it is not so, because the manifestation of a class is through its dependence upon the form and the individual thing. Therefore, the object of a word is at the same time an individual thing, a form and a class".[15]

Reading through this passage, one can see evidently that it is because of the descriptions that doubts appear as to what the object of a word is. It is hence natural that a determination of what description is must be made in order to

enable those participating in the discussion recognize clearly what the implications are in the notion of description.for the problem of what the object of a word is. If it is maintained that the object of a word is each individual thing, then what can one say about such words as "platform" in the statement "the platform yells", where its object is not a platform as one would expect, but the people on the platform? Similarly, if it is asserted to the contrary that the form is the object of a word, then where is the form of the word "platform" when what it says is the people on the platform? Lastly, if it is said that the object of a word is the class of a thing, then the same difficulty is encountered, for how can one classify the people on a platform and the platform into a same class? Given these difficulties, it is at all surprising if one were to conclude that words are but descriptions, and their object is but to be described, and not be stood for, by them. We are not surprised, because that is the only possible and correct conclusion which one can reach. Yet, it is a marvel that the Nyāyasūtra is merely content to repeat what is already quite well-known since the days of Pāṇini. What is worse is the fact that while the latter succeeds in giving a formal answer to the problem, thus freeing it from all the entailed questions that might araise therefrom, the former fails in that attempt. Thus in response to the query "Is form the object of a word, or a thing?", Pāṇini offers the following answer, according to Patañjali:

> "He said, both. How is that known? Because sūtras conceding both views are written. Thus, the sūtra I.2.58 says that the plural can be taken as a singular, concurrently, when it is to express a class, which is to mean that form is the object of a word, while the sūtra I.2.64 says that when words are of the same form and having the same

> ending, one of them remains, which, by basing itself upon the notion of one remaining, is to mean that the object of a word is a thing".[16]

To Pānini, then, the problem of determining what the object of a word is appears very simple, if not routinely trivial. He offers some formal rules by which one can easily test a word to see if its object is a thing or a class of thing. Hence wherever the rule I.2.58 of his applies, the word in question has a class as its object. On the other hand, whenever the rule I.2.64 could be used, the word concerned stands for a thing. We can see that Pānini adroitly eschews the problem which evidently may engulf him with all sorts of nagging questions by having resort to a purely formal solution, which, it must be admitted, is very satisfactory as far as his subject is concerned. However, when the Nyāyasūtra borrows Pānini's theory, it seemingly is not aware that it does not have the vintage point that the latter has. Therefore, it fails to give any clear indication as to how one can determine when the object of a word is a thing, a form or a class, or all three of them at the same time, a question which, as has been said, the formal test given by Pānini can resolve without any difficulty. And this is perhaps the most notable failure that the Nyāyasūtra suffers in its rather interesting formulation of the problem of the object of a word. In any case, by inserting into the discussion of that problem the question of descriptions, it doubtlessly indicates that by its time the notion of description presents an effective challenge to all possible resolution of what the object of a word is. In fact, as has been pointed out previously, by defining description as "that which is in the state of not being itself", that notion can seriously challenge all the traditional solutions to the problem, which consist mainly of Pānini's and numerous variants thereof. So, on

this point at least, we must count it as one of the most remarkable contributions that the Nyàyasùtra made to our understanding of the general history of the concept of descriptions. It realizes the significance of that concept even when its commentators throughout centuries fail to properly grasp it.

Thus at the time Vàtsyàyana writes his standard commentary upon the Nyàyasùtra, although he gives a considerable space to the discussion of what the object of a word is with a rather thourough description of all the traditional views known to him, he has almost nothing to say about the term 'description'. Furthermore, he glosses it as "usage" or "use", a gloss which indicates that he does not fully appreciate the all-important significance of the term, for as we have seen, it is because of the descriptions that doubt arises as to the relation betwen words and things, form and class. It is due to them that the whole discussion on that related subject-matter has taken place. Besides, even the gloss of it as "usage" or "use" does not seem to be entirely justified. Upon the statement by the Nyàyasùtra that "some maintain that the object of a word is a particular individual thing on account of there being descriptions where the word 'that', the group, the giving, the owning, the number, the increase, the decrease, the color, the compound and the pedigree are all applied to each individual thing", Vàtsyàyana comments as follows:

> "The object of a word is a particular individual thing. Why? Because of there being such descriptions as the word 'that', which is applied to a particular individual thing. Description here means usage. A statement such as "that cow stands", "that cow is lying", is not a designator of a class because there is no multiplicity therein. But if there is multiplicity, then it is the designator of a thing. If there is multiplicity, an expression such as "a group of cows" is the name of a thing and not of a class, because there is no multiplicity of

latter. The statement "he gives a cow to the physician" means that there is actually a giving up of a thing and not of a class because the latter is immaterial and incapable of being exchanged in one way or another. Owning means having a proprietary relationship as is in such statements as "the cow is of Kaundinya", "the cow is of the brahman". It follows then that one may have multiple relationship with the things named if there are multiple things. But it is said that class is not multiple, i.e., not divisible. Number means ten cows, twenty cows... Thus, it is the multiple things that are counted and not the class, for there is no multiplicity for the latter. Increase means the accumulation of parts of a thing created, as is in the statement "the cow grows". But it is said that a class has no part. So is the decrease, which is similarly explained. The color is like in the statements "the cow is white","the cow is brown"..., so the quality is attached to a thing, and not to a common trait. The compound is like in the expression "good for the cow", "pleseant for the cow"..., where the words 'good' etc... are connected with a thing and not with a class. Pedigree means a series of continuous birth of the same sort like cow giving birth to cow, and this meaning is cogent for a thing which is capable of giving birth and not for a class which is otherwise. So, the object of a word is none other than a real thing, a particular individual real thing."[17]

This comment by Vàtsyàyana evidently shows that he does not have to resort to the notion of description as the Nyàyasùtra defines it, which is to say that description is that which is in the state of not being itself on account of association etc... Instead he simply interpret it to mean "usage" as Patañjali's tradition has it, according to which the question of what the object of a word is can just

be decided upon its usage. So, here at least Vàtsyàyana seems to believe that the Nyàyasùtra borrows not only Pànini's answer to the problem of the object of a word, but also the latter's formal test of whether his own answer is fit or not. Is this the reason why the Nyàyasùtra was merely content to repeat what Pànini had to say on that subject? In any case, we know for sure that the former explicitly defines rather correctly what description is, and that that definition is still very current by Vàtsyàyana's time, as is evidenced in his quotation of it.[18] Thus, it does not matter whether they draw a wrong or right conclusion from it, although logically we would expect them to so do. And in this, they fail us much disappointedly. Besides, by inserting the notion of description into the discussion of the object of a word, the Nyàyasùtra proves that it is acutely aware of the unfeasibility of a many solutions in so far as that problem is concerned. The failure to draw a correct conclusion is therefore all the more regretable. In fact, the notion of description receives so little attention that not untill Vasubandhu is it considered of any value in helping to solve various questions that the advanced science of linguistics in India has engendered. And after him only Bhartrhari and Sthiramati are of any regard for it in their philosophical thinking, although not much is coming out of it due to the difference in perspective of their respective philosophy. Even so, on account of their being concerned with that notion, they offer many rare and valuable clarifications upon not only Vasubandhu's philosophy itself, but also those of his predecessors, thus letting us see how historically Vasubandhu's thought evolved the way it did. And that must be admitted as the most precious contribution

they ever make to the task of elucidating the latter's manifold philosophy, perhaps in an attempt to repay their debt they owe to him.

After having repeated the now standard definition of what description is by saying that description is that which is applied to what it is not and to where it is not, Sthiramati formulates the problem of description in terms of just what the object of a word is, as follows:

> "But another says that if there are no self and thing to serve as the primary sense of a word, then it is not right to speak of description. For a description is valid only when three conditions are fulfilled; if one of them is lacking, there will be no description. The three conditions are: (1) an object to serve as the primary sense of a word, (2) another object resembling to that object and (3) the similarity betwen them. For instance, fire is the object which serves as the primary sense of that word. Then, the boy is another object which resembles to fire. And finally there is a common property betwen them which is the state of their being red or ardent. So, one can creates a description 'the fiery boy'.
>
> On this point, we ask: does the description 'the fiery boy' describe a class or a thing? In either cases there will be no description. For here the common property of their being red or ardent is not of a class; and when there exists no common property, it is not right to speak of the description of a class in terms of that boy, on account of its over-implication. If [it is argued that] even though a class is not present in a common property, the state of being red and ardent is inseparably connected by means of a class; so it is still possible to speak of the description of a class in terms of that boy; then we respond that once [it is admitted that] a class is not present in a common property, it is not right to hold that the state

of being red and ardent is inseparably connected as what is seen in the boy. Furthermore, in the case they are inseparably connected, there will be no description because a class is really present both in the boy and in fire. Therefore, a class description for the boy is not possible.

A description of thing is not possible either on account of there being no common trait. For the quality of being red or ardent of the fire is not just that which is found in the boy. In fact, they are totally different from each other, as the characterization is bound to their own respective substrat. And without the quality of fire it is not right that a description of fire is applied to the boy. If it is argued that it is right because of the similarity of the quality of fire to that of the boy, then it is all right to apply the red or ardent quality of the fire to the red or ardent quality of the boy, but it is not right to apply a description of fire to the boy, because the similarity of quality does not entail a necessary relationship betwen them. Therefore, a description of thing is not right, either.

Further, there exists no object of a word which can serve as the primary sense for that word, because the own form of it is beyond the domain of all knowledge and expression. In truth, the knowledge and expression function only upon the primary sense of a word by means of the form of its quality, for they simply do not have any contact with the own form of the object in question. Otherwise, it would follow that the quality is of no use at all. In fact, there is no other means than knowledge and expression which can define the own form of the object of a word. And since the own form of the object which serves as the primary sense of a word is beyond knowledge

> and expression, it would follow that there is no object of a word which can serves as the primary sense for that word. Thus, in so far as words are concerned, there exist neither knowledge nor expression due to non-existence of a necessary relationship. So, on account of the non-existence of name and what is named, there just is no object of a word which can serve as the primary sense for that word. Hence, everything is just named after their quality; there just is not any object which can serve as the primary sense for a word. For the name which is of the quality functions where the own form of an object is not found, and all the words function upon the object which can serve as the primary sense for a word only by means of the form of quality which is not found there. Consequently, there just is not any object which can serve as the primary sense for a word.
>
> On this point, then it is not right to say that if there are no self and thing which serve as the primary sense of a word, it is not right to speak of description".[19]

What Sthiramati says in the above passage now explains to us why the Nyàyasùtra speaks of "there still being doubt as to the relationship betwen words and things, form and class" on account of the descriptions". It is thought that each word must stand for a thing or a form or a class of things. However, when one uses such terms as "the fire-boy", what does the word 'fire' have something to do with the word 'boy'. Neither has any relationship to each other, regardless of what one thinks the object of a word must be. If one thinks that its object is an individual thing, then fire is one thing, and the boy is another. They hardly have anything in common. In fact, if the boy is not careful, he may be burnt to death by the fire. Similarly, the boy is capable, too, of putting out the fire. On the

hand, if one thinks that it is the form, that is, the structure of a thing which is the object of a word, then once again there is nothing in common betwen the form of a fire and that of a boy. Thus, it is absurd in this sense to speak of a "fire-boy". Lastly, if it is alleged that the object of a word is its class, again what does the class of fire have to do with the class of boy. They surely do not belong to the same class. From such an analysis, only one possible conclusion can be drawn, which is that such terms as "fire", "boy" etc... must be descriptions, because being descriptions, they can be applied to what they are not and to where they do not pertain, and therefore are not required to fulfill any of the conditions that the just-mentioned analysis enumerates. In other words, the object of a word is neither a thing, nor a form, nor a class; it has no object whatever. It is just a description which, depending upon the use it is put into, can describes some quality, some aspect of an object and thus help that object to be recognized. Clearly then, all words are descriptions, and that because of the use it is put into. Perhaps, due to this reasoning it is that Vàtsyàyana and before him, Patañjali have glossed description as use or usage. In any case, to Sthiramati words do not stand for an object, but are used to signify it by means of some of its qualities. Description therefore means description of the quality of an object and nothing more. So, the above discussion by Sthiramati gives us a rather precise idea as to why the Nyàyasùtra inserts its definition of description into the exposition of what the object of a word is, and just what the term 'description' means to those who continue upholding Vasubandhu's tradition of thought. It is hence very helpful to a considerable extent, especially in ascertaining that the definition

given to that term by the Nyàyasùtra is freely admitted and used within Vasubandhu's own philosophical circle. It must be noted, however, that in so formulating the problem, Sthiramati fails to go into its heart. It is admittedly true that when such expressions as "the fire-boy" are used, as they are in every-day language, which seemingly are understandable to everyone, we cannot help but to conclude that even a name is just a description and nothing more. But that conclusion is just a generalization of questionable value, since there might exist some term which is not susceptible to such an analysis as it is applied to the expression "the fire-boy" and the like. And here, Bhartrhari's investigation into the problem of description offers the most interesting results of all.

Bhartrhari approaches the problem of description from two different ways. First, he asks himself what a word stands for. The immediate response would be that it stands for a thing. Thus, the word 'horse' is standing for some animal out there called 'horse'. Or the word 'ear' stands for something on the head of the horse which is called 'ear' etc... Up to this point, the response clearly fares very well. However, when someone says, "this is a horse-ear", the response equally immediately breaks down, for the word 'horse-ear' has nothing to do with either the word 'horse' or 'ear', if it is maintained that the words 'horse' and 'ear' must stand for the things they are assumed to stand for. Similarly, the term "white-donkey" in Sanskrit does not mean to stand for a color called 'white' and a thing called 'donkey'. The word "horse-ear" is the name of a species of tree, and "white-donkey" is that of a species of wild donkey. Each word does not, therefore, necessarily

stand for a thing.[20] There is, of course, nothing new in that conclusion, except perhaps that it is the first explicit pronouncement since the days of the Nyāyasūtra on the problem, which Sthiramati were about to repeat, as has been seen. So, the first way of approach does not reward Bhartrhari with any very interesting result, to say the least.

The second way gives him in return some of the most beautiful fruit, however, at least in terms of the development of his thinking on the problem of the nature of language. He begins this second approach by asking such questions as "what does the statement "the sprout germinates" say?" He reasons as follows. If the word 'sprout' stands for something really existing out there, then what is the point of saying "it germinates", because to say that something germinates is to say that that thing is not wholly what it is, that is, that it is not existing as yet. In fact, if the word 'sprout' does stand for something really existing already, it is a contradiction in terms to say that it germinates. Furthermore, there are only two possible alternatives in that case for the sprout: either it exists or it does not exist. In either cases, it is absurd to say "the sprout germinates". For if it exists, why should it germinate,, which means that something comes into existence from the non-existence; and if it does not exist, how can it be said to germinate? Similarly, what does the statement "there is no sprout" say? If the word 'sprout' stands for something really existing out there, how can one say "there is no sprout"? Because by merely saying in that case the word 'sprout', one already postulates that there does exist something out there called sprout. In fact, by thinking that each word must stand for a thing, one encounters all sorts of difficulties of which the question "what

does the statement "the sprout germinates" say" is just the beginning. For if anybody attempts to establish a rational system based upon that thinking, it can be shown that that system could be easily brought down. In fact, the whole of Nàgàrjuna's Madhyamakakàrikà is devoted to that task, and the above reasoning by Bhartrhari can be traced back directly to it.[21]

In the first chapter of that work, Nàgàrjuna examines the problem of causation. He points out that the word 'cause' is by definition to mean 'bringing something into existence'. Yet, if it is maintained that each word must stand for a thing really existing somewhere out there, then even that definition is absurd. For the word 'something' therein must stand, of necessity, for something, which is existing, so what is the point of "bringing it into existence"? Further, if there exists no such something, then it is even more absurd to speak of bringing it into existence. For what is there to bring into existence, after all? So, by that reasoning Nàgàrjuna proceeds to destroy bit by bit the whole structure of the standard theory of causation set up by the Vàibhàsika and their like.[22] Thus, when Nàgarjunà says, "neither an existing object nor a non-existing object can logically have a cause, because if the object is existing, what is the cause for?, and if it is not existing, then whose cause is it?", we can immediately find it echo in Bhartrhari's statement that "birth is defined as a state of an existent possessing what is possessable of its own possession, then if that existent exists, why should it be born? if it is not existing, how can it be born?".[23] And it is here that Bhartrhari's contribution to our understanding of the historical position of Vasubandhu's thought becomes very valuable. It points to us why Nàgàrjuna has formulated his philosophy in such terms that they led Vasubandhu

into proposing the solution the way he did. In fact, we can say with confidence that Vasubandhu's thought is a fulfillment of Nàgàrjuna's philosophy, a fulfillment which is concisely summarized in Bhartrhari's view of the nature of language. In short, by reading Bhartrhari, we recognize why Nàgàrjuna has examined the problem of causation and similar topics the way he did, and why Vasubandhu felt the necessity of arguing that the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction and that that transformation is based upon the description of self and things. Otherwise stated, when Bhartrhari urges that in order to avoid all the difficulties that the notion of words being standing for things causes in relation to such statements as "the sprout germinates", one must consider words as nothing but descriptions, he actually recapitulates the entire excellent result that philosophical investigations have given rise to since the time of Nàgàrjuna to Vasubandhu's. It is no wonder then that Asvabhàva extensively quotes him in his commentary upon the Trimśikà, and why I Tsing records that he attempted to become a Buddhist bhiksu seven times, and seven times he failed. In truth, we can even take him to be the best disciple Vasubandhu has ever had. And his thought cannot be evaluated superficially so as to make it "brahmanical" or "anti-Buddhist", as some authors have alleged.[24] Of course, we cannot go into this problem right here, as space is not available and Bhartrhari is such a thinker that he should deserve a better treatment than what we can afford in these pages. Suffices it to say, however, that given the above discussion of ours, it is undeniably certain that future studies made along that line will substantiate our claim.

The theory of descriptions as it is formulàted in the Trimśikà indicates the-

refore not only Vasubandhu's response to his own initial philosophical concern, but also his own solution to an aged-old problem to which Nāgārjuna, despite his brilliant criticism of it, fails to provide an answer. Hence, we can say that it represents the culminating point of Vasubandhu's long and often arduous course of philosophical investigation. It is perhaps owing to this historical connection which he has with the thinkers of the past that he feelsno need to state plainly and explicitly just what the term 'description' may mean in his writings. And our survey of the source-materials above clearly bears that out.in that the term was quite well defined by his time. In effect, if we were to apply the definition given to it by the Nyāyasūtra to few cases where Vasubandhu has used it in his works, we will see that the definition fits in exactly as would be expected. Thus, in one of the rare occurrences of the term 'description' in the Abhidharmakośa, we read the following:

> "If the self does not exist, what is the point of undertaking an action? — The point is that so that I may be happy and that I may not be suffered. What is the object of that so-called I, which you speak of? — Its object is the aggregates. How do you know? — Because of its attachment to them, that is to say, because of its having the same locus with such ideas as white etc... People say, for example, "I am white", "I am black", "I am big", "I am thin", "I am old", "I am young" etc... The notion of 'I' should be looked upon as having the same locus like such ideas as white etc... And those kinds of ideas should not be looked upon as belonging to the self. It follows hence that the self attaches itself to the aggregates, too. Even when the body is served by the [word] 'self', so as to have such description of self as "that is what I am", "that is just what the minister is", even in so serving, the [word]

'self' is just a description, but there is no notion of a [real] self.

Now, if [the word 'self'] has the body as its object, then why is it that it is not the body of another person which serves in that capacity? — Because there is no relationship, that is, because the notion of 'I' arises wherever it has a relationship with a certain body or a certain mind, and not somewhere else....

But if the self does not exist, then to whom does the notion of 'I' belong? This question is already answered by us in the discussion of memory where it is pointed out that the owner of the memory is the cause of memory.

But what is the cause? Is it different? The cause is the tainted consciousness which is totally influenced by previous notions of 'I' and which has its own stream of consciousness as its object.

Yet, if the self does not exist, who is this that feels happy or sorrow? — Happiness or sorrow arises from a certain base, just as people say, the tree has fruits, the forest has flowers".[25]

Without stating explicitly what description is, the above passage gives us the most detailed, perhaps the only detailed exposition of just what Vasubandhu has in mind when the term is used in his works. It is therefore worth our while to consider if the definition of the Nyàyasùtra can be applied here. In the just quoted passage, Vasubandhu argues that the term 'self' refers to the aggregates, which makes up a human being and which according to the Vaibhàsika can be analyzed into five categories, i.e. the physical aggregate, the feeling aggregate, the conceptualizing aggregate, the volitional aggregate and the perceptual aggregate. Thus, it is clear that the term 'self' is being applied to what it is not and to where it does not belong. For according to the Vaibhàsika again, each of those

aggregates has its own mechanism of operation and needs no further intervention beyond that mechanism. So, just as when someone says, "the platform yells", what he means is that the people on the platform yell, therefore when someone says, "I see", what he similarly means is that a complex mechanism of certain bodily mass sees, and nothing more. The term 'I' in the statement "I see" plays thus the role of the word 'platform' in the expression "the platform yells". It folows hence that that term must be a description, as it has been defined by the Nyàyasùtra. In short, the word 'self' describes the quality of a certain thing, but it does not stand for a thing really existing called 'self'. There is no such thing as 'self', which feels happy or sorrow, just precisely in the same way as there is no such thing as forest which has flowers. It is the trees and the bushes which do, and not the forest. But in everyday language it is quite understandable to say "the forest has flowers" and this in turn makes the term 'forest' a description. It is used to describe a number of things which, due to the sake of economy in communication, are not readily liable to an exhaustive enumeration. Evidently then, Vasubandhu must have known well the Nyàyasùtra and its definition of description, and that knowledge has already exhibited itself quite as early as in the Abhidharmakośa.

At this point, equipped with a rather exact knowledge of just what the term 'description' means, we can now return to the question of why the description of self and things is upon the transformation of consciousness, a transformation which is defined as verbal construction and which leads to the famous thesis that whatever is verbally constructed does not exist. We have seen that description is defined as "that which it is not and where it is not". Further, we know from

Nàgàrjuna's and Bhartrhari's criticisms that all words are descriptions, if they are to mean anything. From these concepts it follows naturally that what is verbally constructed by means of those descriptions should not exist, of necessity. For how can it exist when it is made of descriptions which by definition are"in the state of not being itself" or "are those that are applied to what they are not and to where they do not belong"? It is hence just "what causes one to know", as Vasubandhu puts it. In effect, just like the term 'platform' which is used to something other than itself, every verbal construction must therefore refer to something other than itself in a similar manner. And just like the platform in the statement "the platform yells" does not exist, because the term 'platform' therein is referring to the people and not to the platform, every verbal construction must also be non-existing, since they themselves are consisted of descriptions. Once the verbal construction does not exist, naturally what is verbally constructed must also be non-existing by necessity. It does not exist in the sense that it does not stand for a thing, after which it is named or verbally constructed. That is to say that its non-existence presupposes the existence of something other than itself and of which thing it is intended to be a description. In fact, in the Trisvabhàvanirdeśa Vasubandhu emphatically states that "the consciousness does not exist absolutely in the way in which it verbally constructs itself and in the way in which it verbally constructs the object".[26] Those who have the prediliction of always wanting to assert that to Vasubandhu "consciousness is the sole reality", better well remenber the statement just quoted. What it says is very simple. The consci-

ousness simply does not exist, for how can it exist when all what is making it up is "in the state of not being itself", "is applied to what it is not and to where it does not belong"? In other words, consciousness does not exist because it is what it is not and it is not what it is. Be it noted at the same time that the word 'platform' in the statement "the platform yells" can also be similarly defined: it is what it is not and is not what it is. And here becomes apparent the reason why consciousness in its state of continuously transforming is identified with the process of verbal construction, and why the description of self and things is upon that consciousness, if not being identical with it. In short, when words are required by the above notion of description to refer to things other than themselves and when the consciousness is totally conditioned by words, it is not difficult to see why "the consciousness does not exist absolutely in the way in which it verbally constructs itself and in the way in which it constructs the object". But if the consciousness does not exist because it is what it is not and is not what it is, then what does exist?

Answering this question, Vasubandhu proposes his so-called theory of three natures. In the Trimśikà he describes it as follows:

> "Whatever is verbally constructed by whatever verbal construction is of a verbal own-nature which cannot be found. But there is the relational own-nature arising out of conditioning factors [which serves as the basis for] the verbal construction and which is also of the absolute own-nature whenever it is permanently separated from the verbal construction. Thus, the absolute own-nature is neither other than nor not other than the relational one. It must be considered like impermanence, etc... When the one has not been perceived, the other is not perceived. [However], it is the state of not having the threefold own-nature of the threefold own-nature that the state of not having the threefold own-nature of all things is figuratively

> preached. The first own-nature is without own-nature by its very characteristic. The second one so because it does not exist by itself. The third is without own-nature because it is the most primitive state of things and their suchness, and because it is so forever. It alone is just "what causes one to know".[27]

What the passage says is evidently clear. Although one can differentiate things into at least three kinds, i.e. things as we verbally construct them, things as they exist depending upon others, including the verbal construction, and things as they just exist as they are, there is just one fact which is that things just exist as they are, regardless of whether there is or not a consciousness or a verbal construction. This state of their being so is therefore the sole fact worthy of our knowing, and it alone can serve as "just what causes one to know". Otherwise stated, originally there is just things, that is, the most primitive state of things. Then, from that state other things arises by dependence upon them. And finally there are verbal constructions of them. The verbal construction is obviously referring to them, so in so far as things are concerned, it surely does not exist by its own-nature, by its own very characteristic. Remaining are the things and their most primitive state. They are identical, because the most primitive state can manifest only through its appearance in things, and things can appear only by depending upon that state. In short, they are just like the impermanent state of a thing. We cannot recognize the impermanence of a flower without seeing the flower, just as we cannot see the flower without recognizing how fast it loses its freshness and beauty. So, although one can speak of a threefold own-nature, there is just one own-nature, and this

own-nature is itself "without own-nature because it is the most primitive state of things and their suchness and because it is so forever". In effect, what Vasubandhu says by that is this that things just exist as they are in their most elemental state, regardless of what they may change into and how they do it. Thus, to answer the above question: "what does exist, then", Vasubandhu might very well say, things just exist.

That response is even more explicit in the Trisvabhàvanirdeśa, a treatise designed, properly enough, to present a comprehensive view of the theory of three natures. In it, Vasubandhu tells us how that theory should be understood as follows:

> "The absolute own-nature is not different from the verbal own-nature, because the latter has as its own-nature a duality which does not exist while the former has as its own nature the absence of that duality. Inversely, the verbal own-nature is known to be not different from the absolute one, because the latter has as its own-nature the non-existence of a duality while the former has as its own-nature a duality which does not exist.
>
> "The absolute own-nature should also be considered as not different from the relational one, because the latter does not exist in the way in which it appears while the former has as its own-nature the non-existence of the way of that appearance. Inversely, the relational own-nature should be known to be not different from the absolute one, because the latter has as its own-nature a non-existing duality while the former has as its own-nature a way of appearance which does not exist.....
>
> "Thus, these three own-natures should be characterized as non-dual and imperceptible, because the first does not exist, the second does not exist in the way it does, and the third has as its own-nature the non-existence of the first. It is just as

> a magical image appears due to the power of a magic formula as an elephant. But there exists only a form, and there is no elephant at all. Here, the elephant is the verbal own-nature; the form on which the elephant appears is the relational one; and the absolute is the non-existence of the elephant which appears on that form. From the fundamental consciousness, the verbal construction which does not exist appears as a dual self. This dual self does not exist. So there exist just the form on which that self appears. One can compare the fundamental consciousness to the magic formula, the suchness to the piece of wood [on which the elephant appears], the verbal construction to the form on which [the elephant appears], and the dual self with the elephant".[28]

The just-quoted statement leaves no room for doubt as to what Vasubandhu's position is on the question of what does exist. He emphatically says that the absolute own-nature is not different from the verbal own-nature or the relational own-nature of a thing. Thus, a thing exists not only in depending upon the state of what it is, but also in depending upon other things. Further, it is equally capable of being verbally constructed, because "the absolute own-nature is not different from the verbal one". And this is what interests us. For it clearly indicates that to Vasubandhu although what is verbally constructed does not exist, it does not exist only in so far as it is conceived to stand for some definite real thing out there somewhere in the external world; but it does exist when it is taken to be a description, which describes something out there, since what is verbally constructed, too must refer to something other than itself. So, to identify the absolute own-nature of a thing with its verbal own-nature, Vasubandhu evidently shows that language is not

without its meaning, for if not, how can such an identification be carried out? This, of course, is nothing startlingly new. What is new is the inference that to Vasubandhu language is based upon fact and not upon things. To be based upon fact is to describe the state of a thing at a particular time and in a particular place. When a language is so conceived, it is natural that all of its words must be considered as descriptions. And the so-called verbal construction is the construction of descriptions.

We have noticed that Vasubandhu considers the transformation of consciousness as a verbal construction. Now, we know that verbal construction is just a construction of the descriptions. We are then in a position presently to discuss the reason why the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction and why the consciousness transforms itself in the first place, reason that we left undiscussed ever since we touched upon the notion of transformation up to this time. Recall that the Nyàyasùtra defines description as "that which is in the state of not being itself", and further that the transformation of consciousness is thought to be a construction of descriptions. Moreover, it is argued that whatever is verbally constructed by the construction of descriptions is not different from the thing which the verbal construction refers to. That is to say that the result of the verbal construction is actually the thing out there somewhere. Thus, if the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction and the result of the verbal construction is not different from the thing out there somewhere, it follows then that the transformation of consciousness implies something other than itself and is supported by that thing, which cannot be separated. But if the consciousness implies something

other than itself in the course of its transformation, it is precisely because of the presence of that "something other than itself" which sets on the course of its transformation in the first place, and this transformation in its turn is the raison d'être of the consciousness itself. Why? Because if it implies something other than itself, then it must somehow accommodate that thing in such way that the implication can be realized. And that would necessarily require that some change within itself must be made. In short, it must somehow transform. That is the reason why the consciousness transforms itself, to begin with. It transforms itself because it implies in itself something other than itself, which requires that it transforms itself so that that thing can emerge. So, if I perceive a book, that perception is possible only because my consciousness has transformed itself from whatever state it was in to that of a consciousness of the book. Similarly, from a consciousness of the book it transforms itself again into a new consciousness so that I could read the title of that book, for example. The consciousness is thus in a state of perpetual transformation and change. Reemenber that every consciousness of something is at the same a consciousness of itself.

But if the consciousness is always in a state of perpetual change and transformation, then it is always of something other than itself, because it is the presence of that something other than itself which sets on the motion of its transformation in the first place. The consciousness must therefore always be the consciousness of something, for without that something it does not exist to begin with. In other words, there is no such thing as pure consciousness. Consciousness is, by and of necessity, consciousness of something.

But if consciousness is by and of necessity consciousness of something, that is because it is always conditioned by language. If I see a daisy, the daisy is there in the garden among the bushes. It does not move into my consciousness, nor does it exist therein. What then is meant by such statements as "I see a daisy"? It means that when I see a daisy, some information is supplied to a visual apparatus which then sets on a series of transformation making not only the apparatus aware of itself but also aware of something other than itself, which in this case is expressed by means of a given language as "a daisy". What the daisy does is thus very simple. When the condition is right, it acts through means of some physico-chemical process upon a particular visual apparatus, which is called for the sake of economy 'me', and from thereon it is the operations of that apparatus which gives rise to such statements as "I see a daisy". However, if the daisy acts through means of some physico-chemical process, it acts so only in so far as it is a source of information, for it is there, it does not move into my consciousness or do any thing of that kind. Consequently, my perception of the daisy would occur only in so far as my language, spoken or otherwise, would allow me express it. For it is not the daisy which moves into my consciousness. On the contrary, it is its information which sets on my perception in the first place, and that information can conceivably exist only in one form or another of a given language. The implication of the role of language in the development of a consciousness is thus obvious. In fact, it is difficult to conceive the existence of a consciousness without language, as Vasubandhu has recognized even as early a time as is the years of his

writing the Abhidharmakośa, where it is pointed out that "all the sensory consciousnesses are always accompanied by the so-called mental talkings". Thus, being consciousness is being condamned to be always consciousness of something and to be the verbal construction of that thing. There is hence no such thing as consciousness. It is the product of the conditions which give rise to it. In short, as Vasubandhu has said, "the consciousness does not exist absolutely in the way in which it verbally constructs itself and in the way in which it verbally constructs the object". The consciousness does not exist, not because there is no consciousness, for there is always a consciousness of something. It does not exist, because there is no consciousness as such. It is condamned to always be consciousness of something and always be a verbal construction of that thing. The transformation of consciousness is therefore nothing but a verbal construction of one kind or another.

From that conclusion, the question of whether the description of self and things is the transformation of consciousness or merely is upon that transformation becomes rather irrelevant. For if the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction, as is just defined, the description of self and things is both that transformation and based upon it. That is to say that the transformation would occur precisely because of the description, and the description is description precisely because of the transformation. This, of course, is not intended as an eclectic solution to the purely philological problem of what the original form of Vasubandhu's thesis in the Triṁśikà is, i.e. whether it is worded as "the description of self and things.... is the transformation of consciousness" or as "the description of self and things... is upon the transformation of consciousness". In regards to this latter question, we have offered our own opinion in the precious chapter, which says in part that the former

form should be preferred. That philological problem, despite its potentially interesting implications, can be for all intents and purposes considered as already resolved. By stating that the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction, Vasubandhu leaves no doubt as to the position of description in that transformation. Hence, we have no need to occupy ourselves with that philological question, which seems to be decisively beyond any purely philological treatment, given the data available at the present time. These data tend to argue both for and against either the statement that the description of self and things is the transformation of consciousness or that it is upon that transformation. The said data are obviously come from Vasubandhu's commentators and translators in various languages. In any case, we think that his own line of argument in the Trimśikà definitely favors the reading that the description of self and things is the transformation of consciousness, for his final conclusion is that that transformation is a verbal construction; and that verbal construction is none other than the construction of descriptions, as has been seen. Further, neither the description exist as such, nor does the consciousness, both because what is verbally constructed by the construction of descriptions does not exist. It does not exist because it is not different from the thing which it is intended at. So, just as the consciousness does not exist because it is condamned to always be consciousness of something, the description does not exist similarly in that being a description, it is condemned to a state of not always being itself.

In one of a few rare examples which he gives to illustrate the point which wishes to make, Vasubandhu offers the following which is of a very special

significance for the understanding of his thought in the later period of his life. He said: "It is just as owing to the power of a magic formula, a magical image appears as an elephant, but there exists only a form and there is no elephant at all. Here, the elephant is the verbal own-nature, the form on which the elephant appears is the relational one, and the absolute is the non-existence of the elephant which appears on that form". And further he said: "One can compare the fundamental consciousness to the magic formula, the suchness to the piece of wood on which the elephant appears, the verbal construction to the form on which the elephant appears, and the dual self with the elephant". What these two statements indicates is evidently clear. There is no consciousness which appears as a dual self, because that consciousness is already involved in precisely the task of creating that dual self in the first place. Furthermore, in such an involvement it loses itself in the process of verbal construction which gives rise to the form on which the dual self can attach itself to. And that form would occur only because there is a suchness, which in the case of the magic elephant is a piece of wood, and with which it can identify itself. In other words, just as the magic formula and the magic elephant exist on account of the existence of a piece of wood, so the consciousness and its verbal construction do similarly because of there being the suchness, the things as they are. This suchness is what Vasubandhu calls "just merely what causes one to know", and that is what he urges people to stay in so that any understanding thereof can be achieved.

Thus, the message Vasuabandhu wishes to convey in the Trimśikà and in the Trisvabhàvanirdeśa is perfectly clear and simple. He wishes to say that although our consciousness is totally dependent upon language for its operations, it is the things as such which give rise to that consciousness in the first place and to which we must return in order to have any exact knowledge at all. If this statement seems triflingly evident, if not superfluous, at first, let us not forget that even today a great part of human conduct and behavior are determined in most circumstances by some sort of verbal construction, which has no basis at all either in facts or in things. And this situation is all the more widespread and prevalent it must be at Vasubandhu's time. So, no matter how triflingly evident it is, it is good that Vasubandhu explains to us why it is necessary to state it forcefully and has in fact stated forcefully as he promised. And for it, we must be deeply grateful.

N O T E S

1. Trimśikà ad 1: àtmadharmopacàro hi vividho yah pravartate/
vijñànaparinàme'sau parinàmah sa ca tridhà//

Cf. Sum cu pahi tshig lehur byas pa, TT 5556 p 231b3-4:

bdag daṅ chos su ñer hdogs pa/ sna tshogs dag ni gaṅ byuṅ ba/
de ni rnam par śes par gyur/ gyur pa de yaṅ rnam gsum ste//

and Wei shih san shih lun tsung, Taishō 1586 p 60a27-28: 由假設我法、有種種相轉、彼依識所變、此能變唯三

Thus, from seventh century down there existed at least two different ways of reading the third pàda: either as vijñànaparinàmo'sau, which is evidenced in the Tibetan translation "de ni rnam par śes par gyur" where no locative case is indicated; or as vijñànaparinàme'sau which is faithfully rendered in Chinese. Note also that despite the alleged existence of different views betwen Sthiramati and Dharmapàla, both of them adopt the latter reading, a curious state of affair indeed.

2. Abhidharmakośa IX p 476: àtmany asati kim arthah karmàrambhah/ aham sukho syàm aham duhkho na syàm ity evam arthah/ ko'sàv aham nàma yad visayo'yam ahamkàrah/ skandhavisayah/ katham jñàyate/ tesu snehàt/ gauràdibuddhibhih sàmànàdhikaranyàt tu/ gauro'ham aham syàmah sthùlo'ham aham krśah jìrno'ham aham yuveṭi gauràdibuddhibhih samànàdhikarano'yam ahamkàro drśyate/ na càtmana ete prakàrà drśyante/ tasmàd api skandhesv ayam iti gamyate/ àtmana upakàrake'pi śarìra àtmopacàro yathà ya evàyam sa evàham sa evàyam me bhrtya iti bhavaty upakàrake'pi àtmopacàro na tv ahamkàrah/ sati śarìràlambanatve paraśarìràlambano'pi kasmàn na bhavati/ asambandhàt/ yenaiva hi sahàsya sambandhah kàyena cittena và tatraivàyam ahamkàra uṭpadyate nànyatra/ anàdau samsàra evam abhyàsàt/ kaś ca sambandhah/ kàryakàranabhàvah/ yady àtmà nàsti kasyàyam ahamkàrah/ idam punas tad evàyàtam kim arthaisà sasthìti/ yàvady evàsya hetus tasyaivàyam iti/ kaś cànyo hetuh/ pùrvàhamkàraparibhàvitam svasamtativisayam sàvadyam cittam/ asaty àtmaṇi ka esa sukhito duhkhito và/ yasminn àśraye sukham utpannam duhkham và/ yathà puspito vrksah phalitam vanam iti/

3. Bhàvanopanisat 3, ed. A. Mahadeva Sastri, in The Sàkta Upanisads, Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1950, pp 71-72: salilam sauhityakàranam sattvam kartavyam akartavyam iti bhàvanàyukta upacàrah/ asti nàstìti kartavyatà upacàrah/ bàhyàbhyantah-karanànàm rùpagrahanayogyatà'stv ity àvàhanam/ tasya bàhyàbhyantah-karanànàm ekarùpavisayagrahanam àsanam/ raktaśukla-padaikìkaranam pàdyam/ ujjvaladàmodànandàsanam dànamardhyam/ svaccham svatahsiddham ity àcamanìyam/ ciccandramayì sarvàngasravanam snànam/ cid agnisvarùpaparamànandaśaktisphuranam vastram/ pratyekam saptavimśatidhà bhinnatvenecchàjñànakriyà'tmakabrahmagranthimadrasatantubrahmanàdhì brahmasùtram/ svavyatiriktavastusangarahitasmaranam vibhùsanam/ svaccha-svaparipùranànusmaranam gandhah/ samastavisayànàm manasah sthairyenànusam-dhànam kusumam/ tesàm eva sarvadà svìkaranam dhùpah/ pavanàvacchinnordhva-jvalanasaccidulkà'kàśadeho dìpah/ samastayàtàyàtavarjyam naivedyam/ avasthà-trayaikìkaranam tàmbùlam/ mùlàdhàràdàbrahmarandhraparyantam brahmarandhràdà-mùlàdhàraparyantam gatàgatarùpena pràdaksinyam/ turyàvasthà namaskàrah/ dehasùnyapramàtrtànimaj janam baliharanam/ satvam asti kartavyam akartavyam audàsìny anityàtmavilàpanam homah/ svayam tatpàdukànimajjanam paripùrnadhyànam//. Obviously, with the mention of the name of the Brahmasùtra, this Upanisad cannot be earlier than the first century A.D., the date which that Sùtra is supposed to take form.at the earliest. But see also Radhakrishnan, The Brahma Sùtra, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960, pp 22-23 where it is said to have been composed "about the second century B.C."; and Nakamura Hajime, Indo shisô no sho mondai, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1967, p 307 where Nakamura accepts the lower limit date proposed by Jacobi (JAOS XXXI (1910) 29) and assigns the period betwen 400-450 A.D. to its composition. Cf. Brhajjàbàlopanisat III.27:

tatra càvàhanamukhàn upacàràms tu sodśa/
kartavyà vyàhtatàs tv evam tato'gnim upasamharet//

(ed. A. Mahadeva Sastri, in The Śaiva Upanisads with the commentary of Śrì Upanisad-Brahma-Yogin, Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1950, p 101); Gopàlatàpiny-upanisat 18, ed. Sastri, in The Vaisnava-Upanisads, Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1953, pp 47-48; Sùryatàpinyupanisat IV, ed. C. Kunhan Raja, in Unpublished Upanishads, Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1933, p 58.

4. See, for instance, J.A.B. van Buitenen, The Maitràyanìya Upanisad, 'S-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co, 1962.

5. Patañjali, The Vyàkarana-Mahàbhàsya of Patañjali I, ed. F. Kielhorn, Poona: The BHandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1962 (Third Edition), p 38: samjñàsamjñyasamdehaś ca//

kriyamàne'pi samjñàdhikàre samjñàsamjñinor asamdeho vaktavyah/ kuto hy etad vrddhiśabdah samjñàdaicag sanjñina iti na punar àdaicah samjñà vrddhiśabdah samjñìti// yat tàvad ucyate samjñàdhikàrah kartavyah samjñàsampratyayàrtha iti na kartavyah/

àcàryàcàràt samjñàsiddhih

àcàryàcàràt samjñàsiddhir bhavisyati/ kim idam àcàryàcàràd iti/ àcàryànàm upacàràt/

yathà laukikavaidikesu//

tadyathà laukikesu vaidikesu ca krtàntesu/ loke tàvan màtàpitarau putrasya jàtasya samvrte'vakàśe nàma kurvàte devadatto yajñadatta iti/ tayor upacàràd anye'pi jànantìyam asya samjñeti/ vede yàjñikàh samjñàm kurvanti sphyo yupaś casàla iti/ tatra bhavatàm upacàràd anye'pi jànantìyam asya samjñeti/ evam ihàpi/ ihaiva tàvat kecid vyàcaksànà àhah/ vrddhiśabdah samjñàdaicah samjñina iti/ apare punah sici vrddhih ity uktvàkàraikàrànudàharanti/ te manyàmahe yayà pratyàyyante sà samjñà ye pratìyante te samjñina iti//

6. Nyàyasùtra II.2.61: yàśabdasamùhatyàgaparigrahasamkhyàvrddhyapacayavarnasamàsànubandhànà vyaktàv upacàràd vyaktih//

vyaktih padàrthah kasmàt/ yàśabdaprabhrtìnàm vyaktàv upacàràt/ upacàrah prayogah/ yà gaus tisthati yà gaur nisanneti nedam vàkyam jàter abhidhàyakam abhedàt/ bhedàt tu dravyàbhidhàyakam/ gavàm samùha iti bhedàd dravyàbhidhànam na jàteh abhedàt/ vaidyàya gàm dadàtìti dravyasya tyàgo na jàter amùrtatvàt pratikramànukramànupapatteś ca/ parigrahah svatvenàbhisambandhah/ kaundinyasya gaur bràhmanasya gaur iti dravyàbhidhàne dravyabhedàt sambandhabheda ity upapannam/ abhinnà tu jàtir iti/ samkhyà daśa gàvo vimśatir gàva iti bhinnam dravyam sankhyàyate na jàtir abhedàd iti/ vrddhih kàranavato dravyasyàvayavopacayo'vardhata gaur iti/ niravayavà tu jàtir iti/ etenàpacayo vyàkhyàtah/ varnah śuklà gauh kapilà gaur iti dravyasya gunayogo na sàmànyasya/ samàso gohitam

gosukham iti dravyasya sukhàdiyogo na jàter iti/ anubandhah sarùpaprajananasamtàno gaur gàm janayatìti/ tad utpattidharmakatvàd dravye yuktam na jàtau viparyayàd iti/ dravyam vyaktir iti hi nàrthàntaram//

7. Nyàyasùtra I.2.10-17: vacanavighàto'rthavikalpopapatyà chalam// tat trividham vàkchalam sàmànyachalam upacàrachalam ceti// aviśesàbhihite'rthe vaktur abhipràyàd arthàntarakalpanà vàkchalam// sambhavato'rthasyàtisàmànyayogàd asambhùtàrthakalpanà sàmànyachalam// dharmavikalpanirdeśe'rthasadbhàvapratisedha upacàrachalam// vàkchalam evopacàrachalam tadaviśesàt// na tad arthàntarabhàvàt// aviśese và kiñcit sàdharmyàd ekachalaprasangah//

8. Carakasamhità, Vimànasthànam VIII.56: atha cchalam chalam nàma pariśatham arthàbhàsam anarthakam vàgvastumàtram eva/ tad dvividham vàkchalam sàmànyacchalam ca/ tatra vàkchalam nàma yathà kaścid brùyàn navatantro'yam bhisag iti/ bhisag brùyàt nàham navatantra ekatantro'ham iti/ paro brùyàt nàham bravìmi navatantràni taveti api nu navàbhyastam hi te tantram iti/ bhisag brùyàt na mayà navàbhyastam tantram anekadhà'bhyastam mayà tantram iti/ etad vàkchalam/ sàmànyacchalam nàma yathà vyàdhipraśamanàyausadham ity ukte paro brùyàt sat satpraśamanàyeti/ kim nu bhàvàn àha san hi rogah sadausadham yadi ca sat satpraśamanàya bhavati tatra san hi kàsah san ksayah satsàmànyàt kàsas te ksayapraśamanàya bhavisyatìti/ etat sàmànyacchalam//

9. Nyàyasùtrabhàsya I.2.12: aviśesàbhihite'rthe vaktur abhipràyàd arthàntarakalpanà vàkchalam//

navakambalo'yam mànavakah iti prayogah, atra navah kambalo'syeti vaktur abhipràyah/ vigrahe tu viśesah, na samàse/ tatràyam chalavàdì vaktur abhipràyàd avivaksitam anyam artham nava kambalà asyeti tàvad abhihitam bhavatèti kalpayati kalpayitvà càsambhavena pratisedhaty eko'sya kambalah kuto nava kambalàh iti/ tad idam sàmànyaśabde vàci chalam vàkchalam iti/ asya pratyavasthànam sàmànyaśabdasyànekàrthatve'nyataràbhidhànakalpanàyàm viśesavacanam/ navakambalah ity anekàrthàbhidhànam navah kambalo'syeti nava kambalà asyeti/ etasmin prayukte yeyam kalpanà nava kambalà asya ity etad bhavatà'bhihitam tac ca na sambhavatìty etasyàm anyataràbhidhànakalpanàyàm viśeso vaktavyah/ yasmàd viśeso'rthaviśesesu vijñàyate'yam artho'nenàbhihita iti sa ca viśeso nàsti/ tasmàn mithyàbhiyogamàtram etad iti/ prasiddhaś ca loke śabdàrthasambandho'bhidhànàbhidheyaniyama-

niyogaḥ/ asyàbhidhànasyàyam artho'bhidheyaḥ iti samànaḥ sàmànyaśabdasya viśeṣo viśistaśabdasya/ prayuktapùrvàś ceme śabdà arthe prayujyante nàprayuktapùrvàh/ prayogaś càrthasampratyayàrthah, arthapratyayàc ca vyavahàra iti/ tatraivam arthagaty arthe śabdaprayoge sàmarthyàt sàmànyaśabdasya prayoganiyamaḥ/ ajàm gràmam naya sarpir àhara bràhmanam bhojaya iti sàmànyaśabdàḥ santo'rthàvayaveṣu prayujyante/ sàmarthyàdy atràrthakriyàdeśanà sambhavati tatra pravartante nàrthasàmànye kriyàdeśanà'sambhavàt/ evam ayam sàmànyaśabdah navakambalaḥ iti yo'rthah sambhavati navaḥ kambalo'syeti tatra pravartate yas tu na sambhavati nava kambalà asyeti tatra na pravartate/ so'yam anupapadyamànàrthakalpanayà paravàkyopàlambhaste na kalpata iti//

10. Nyàyasùtrabhàṣya I.2.14: dharmavikalpanirdeśe'rthasadbhàvapratiṣedha upacàracchalam//

abhidhànasya dharmo yathàrthaprayogaḥ/ dharmavikalpo'nyatra dṛṣṭasyànyatra prayogaḥ/ tasya nirdeśe dharmavikalpanirdeśe/ yathà mañcàh krośantìti arthasadbhàvena pratiṣedhaḥ mañcasthàh puruṣà krośanti na tu mañcàḥ krośanti/ kà punar atràrthavikalpopapatiḥ/ anyathà prayuktasyànyathà'rthakalpanam bhaktyà prayoge pràdhànyena kalpanam upacàraviṣayam chalam upacàracchalam/ upacàro nìtàrthaḥ sahacaraṇàdinimittenàtadbhàve tadvad abhidhànam upacàra iti/ atra samàdhiḥ prasiddhàprasiddhe prayoge vaktur yathàbhipràyam śabdàrthayor abhyanujñà pratiṣedho và na cchandataḥ/ pradhànabhùtasya śabdasya bhàktasya ca guṇabhùtasya prayoga ubhayor lokasiddhaḥ/ siddhe prayoge yathà vaktur abhipràyas tathà śabdàrthàv anujñèyau pratiṣedhyau và na cchandataḥ/ yadi vaktà pradhànaśabdam prayunkte/ yathàbhùtasyàbhyanujñà pratiṣedho và na cchandataḥ/ atha guṇabhùtam/ tadà guṇabhùtasya/ yatra tu vaktà gunabhùtam śabdam prayuṅkte pradhànabhùtam abhiprety parah pratiṣedhati svamanìsayà pratiṣedho'sau bhavati na paropàlambha iti//

11. Nyàyasùtrabhàṣya I.2.15: vàkchalam evopacàracchalam tadaviśeṣàt//
na vàkchalàd upacàracchalam bhidyate tasyàpy arthàntarakalpanàyà aviśeṣàt/ ihàpi sthànyartho guṇaśabdaḥ pradhànaśabdaḥ sthànàrtho iti kalpayitvà pratiṣidhyata iti//

12. Nyàyasùtrabhàṣya I.2.16: na tadarthàntarabhàvàt//
na vàkchalam evopacàracchalam tasyàrthasadbhàvapratisedhasyàrthàntarabhàvàt/ kutaḥ/ arthàntarakalpanàtaḥ/ anyà hy arthàntarakalpanà anyo'rthasadbhàva pratiṣedha iti//

13. Nyàyasùtra II.2.64: sahacaranasthànatàdarthyavrttamànadhàranasamìpyayogasàdhanàdhipatyebhyo brahmanamañcakataràjasaktucandanagangàśàṭakànnapuruṣeṣv atadbhàve'pi tad upacàrah//

14. Nyàyasùtrabhàsya II.2.64: atadbhàve'pi tad upacàra ity atacchabdasya tena śabdenàbhidhànam iti/ sahacaranàt yaṣṭikàm bhojaya iti yaṣṭikàsahacarito bràhmano'bhidhìyata iti/ sthànàt mañcàḥ krośantìti mañcasthàḥ puruṣà abhidhìyante/ tàdarthyàt kaṭàrtheṣu vìraneṣu vyùhyamàneṣu kaṭam karotìti bhavati/ vṛttàd yamo ràjà kubero ràjeti tadvad varttate iti/ mànàd àḍakena mitàh saktavaḥ àḍakasaktava iti/ dhàranàt tulàyàm dhṛtam candanam tulàcandanam iti/ sàmìpyàd gangàyàm gàvaś carantìti deśo'bhidhìyate sannikṛṣṭah/ yogàt kṛṣnena ràgena yuktah śàṭakaḥ kṛṣna ity abhidhìyate/ sàdhanàt annam pràṇàḥ iti/ àdhipatyàt ayam puruṣaḥ kulam ayam gotram iti/ tatràyam sahacaranàd yogàd và jàtiśabdo vyaktau prayujyata iti//

15. Nyàyasùtra II.2.61-68: vyaktyàkṛtijàtisannidhàv upacàràt samśayaḥ// yàśabdasamùhatyàgaparigrahasankhyàvrddhyapacayavarnasamàsànubandhànà vyaktàv upacàràd vyaktih// na tadanavasthànàt// sahacaranasthànatàdarthyavrttamànadhàranasàmìpyayogasàdhànàdhipatyebhyo bràhmanamañcakataràjasaktucandanagangàśàtakànnapuruṣeṣv atadbhàve'pi tad upacàrah// àkṛtih tadapekṣatvàt sattvavyavasthànasiddheḥ// vyaktyàkṛtiyukte'py aprasangàt prokṣanàdìnàm mṛdgavake jàtiḥ// na àkṛtivyaktyapekṣatvàj jàtyabhivyakteḥ// vyaktyàkṛtijàtayaś tu padàrthaḥ//

16. Patañjali, The Vyàkarana-Mahàbhàsya of Patañjali I, p 6: kim punar àkṛtiḥ padàrtha àhosvid dravyam/ ubhayam ity àha/ katham jñàyate/ ubhayathà hy àcàryena sùtràni paṭhitàni/ àkṛtim padàrtham matvà jàtyàkhyàyàm ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyàm ity ucyate/ dravyam padàrtham matvà sarùpànàm ity ekaśesa àrabhyate//. Cf. I, p 246: idam tàvad ayam praṣṭavyaḥ/ atha yasya dravyam padàrthah katham tasyaikavacanadvivacanabahuvacanàni bhavantìti/ evam sa vakṣyati/ ekasminn ekavacanam dvayor dvivacanam bahuṣu bahuvacanam iti/ yadi tasyàpi vàcanikàni na svàbhàvikàny aham apy evam vakṣyàmy ekasminn ekavacanam dvayor dvivacanam bahuṣu bahuvacanam iti/ na hy àkṛtipadàrthakasya dravyam na padàrtho dravyapadàrthakasya vàkṛtir na padàrthah/ ubhayor ubhayam padàrthaḥ kasyacit tu kimcit pradhànabhùtam kimcid guṇabhùtam/ àkrtipadàrthakasyàkrtih pradhànabhùtà dravyam gunabhùtam/ dravyapadàrthakasya dravyam pradhànabhùtam àkrtir gunabhùtà//. Also The Vyàkarana-Mahàbhàsya of Patañjali II, F. Kielhorn ed., Poona: The Bhandarkar Oriental Rese-

arch Institute, 1965 (3rd Ed.), p 225: jàter ity ucyate kà jàtir nàma/

àkṛtigrahanà jàtir lingànàm ca na sarvabhàk/
sakṛdàkhyàtanirgràhyà gotram ca caranaiḥ saha//

apara àha/

pràdurbhàvavinàśàbhyàm sattvasya yugapad gunaiḥ/
asarvaliṅgàṃ bahvarthàm tàm jàtim kavayo viduḥ//

gotram ca caranàni ca/ kaḥ punar etayor jàtilakṣanayor viśeṣaḥ/ yathà pùrvam jàtilakṣanaṃ tathà kumàrìbhàrya iti bhavitavyam/ yathottaram tathà kumarabhàrya iti bhavitavyam//

17. Nyàyasùtrabhàṣya II.2.61: vyaktiḥ padàrthaḥ/ kasmàt/ yàśabdaprabhṛtìnàm vyaktàv upacàràt/ upacàraḥ prayogaḥ/ yà gaus tisthati yà gaur niṣanneti nedaṃ vàkyaṃ jàter abhidhàyakam abhedàt/ bhedàt tu dravyàbhidhàyakam/ gavàṃ samùha iti bhedàd dravyàbhidhànaṃ na jàter abhedàt/ vaidyàya gàm dadàtìti dravyasya tyàgo na jàter amùrtatvàt pratikramànukramànupapatteś ca/ parigrahaḥ svatvenàbhisambandhaḥ/ kauṇḍinyasya gaur bràhmaṇasya gaur iti dravyàbhidhàne dravyabhedàt sambandhabheda ity upapannam/ abhinnà tu jàtir iti/ sankhyà daśa gàvo vimśatir gàva iti bhinnaṃ dravyaṃ sankhyàyate na jàtir abhedàd iti/ vṛddhiḥ kàranavato dravyasyàvayavopacàyo'vardhata gaur iti/ niravayavà tu jàtir iti/ etenàpacayo vyàkhyàtaḥ/ varṇaḥ śuklà gauḥ kapilà gaur iti dravyasya gunayogo na sàmànyasya/ samàso gohitaṃ gosukham iti dravyasya sukhàdiyogo na jàter iti/ anubandhaḥ sarùpaprajananasantàno gaur gàm janayatìti/ tad utpattidharmakatvàd dravye yuktam na jàtau viparyayàd iti/ dravyaṃ vyaktir iti hi nàrthàntaram//

18. Nyàyasùtrabhàṣya I.2.14: ..... kà punar atràrthavikalpopapatiḥ/ anyathà prayuktasyànyathà'rthakalpanaṃ bhaktyà prayoge pràdhànyena kalpanam upacàravisayaṃ chalam upacàracchalam/ upacàro nìtàrthaḥ sahacaranàdinimittenàtadbhàve tadvad abhìdhànam upacàra iti/....

19. Sthiramati, Trimśikàvijñaptibhàṣya, ed. Lévi, ad 1c pp 16-18: yac ca yatra nàsti tat tatropacaryate/ tad yathà bàhìke gauḥ/...../ anyas tv àha/ asaty àtmani mukhye dharmeṣu copacàro na yujyate/ upacàro hi triṣu bhavati nànyatamàbhàve mukhyapadàrthe tatsadṛśe'nyasmin viṣaye tayoś ca sàdṛśye/ tad yathà mukhye'gnau tatsadṛśe ca mànavake tayoś ca sàdhàrane dharme kapilatve tìkṣṇatve và saty agnir mànavaka ity upacàraḥ kriyate/ atra hy agnir mànavaka

iti jàtir dravyam vopacaryate/ ubhayathàpy upacàràbhàvaḥ/ tatra tàvan na jàteḥ sàdhàrana kapilatvam tìkṣṇatvam và/ na ca sàdhàranadharmàbhàve mànavake jàter upacàro yujyate'tiprasangàt/ ataddharmatve'pi jàteh tìkṣṇatvakapilatvayor jàtyavinàbhàvitvàn mànavake jàtyupacàro bhaviṣyati/ jàtyabhàve'pi tìkṣṇatvakapilatvayor mànavake darśanàd avinàbhàvitvam ayuktam/ avinàbhàvitve copacàràbhàvo'gnàv iva mànavake'pi jàtisadbhàvàt/ tasmàn na mànavake jàtyupacàraḥ sambhavati/ nàpi dravyopacàrah sàmànyadharmàbhàvàt/ na hi yo'gnis tìkṣṇo guṇaḥ kapilo và sa eva mànavake/ kiṃ tarhi tato'nyaḥ/ viśeṣasya svàśrayapratibaddhatvàn na vinàgniguṇenàgner mànavake upacàro yuktaḥ/ agniguṇasàdṛśyàd yukta iti cet/ evam apy agniguṇasyaiva tìkṣṇasya kapilasya và mànavakaguṇe tìkṣṇe kapile và sàdṛśyàd upacàro yukto na tu mànavake'gner guṇasàdṛśyenàsambandhàt/ tasmàd dravyopacàro'pi naiva yujyate/ mukhyo'pi padàrtho nàsti tatsvarùpàd sarvajñànàbhidhànavisayàtikràntatvàt/ pradhàne hi guṇarùpenaiva jñànàbhidhàne pravartate tatsvarùpàsamsparśàt/ anyathà ca guṇavaiyarthyaprasangaḥ/ na hi jñànàbhidhànavyatirikto'nyapadàrthasvarùpaparicchittyupàyo'stìty atah pradhànasvarùpaviṣayajñànàbhidhànàbhàvàn naiva mukhyaḥ padàrtho'stìty avagantavyam/ evam yàvac chabde sambandhàbhàvàj jñànàbhidhànàbhàva evam càbhidhànàbhidheyàbhàvàn naiva mukhyaḥ padàrtho'sti/ api ca sarva evàyam gauna eva na mukhyo'sti/ gauno hi nàma yo yatràvidyamànena rùpena pravartate/ sarvaś ca śabdaḥ pradhàne'vidyamàne naiva gunarùpena pravartate ato mukhyo nàsty eva/ tatra yad uktam asaty àtmani mukhye dharmeṣu copacàro na yukta iti tad ayuktam/. Note that Sthiramati's attempt to reduce all the nouns to the category of quality is in response to the general demand of his philosophical outlook that everything is impermanent. And in this he must have derived his strength greatly from Patañjali, <u>The Vyàkarana-Mahàbhàsya of Patañjali</u> I, p 246: sarvàś ca punar sùrtaya evam àtmikàh samstyànaprasavagunàh śabdsparśarùparasagandhavatyaḥ/ yatràlpìyàmso gunàs tatràvaratas trayah śabdah sparśo rùpam iti/ rasagandhau na sarvatra/ pravṛttiḥ khalv api nityà/ na hìha kaścid api svasminn àtmani muhùrtam apy avatisthate/ vardhate yàvad anena vardhitavyam apacayena và yujyate/ tac cobhayam sarvatra/.

20. Bhartrhari, <u>Vàkyapadìya</u> II, ed. Raghunàtha Sharmà, Varanasi: Sarasvatì

Bhavan Granthamàlà, 1968, ad 13-40 pp 34-92:

śabdasya na vibhàgo'sti kuto'rthasya bhaviṣyati/
vibhàgaiḥ prakriyàbhedam avidvàn pratipadyate//
bràhmanàrtho yathà nàsti kaścid bràhmanakambale/
devadattàdayo vàkye tathaiva syur anarthakàḥ//
sàmànyàrthastirobhùto na viśeṣe'vatiṣṭhate/
upàttasya kutas tyàgo nivṛttaḥ kvàvatiṣṭhatàm//
aśabdo yadi vàkyàrthaḥ padàrtho'pi tathà bhavet/
evam ca sati sambandhaḥ śabdasyàrthena hìyate//
viśeṣaśabdàh kesàñcit sàmànyapratirùpakàḥ/
śabdàntaràbhisambandhàd vyajyante pratipattṛṣu//
teṣàm tu kṛtsno vàkyàrthaḥ pratibhedam samàpyate/
vyaktopavyañjanà siddhir arthasya pratipattṛṣu//
avyaktaḥ kramavàñśabdaḥ upàmśv ayam adhìyate/
akramas tu vitaty eva buddhir yatràvatiṣṭhate//
yathàkṣepaviśese'pi karmabhedo na gṛhyate/
àvṛttau vyajyate jàtih karmabhir bhramanàdibhih//
varṇavàkyapadeṣv evam tulyopavyañjanà śrutiḥ/
atyantabhede tattvasya sarùpeva pratìyate//
nityeṣu tu kutaḥ pùrvam param và paramàrthataḥ/
ekasyaiva tu sà śaktir yad evam avabhàsate//
ciraṃ kṣipram iti jñàne kàlabhedàd ṛte yathà/
bhinnakàle prakàśete sa dharmo hrasvadìr ghayoḥ//
na nityaḥ paramàtràbhiḥ kàlo bhedam ihàrhati/
vyàvarttinìnàm màtrànàm abhàve kìdṛśaḥ kramaḥ//
tàbhyo yà jàyate buddhir ekà sà bhàgavartinì/
sà hi svaśaktyà bhinneva kramapratyavamarśinì//
kramollokhànusangena tasyàm yad bìjam àhitam/
tattvanànàtvayos tasya niruktir nàvatiṣṭhate//
bhàvanàsamaye tv etat kramasàmarthyam akramam/
vyàvṛttabhedo yenàrtho bhedavàn upalabhyate//

padàni vàkye tàny eva varṇàs te ca pade yadi/
varṇeṣu varṇabhàgànàm bhedaḥ syàt paramànuvat//
bhàgànàm anupaśleṣàn na varno na padaṃ bhavet/
teṣàm avyapadeśyatvàt kim anyad apadiśyatàm//
yad antaḥ śabdatattvam tu nàdair ekaṃ prakàśitam/
tad àhur apare śabdam tasya vàkye tathaikatà//
arthabhàgais tathà teṣàm àntaro'rthaḥ prakàśyate/
ekasyaivàtmano bhedau śabdàrthàv apṛthak sthitau//
prakàśakaprakàśyatvam kàryakàranarùpatà/
antarmàtràtmanas tasya śabdatattvasya sarvadà//
tasyaivàstitvanàstitvasàmarthye samavasthite/
akrame kramanirbhàse vyavahàranibandhena//
sampratyayapramànatvàt padàrthàstitvakalpane/
padàrthàbhyuccaye tyàgàd ànarthakyam prasajyate//
ràjaśabdena ràjàrtho bhinnarùpena gamyate/
vṛttàvàkhyàtasadṛśaṃ padam anyatra yujyate//
yathàśvakarṇa ity ukte vinaivàśvena gamyate/
kaścid eva viśiṣṭo'rthaḥ sarveṣu pratyayas tathà//
vàkye tv arthàntaragateḥ sàdṛśyaparikalpane/
kesàñ cid rùdhiśabdatvam śàstra evànugamyate//
upàdàyàpi ye heyàs tàn upàyàn pracakṣate/
upàyànàm ca niyamo nàvaśyam avatiṣṭhate//
arthaṃ kathañ cit puruṣaḥ kaścit sampratipadyate/
samsṛṣṭà và vibhaktà và bhedà vàkyanibandhanàḥ//
so'yam ity abhisambandho buddhyà prakramyate yadà/
vàkyàrthasya tadaiko'pi varṇaḥ pratyàyakaḥ kvacit//

21. Bhartrhari, Vàkyapadìya III, 1, ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer, Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1963, ad 39-51 pp 150-158:

vyapadeśe padàrthànàm anyà sattaupacàrikì/
sarvàvasthàsu sarveṣàm àtmarùpasya darśikà//
sphatikàdi yathà dravyam bhinnarùpair upàśrayaiḥ/
svaśaktiyogàt sambandham tàdrùpyenopagacchati//

tadvac chabdo'pi sattàyàm asyàm pùrvam vyavasthitaḥ/
dharmair upaiti sambandham avirodhivirodhibhiḥ//
evam ca pratisedhyeṣu pratiṣedhaprakḷṛptaye/
àśriteṣùpacàrena pratiṣedhaḥ pravartate//
àtmalàbhasya janmàkhyà sattà labhyam ca labhyate/
yadi saj jàyate kasmàd athàsaj jàyate katham//
sato hi gantur gamanaṃ sati gamye pravartate/
gantṛvac cen na janmàrtho na cet tadvan na jàyate//
upacarya tu kartàram abhidhànapravṛttaye/
punaś ca karmabhàvena tàm kriyàm ca tadàśrayàm//
athopacàrasattaivaṃ vidheyàs tatra Làḍayaḥ/
janmanà tu virodhitvàt mukhyà sattà na vidyate//
àtmànam àtmanà bibhrad astìti vyapadiśyate/
antarbhàvàc ca tenàsau karmanà na sakarmakaḥ//
pràk ca sattàbhisambandhàn mukhyà sattà katham bhavet/
asaṃś ca nàsteḥ kartà syàd upacàras tu pùrvavat//
tasmàd bhinneṣu dharmeṣu virodhiṣv avirodhinìm/
virodhikhyàpanàyaiva śabdais tais tair upàśritàm//
abhinnakàlàm artheṣu bhinnakàleṣv avasthitàm/
pravṛttihetum sarveṣàm śabdànàm aupacàrikìm//
etàm sattàm padàrtho hi na kaścid ativartate/
sà ca sampratisattàyàḥ prthagbhàsye nidarśità//

22. Nàgàrjuna, Madhyamakakàrikà I.3-16:

na svato nàpi parato na dvàbhyàm nàpy ahetukaḥ/
utpannà jàtu vidyante bhàvàḥ kvacana kecana//
na hi svabhàvo bhàvànàm pratyayàdiṣu vidyate/
avidyamàne svabhàve parabhàvo na vidyate//
catvàrah pratyayà hetuś càlambanam anantaram/
tathaivàdhipateyam ca pratyayo nàsti pañcamaḥ//
kriyà na pratyayavatì nàpratyayavatì kriyà/
pratyayà nàkriyàvantaḥ kriyàvantaś ca santy uta//

utpadyate pratìtyemàn itìme pratyayàḥ kila/
yàvan notpadyata ime tàvan nàpratyayàḥ katham//
naivàsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo'rthasya yujyate/
asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kim//
na san nàsan na sadasan dharmo nirvartate yadà/
kathaṃ nirvartako hetur evam sati hi yujyate//
anutpanneṣu dharmeṣu nirodho nopapadyate/
nànantaram ato yuktaṃ niruddhe pratyayaś ca kaḥ//
anàlambana evàyam saddharma upadiśyate/
athànàlambane dharme kuta àlambanam punaḥ//
bhàvànàṃ niḥsvabhàvànàm na sattà vidyate yataḥ/
satìdam asmin bhavatìty etan naivòpapadyate//
na ca vyastasamasteṣu pratyayeṣv asti tat phalam/
pratyayebhyaḥ katham tac ca bhaven na pratyayeṣu yat//
athàsad api tat tebhyaḥ pratyayebhyaḥ pravartate/
apratyayebhyo'pi kasmàn nàbhipravartate phalam//
phalam ca pratyayamayam pratyayàś càsvayammayàḥ/
phalam asvamayebhyo yat tat pratyayamayam phalam//
tasmàn na pratyayamayam nàpratyayamayam phalam/
samvidyate phalàbhàvàt pratyayàpratyayàh kutaḥ//.

See also Lê Mạnh Thát, Dựa vào việc nghiên cứu luận lý học trung quán của Nàgàrjuna, Tư Tưởng I (1967) 53-83. For a deeper analysis of Nàgàrjuna's philosophy as a whole, see Lê Mạnh Thát, Nghiên cứu triết học Long Thọ (to appear).

23. Nàgàrjuna, Madhyamakakàrikà I.9:

naivàsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo'rthasya yujyate/
asatah pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kim//

Cf. Madhyamakakàrikà IV.4:

rùpe saty eva rùpasya kàranam nopapadyate/
rùpe'saty eva rùpasya kàranam nopapadyate// etc....

Bhartrhari, Vàkyapadìya III.43:

àtmalàbhasya janmàkhyà sattà labhyam ca labhyate/
yadi saj jàyate kasmàd athàsaj jàyate katham//

àtmalàbho vastunaḥ svarùpapràptiḥ janma kathyate/ tatra ca tritayam anvayi labdhà kartà labhyam karma làbhaś ca kriyà/ etac ca tritayam sàdvisayam/ tathà ca janmavirodhaḥ sat àtmalàbhàyogàt/ labdhàtmà hi sann ucyate/ kàrane śaktir upatayàvasthàne'pi sarvathàsato janmàyogàd avaśyam apùrvasya kasya cid aṃśasya làbho'bhyupagantavya iti yena rùpena san na tena rùpena janma yena ca janma na tena sann iti jàyate'ṇkura iti prayogànupapattiḥ/ janmànurodhàdasattvàbhyupagame dhàtvarthe kartrtvànupapatteḥ pratyayàrthavirodhaḥ/ tad anurodhàt sattvàbhyupagame janmalakṣanadhàtvarthavirodha ity arthaḥ//.

24. Biardeau, Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique, La Haye: Mouton & Co, 1964; Nakamura, Vedanta tetsu gaku no hatten, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1957; Subramania Iyer, Bhartrhari: A study of the Vàkyapadìya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries, Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1969; Nakamura, Kotoba no keijijôgaku, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1957, pp 55-140. The last of these books, particularly those pages just given, should be read to see how superficially its author understands Bhartrhari, let alone the manifold doctrines and nuances of Buddhism. In fact, one cannot discount lightly I Tsing's report about his relation with the latter, despite the seemingly erroneous account of the latter's date of death. We said 'seemingly', because clerical and typographical errors should not be ruled out, of which there is no lack of evidence from Chinese sources, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Biardeau was able to recognize the close relationship betwen Vasubandhu and Bhartrhari in regards to particularly the role which the concept of vikalpa plays in their writings. But perhaps, due to the prevalent influence of phenomenological psychologism typified in France by such men as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre etc..., she failed to properly grasp its significance and thus failed to see its connection with the notion of upacàra, a notion which Bhartrhari devoted a considerable space in the third kanda of his Vàkyapadìya to discussing and which receives some rather passing remarks only from her work. Bhartṛhari's philosophy needs new investigations. For a presentation of its problematics, see Lê Manh Thát, Bhartrhari và cao đỉnh của triết học ngôn ngữ phật giáo, Typescript 1970, Sài gòn.

25. Abhidharmakośa IX p 476: àtmany asati kim arthaḥ karmàrambhaḥ/ aham sukho syàm aham duḥkho na syàm ity evam arthaḥ/ ko'sàv aham nàma yad viṣayo'yam ahaṃkàraḥ/ skandhaviṣayaḥ/ kathaṃ jñàyate/ teṣu snehàt/ gauràdibuddhibhiḥ sàmànàdhikaraṇyàt tu/ gauro'ham aham śyàmaḥ sthùlo'ham ahaṃ kṛśaḥ jìrno'ham ahaṃ yuveti gauràdibuddhibhiḥ samànàdhikaraṇo'yam ahamkàro dṛśyate/ na càtmana ete prakàrà dṛśyante/ tasmàd api skandheṣv ayam iti gamyate/ àtmana upakàrake'pi śarìra àtmopacàro yathà ya evàyam sa evàham sa evàyam me bhrtya iti bhavaty upakàrake'pi àtmopàcàro na tv ahaṃkàraḥ/ sati śarìràlambanatve paraśarìràlambano'pi kasmàn na bhavati/ asambandhàt/ yenaiva hi sahàsya sambandhah kàyena cittena và tatraivàyam ahaṃkàra utpadyate nànyatra/ anàdau samsàra evam abhyàsàt/ kaś ca sambandhaḥ/ kàryakàranabhàvaḥ/ yady àtmà nàsti kasyàyam ahamkàraḥ/ idam punas tad evàyàtaṃ kim arthaisà ṣaṣṭhìti/ yàvady evàsya hetus tasyaivàyam iti/ kaś cànyo hetuḥ/ pùrvàhaṃkàraparibhàvitam svasamtativiṣayaṃ sàvadyaṃ cittam/ asaty àtmani ka eṣa sukhito duḥkhito và/ yasminn àśraye sukham utpannaṃ duhkhaṃ và/ yathà puspito vrksah phalitam vanam iti//. Cf. Abhidharmakośa IX p 472-3: yadi tarhi sarvathàpi nàsty àtmà katham ksanikesu cittesu cirànubhùtasyàrthasya smaranam bhavati pratyabhijñànam và/ smrtivisayasamjñànvayàc cittaviśesàt/ kìdrśàc cittaviśesàt yato'nantaram smrtir bhavati/ tadàbhogadrśasambandhasamjñàdisamto'nupahata prabhàvàd àśrayaviśesaśokavyàksepàdibhih/ tadrśo'pi hy atadanvayaś cittaviśeso na samarthah tàm smrtim bhàvayitum tadanvayo'pi cànyàdrśo na samarthas tàm smrtim bhàvayitum/ abhayathà tu samartha ity evam smrtir bhavaty anyasyàm sàmarthyàdarśanàt/ katham idànìm anyena cetasà drstam anyat smarati/ evam hi devadattacetasà drstam yajñadattacetah smaret/ nàsambandhàt/ na hi tayoh sambandho'sti akàryakàranabhàvàd yathaikasamtànikàyoh/ na ca brùmo'nyena cetasà drstam anyat smaratìti/api tu darśanacittàt smrticittam anyad utpadyate/ samtatiparinatyà yathoktam iti ka evam sati dosah/ smaranàd eva ca pratyabhijñànam bhavati/ asaty àtmani ka eva smarati/ smaratìti ko'rthah/ smrtyà visayam grhnàti/ kim tadgrahanam anyat smaranàt/ smrtim tarhi kah karoti/ uktah sa yas tàm karoti smrtihetucittaviśesah/ yat tarhi caitrah smaratìty ucyate/ tato hi caitràkhyàt samtànàt tàm bhavantàm drstvocyate caitrah smaratìti/..

26. Trisvabhàvanirdeśa ad 5, ed. de La Vallée Poussin, MCB II (1932-1933) 147-161:

asatkalpo'tra kaś cittam yatas tat kalpyate yathà/
yathà ca kalpayaty artham tathàtyantam na vidyate//

And if there is any doubt as to what exactly that consciousness refers to, the four subsequent verses dispell it easily and completely: ad 6-9:

tad dhetuphalabhàvena cittaṃ dvividham iṣyate/
yad àlayàkhyavijñànaṃ pravṛttyàkhyam ca saptadhà//
saṃkleśavàsanàbìjaiś citatvàc cittam ucyate/
cittam àdyaṃ dvitìyaṃ tu citràkàrapravṛttitaḥ//
samàsato'bhùtakalpaḥ sa caiṣa trividho mataḥ/
vaipàkikas tathà naimittiko'nyaḥ pràtibhàsikaḥ//
prathamo mùlavijñànaṃ tad vipàkàtmakaṃ yataḥ/
anyaḥ pravṛttivijñànam dṛśyadṛgvittivṛttitaḥ//

With such an explicit statement as the above, it is difficult to see how and why numerous assertions of the type "for Vasubandhu consciousness is the sole reality" or "according to the Vijñànavàdins the vijñàna is the source (àlaya-vijñàna) of all, including the seven functional consciousness (pravrttivijñàna) outside of which nothing really exists" continue to appear and repeat almost ad nauseam, even twenty or thirty years after de La Vallée Poussin's edition of the Trisvabhàvanirdeśa. Even for those who vaguely feel that Vasubandhu might deny the existence of an entity called "consciousness", they still seem not to understand what that denial may means, leading them to assert even more ridiculous propositions and attribute them to Vasubandhu. Thus, Ueda Yoshifumi (Two main streams of thought in Yogàcàra philosophy, Philosophy East and West XVII (1967) 155-165) says: "When the mind sees the mountain as it really is, it does not see the mountain as its object, and accordingly, the object (the mountain) must become identified with the subject (the mind). In other words, the dichotomy betwen subject and object must be extinguished, for there is no object except the mind (the seer). And this self-identity of the seer with itself, by the extinction of the object, must at the same time be the self-identity of the seen, because a thing (the mountain) is seen by the mind as it really is. Here the mountain is seen from within, or by itself without the seer outside it. This negation of the seer which stands in opposition to the seen is called no-mind (acitta) in the 29th verse, and the negation of the

object (the seen) is called nothing-grasped (anupalambha)..... Thus, when the mind sees a thing as it really is, it is the mind seeing itself as it really is, and, at the same time, by losing itself in the mountain (no-mind), the mind sees the mountain from within, or, as it were, the mountain is seen by the mountain. There is no seer outside or except for the mountain". To so write is nothing more ridiculous. In effect, by so writing, authors such as Ueda and the like contribute not a little to the misunderstanding of, if not contempt for, Vasubandhu's philosophy, which in turn continues to perpetuate all sorts of wrong assertions of the above kind.

27. Trimśikà ad 20-25:

yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate/
parikalpita evàsau svabhàvo na sa vidyate//
paratantrasvabhàvas tu vikalpaḥ pratyayodbhavaḥ/
nispannas tasya pùrvena sadà rahitatà tu yà//
ata eva sa naivànyo nànanya paratantrataḥ/
anityatàdivad vàcyo nàdṛṣṭe'smin sa dṛśyate//
trividhasya svabhàvasya trividhàṃ niḥsvabhàvatàm/
saṃdhàya sarvadharmànàm deśità niḥsvabhàvatà//
prathamo laksanenaiva nihsvabhàvo'parah punah/
na svayambhàva etasyety aparà nihsvabhàvatà//
dharmànàm paramàrthaś ca sa yatas tathatàpi sah/
sarvakàlam tathàbhàvàt saiva vijñaptimàtratà//

In commenting upon ad 20, Sthiramati, Trimśikàvijñaptibhàsya p 50, observes: "àdhyàtmikabàhyavikalpyavastubhedena vikalpànàm ànantyam pradarśayann àha yena yena vikalpeneti/ yad yad vastu vikalpyate/ àdhyàtmikam bàhyam và antaśo yàvad buddhadharmà api/ parikalpita evàsau svabhàva ity atra kàranam àha na sa vidyata iti/ yad vastu vikalpavisayas tad yasmàt sattàbhàvàn na vidyate tasmàt tad vastu parikalpitasvabhàvam eva na hetupratyayapratipadyasvabhàva/ tathà hy ekasmin vastuni tadabhàve ca parasparavirudhànekavikalpapravrttir drstà/ na ca tad ekam vastu tadabhàvo và parasparavirudhànekasvabhàvo yujyate/ tasmàt sarvam idam vikalpamàtram eva tadarthasya parikalpitarùpatvàt/ uktam ca sùtre/ na khalu punah subhùte dharmàs tathà vidyante yathà bàlaprthagjanà abhinivistà iti//".

For Dharmapàla's view on the problem, see La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang, transl. de La Vallée Poussin, Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1929, vol. II, pp 514-561.

28. Trisvabhàvanirdeśa ad 18-30:

asaddvayasvabhàvatvàt tadabhàvasvabhàvataḥ/
svabhàvàt kalpitàj jñeyo niṣpanno'bhinnalaksanaḥ//
advayatvasvabhàvatvàd dvayàbhàvasvabhàvataḥ/
niṣpannàt kalpitaś caiva vijñeyo'bhinnalaksanaḥ//
yathàkhyànam asadbhàvàt tathàsattvasvabhàvataḥ/
svabhàvàt paratantràkhyàn niṣpanno'bhinnalaksanaḥ//
asaddvayasvabhàvatvàd yathàkhyànàsvabhàvataḥ/
niṣpannàt paratantro'pi vijñeyo'bhinnalaksanaḥ//
kramabhedah svabhàvànàm vyavahàràdhikàratah/
tatpraveśàdhikàràc ca vyutpattyartham vidhìyate//
kalpito vyavahàràtmà vyavahartràtmako'paraḥ/
vyavahàrasamucchedaḥ svabhàvaś cànya iṣyate//
dvayàbhàvàtmakah pùrvam paratantrah praviśyate/
tatah praviśyate tatra kalpamàtram asaddvayam//
tato dvayàbhàvabhàvo nispanno'tra praviśyate/
tathà hy asàv eva tadà asti nàstìti cocyate//
trayo'py ete svabhàvà hi advayàlabhyalaksanàh/
abhàvàd atathàbhàvàt tadabhàvasvabhàvatah//
màyàkṛtam mantravaśàt khyàti hastyàtmanà yathà/
àkàramàtram tatràsti hastì nàsti tu sarvathà//
svabhàvaḥ kalpito hastì paratantras tadàkṛtiḥ/
yas tatra hastyabhàvo'sau parinispanna iṣyate//
asatkalpas tathà khyàti mùlacittàd dvayàtmanà/
dvayam atyantato nàsti tatràsty àkṛtimàtrakam//
mantravan mùlavijñànam kàṣṭhavat tathatà matà/
hastyàkàravad eṣṭavyo vikalpo hastivad dvayam//

CHAPTER EIGHT

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

From what has been said, we are now in the position to form some concluding observations as to what Vasubandhu's philosophy is and what implications it has for us today. In Chapter One we have pointed out that it is possible to apply a genetic approach to the study of that philosophy, which views it as a development out of an initial philosophical concern. This initial concern centers around the question of just what exactly the object of a consciousness is. We have seen how Vasubandhu attempted to respond to that concern by developing a logical device which we nowadays know as description. From this device new concepts were derived, which served not only to strengthen his solution, but further to help him finding out a satisfactory answer to that concern. The said answer predicates itself upon the notion that every activity of a consciousness is totally conditioned by and entirely dependent upon language. Thus, the consciousness is considered to be non-existing in so far as it is defined as a consciousness as such. There is no such thing as pure consciousness. Consciousness is always consciousness of something. It implies in itself, hence, something other than itself, which gives it the status of a consciousness in the first place, and which constitutes its raison d'être. And this something other than itself is none other than the language itself. It is the language which gives the consciousness the opportunity to build up itself. It is also the language which it must embody to manifest its activities. And finally, it is the language which makes it what it is, a consciousness. In effect, as Vasubandhu said, the working of a consciousness is nothing but a verbal construction. And it is

very difficult indeed to conceive a conscious act without accompanying language, either spoken or otherwise.

The all-important role played by language in such acts is now generally acknowledged not only owing to the advances made in the fields of psycholinguistics and brain researches, but also to the real possibility that artificial intelligence might be created.[1] However, the implications it has are often ignored, particularly and rather curiously within some dominant philosophical circles. So, ever since Husserl made the famous statement that "consciousness is always consciousness of something",[2] the problem of consciousness continued to be discussed as if there is a consciousness as such. Even Sartre with his enlightened theory of consciousness which indicates a decided improvement over that of Husserl and which comes closest to that of Vasubandhu in that it denies the postulate of the existence of a transcendental Ego, still fails to properly take into account that all-important role. Although together with Heidegger, he recognizes that "I am what I say" and that "I am language", he is merely content to say: "Language is not a phenonmenon added on to being-for-others. It is originally being-for-others; that is, it is the fact that a subjectivity experiences itself as an object for the Other.(...) Language is not an instinct of the constituted human creature, nor is it an invention of our subjectivity. But neither does it need to be referred to the pure "being-outside-of-self" of the Dasein. It forms part of the human condition; it is originally the proof which a for-itself can make of its being-for-others, and finally it is the surpassing of this proof and the utilization of it toward possibilities which are my possibilities; that is, toward my possibilities of being this or that for the Other".[3] Thus, "by the sole fact that

whatever I may do, my acts freely conceived and executed, my projects launched toward my possibilities have outside of them a meaning which escapes me and which I experience. It is in this sense --- and in this sense only--- that Heidegger is right in declaring that I am what I say". In other words, the role of language is viewed purely in terms of means of communication and hence is totally determined by its being-for-others in the sense that "it presupposes an original relation to another subject".

However, in so describing the role and, in a sense, the nature of language, Sartre misses a very important point, leading finally to his new dualism, which posits the existence on the one hand of what is called "being-in-itself" and on the other of the being-for-itself. This point is that not only is language the essence of the being-for-others, but further it is also the essence of the being-for-itself as well as of the being-in-itself. The language is the essence of, or better, is the being-for-itself, because it is it which makes it possible for the consciousness to be what it is not and not to be what it is, as has been seen. It is due to the description of self and things that the consciousness transforms itself, and this transformation is possible on account of the fact that it is a verbal construction, as Vasubandhu has said. In short, in spite of the case that language originally presupposes an original relation to another subject, it remains that that relation is possible only because of there being some consciousnesses to begin with. Otherwise, what relation is there to another subject, after all? So, if language were to presuppose an "original relation to another subject", as Sartre maintains, it must at the same time be the consciousness of the subject which has the original relation to the other subject. But the consciousness of a subject can

be a language only in so far as it is a verbal construction, a construction which allows it to express itself variously and frequently as its life-situation requires. We need not engage here into the discussion of whether language is the primary factor which initiates the complex development of central nervous system in the human being.[4] Nevertheless, if it is so, as has been supposed, the transforming process of a consciousness is thus but a verbal construction. As a result, the statement that "I am what I say" should be interpreted not only as "a proof which a for-itself can make of its being-for-others", but also as a proof of its very being. The failure to recognize that point leads Sartre eventually to his new pseudo-dualism, the For-itself and the In-itself, which demands "a synthetic connection" to be resolved and reunited in that "the For-itself, in fact, is nothing but the pure nihilation of the In-itself: it is like a hole of being at the heart of Being".

That the For-itself and the In-itself constitute a pseudo-dualism and the "synthetic connection" a make-believe solution can be easily shown by pointing out that all of them are dependent upon language to be of any part in the thinking process in the first place. We have described previously how the "for-itself", that is, the consciousness is a verbal construction. Now, to the extent that the in-itself is defined in accordance with Sartre's definition, it can be similarly proved to be but a product of that process of verbal construction, which is the consciousness. Sartre says, for example, that "being is isolated in its being and that it does not enter into any connection with what is not itself. Transition, becoming, anything which permits us to say that being is not yet what it will be and that it is already what it is not — all that is forbidden on principle. For being is the being of becoming and due to this

fact it is beyond becoming".[5] We choose this rather particular statement of Sartre's to illustrate how the "in-itself" is conceived and described. In reading it, one is struck immediately by its rather sophistic character in its affirmation that "being is the being of becoming and due to this fact it is beyond becoming". Besides, it tends to assert what Sartre himself denies, which is that "Being-in-itself has no within which is opposed to a without and which is analogous to a judgment, a law, a consciousness of itself. The in-itself has nothing secret; it is solid". For in saying that beyond becoming there is a being which "is the being of becoming", he obviously must assume that being-in-itself does have a within which is opposed to a without and does have something secret. Otherwise, if being is the being of becoming and the being of becoming is the becoming itself, then how can being be beyond becoming? And here we see how Sartre eludes by sophistry the aged-old and crucial problem of Western philosophy, i.e. being versus becoming. This problem has been well formulated by Socrates in his dialogue with Cratylus as follows according to Plato:

> "Socrates: How realities are to be learned or discovered is perhaps too great a question for you or me to determine; but it is worth while to have reached even this conclusion, that they are to be learned and sought for, not from names but much better through themselves than through names.
>
> "Cratylus: That is clear, Socrates.
>
> "Soc.: Then let us examine one further point to avoid being deceived by the fact that most of these names tend in the same direction. Suppose it should prove that although those who gave the names gave them in the belief that all things are in motion and flux -- I myself think they did have that belief-- still in reality that is not the case, and the

name-givers themselves, having fallen into a kind of vortex, are whirled about, dragging us along with them. Consider, my worthy Cratylus, a question about which I often dream. Shall we assert that there is any absolute beauty, or good, or any other absolute existence, or not?

"Cra.: I think there is, Socrates.

"Soc.: Then let us consider the absolute, not whether a particular face, or something of that sort, is beautiful, or whether all these things are in flux. Is not, in our opinion, absolute beauty always such as it is?

"Cra.: That is inevitable.

"Soc.: Can we, then, if it is always passing away, correctly say that it is this, then that it is that, or must it inevitably, in the very instant while we are speaking, become something else and pass away and no longer be what it is?

"Cra.: That is inevitable.

"Soc.: How, then, can that which is never in the same state be anything? For if it is ever in the same state, then obviously at that time it is not changing; and if it is always in the same state and is always the same, how can it ever change or move without relinquishing its own form?

"Cra.: It cannot do so at all?

"Soc.: No, nor can it be known by anyone. For at the moment when he who seeks to know it approaches, it becomes something else and different, so that its nature and state can no longer be known; and surely there is no knowledge which knows that which is in no state.

"Cra.: It is as you say.

"Soc.: But we cannot even say that there is any knowledge, if all things are changing and nothing remains fixed; for if knowledge itself does not change and cease to be knowledge, then knowledge would remain, and there would be knowledge; but if the very essence of knowledge changes, at the moment of the change to another essence of knowledge there would be no knowledge, and if it is always

> changing, there will always be no knowledge, and by this reasoning there will be neither anything to be known nor anyone to know. But if there is always that which knows and that which is known -- if the beautiful, the good, and all the other verities exist-- I do not see how there is any likeness betwen these conditions of which I am now speaking and flux or motion. Now whether this is the nature of things, or the doctrine of Heracleitus and many others is true, is another question; but surely no man of sense can put himself and his soul under the control of names, and trust in names and their makers to the point of affirming that he knows anything; nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots, or believe that all things are like people afflicted with catarrh, flowing and running all the time. Perhaps, Cratylus, this theory is true, but perhaps it is not. Therefore you must consider courageously and thoroughly and not accept anything carelessly --- for you are still young and in your prime; then, if after investigation you find the truth, impart it to me."[6]

Thus, Socrates gives us a rather strong reason why there must exist something beyond what is changing and becoming so that even the latter itself can be known. In other words, there must exist a being which is the being of becoming and is beyond becoming. To that extent, Sartre's description of his notion of being-in-itself agrees quite well with Socrates' idea of absolute. Beyond that, however, what makes the former a sophistry is the claim that "being-in-itself has no within which is opposed to a without.... [and] has nothing secret", a claim which is lacking in the latter. At least, Socrates tells us why there must exist such absolutes as beauty or good by pointing out if all things are changing and nothing remains fixed, there will always be no knowledge, nor anyone to know nor anything to be known. Even this Satre seeks the ways to avoid facing, which is done

by means of a prevarication, as has been seen. But what is perhaps the most remarkable feature of the above dialogue betwen Socrates and Cratylus is the fact that Socrates discusses the problem of what we can know if everything is changing within the context of his exposition of ideas on the question of names. And here he may give us a clue as to why the being-in-itself is but a verbal construct.

We have seen that Socrates and Cratylus agree that "how realities are to be learned or discovered is perhaps too great a question for you or me to determine; but it is worth while to have reached even this conclusion, that they are to be learned and sought for, not from names but much better through themselves than through names". We nowadays know much better that although realities "are to be learned and sought for, not from names but much better through themselves than through names", it is still through names that any reality can be known at all. For instance, I now inspect the blue book on my desk. The book is there. If I were to know anything from my inspecting of it, it is not that physical book there which moves in into my knowledge and fills in some hole there in. Rather it is its information which is transmitted by various physical channels and numerous chemical processes to my brain and which is to be processed there finally so as any awareness of mine of the book and any knowledge of mine thereof are possible. Clearly then, if there is a reality, that reality is known only in so far as its information is offered to us. And once it is so, it follows that if any thing were to be known, it must be through its name, taken in the broadest sense, that it can be known. In fact, as has been said, it is hardly conceivable that any conscious act, any knowledge is without language.

When the role of language is so conceived in the process of knowing, it is evidently clear that the dilemma posed by Socrates can be easily avoided. Socrates claimed that if "all things are changing and nothing remains fixed", then "there will always be no knowledge..., nor anyone to know nor anything to be known". The reason for proposing that claim lies in the perception that if all things are changing and nothing remains fixed, then "at the moment when he who seeks to know it approaches, it becomes something else and different, so that its nature and state can no longer be known; and surely there is no knowledge which knows that which is in no state". Now, if "the transformation of consciousness is a verbal construction", then knowledge is still possible even if and despite that "all things are changing and nothing remains fixed". For it is not the things themselves which constitute the knowledge, rather it is the information which they offer and which is subject to processing in the human brain, which gives rise to it. Thus, even if "all things are changing and nothing remains fixed", it does not matter much. In fact, to the extent that changing things as well as changing knowledge can be known at all, it surely does not come from the things themselves nor the knowledge. For if it is otherwise, they must exist in two distinct moments at the same time so as to be able to show that there is some difference in those two moments which indicates the presence of a change in themselves. And this they obviously cannot do, since one thing cannot exist in two distinct moments at the same time. So, in order for the perception of change to be possible, it requires something more than the changing things themselves. What this something is, is neither Socrates' absolutes nor Sartre's being-in-itself, because the latter are but

postulated upon the informations which the things themselves present. In short, that something is none other than language itself. Sartre's pseudo-dualism of being-in-itself and being-for-itself is thus exactly what it is, a pseudo-dualism. And the being-in-itself is nothing but a verbal construction, just as the being-for-itself is only with an obvious difference which is that while the latter is a process, the verbal construction of the former kind is a product.

At this point one may wonder why we dwell so long in this discussion of Sartre's pseudo-dualism of being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Evidently, neither Sartre himself nor his philosophy have anything to do with Vasubandhu in so far as the establishment of an explicit historical relationship is concerned. However, they can serve as a model for us to see how many pseudo-problems in philosophy have perpetuated themselves, from which to appreciate more of Vasubandhu's own contributions to their removal. We have seen that in front of a rapidly changing world Socrates claims that there must exist something unchanged so that what is changing can be known, and he calls it the absolute existence. Sartre similarly argues, though with slightly different reasons, that "being is beyond becoming". But while Socrates shows at least his acute awareness of the intricacy of the problem and its relationship with the role of language by framing his whole claim within the confines of a discourse on language, Sartre completely fails to so recognize. And that is what makes his argument further inferior to Socrates and thus almost bordering on sophistry, as has been said. Still, despite its interesting character Socrates' claim needs not be honored today, as we now know that

it is not the absolute existence which allows us to know the changing things, as that claim supposed; rather, it is the language itself of a given person which carries out that task. And here lies the essence of Vasubandhu's philosophy.

Vasubandhu grew up in a philosophical tradition which explicitly asserts that "there is neither the doer, the doing nor the done", which can be paraphrased in Socrates' terms to become "there is neither knowledge, nor anyone to know nor anything to be known".[7] For it conceives everything to be bound in the law of dependent co-arising, which says that "when this is, that arises". So, when an utterance of the type "I see a tree" is made, it understands it to mean nothing more than a description of a state of affair where conditions of some various sorts act and react to each other, which produce in this case an event called "I see a tree", and in which neither the seer nor the seen nor the seeing is postulated as being of some existence or entities. Thus, true to its doctrine of no-self, it views all events and everything else merely as some kinds of chemical reaction and the products thereof.

Given that philosophical tradition it is no wonder that when facing with the challenge posed by the Vaibhāsika theory of object of consciousness, Vasubandhu proposes his own solution in a characteristic way. First, he asks himself whether a name can be an object of a consciousness. Secondly, if it is, what would follow? Lastly, what implication such a theory would have in human conduct? From what has been said, we have seen that in order to answer the first question, Vasubandhu advances his theory of descriptions, which shows beyond any doubt that a name can indeed be the object of a consciousness, because regardless of whether one says "There is the birth of a child" or "A child is being born" or "Something

is born which is a child" etc..., all of them amounts to mean the same thing, which is the announcement of the birth of a child. In other words, if more than a statement can be understood to mean the same thing, then there is no need to postulate the existence of something behind every statement. Once no such need exists, it follows that every statement, every name, in itself can be the object of a consciousness. This initial realization by Vasubandhu leads him to numerous far-reaching consequences a number of which have been discussed in detail in the preceeding chapters. So, we will not repeat them here. Suffice it to say that if every name is an object of consciousness, then it would follow that every perception must be similarly defined, that is, that it must be defined in terms of the name of the object from which it originates exclusively, which naturally leads to the conclusion that every transformation of consciousness is but a verbal construction. What will concern us now is to make an inquiry into the question of why given the above philosophical tradition Vasubandhu chooses to resolve the afore-mentioned problem with his theory of descriptions.

We have said that in front of an ever changing world both Socrates and Sartre suppose the existence of something which is unchanged or is beyond becoming, so that a knowledge of that world is to be possible We have also shown that such a supposition may reveal itself to be unnecessary, if not untrue and superfluous, in so far as the condition for that knowledge to be possible is concerned. And the said condition according to Vasubandhu is none other than language itself. Language allows us to grasp what is changing and even what is not existing at all. The recognition by Vasubandhu of the role of language in that process of knowing has been said by us to have come mostly from the conditioning factors of his

philosophical tradition. This tradition, as has been described above, clearly excludes any possibility of assuming the existence of any entity at all beside that which is come about owing to "chance (pratītya) and necessity (hetu)". For if a thing were thought to be nothing but that which comes about due to chance and necessity, then what is there beside it to assume? In fact, it does otherwise, it would contradict itself. So ever since the days of Gautama Śākyamuni, it struggles to show itself that it can respond such problems as that which leads Socrates and Sartre to their own solutions without much success. The difficulties which it encounters on the way can be seen in numerous documents of which we have pointed out the two most prominent, i.e. those of Nagasena and Nāgārjuna. Recall how Nagasena struggles to show to Milinda that the word 'chariot' does not stand for a thing called 'chariot' because chariot is neither the pole, nor the axle, nor the wheels, nor the yoke etc..., nor is it apart from them, and how Nāgārjuna laboriously tries to prove that if there is something existing beside that which comes about owing to chance and necessity and being capable of being designated by words, then language is impossible, logically because if it were so, when a name is uttered, an existence is already called into reality and nothing can be further added. The effort of these men, though heroic, shows itself to be short-run, for it fails to sustain its logic to the extent that the listener or reader is convinced completely of its correctness. Yet, despite that failure, it must be admitted that both Nagasena and Nāgārjuna have opened a new vista which unequivocally points to one sole possible exit available for those who accept the world-view of the above tradition, i.e., if things are just those which come

about due to the congruence by chance of necessary conditions, then barring from assuming the existence of something behind or beyond them on account of the fact that there is nothing behind or beyond them to assume, there is no need to assume the existence of any thing at all. What one knows of them is coming from the informations which they furnish and which by and large are coded in a given language to be processed by the brain. That is the conclusion which has been largely reached by both Nagasena and Nàgàrjuna. It fails, however, to sustain itself owing to its lacking of proof, a defect which Vasubandhu characteristically recognizes and duly corrects. The remedy which he contributes to its correction is obviously his theory of descriptions. This theory, as has been said, points out that an object can be variously described by more than one name or statement without being misunderstood, which leads in turn to the realization that it is not that object itself which one knows, because if it is so, then how can one thing be expressed in more than one name or statement?, Rather, it is the informations which it presents through various means, which allow one to know it and to describe it in more than one way. And here we can see why given his philosophical tradition, Vasubandhu advances his theory of descriptions when challenged by the Vaibhàsika doctrine of the object of consciousness, and why with that theory he proceeds to revolutionize not only the whole foundation of Indian logic, but also of the entire notion of consciousness. Consciousness is nothing but a transforming process which is defined as a verbal construction.

At this point it may be well to ask ourselves whether the notion of consciousness as a verbal construction is correct or not. For it would be useless to labor on something which is already known to be outright false or wrong.

The question just raised seems at first sight to be quite easy to answer. But after some reflection it becomes impressively plain that that question is actually fraught with all sorts of obstacles which are not readily solvable as would be expected. For instance, what would be our criteria for judging whether Vasubandhu's notion of consciousness is correct or not? We have seen that that notion is arrived at as a logical consequence of his thinking process, that is, that it imposes itself upon him under the force of his deduction. So, if we are to accept his initial theory of descriptions, the same conclusion would similarly follow, and Vasubandhu's notion of consciousness is perfectly valid in so far as a logical consequence is concerned. However, such an approach to the problem is evidently not very satisfactory, since it fails to judge the above notion upon its own merits, and further since it bars us from making any judgment at all due to the fact that once his initial theory is accepted, that notion would logically follow, regardless of what we might think, as one sole possible conclusion. On the other hand, if we are to judge it from the criteria of what we know today, not only are we perhaps unfair to him, but also we might incur the risk of being wrong ourselves, particularly in relation to such vague and ambiguous a notion as consciousness. Thus, difficulty is not lacking in the type of question just raised above. Nevertheless, since it is already touched upon, we think that somehow it must be answered; and we here accept the latter approach, looking Vasubandhu's notion of consciousness from the standpoint of what we know of it today.

We have pointed out earlier that from what is known in the field of brain and artificial intelligence researches nowadays the brain and its accessories

are considered to be a sort of computer with the highest degree of complexity and capability, which carries out every function normally attributed to a consciousness.[8] Consciousness can therefore be defined as a processing process of informations with every conceivable necessary attending accessory thereof, including every conceivable operation which it is capable of carrying out.[9] Once it is so defined, one can easily see that more or less it is but a verbal constructing process, as Vasubandhu has claimed. Of course, it might be questioned as to whether the processing process of informations is purely a verbal process. For example, the process called simulation has been said to be not purely verbal, if not totally non-verbal, when it occurs in man or animal,[10] despite that in present-day computers it entirely depends upon language in one form or another to be realized. It is noted that when a dog sees its master preparing for a walk, it shows its joy by wagging its tail etc... "evidently [because it] imagines, that is, simulates by anticipation," all the pleasures it is going to have. So, in so far as the dog is concerned, the simulation is but an "imaginary experience", which is quite correct, because no one has claimed that the dog has a language of its own, so far anyway. And on this point some have testified themselves to its correctness by indicating that they sometimes identified themselves with the things they meditated upon. However, the imaginary experience of the dog aside, they further added that "it is not at that moment that the significance of the simulated experience appears, but only after it is explicated symbolically". Consequently, in the current usage "the process of simulation is entirely masked by language which follows it almost immediately and seems to be confused with thought itself".

The proof for the latter statement is drawn mainly from studies made upon various types of aphasia, particularly those of the subjects who underwent the so-called split-brain operation,[11] where due to some disease it is required that the two cerebral hemispheres must be surgically split at the corpus callosum. In these patients, after their recovery from the surgery it is found that some form of aphasia has occurred, in which the subject can not name the object which is seen only by the left eye or touched by the left hand, although he can recognize it. But to take these cases as proof for the assertion that in man cognitive functions, even the complex among them, are not immediately related to language or any other means of symbolic expression is evidently misleading, if not outright false. For in so far as aphasia is concerned, it is defined as language dysfunction, which is to mean to that language is not necessarily unrelated to the dysfunction itself not only in the sense that it is it which gives rise to that specific dysfunction in the first place, but further that when the dysfunction occurs, it does not automatically follow that language is completely excluded from the cognitive functions of an aphasic person. In fact, if one accepts the innate hypothesis of language, which leads to the realization that "articulated language since its appearance in the human lineage not only has allowed the evolution of culture, but also has contributed decisively to the <u>physical</u> evolution of man", and that "the linguistic ability which reveals itself in the course of epigenetic development of the brain is today a part of the "human nature" which itself is defined at the heart of the genome in a language radically different from the genetic code",[12] it is difficult to see how he could at

the same time advance the notion that "cognitive functions in man, even most complex among them, are not immediately related to language or any other means of symbolic expression". And this is not to mention the highly controversial hypothesis which is also accepted by the same one just referred to above, according to which the emergence of the human brain from its rudimentary antecedent is a consequence of the human adoption of language as the most primitive means of symbolic communication. It is due to this adoption that a new selection occurs, which "must have favored the development of the linguistic performance itself and therefore that of the organ which serves it, the brain". So, it is language, according to this view, which initiates the emergence of the human brain to begin with. Consequently, if it is agreed that the brain with its accessories carries out every function which is normally attributed to a so-called consciousness, and that it does this due to the pressure of its own evolutionary process, then how can one assert that "cognitive functions in man, even the complex among them, are not immediately related to language or any other means of symbolic expression"? In effect, in so asserting, he runs the risk of contradicting himself.

Thus, up to this point at least evidence not only does not gainsay Vasubandhu's notion of consciousness, but further tends to corroborate its accuracy. Of course, we are not out to look for modern evidence to defend his philosophy or ideology. For we have said that his notion of consciousness has a firm logical basis upon which to establish itself without any need for further confirmation: it is either accepted or rejected altogether with its premises and consequences. What we have done above is to show that to the extent that our present-day knowledge concerning

the human biological condition allows, we can see for ourselves how much we have come closer to Vasubandhu's way of thinking and his thought. It is here that the implications, if any, of his philosophy for us today must be found. And it is precisely because of this that we raised and discussed the above question of whether the notion of consciousness as a verbal construction is correct or not. Now we have resolved it to our satisfaction in the present state of our knowledge wh[illegible] indicates that there are reasons for such a notion to be true. It is with this evaluation in mind that we presently proceed to consider what those implications may be.

Today it becomes increasingly and impressively clear that "man finally knows that he is alone in the indifferent immensity of the Universe in which he has emerged by chance" and that all the systems of value "belong to him alone" beyond which no duty, no destiny is inscribed anywhere. So, it is up to him "to choose betwen the Kingdom and the Darkness". Yet, despite its increasing clarity no impressive foundation can be found in sight for such a view of man. Worse still, is the fact that if it is universally accepted, there is not the least reason for it to be postulated in the first place. For who cares to have such a view at all when he "knows that he is alone in the indifferent immensity of the Universe in which he happened to emerge by chance" and that beyond him "no duty, no destiny is inscribed anywhere"? In fact, if it is accepted, "there is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide", as Camus has put it.[12] In this connection, it is interesting to note that Monod who opens with a quotation from the same Camus his book devoted to the discussion of that view which he himself accepts, fails rather curiously to arrive at

the same position as that of Camus which is expressed in the statement we just cited. Perhaps he is already satisfied with Camus' assertion that "even if one does not believe in God, suicide is not legitimate", so willing to leave aside the "judging whether life is or is not worth living [which] amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy" to others and return to "all the rest...[which] comes afterwards" like finding out whether there is a truly scientific socialist humanism,[13] which is probably more fruitful and exciting a subject than is the morose and sterile question of suicide. In any case, if the above view is accepted, the human condition does not differ much from that of Sisyphus who is still on the go, "convinced of the wholly human origin of all that is human, a blind man eager to see and knowing at the same time that the night has no end".

Such a dismal consequence needs not, of course, result from the acceptance of the view previously described. A man can be aware that "he is alone in the indifferent immensity of the Universe in which he happened to emerge by chance", that all systems of value belong to him alone beyond which no duty or destiny is inscribed anywhere" and that it is up to him "to choose betwen Kingdom and Darkness", without necessarily running the risk of facing "but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide". And this is done by recognizing at the same time that even the consciousness which allows one to be aware of such a view is still merely a verbal constructing process. For in so recognizing, he knows that that view is but one among many other possible views which the said process is capable of constructing. It is there that lies the origin of human freedom. This freedom does not lie in "the ethical choice

of a primitive value which founds the knowledge", as Monod has argued after his rather successful assault upon various ethical theories of the old "animist alliances". For whenever "a primitive value" is chosen, what follows is but a necessary manifestation of that value. Thus, freedom then becomes a sort of necessity, which is naturally not a freedom at all. And this is not to mention the no less threatening danger that such an ethical choice might be carried out by a party in power which is then quite capable of imposing it upon others, thus realizing the most characteristic aspect of the "ethics of knowledge", which is that it is man who will impose the ethics upon themselves while axiomatically creating the condition for authenticating every discourse or action. In fact, freedom exists only in each individual who is to realize it to the fullest extent which his conditions allow. So, even a prisoner in jail still possesses his freedom in that sense, because by the mere fact of his being in jail, he manifests his own freedom, perhaps negatively, in opposition to that of those who try to curtail his by their jailing of him. When freedom is so defined, we then can understand why a collective may lose its freedom as a whole while its individuals may very well preserve theirs intact, which usually serve in some future time as the mainstay of force for recuperating the freedom of their collective.

But if freedom were to be so conceived, and given the above description of the modern view of human evolution, then there is but one acceptable conception of the human condition which both frees us from the dismal consequences of Camus' analysis and at the same time strenghthens the validity of the just-mentioned view. And this one acceptable conception of the human condition is none other

than the notion that the transformation of consciousness is but a verbal construction. It is this one special function of the human consciousness which distinctly differentiates it from every other kind of functions which may be found in the animal world. And it is probably it which favors the development of the linguistic capability of the human brain, as has been said. To these extents the function of a consciousness is indeed for carrying out any verbal construction as it is needed. Thanks to this ability, which seems to be inexhaustive, of effectuating any conceivable and necessary verbal construction, the freedom of an individual is thus guaranteed and asserted. Whether this freedom is inherent in and inherited from the molecules which make up an individual and which, in turn, possess it perhaps as a remainder of their origination due to chance in some distant past, or merely a built-in mechanism under the pressure of selective process of evolution so as to insure the survival of at least some lucky bearer of a species, is not very susceptible, of course, to resolution. What we know for certain is the fact that in so far as the verbal construction of each human individual is concerned, he is absolutely free to construct his own expressions and statements as he sees fit,[14] ever since his physiological condition allows him to so do, which begins towards to the age of 18 months.

Given that freedom, it is very difficult to imagine how man at this stage of his evolution can give it up in exchange for any restrictive ethics at all, including the so-called ethics of knowledge. In fact, even with the evident and ever-present fragility of his biological existence he still attempts to

ignore, if not to deny and negate, that self-evident and ever-present truth by having recourse to all sorts of myths, religions and philosophies. This recourse to these sorts does not necessarily and solely mean that he is in search of a means to suppress his own anxiety, as some have argued recently; for it can be maintained to the contrary at the same time that such a recourse merely and characteristically indicates the freedom that he possesses, a freedom based chiefly upon the free working of his consciousness, that is, of his power of verbal construction and processing. So, the invading power of an idea does not necessarily and solely consist of its capacity to resolve negatively the human anxiety by its explication of the condition of man in assigning to him a definite place "in an immanent destiny"; rather it may lie in its ability to repsond to the demands of the human freedom, which, as has been said, even wishes to deny and negate the fragility of its biological existence, a freedom which wishes to be absolute. Similarly, it has been proposed that "the invention of myths and religions, the construction of vast philosophical systems are the price which man must have paid to survive as social animal without being converted into a mere automate". However, it can again be argued to the contrary that if the invention and the construction just said are possible, that is not beacuse they are the price man has paid for his survival as a free social animal, but rather that is because he possesses a freedom which needs to be realized even to the point of disregarding the biological basis of his existence. Consequently, if the freedom hypothesis is accepted, one is not forced into having resort to more than one basic element to explain such widespread phenomena as myths, religions, philosophies etc...

We have said that we are not sure as to whether the human freedom is an

inherent and inherited biological property of the human constitution or a built-in mechanism which the selective process of evolution confers upon it as a result. We are sure, nevertheless, of its exclusive manifestation in the human condition under the form of a verbal processing-construction which is usually called consciousness. It is this verbal processing-construction that must be taken into account if the human existence is properly dealt with. For it represents the highest achievement so far that the process ordained by chance and necessity has ever attained. We therefore hold that regardless of whether human freedom is an inherited biological property or a built-in mechanism, if we define the transformation of consciousness as a verbal construction, as Vasubandhu does, then that verbal construction is the exclusive and concrete manifestation of that said human freedom. And it is here that lies the most pronounced implication of Vasubandhu's philosophy for our present pressing need for a rational attitude in our life when we "finally know that man is alone in the indifferent immensity of the Universe in which he happened to emerge by chance and that his destiny, his duty is not inscribed anywhere: it is up to him to choose betwen the Kingdom and the Darkness".

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ΣΩ. Ὄντινα μὲν τοίνυν τρόπον δεῖ μανθάνειν ἢ εὑρίσκειν τὰ ὄντα, μεῖζον ἴσως ἐστὶν ἐγνωκέναι ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ σέ· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογήσασθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν καὶ μαθητέον καὶ ζητητέον ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων.

ΚΡΑ. Φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν τόδε σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ ἡμᾶς τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ὀνόματα ἐς ταὐτὸν τείνοντα ἐξαπατᾷ, εἰ τῷ ὄντι μὲν οἱ θέμενοι αὐτὰ διανοηθέντες γε ἔθεντο ὡς ὄντων ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων — φαίνονται γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι —, τὸ δ', εἰ ἔτυχεν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὗτοι αὐτοί τε ὥσπερ εἴς τινα δίνην ἐμπεσόντες κυκῶνται καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐφελκόμενοι προσεμβάλλουσιν. σκέψαι γάρ, ὦ θαυμάσιε Κρατύλε, ὃ ἔγωγε πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω. πότερον φῶμέν τι εἶναι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων οὕτω, ἢ μή;

ΚΡΑ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο σκεψώμεθα, μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν τί ἐστιν καλὸν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα ῥεῖν· ἀλλ' αὐτό, φῶμεν, τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιοῦτον ἀεὶ ἐστιν οἷόν ἐστιν;

ΚΡΑ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οἷόν τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν;

ΚΡΑ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη τι ἐκεῖνο ὃ μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει; εἰ γάρ ποτε ὡσαύτως ἔσχει, ἐν γ' ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβαίνει· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, πῶς ἂν τοῦτό γε μεταβάλοι ἢ κινοῖτο, μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας;

ΚΡΑ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν γνωσθείη γε ὑπ' οὐδενός. ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἐπιόντος τοῦ γνώσομένου ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλοιον γίγνοιτο, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γνωσθεὶν ἔτι ὁποῖόν γέ τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον· γνῶσις δέ ἔμοιγε οὐδεμία γίγνοιτο ὃ γιγνώσκει μηδαμῶς ἔχον.

ΚΡΑ. Ἔστιν ὡς λέγεις

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γνῶσιν εἶναι φάναι εἰκός, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἡ γνῶσις, τοῦ γνῶσις εἶναι μὴ μεταπίπτει, μένοι τε ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ γνῶσις καὶ εἴη γνῶσις· εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος μεταπίπτει τῆς γνώσεως καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ μεταπίπτει, ἀεὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον ἂν εἴη· εἰ δὲ ἔστι μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνῶσκον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἕν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οὐ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἃ νῦν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ἐοῦ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ φορᾷ. ταῦτ' οὖν πότερόν ποτε οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἐκείνως ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε λέγουσι καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί μὴ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἢ ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πάνυ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτά, διισχυρίζεσθαι ὥς τι εἰδότα, καὶ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγιγνώσκειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ῥεῖ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ καταρρῳνοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως οἴεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι, ὑπὸ ῥεύματός τε καὶ καταῤῥου πάντα τὰ χρήματα ἔχεσθαι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν δή, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ οὔ. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ εὖ, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποδέχεσθαι — ἔτι γὰρ νέος εἶ καὶ ἡλικίαν ἔχεις —, σκεψάμενον δέ, ἐὰν εὕρῃς, μεταδιδόναι καὶ ἐμοί. The English version is Fowler's.

7. Vimśatikà ad 8: nàstìha sattva àtmà và dharmàs tv ete sahetukàh iti vacanàt/. Cf. Abhidharmakośa IX p 475; Vimalàkìrtinirdeśasùtra Taishô 475 p 537c16 & Taishô 476 p 558c4:

8. Pratìtyasamutpàdavyàkhyà TT 5496. Cf. Tucci, A fragment from the Pratìtyasamutpàda of Vasubandhu, JRAS (1930) 611-623. Our use of the terms "chance" and "necessity" for translating hetu and pratìtya, respectively, might appear to some to smack of some modern flair, particularly that of the Monodian type. It reminds one of Monod's Le Hasard et la Nécessité (Paris, 1970). But we think that those two terms are perhaps the best for conveying precisely what the notions of hetu and pratìtya actually mean.

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13. Monod, Op. cit., p 194

14. Lenneberg, Biological Foundations of language, New York: John Wiley & Son, 1967; Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966; Fǿrdor and Katz, The Structure of Language: Reading in the Philosophy of Language, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall , 1964.

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Abbreviations:

BEFEO	Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient
BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
IA	Indian Antiquary
IBK	Indogaku Bukkyôgaku Kenkyû
IHQ	Indian Historical Quarterly
JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
MCB	Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques
WZKM	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde der Morgenlandes
WZKSOA	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens
Taishô	Taishô shinshû Daizôkyô, ed. Takakusu & Watanabe, Tokyo, 1924
TT	The Tibetan Tripitaka, ed. The Tibetan Tripitaka Research Society, Tokyo: Suzuki Gakuju saipan, 1958

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